A world map represents a few countries numbered from 1 to 6 in which people migrate as a result of changes in the environment. The text is written in a foreign language.

The factors of environmentally displaced migrationsAlaska, New Orleans, Tuvalu, Halligen, Chad, Maldivian Islands, Bangladesh, Nepal, ChinaLegend: Main causes of movements of climate refugees1. Thaw of water from Arctic areas2. Storms trajectories3. Rise of sea levels4. Desertification of soils5. Smelting of continental ices6. Floods

Citizenship is usually defined in terms of the rights and duties of citizens in relation to nation states. The definition used in France refers to the philosophical content of the social contract and the values of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, whereas in most countries it refers to nationality rights (which are specifically conceived in terms of “nationality” in France). However, the concept of citizenship is now being challenged by migration, because the nation state is no longer the only reference in terms of individuals’ belonging. Transnational diasporas, border-crossing experiences, and the existence of large numbers of undocumented migrants are calling into question both the international system of national borders and the concept of citizenship, since various forms of citizenship have developed in response to migration issues in the international order (local citizenship for foreigners, dual citizenship, refugee status for asylum seekers, etc.). Citizenship is also becoming a multicultural phenomenon in large immigration countries, which sometimes change their constitution in response to such changes in their populations. Transnational diasporas, as new actors in the international order (acting through “the strength of weak ties”, as Mark Granovetter puts it; 1973; see also Safran, 1991; Scheffer, 2006) are becoming increasingly influential and blurring the boundaries of states owing to the diversity of links that they build across borders.

4.1 I – Citizenship and Nationality

For a long time, citizenship was not addressed in studies on migration, because it was considered to be a question of internal law, usually addressed as an afterthought in books about constitutional rights. Approaches to migration were focused on the needs for labour force, assimilation, return, and integration in the labour market. The earliest recognition that migration may exert an influence on citizenship appeared with the debate on local political rights for foreigners in the Nordic countries in the years 1975–1985, notably in Sweden. A little later, the political scientist Tomas Hammar (1990) coined the concept of “denizens” to define foreigners to whom full citizenship was denied, but who participated in local level elections as citizens. In this period, the distinction between nationals of EU Member States and those of other states was not important because the Schengen treaty of 1985 did not exist, nor the Maastricht treaty of 1992 defining European Citizenship. Whereas this question arose in EU Member States, and also in Japan (a country where it is very difficult for foreigners to acquire citizenship), it did not arise in countries of immigration of settlement that apply the principle of jus soli, such as the US, Canada, and Australia. In these countries, citizenship is acquired at birth and naturalisation is rapidly granted to new settlers.

A new approach to citizenship also emerged in the years 1990–1995, in connection with the concept of transnationalism. Transnational citizenship is a particularly relevant approach in contexts of migration, since migrants build links across borders through their diasporas. The geographical extent of citizenship thus becomes more important than its limitation to the borders of the nation state, as conceived in its traditional definition. Authors such as Rainer Bauböck (1994) and Yasemin Soysal (1994) developed this concept further in a period when transnationalism was rapidly increasing in the world owing to the growth in cross-border mobility following the fall of the Iron Curtain. Meanwhile, older waves of migration continued to reinforce transborder links through associative and cultural networks, marriage practices, transnational trade, and entrepreneurship across borders.

The growth in multiculturalism also had an influence on citizenship in the 1990–2000s. This issue was raised by authors such as Will Kymlicka (1995) in Canada, Stephen Castles in Australia, and John Rex and Guharpal Singh in the UK (2004). Multiculturalism leads to an enlargement of the concept of citizenship, with the addition of values of diversity and ethics of anti-discrimination. The concept was also developed in Germany and in the Netherlands, but was later abandoned and replaced with more integrationist approaches. Angela Merkel herself publicly declared that multiculturalism in Germany had failed.

4.1.1 The French Case: Distinction Between Citizenship and Nationality

In France, citizenship is linked to secularism (“laïcité”), a concept that was defined by the law of 1905 concerning the separation of church and state, and which returned to prominence in the 1990s in relation to the place of Islam in public life (controversy around the wearing of Muslim types of headscarf in 1989, and more generally the visibility of Islam in public space, such as prayer rooms, halal butchers, Muslim libraries, and other manifestations of Islamic ways of life). Those who attempted to find a new form of citizenship of immigrant origin, while remaining Muslim, found themselves involved in many different negotiations, as documented in various field studies (Kepel, 1987; Etienne, 1989; Cesari, 1994; Leveau & Mohsen, 2005).

