Introduction

As the world confronts climate change, environmental degradation, rampant social and economic inequalities, wars and insecurity, extractive activities have come under increasing scrutiny (Bridge, 2004); the uncertainty over the future of fossil fuel and mineral extraction has perhaps never been greater. When an increased global recognition of the rights of Indigenous peoples is added, then it is evident that how extraction takes place has become a source of major contention with states finding themselves at the centre of conflicting pressures from extractive capital and civil society forces.

There are many studies of how resistance to extraction is taking place around the world (Arboleda, 2020; Svampa, 2019; Kroger, 2020; Willow, 2018) and how corporations are responding through a plethora of corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives designed to placate their critics (Farkes, 2015). Relatively less attention has been paid to analysing how states have responded. This volume seeks to fill a part of that gap.

States have the authority to regulate extractive activities, set the terms for their approval or rejection and determine who has the opportunity or right to be involved in review processes and decision-making bodies. States decide who owns sub-surface rights and who therefore has the ability to use, transfer or lease those lands and waters for extractive activity. States also have the legal and military mechanisms to enforce their decisions if needed. In making their policies, states are subject to a multitude of pressures. All states operate in a global capitalist system that conditions and constrains their policy options; extractive industries are dominated by global capitalist firms. States have differing degrees of internal coherence and face a variety of domestic constituencies. In some cases, such constituencies have little power to affect state action and policy; in other cases, they have significantly more power to provide input and to shape, or to initiate disruption of, state policies on extraction. At the very least, states are critical actors in determining the extent and forms of the extractive activities which take place within their borders. For this reason alone, analysis of state behaviour and policy is important. Chagnon et al. (2022) argue more forcefully that “the state is central in birthing extractivism”. Ehrnström-Fuentes and Kröger (2018) have also shown that the state plays a fundamental role in birthing extractive investment even when extractivism is largely based on multinational capital.

Historically, the state has been tasked with promoting economic growth and development and resource extraction has been a key feature of that for many of them. This has typically been accompanied by an optimism that a state’s natural resource endowment has the potential to contribute positively to economic growth or development broadly defined (Bebbington et al., 2008; Kemp, 2010; O’Faircheallaigh, 2017; Andrews et al., 2022). The mounting evidence of a “resource curse” has significantly undermined this claim (see Morrison, 2013; Papyrakis, 2017; Williams & Le Billon, 2017; Andrews & Siakwah, 2021), but many resource-rich countries continue to rely on the notion that more is actually more: the idea that the more resources a state controls or exploits, the better its chances of making significant gains over time that could trickle down to address key societal needs.

The standard case made for extractive activities relies upon this assumption and extraction is seen as having the ability to generate employment and provide revenues to various actors in the form of incomes, tax and royalty payments, and export earnings.Footnote 1 This economic case has, however, been weakened as the limited jobs available from a capital-intensive industry often operating as an “enclave” have been evident, as royalty regimes have been diluted as states have competed with each other to attract capital, and as export earnings have been captured or dissipated by elites. Accompanying the realization that in many cases the economic benefits of extractive activities have been overstated has been the increasing recognition of the environmental and social costs of extraction and the intensification of resistance to extractive activities in many parts of the world. Appealing to the direct economic benefits of extractive activities has therefore become a more tenuous approach for many states pursuing extraction policies.

States have increasingly responded by making larger claims for extraction. That is, they have sought to persuade their citizens that extractive activities can bring more than the limited economic benefits that have typified many countries’ experiences to date. In this way, states have sought to re-imagine extractive activities as presenting an opportunity for broader societal goals to be met. In this way, states are designing and promoting “extractive bargains”, a search for an acceptance by a wide range of social actors of the state’s preferred extractive policies in exchange for delivering on wider societal goals. There is something of a paradox here in that as the direct benefits of extraction have been perceived as declining, and its costs escalating, the claims made on behalf of extraction by states have in many ways become larger and bolder. The idea of the “extractive bargain” assists us in examining what forms these claims take, who gains from them and whether they offer the prospect for improved social and environmental outcomes or not.

Previous work has looked at “extractive political settlements” (see Winato & Diprose, 2020), while Ali (2022) has referred to the “grand bargain” initiated, but subsequently abandoned, by President Correa of Ecuador which offered “not extracting oil from the highly biodiverse Yasuni National Park in the Amazonian reforest” in exchange for $3.6 billion from the international community. Gunster (2019) has referred to the “spectacular failure” of the “grand bargain” offered by some Canadian political leaders “in which support for a modest carbon tax afforded ‘social licence’ for new pipelines and tar sands expansion”. We draw inspiration from these ideas and seek to move beyond them in several important ways. Work on political settlements has tended to be primarily elite-based and rather static, while work on “grand bargains” has been piecemeal and under-theorized. In this volume, we seek to lay out more fully and comparatively the concept and utility of “extractive bargains” as an analytical framework. As we explain further below, for us extractive bargains are ubiquitous, complex and dynamic.

We define extractive bargains as the ways in which states attempt to convince different stakeholders and seek to establish some degree of consensus with societal actors about the need to pursue particular policies on resource extraction, whether that be the continuation, expansion or even reduction of extraction, for societal good. The purpose of examining state-society relations in the context of extractive bargains is not to reify the state or to suggest that it exists separate from society but to examine how it responds to, and seeks to shape, the actions of other social actors whether corporations, classes, social movements, Indigenous nations and groups or simply public opinion. Our conceptualization of state-society relations denotes a complex iteration of the broader assemblage of actors, power structures, institutions and coalitions that contribute to the justification for and material manifestations of resource extraction. This perspective challenges the tendency to see the state as a coherent or homogeneous entity working alongside other equally distinct entities. Exploring the state-society nexus as extractive bargains requires us to imagine a plethora of complex social forces and connections that operate through multiple channels to promote and/or resist extractivism. In other words, extractive bargains are dynamic and there is a dialectical process between states and social actors in the search for consensus as bargains constantly shift in their emphasis and scope.

Our primary objective in this book is to examine in detail and comparatively the ways in which different states have sought to construct these extractive bargains. We do so by examining case studies from 16 countries from both the Global North and Global South and including some majority Indigenous states. In selecting countries as case studies, we were conscious of finding countries where bargains may be said to have been offered. In some states, this is demonstrably not the case and the use of state violence is the standard response to civil society opposition. Of course, violence comes in different forms and is often present when examining natural resource extraction (Shapiro & McNeish, 2021). But violence is not the only, or necessarily the primary, mechanism which is used and in many states various efforts are made to obtain legitimacy; it is these states which are candidates for inclusion as case studies. We also selected cases where the direct benefits in terms of employment and tax revenue are not, in themselves, deemed sufficient to ensure public support for the extractive activity and other societal benefits have been promoted. These criteria guided us in our selection of case studies which include Australia, Bolivia, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Ghana, Greenland, Ireland, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, Sweden and Tanzania.

Our starting point therefore is the lacuna in the study of the intricate position of states in extractivism despite their role in navigating the plethora of societal and private actors and structures of power. While being cognizant of the challenges of methodological nationalism (i.e. maintaining the prevalence of the state as a primary unit of analysis), within the context of this book we see the extractive bargains conceptualization as an innovative way of unpacking the different strategies taken by states to negotiate support for various kinds of extractive (and even post-extractive) activities. A bargains approach is a particularly productive way of understanding policy framings and choices, why and how they come about, the ways in which they are challenged or resisted and the strategies being used to justify such choices as serving the broader societal good. At the very least, this book highlights how the process of negotiating such bargains is neither straightforward nor consistent across a number of important cases in the Global South and Global North.

The next section provides a more detailed conceptualization of the central notion of an extractive bargain by examining varieties of analytical and normative bargains. In setting the scene in this way, we also highlight some of the key insights from the case study chapters which follow.

Conceptualizing Extractive Bargains

Underpinning the concept of an extractive bargain is the idea that policies concerning natural resource extraction are contestable and negotiable. The focus of this book is how states seek to negotiate with non-state actors to gain support for their preferred policies. The state’s aim is to achieve a degree of consensus for, or at least a broad coalition in support of, its approach. From this several implications arise.

The first is that the state is an actor in its own right with its own interests—a proposition consistent with a number of theoretical traditions. It can be argued the state in capitalist society performs many functions which are critical to the process of capital accumulation including the protection of private rights, both legally and by force, and by facilitating and financing the infrastructure needed to support accumulation. But the state also operates with a degree of “relative autonomy” from capital to use the term developed by Marxist political economist Poulantzas (1968), when analysing state-society relations. As such, the state has the potential to regulate and control factions of capital, including powerful extractive capital. This is not to deny that extractive corporations and states often sing from the same hymn sheet especially when it comes to particular projects (see e.g. Cervantes & Zalik, 2018; Gilbert & Zalik, 2019; MacPhail & Bowles, 2021) or seek to construct discourses conducive to viewing land as a resource available for capital accumulation (Le Billon & Sommerville, 2017). But, at the state level, it is not necessarily or always the case that the state can be reduced to a mouthpiece for capital. To some examining the politics of the state in the economically successful developmental states of East Asia, for example, it was precisely the state’s ability to discipline and structure capital (as well as labour) that was identified as a critical component in the explanation for their success (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). These successes provided those states with a degree of legitimacy. All states seek to find legitimacy and do so in many ways such as the provision of economic growth as in the East Asian case but also from addressing inequalities and providing social goods as found in Nordic social democracies. The state’s position as a facilitator of capitalist accumulation and as an institution requiring societal legitimacy results in it having to navigate complex and contradictory pressures to ensure its own continuity. Striking societal bargains is one mechanism it can use to achieve this.