While many immigration countries use only one word in this context (so that there is no distinction between citizenship and nationality), in France the two words are used differently: citizenship refers to the rights and duties of a citizen, while nationality refers to the legal distinction between French people and foreigners. More than a century ago, France became the first country to make a change in the law governing access to nationality from jus sanguinis (introduced by Napoleon I in the Civil Code of 1804, and also applied in conquered lands) to one based on a balance between jus sanguinis and jus soli. This change was intended to make it easier to incorporate foreigners into the nation state. However, despite its long history of immigration, France never considered immigration as part of its founding national myth. Its republican model was built on shared political consensus around the values of the French Revolution (freedom, equality, and fraternity), without any reference to ethnic or regional origins. Yet, in periods of low demographic growth during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, there was a need to grant access to French nationality to newcomers in order to meet the need for soldiers and future citizens. The law of 1889 extended access for foreigners to French nationality, through an extension of jus soli to apply to those born in France or having been resident in France (Weil, 2004). New debates instigated by the far right in France on possible reforms to the laws governing nationality, and a possible change in the application of the principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis, have often made reference to dark periods of France’s history from the 1940s (for example, the possibility of “déchéance de nationalité” – the withdrawal of nationality from someone who had previously acquired it). Nonetheless, after fierce debates between 1988 and 1998, France continues to apply policies involving a balance between jus soli and jus sanguinis. Most EU Member States, having formerly managed access to nationality by jus sanguinis (except for the UK) reformed their laws in this domain in the years 1990–2000. For example, a century after France, Germany introduced a principle of jus soli into its citizenship laws in order to incorporate foreigners who had previously had only limited possibilities for acquiring German citizenship. Italy continues to apply jus sanguinis, as defined by a law of 1913.

In parallel, multiculturalism has also challenged the French model of citizenship, which is strongly linked with the nation state, owing to the pressure of migration within the EU and that of second generation immigrants who had become nationals. Whereas in the 1960s the term “assimilation” was still used in public discourse (since the 1880s), the term “integration” began to be used at the end of the Algerian War of Indepedence, and was adopted in 1974 by the Secretary of State for Immigration Paul Dijoud. The aim was to abandon the individualist and authoritarian approach associated with “assimilation” in favour of an expression of cultural diversity, in order to help foreigners to feel that they belonged. The particular situation of Islam in France gave some specificity to the French approach to integration: the headscarf affair of 1989 and then the law of 2004 prohibiting the wearing of visible religious signs in schools brought an emphasis on secularism as a republican value to be shared by future citizens, while the value of “fraternity” was seriously challenged by the recognition of a “social gap” (Jacques Chirac described this gap as a “fracture sociale” during his presidential campaign in 1995).

Despite being an old country of immigration, France developed a political myth based on philosophical values (the “social contract”) in order to bring more homogeneity to a diverse population made up of many cultures in its various “provinces”, with their own languages and specific ways of life. In spite of its republican myth, France is a multicultural country. This blindness towards immigration and internal diversity is connected with France’s founding national myth, which is mostly built on the heritage of the Revolution. When the Third Republic, established in 1875, announced its ambition to create a system of free, compulsory, secular primary education (through the laws of 1882 and 1884), in which 80% of the pupils would be the children of peasants, it created a need to formulate a shared history, acceptable to all, and which would contribute to the creation of educated republican citizens. It was a particular priority to write a consensual history of France. Ernest Lavisse (2014), Professor at the prestigious Collège de France, was appointed to this task. He created the citizen-myth of the “Gaulois”, centred on the image of an autochthonous French population invaded by foreigners (the Romans, the “Francs”, the Arabs). Thus, in spite of the considerable cultural and ethnic diversity of France, represented by its division into the countries of the “langue d’Oïl” in the North and of the “langue d’Oc “in the South, it became a unified country by means of centralised rules that made no reference to ethnic belonging or foreign components. This myth of autochthony progressively came to characterise representations of the country, in opposition to various forms of cosmopolitanism. It is now a major source of inspiration for populist political parties (this conception of France is particularly used by the populist right wing politicians Marine Le Pen and Éric Zemmour; Wihtol de Wenden, 2004).