The second is that a bargain is not pre-determined and can lead to multiple outcomes depending on the power, agency and skill of the negotiating actors. The concept of a bargain implies that all actors have some power to influence the outcome even if there may be asymmetrical power differences. Bargains may be difficult to conclude and may not endure over time. They can be fluid, continually shifting in their terms as power shifts within states and society. The fact that there is a state-society bargain, or attempts to find one, does not therefore imply the absence of contestation or resistance. Part of each bargain are formidable social forces that may be considered “entrepreneurs” or “anti-preneurs” whose respective support for and/or opposition to bargains condition the bargain’s potential to remain intact or shift over time. In short, the search for consensus is often elusive. As such, there is the prospect of continual struggle over how the state will construct its bargains.

The third is that in analysing state-society relations, it is necessary to disaggregate the actors involved. Extractive bargains can usefully be understood as societal level narratives designed by states to gain support for their extractive policies. But just as society is not homogenous neither is the state a unitary actor. The executive and legislative branches of government, the civil servants in the ministries which perform the day-to-day functions of government, the judiciary and the various forces of “law and order”, all have their own interests and influence the design and implementation of bargains. In this context it is typically a branch of government which enunciates the bargain, seeking societal support, and changes in government often bring with them changes in the narratives. While governments and their policies are therefore crucial to the analysis of bargains, we argue that it is necessary to consider the broader concept of the state since other state actors, such as the judiciary and different ministries, for example, can and do play important roles in interpreting and implementing the bargain offered by political leaders, roles which may influence how the bargain is perceived by broader social actors.

In moving on to examine the content of specific extractive bargains, it is evident that state responses to extraction take many forms and need to be contextualized; we make use of the idea of Varieties of Extractive Bargains to capture and assess these responses. We propose to examine Varieties of Extractive Bargains along two axes. The first is the analytical and in which the content and social basis for bargains in specific state-level locations are identified, analysed and categorized. The second is a normative assessment of bargains and their ability to meet the challenges of a world beset with inequality, injustice and environmental crises at multiple scales. This requires the placement of bargains on a spectrum and analysing how each can be moved towards the progressive end of that spectrum.

Varieties of Extractive Bargains I: Analytical Types

The attempts to construct new state-society bargains to justify particular resource extraction policies have taken many forms. We identify six major state-level bargains here based on the country case studies and one which operates at other levels (as summarized in Table 1.1). The identification of these six “ideal types” was the result of an interactive and iterative process between the editors and the country specialist authors. The editors initially set out the framework of extractive bargains and suggested a number of possible types asking country authors to assess how their cases might fit within this framework. This led to some types of analytical bargain gaining support but country experiences suggested other types of bargain were in play or that countries differed from our initial placement. This led to further iterations until Table 1.1 was derived, a collaborative effort involving all authors.

Table 1.1 Analytical varieties of extractive bargains
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It should be noted, and as will become clear in the examples provided, each type of bargain comes in several different forms and that, while we can identify a number of distinct conceptual ideal types of bargains, they may be invoked at different times by the same state and/or a state may commonly invoke more than one at the same point in time in an attempt to appeal to different social actors. Furthermore, while the type of bargain can be identified, many of the case studies reveal there are large gaps between what is promised and what is delivered, and opposition and resistance to the bargains on offer remain significant.

One bargain may be termed a climate bargain. In this version of an extractive bargain, states justify their policies and seek to gain support for them by pointing to their climate benefits. For example, in Canada, the limits of the “staples trap” (Innis, 1999; Haley, 2011; Bowles & MacPhail, 2018) have led to new justifications for natural resource extraction which seek to balance this with climate commitments. Thus, Trudeau’s Liberal government initiated a full public review of the way in which projects are assessed by the National Energy Board, introduced a national carbon tax and committed to meet GHG emission targets. In return, the state has sought support for the expansion of large fossil fuel mega-projects, such as those in the tar sands as well as so-called “transition fuels” such as natural gas, including the infrastructure necessary to get the product to market justifying them as consistent with its climate commitments. Sweden, the largest exporter of minerals in Europe, has a corporatist political system which encourages and facilitates consensus-based tripartite decision-making but has found it necessary to add a green twist to its arguments in support of continued extraction and “sustainable development” as Karin Beland Lindahl demonstrates in her chapter. In Greenland too, Ulrik Jørgenson argues, the global climate benefits of rare earth extraction have provided a justification in proposals for some mining projects. Thus, climate bargains have been used to support continued and expanded extraction in the context of both fossil fuels and the critical minerals needed for a transition to renewable energy.

Interestingly, Sarah Greene and Angela Carter show in their chapter how a form of climate bargain can also be used to “keep it in the ground”. Analysing the examples of France, Ireland and Denmark, they show how states have sought to fashion extractive bargains which result in a ban on new fossil fuel projects in what may be termed a post-extractive bargain. While this can be seen as a subset of the climate bargain, we view it as sufficiently important and different from climate bargains which lead to continued extraction, to warrant its own category. It is found not only in three countries analysed here but also found in a number of other countries including Costa Rica, Belize, Bulgaria, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain and Uruguay although the ban on extraction in a few of these countries refers to a technology (fracking) rather than all extraction. The post-extractive bargain is framed in terms of eschewing extraction activities in order to meet a higher-order cause such as climate change. It may also include social justice components such as the support for “green jobs” in order to compensate those who might otherwise lose from the implementation of the bargain. This form of bargain can extend beyond oil and gas to other resources, such as uranium, with Greenland’s return to a “zero tolerance policy” illustrating how post-extractive bargains can extend beyond the climate goal; extraction is forgone in order to support the higher-order moral and political goal of a nuclear-free country (and world).

The continuing and expanding extraction of resources from Indigenous territories around the world has led to inevitable and rising conflicts (see Veltmeyer & Bowles, 2014; Rasch, 2017; Beland Lindahl et al., 2018; Wilson, 2019; Kuokkanen, 2019). As Indigenous rights have increasingly been recognized at the international level, for example with the adoption of the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007, states have responded by proposing various forms of what might be termed Indigenous-focused bargains. These are designed to permit extraction to take place on Indigenous territories in return for specific benefits to Indigenous societies. As Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh demonstrates in his chapter, these have taken many different forms and led to a variety of outcomes across the world. He shows specifically how the bargain was framed, but not implemented, in the Philippines, how the outcomes of bargains differed from their intent in South Africa, and how Impact Benefit Agreements (IBAs) have been applied in Australia with varying outcomes. In their chapter, Cliff Atleo and Jonathan Boron argue that successful legal challenges by Indigenous nations in Canada have required the settler colonial state to pursue extractive bargains. However, outcomes vary and the continued dominance of Canadian law and priorities has meant there are and continue to be many instances where the bargains, including IBAs, have been used to essentially limit and remove Indigenous rights to land and disempower communities, a case of an Indigenous-focused bargain leading to outcomes which fundamentally undermine Indigenous communities’ long-term viability in favour of the interests of the state and capital. Furthermore, as workshop participant Ricado Jacobs explained in his remarks, “indigeneity” has been used and manipulated by the state in South Africa as a way of privileging some groups, in essence striking a “retribalization bargain” with them, in order to enable a new round of capitalist extractive expansion. By promoting and incorporating (unelected) hereditary chiefs, Jacobs argued, the South African state is using “indigeneity” to enhance the power of chiefs who can be relied upon to support further extractive projects. A potentially profound form of an Indigenous-focused bargain is evident in the experience of extractivism in the plurinational states of Bolivia and Ecuador. Here, as Isabella M. Radhuber, Marie Jasser and Diego Andreucci show, the extractive bargain to reconcile postcolonial pluralism can open up the space for the plural economies important for the vitality of the diverse Indigenous and non-Indigenous societies alongside an expanding capitalist extractive sector (cf. Radcliffe & Radhuber, 2020; Radhuber & Radcliffe, 2022). In this way, a radically new way of reconciling internally socially diverse states and extractive activity is conceived, even if practice has fallen short. Plurinational states are enshrined in the Constitution, as are their plural economies, which encourage various forms of economic organization and activity and should particularly empower the Indigenous and communitarian. At the same time, the rights of nature have been incorporated into Constitutions thereby implying that resource extraction could be restrained according to socio-ecological principles.

Indigenous-focused bargains, therefore, utilize a variety of mechanisms designed to offer Indigenous communities sources of income, through IBAs, for example, and in some cases offer forms of political power, such as constitutional protections, in exchange for largely ongoing resource extraction.

There are also broader classes of bargains which can be termed social redistribution bargains. This type of bargain is often attributed to the so-called “Pink Tide” countries in Latin America and occurring with the global commodities boom on the first decade of the twenty-first century. Here some states sought to gain popular support for expanded resource extraction in return for revenues which “were funneled into a myriad of social programs for children, the elderly, and the poor, as well as infrastructure and other spending” (Perreault, 2022: see also Brand et al., 2016). The bargain offered is that dependence on external capital inflows and the environmental costs of resource extraction be borne in exchange for poverty reduction. In broad terms, the emphasis on social inclusion and on the benefits to all that this extractive bargain suggests also resonates with Beland Lindahl’s analysis of mining in social democratic Sweden. Jamie Shenk’s analysis of the extractive bargain in Colombia can be seen as a specific form of social redistribution bargain. Here, she argues that the war with the FARC and the subsequent peace settlement has led to the role of extractive activities being framed in terms of a territorial peace bargain. Perhaps ironically in view of the many conflicts which have arisen over extraction projects, such projects have been touted as contributing to post-conflict reconstruction and as a way of redistributing resources and power to former conflict areas.