4.2 II – Citizenship and Migration in a Globalised World

Globalisation, as one of the main factors affecting mobility, also has an impact on the nature of citizenship, which was formerly mainly determined by nation states. The new gap that has emerged between a universal right to emigrate and a discretionary right to immigrate is creating a new disorder. Global inequality in terms of the right to mobility, depending on an individual’s nationality and passport, is leading to the emergence of various forms of citizenship, mostly as a result of localised negotiations, involving many possibilities for agency but also many exclusions (Wihtol de Wenden, 2013).

Many forms of transnational citizenship have appeared, with many forms of double presence, both at the national and international level. The concept of transnational citizenship also changes the definition of belonging. The hierarchy of citizenship is also challenged when new nationals go on to be considered as “others”, with a major segmentation between different statuses of nationals, just as can be observed in the case of citizenship in Europe. Indeed, we can observe a hierarchy with, at the top, nationals living in their country of origin, followed by nationals of other EU Member States, then long-term extra-European residents and statutory refugees, then short-term extra-European migrants, then asylum seekers and irregular migrants. More broadly, mobility weakens the relationship between the citizen and the state (Wihtol de Wenden, 2017).

The globalisation of migration has led to an evolution in the concept of citizenship. Citizenship was formerly confined to the nation state, linking the citizen to exclusive rights and duties towards the state of belonging. With increasing mobility, as well as multiple affiliations for those who are settled, new forms of citizenship continue to appear. These new forms of citizenship include multiple allegiances and policies in countries of both destination and departure that create links with their members. Meanwhile, debates and policies related to integration lead second generation migrants to rebuild their identities as citizens and nationals, while newcomers may be totally excluded (Leveau & Wihtol de Wenden, 2001).

4.2.1 Citizenship Challenged by Migration

Migration brings new challenges to established models of citizenship, owing to the increasing diversification and globalisation of migration, the new forms of dissociation that it creates between nationality and citizenship, and the emergence of transnational forms of citizenship that cross borders and mix identities.

4.2.1.1 Citizenship in a World of Mobility

Do migrants have access to a legitimate form of citizenship in a world on the move, where mobility is considered as an element of modernity and a factor of human development, but where those who remain in place have more rights than those who are mobile? The question is particularly pressing in the case of international migration, since many categories of migrants do not attain a legal existence in this mobile world. Some people wish to define mobility as a world public good (this is the aim of the GFMD, as announced by Kofi Annan in 2006; Badie et al., 2008), a new human right for the twenty-first century, while others consider that mobility is introducing disorder into the world of nation states.

Some countries, such as Canada and Australia, have built their history on migration and adapted their particular concept of citizenship in relation to newcomers, so as to build an identity based on migration and diversity. Many migrants do not have any citizenship status in the countries where they live. This includes undocumented people, refused asylum seekers, stateless people, and environmentally displaced persons. All of these categories of migrants disturb the order of nation states, whether as refugees, foreigners, Europeans, or double nationals; they transgress the link between nationals and their state, they do not belong to the nation state territory where they reside, they do not necessarily speak the national language (or languages), and they may not be involved in all the laws of the country. Conversely, the nation state loses its control over a part of its population, its borders, and more broadly over the population-state-territory nexus.

In matters of migration, citizenship cannot be considered in its traditional context (Castles & Davidson, 2000; Castles, 1997). Most previous research on migration and citizenship viewed the migrant as a future citizen in the country of destination, or as an actor in relation to the country of origin. Most migrants in Northern Europe effectively became second class citizens, or “denizens” (Hammar, 1990), even when they acquired local political rights without full citizenship. With globalisation, we are faced with segmented forms of citizenship, mostly belonging to a hierarchy, despite the fact that citizenship has been extended at the local level in some cases, and the fact that dual citizens can benefit from citizenship both in their countries of origin and of destination. Second generation migrants have also contributed to the emergence of new concepts of belonging, with multiple allegiances and transnational forms of citizenship, thanks to the international networks formed by diasporas. For many migrants, the “double absence” that was formerly experienced by migrant workers (Sayad, 1999), as a foreigner in both the country of origin and the country of destination, has now been transformed into a double presence, and they have been able to adopt mobility as a way of life, benefitting from systems of visas and free circulation. These new migrant citizens offer an example of citizenship based mainly on residence and participation, thereby dissociating citizenship from migration and introducing new values into the classical model of citizenship, such as those of anti-discrimination and diversity.