The role of extractive activities in supporting state independence in various circumstances has led to examples of independence bargains where states appeal for public support for extraction to meet nationalist goals. In Greenland, for example, following the move to self-government in 2009 and with an over 80 per cent Indigenous population, resource extraction projects were touted as a way for the country to gain economic independence from Denmark. The 2009 decision to include sub-surface rights among those claimed by the new self-government opened up this possibility and it was seized upon with governments supporting oil and mineral exploration (see Kuokkanen, 2017; Cambou, 2020). However, as Ulrik Jørgensen documents in his chapter, this independence bargain was essentially rejected once the scale of new mining that would be required to meet the bargain’s aim became clear and as a result of the opposition from social actors to one particular mine which has influenced national attitudes towards large-scale mining in general. The role of oil revenues in providing independence from global economic pressures has been an important part of the independence extractive bargain promoted in Mexico as Darcy Tetreault analyses. In fact, there is also a specific context for this in Mexico which extends beyond oil and includes mineral extraction. Mining activity in Mexico was spurred by the relaxation of restrictions on foreign direct investment in the sector which were part of the NAFTA agreement in 1994 (Palma, 2005). Mining was therefore viewed as part of the export-led growth model that Mexico adopted which brought with it the promise of higher living standards. Perhaps ironically, mining was subsequently promoted as a sector which could flourish in the wake of tariffs and a bleaker outlook for the manufacturing sector as fear of a trade war with the U.S. under former President Trump took hold. This led the Mexican state to emphasize mineral extraction as a compensatory mechanism for possible trade disruptions. In this context, we may view compensatory bargains as a particular form of independence bargain. The idea of continued extraction as a compensatory mechanism for externally-induced disruptions has more recently been invoked in parts of the EU as it has sought to respond to the disruptions to its energy supply in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine by increasing its energy independence.

In many countries of the Global South, it is perhaps not surprising to find a developmentalist bargain being promoted by states. Revenues from extraction are promoted as providing the means to support broad structural change of the economy thereby facilitating the development transition. This type of reasoning is common to many states which participated in the commodities boom and saw this as a way of becoming developmental states (Ovadia & Nem Singh, 2019). This is most obvious in Africa where, beginning with the Africa Mining Vision in 2009, which represents a regional consensus on effectively utilizing natural resources for development, many states have launched various plans and policies to make extraction provide the most benefit to the state to enable broader development goals to be met (Ovadia, 2016a; Nwapi & Andrews, 2017; Andrews & Nwapi, 2018). However, this comes against the long-standing concerns of limited domestic linkages, labour strife, corruption and environmental degradation. In response, many African states have, with the encouragement of international agencies such as the World Bank, included local content provisions as part of mining licences in an attempt to address the limits of “enclave development” and increase the potential for extractive projects to support broader developmental transitions (Campbell, 2004, 2008). Jesse Salah Ovadia and Maud Esi Amoafo demonstrate this in their chapter on Tanzania. In Ghana, the state only recently developed its oil industry. The responsibility for providing broader benefits was largely delegated to corporations as Moses Adjei and Nathan Andrews document. CSR policies essentially acted as a substitute for the state in constructing an extractive bargain illustrating how state roles can be delegated and subordinated to capital in extractive bargains especially in neoliberal contexts. These developmentalist extractive bargains have nevertheless been questioned given the contested politics and elite instrumentalization that underpin them (see Ovadia, 2016b; Gaynor, 2016; Bebbington et al., 2018; Oppong & Andrews, 2020). The need to address local concerns in the pursuit of extraction-supported state-level developmental goals is central to Jing Vivian Zhan’s analysis of the extractive bargain made by the Chinese state. She documents how the central and local states have introduced a battery of regulations designed to ameliorate some of the worst negative consequences of mining on local communities—the “local resource curse” as Zhan calls it—and enhance the economic and social benefits of mining to local communities. The desire to maintain local stability is shared by many states but the specificities of the Chinese political economy mean that the developmentalist bargain to address it is manifested in distinct ways which rely on attempts to find “harmony” by promoting state-capital interactions and ‘embedding’ extractive capital at the local level. Pursuing a national developmentalist bargain but giving attention to environmental, economic, social and, to a more limited extent, political conditions in resource-rich cities, Zhan shows that even in an authoritarian state like China we can identify elements found in social redistribution bargains.

This review has identified some of many ways in which states have sought to construct extractive bargains to gain support for their extractive policies. The state is the main focus of our book but it is clear that extractive bargains are also sought at different scales of analysis. A participant at the workshop, Sarah Katz-Lavigne noted that subnational bargains in the DR Congo are occurring in a state which has received much attention as the supplier of cobalt to the global market and with instances of elite corruption and state violence well  documented. At the local level, however, Katz-Lavigne pointed out that a variety of approaches are taken to the presence of artisanal miners, an often over-looked group in state mining policies. She explained what might be termed parallel bargains between local officials, corporations and local miners who operate in a grey legal zone. These parallel bargains complicate the definition of who is bargaining with whom and for whose benefit—further pointing to both the fluid and conflictual nature of bargains.

Extractive bargains can also operate at the global level and in our Chap. 14 we consider what type of global bargains are being considered to accompany the plethora of proposals and policies associated with Green New Deals. We argue that, at the global level, most of the Green New Deal proposals, rely on international parallel bargains rather than explicitly calling on new global bargains to accompany a global energy transition. This brief foray into the non-state level raises the interesting question for further research of whether and how different analytical bargains are pursued at different levels of authority within states (particularly relevant for federal states) and at the inter-state level.

There are, therefore, a range of extractive bargains that can be identified. Interestingly, many such as post-extractive and Indigenous-focused bargains, can be found in states located in both the Global North and Global South suggesting that there is scope for common ground and that global forces are producing comparable state-level bargains. However, others, such as developmental bargains are found primarily in the Global South and climate bargains are found primarily in the Global North in our (limited) sample suggesting that the distinction between Global North and Global South still has some analytical purchase. Even here though, it should be noted that the concept of the ‘developmental state’ has expanded to include states in the Global North attempting a ‘green transition’ (Bowles, 2020) and so there is also some convergence here as well. It is also interesting, from a comparative perspective, that the same type of analytical bargain can be found under different political regime types; independence bargains in social democratic Greenland and neo-authoritarian Mexico for example. In many cases, extractive bargains take on country specific forms, such as the territorial peace bargain as a form of social redistribution bargain in Colombia. This provides perhaps a unique example of a specific form a more general “ideal type” of bargain but it is also clear that many bargains take particular forms as a result of path dependence and national histories, an observation which is as relevant for countries as diverse as Ghana and Sweden. Taken together, what is striking is that very substantial claims have been made for extractive bargains including meeting climate, redistributive, national development and peace goals. One thing that the bargains all have in common is that they require close scrutiny and assessment; they receive this in the chapters which follow.

Varieties of Extractive Bargains II: Normative Analysis

A variety of extractive bargains can be identified not only in terms of the analytical types discussed above but also in normative terms. That is, the task we have set for this volume is, firstly, to identify and describe the various extractive bargains which states have sought and, secondly, to assess the ability of these bargains to meet the goal of promoting and achieving long-term environmental and social justice. To assess the bargains in this way first requires a closer examination and understanding of the nature of what we have hitherto typically called “extractive activities”. More recently, these have been termed “extractivism”. This term has been used in a number of different ways as explained by Chagnon et al. (2022). The term has been used to denote a phase of capitalism, a new phase of imperialism, and as form of accumulation distinct in its own workings. Chagnon et al. (2022) see it as an “organizing concept”. They argue that “extractivism is based on socio-ecologically destructive processes of subjugation, depletion, and non-reciprocal relations, occurring at all levels of practices. It follows that extractivism is diametrically opposed to the concept and practices of sustainability (including ecological, social, and economic) if that concept is defined through criteria of stewardship, reciprocity, regeneration, and ensuring life for future generations”.

This invites, indeed compels, us to examine further the dynamics of extractivism and the roles which particular bargains take in either reinforcing, reforming or replacing those dynamics. To start us on this investigation, Henry Veltmeyer’s chapter provides a discussion of extractivism and poses the question of what “extraction after extractivism” might require. How we might get there depends on the starting point, the prospects for forming coalitions in favour of change, and questions of strategy. With respect to the latter, this involves calculations of whether bargains which seek to reform existing practices are sufficient to open spaces for coalition building and to lead to further change or whether they simply tinker around the edges and thereby reinforce existing unsustainable practices by failing to challenge them. The question of strategy also raises the thorny issue of whether and how the state can be used as an instrument for radical transformation and its relation to capital.

To apply this more concretely to the analysis of bargains, and to provide a more fine-grained analysis of them, we have conceptualized a spectrum along which extractive bargains may be found. The spectrum has bargains which provide for long-term environmental and social justice (the “practices of sustainability”) at one end and bargains which then move through various degrees of incoherence to short-termism and bargains antithetical to long-term solutions at the other end (“extractivism” as defined by Chagnon et al., 2022). These are ideal types and they vary substantially when examining specific contexts. Yet, they help to frame an understanding of what a normative extractive bargain spectrum might look like as presented in Fig. 1.1.