While the norm of the national order is the citizen living in the state in which they have citizenship and are resident, subject to the rights and duties defined by that state, the rules of belonging and allegiance are different for mobile populations, for whom the nation state is not significant (rejected asylum seekers, the stateless, irregular migrants, etc.). In other cases, allegiances and belonging have no meaning in countries where one can buy a passport or become a legal resident if one brings enough money, buys enough real estate property, or creates a company.

4.2.1.2 Dissociation Between Nationality and Citizenship

This dissociation between nationality and citizenship, created by the development of EU citizenship, but also by EU Member States that decided to grant local citizenship to foreigners, is one of the most important consequences of changes to models of citizenship in Europe (Wihtol de Wenden, 1997). Since 1975, systems for granting local political rights to all foreigners in Northern European countries (Sweden in 1975, Denmark in 1981, the Netherlands in 1985, Belgium in 2000, Switzerland in some places, such as Neuchâtel and Jura, and the UK for Commonwealth citizens) introduced the possibility of a dissociation between nationality and citizenship. 15 EU Member States out of 27 have granted local citizenship to extra-European nationals.

Meanwhile, all EU citizens living in an EU Member State other than their country of origin can be local citizens in that new country without being a national, if they participate as voters or as elected local representatives in political life. Conversely, in the past there were nationals who were not citizens, in the cases of criminal punishments, colonial indigenous statuses, reduced rights for women and the disabled, and military corps in France during the Third Republic.

These new forms of citizenship without nationality place emphasis on residence, local roots, participation in local politics, and multiple belongings. They are more inclusive, more detached from nationality rights and territories, and they further extend the limits of citizenship to include transnational links and networks between migrants, their countries of origin (if they continue to enjoy from national and local voting rights there), and their diasporas. They may give migrants greater influence both in their countries of origin and in receiving countries.

4.2.1.3 Extension of Jus Soli

Most EU Nation States (with the exception of Italy) have also granted access to citizenship for newcomers by adopting the principle of jus soli, rather than exclusively applying the principle of jus sanguinis, in order to be more inclusive to newcomers and their children born in the country of immigration. Rogers Brubaker (2000) has shown that rights of access to nationality and naturalisation policies have an impact on political integration for newcomers. There is, however, no compensation or reciprocity between countries that grant more access to citizenship rights and those that grant more access to local political rights: some countries that are reluctant to grant local citizenship also restrict access to nationality, while others grant easier access both to nationality and to local citizenship rights. Japan, while intending to grant some local political rights to foreigners, in fact makes it very difficult to access Japanese citizenship. Until 2000, Germany was reluctant both to develop local political rights for foreigners and to open nationality to residence criteria. On the contrary, New Zealand grants local political rights and is a country of jus soli.

4.2.1.4 Transnational Citizenship

Transnational migration has led to forms of transnational citizenship, with multiple allegiances and diasporic networks, giving rise to new forms of political influence and intrusion. This is sometimes used as a form of migration diplomacy by countries of origin that become diasporic states, such as the diplomacy conducted in Europe by Turkey or Morocco, whose migrants are spread across various EU Member States and develop networks through migration links. This transnational citizenship, studied by Rainer Bauböck (1994) and Yasemin Soysal (1994), shows the extent to which citizenship can be experienced and activated through migration. This expression of citizenship beyond borders enlarges the limits of the nation state, as an alternative to classical definitions of citizenship.

Transnationalism leads to a questioning of the dynamics of states, networks, and non-state actors. According to Bauböck (1994), citizenship is based on consensual belonging and free entry into transnational citizenship, owing either to escape or adhesion (according to Hirschman’s model; 1970). The right to mobility contradicts the link between the citizen and the state. In most examples, multiculturalism emerged from the failure of bi-national states (in the case of Canada) or the impossible dream of a homogeneous state (in the case of Australia). In many nation states, multiculturalism conflicts with a myth of national homogeneity, which derives from a constructivist approach developed in the late nineteenth century. In particular, the myth of autochthony is often so strong (such as in France, but also in Central and Eastern Europe) that it creates artificial internal borders built on ethnicity or religion, and suspects the “other” of maintaining dubious allegiances in contexts of international conflict (such as during the Dreyfus affair in 1898 in France). All immigration countries have some concerns about the assimilation or integration of foreigners, and multiculturalism was proposed as a model of citizenship and national identity. Multicultural citizenship has acquired some legitimacy in Europe (the value of “diversity” was inscribed in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007), Australia, Canada, and the US, and it may foster universal values such as anti-discrimination, cultural pluralism, dialogue between religions, hospitality, and living together. However, it continues to be strongly challenged by populist and far right political parties on the grounds of their concerns about national identities.

4.2.2 The Multiple Forms of Negotiated Citizenship

In the mid-twentieth century, the negotiation of new forms of citizenship acquired some legitimacy in countries that had already begun to define themselves as countries of immigration, such as Canada and Australia. In this process, an important role was played by transnational mobilisations that had been developed by migrants struggling to attain the desired legal status, as well as by associations and NGOs advocating for greater rights for migrants.

4.2.2.1 Dual Citizenship: An Individual Solution for Mobile Citizens

With globalised mobility, migrants are becoming actors in a multidimensional space. Experiencing mobility as a “double presence” requires access to dual citizenship, although this is prohibited by certain countries of origin. Many emigration countries, such as Turkey and countries of the Maghreb, were formerly opposed to dual citizenship but have now made this available to their departing nationals. Dual citizenship is now easier to obtain owing to the continuing application of jus sanguinis in Islamic emigration countries and to the extension of jus soli in immigration countries. In the past, former migrants were viewed as undeserving subjects or illegitimate citizens in their countries of origin when they acquired nationality in immigration countries. The acceptance of dual nationality by many emigration countries developed in the 1990s, when they started to understand the benefit that this could bring in terms of using their dual citizens to exert international influence on immigration countries (through the power of dual citizens as a voting bloc, as well as through networks of elites and diasporic associations). In the past, migrants who became nationals in immigration countries viewed their nationality in the country of origin as becoming dormant. Whereas, in the Cold War era, refugees obtained nationality in their countries of destination without maintaining any hope of returning to their country of origin, it later became possible for some refugees to return to their country of origin when, for example, a certain conflict had ended (this corresponds to the “cessation clause” defined in the Geneva Convention of 1951).

The concept of membership lies at the centre of the concept of dual citizenship. For the second generation, mobility becomes easier, more affordable (with the exception of some visas), and can be conducted through legal channels. While most of these new citizens simply consider themselves as citizens, they may also be viewed as a security threat in the context of Islamic attacks. When they act as professional soldiers in the army of their immigration country, they serve without any feeling of divided loyalty (Bertossi & Wihtol de Wenden, 2007) in conflicts in Islamic countries (Afghanistan, Iraq), but they are sometimes viewed with suspicion. For these migrants, dual citizenship is also a solution to the problem that the passport of their former country provided limited opportunities for mobility compared with “good” passports (European, American, Canadian, etc.).

4.2.2.2 Refugees

The other main type of agency developed by migrants is that of seeking refugee rights. The crisis of 2015 showed the importance of political asylum for those fleeing wars and conflicts, especially since access to EU Member States is very limited for those looking for work. Seeking asylum is therefore a form of agency leading to a legal status, in cases where the receiving state accepts the asylum seeker’s narrative of persecution. Many migration flows now appear to be mixed flows, since seeking asylum provides the only possibility to enter legally with no documents, in cases of emergency, and in the absence of possibilities for economic migration. For asylum applicants, choosing this route may lead to a restrictive access to refugee status and a politicisation of their profiles. In 2015, half of asylum seekers were accepted as refugees in Germany and 40% in France. In earlier decades (1980–2000), the refusal of refugee status was the norm, and acceptance was the exception. Compared with the Cold War period, when the rate of acceptance was very high because individuals were mostly considered as being victims of the communist world, newcomers since the 1990s have had less individualised profiles, but rather belonged to specific collective groups that have been persecuted by their state of origin or by civil society, owing to their ethnic, religious, or sexual characteristics, or their social categories. The refugee profile transcends the conceptual nexus of state-citizen-territory. As an international actor, the refugee is viewed as bringing disorder to the international order of nation states, while benefitting from a universal status. Other protections (provisional and humanitarian) are the result of negotiated agencies between states and NGOs. Sub-Saharan applicants generally have greater difficultly in being recognised as refugees, since they are widely viewed as false refugees by most nation states.