Fig. 1.1
An illustration has labels that read, progressive, constructive, contradictory, and Faustian. Below them are two labels that read, environmental and social justice in the long term with a left arrow and incoherence and short termism with a right arrow.

Normative spectrum of extractive bargains

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The Progressive normative bargain is one in which extraction takes places in the context of meeting social and environmental justice goals. This may mean that some extractive projects are not undertaken, that a clear path to a just transition is identified and embraced, that extractive activities that are undertaken involve minimized environmental impacts and do not result in “sacrifice zones”, that local affected communities are given important mechanisms of control over the activities, the economic benefits of extraction are fairly shared, and that long-term environmental and social sustainability are enhanced.

Constructive bargains are those where many of the elements are in place to achieve a progressive bargain but where some elements are missing and/or institutional designs are inadequate to realize the promise.

Contradictory bargains arise when some elements of a progressive bargain are in place and being implemented but other state policies and practices are working in the opposite direction so that extraction is taking place in a dualistic and contradictory way. Contradictory bargains may arise for several reasons. Firstly, the state, as a heterogeneous entity, may have actors which are pulling in different directions be they different Ministries, or different branches such as the executive and the judiciary, for example. Secondly, it may be a case of cognitive dissonance where proclaimed goals may be progressive but where the actual practice is at odds with goals. The gap between objectives and practice is so large that it can only be bridged by cognitive dissonance—a failure to recognize the inability of policies to meet stated goals. To the extent that this is a deliberate process, it might also be termed “organized hypocrisy” to borrow a term used by Mörkenstam (2019).

The Faustian bargain is one in which a short-term bargain may be made between state elites and other (narrowly or more widely constructed) social groups which supports extractivism in the short term and which also severely compromises or destroys the possibilities for long-term social and environmental justice.

We find this a useful way of thinking about extractive bargains and take it as axiomatic that the goal should be the progressive bargain. However, few if any, states are close to achieving progressive bargains and extractive bargains are found along the spectrum as the case study chapters will show. It is important to locate specific state bargains along the spectrum because this helps in examining the political economy determinants of why the bargain is found at that particular part of the spectrum and what it would take to move in the direction of the progressive end of the spectrum. By political economy determinants, we mean here considerations of, inter alia, class interests and power, state composition and autonomy, sectoral composition and coherence, national histories and location in the global political economy, the extent of Indigenous rights, and civil society strength. In the transition from one part of the bargain spectrum to another, more progressive part, it is necessary to examine which actors have the agency and capacity to realize such a movement.

Examining extractive bargains through this normative lens not only enables us to see pathways to progressive bargains but also forces us to ask: Who are the bargains for? Which societal actors are implicitly or explicitly being asked to accept the bargain? and Which actors are excluded from the bargain, that is, are some labour, environmental or Indigenous groups being excluded, for example, or are some concerns, such as the gendered implications of resource projects, being ignored? Once these questions are asked it is also possible to reveal more precisely what type of normative bargain is being advanced. The normative analysis therefore allows authors to assess bargains at the level of the state and to place them on the spectrum indicated in Fig. 1.1 but also allows authors to pinpoint the differences that might be found within any bargain for different societal actors, an exercise useful in itself and important for identifying the challenges that need to be overcome before a coalition for progressive state-level bargains can be forged.

Concluding Remarks

A number of themes emerge from our case studies in terms of the normative analysis. These can be summarized as:

  1. 1.

    Bargains of the same analytical type can range significantly in their normative position. An example of this can be found with Indigenous-focused bargains. In the Canadian case, for example, Atleo and Boron argue that the extractive bargain offered by the settler colonial state has ambiguous implications for Indigenous communities and can, in some circumstances, lead to forms of dispossession. Further along the spectrum, however, Radhuber et al. argue that the constitutionally recognized plural economies approach inspired by Indigenous agendas for plurinational states in Ecuador and Bolivia has the potential to be a progressive bargain, if institutional foundations can be established which empower Indigenous nations to have a greater role in practice in the plurinational state.

  2. 2.

    The same bargain can have different normative implications for different groups exposing blind spots or divide and rule strategies. In some cases, we may therefore find that the bargain may seem at the progressive end of the spectrum when judged by the interests of one set of actors but as closer to Faustian when viewed from another. This is indeed exactly the conclusion reached by Beland Lindahl in her chapter when she argues that the Swedish extractive bargain might be viewed as progressive when viewed from the perspective of the working class but is Faustian for the Sami Indigenous population in a political economy which has a blind spot for Indigenous rights. Mexico offers a similar example where its independence bargain is advantageous to state elites and some sections of organized labour while leaving exposed the local communities on the extractive frontline.

  3. 3.

    The state is a complex institution and contradictory bargains often reveal different positions within the state apparatus which can be used as leverage. There are a number of examples which can be used to illustrate this point. Tanzania uses local content provisions (LCP) to good effect, according to Ovadia and Amoafo, in its quest to extend the industrialization agenda. However, it’s Women’s Economic Empowerment (WEE) objectives and institutional policy location have not been integrated with the LCPs with the result that women continue to be adversely affected by extractive activities. However, giving greater support for the WEE programme and locating it in economic ministries, would enable the developmentalist extractive bargain to become more progressive. In the case of Colombia, Shenk argues that the contradictions between the Peace Accord and the ownership of sub-surface rights set up inevitable contradictions and a failure to deliver on the empowerment of local communities promised in the Accord. To move the extractive bargain in the progressive direction requires the realignment of sub-surface ownership rights to match the conditions of the Peace Accord. In the Philippines, the contradictions of the extractive bargain, as illustrated by the disjuncture between the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act and the Mining Act, resemble more an example of “organized hypocrisy” where the possibilities for change appear limited; Iindigenous resistance assisted by the local state and in part validated by the courts has had some success though. In Ghana, the contradictory position of the “privatized developmentalist” bargain points not just to the complexity of the state but to the complexity of state-corporate relations and the need to bring elements of the state back into the bargain.

  4. 4.

    Agency matters and can shift or create bargains in a more progressive direction. The post-extractive bargains analysed by Greene and Carter reveal how the sources of progressive change have both generalizable and country specific elements. The scaling-up and transnational nature of some movements has been clearly important in some cases while, at the same time, the intervention of some key individuals and organizations whether it be in the executive branch of government, as in France, or in the faith movement, as in Ireland, have been important country specific factors. The ability of the opposition to uranium mining in Greenland, even as a by-product of rare earth extraction, to draw upon the historical record played an important role in its success. In Australia, the Philippines, and South Africa O’Faircheallaigh shows how the different political mobilization capacities of Indigenous communities have led to quite different outcomes arising from the framework for extractive bargains offered by the state.

  5. 5.

    The challenge of extraction beyond extractivism. The case studies presented in this volume provide examples of progressive elements in bargains and highlight some of the obstacles and social forces that must be overcome in order to move contradictory bargains in the progressive direction. However, the possibilities for designing extractive bargains which fully meet the goals of social and environmental justice depend critically on being able to challenge the logic of extractivism. Here, the task appears much more difficult as while it is possible to identify and work towards incremental change, a necessary and important purpose, to realize the transformative extractive bargain implied by the progressive end the normative spectrum poses not just questions of immediate strategy but also of longer-term vision. As Veltmeyer’s chapter shows there is no consensus here even in the context of Latin America where the continent has long been subject to extractivism. In other words, moving towards the progressive end of the normative spectrum may become more difficult as more transformative changes are required. It might be argued on the basis of our review of extractive bargains that one point to highlight here is the challenge of integrating ecological and social justice dimensions; few, if any, of the bargains we have enumerated address both dimensions in a systematic way despite the need to do so. The chapters in this volume illustrate how the state can be engaged, challenged and supported to facilitate the movement along the spectrum but fashioning a progressive bargain, and the role that the state can play in this, remains a subject of enduring interest and importance.

To assist us in understanding of the complex ways in which extractive bargains play out on the ground, as it were, we conclude this volume with a set of short observations from experts on the idea and practices of extractive bargains. Contributions are from NGO practitioners, research institute policy analysts and academics with particular areas of interest. Their contributions provide valuable insights into how the idea of extractive bargains is seen on the ground and in specific thematic applications. Raphael Deberdt (IMPACT) and Jeff Geipel (Engineers Without Borders) describe some of their work and campaigns and how bargains are made and are open to contestation in practice. John Hayes and Alem Cherinet provide a perspective as policy analysts. Cliff Atleo writes from his vantage point as a scholar engaged with Indigenous issues and Margot Parkes from her interests in community health and the cumulative impacts of resource projects.

There is much that remains to be further examined using an extractive bargains framework, questions such as, are some bargains more enduring than others? Is there a hierarchy of bargains with some dominating others? Relatedly, are some extractive bargains, such as those based on developmentalism more difficult to confront and change than those based on climate or social redistribution considerations as some of our cases would seem to suggest? Does the calculus of bargains change if a country’s extractive sector consists of predominantly nationally owned corporations or multinational corporations? How does the framing of the bargain and its dynamics vary between states with different political systems? What differentiates states in which extractive bargains are evident from those in which they are not? All of these are important questions for further research; we hope that this volume might act as a spur for the utility of posing them.