4.2.2.3 Environmentally Displaced Persons

Another form of agency is the international mobilisation to institute an official status for environmentally displaced persons. The term “environmentally displaced person” or “climate refugee” appeared at the end of the 1980s, mainly connected to climate change, although there are many other forms of environmental threat that can give rise to refugees. However, none of these conditions have been recognised with an international status. According to the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), there could be as many as 150 or 200 million environmentally displaced persons by the end of this century, but attempts to grant them an official status have failed because the UNHCR does not consider them as escaping from persecution. There is, however, some agency in this matter on the part of NGOs, although the migrants concerned are among the poorest in the world, and are widely dispersed all around the world. Bangladesh is one of the foremost countries to be threatened by large flows of environmentally displaced persons, and it has tried to direct its diplomacy in UN circles towards this issue. The variety of types of environmental threats also makes it difficult to develop an argument at the international level, although the question is far from being new (threats such as earthquakes, droughts, volcanic eruptions, and floods have always been a part of human history). Environmentally displaced persons usually seek protection at the regional level, and most look for shelter in their own country, so as to continue or regain their usual way of life. In all cases, the law has been unable to offer a solution to these new forms of forced mobility, since debate continues to be stalled by the question of the nature of these threats as “persecution”, and that of whether this migration is voluntary or forced.

4.2.2.4 Statelessness

Statelessness became a major problem at the international level after the First World War as a result of the collapse of several of the former Great Empires (the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire) and the expulsion of some minorities from new nation states. There are currently around 13 million stateless people living in the world, despite a UN international agreement of 1954 that aimed to reduce cases of statelessness. For example, the Rohingya in Bangladesh do not have any legal acceptance in this country, nor in Myanmar, where they come from. There are also stateless people in Africa (particularly the Great Lakes region) and in Europe (residents of the Helligen islands between Germany, Denmark, and the Baltic states, who were not granted European citizenship owing to their belonging to the Russian community and their inability to speak national Baltic languages –thus holding so-called “grey” passports). Most stateless people are refugees, but not all, since in some cases they have lived in the same place for a long time, and they have been made stateless by historic developments. Whereas a refugee has citizenship in their country of origin, a stateless person does not have any citizenship, and therefore lacks any diplomatic protection. Some stateless people are also victims of denationalisation procedures (when they have lost their nationality of the country of origin). There are global efforts to reduce the number of stateless people, but many states have no interest in this question.

4.2.2.5 Denizens

The term “denizens” was adopted by Tomas Hammar to describe foreigners (European or extra-European) who were denied full citizenship when they were granted local citizenship rights in the mid-1970s by Sweden. Many other EU Member States granted local citizenship to foreigners during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty extended these local rights to all EU citizens living in another EU Nation State, thus making non-nationals into citizens at the local level. However, for non-Europeans, the principle of “citizenship of residence” was gradually used to seek voting rights, as associations advocating for the defence of voting rights pointed out that those (non-Europeans) who had been settled for a long time were not allowed to vote at the local level, whereas short-term settled EU citizens were eligible to vote after only a short presence (Wihtol de Wenden, 1997). Many national constitutions were altered in order to introduce European and non-European citizenship into their rules relating to democracy and sovereignty.

4.2.2.6 Irregular Migrants, or “Illegals”

The last category includes all those who are refused any status of protection or link with the migration state: this includes refused asylum seekers, ill people without any protection, and people who were formerly unaccompanied minors but then reach the age of adulthood. There is a high degree of activism among these migrants and the human rights associations that support them, generally aimed at legalising irregular migrants or granting refugee status.

The role of political agency has been crucial during the last 30 years on several different fronts: defining a concept of citizenship dissociated from nationality, introducing the cultural values of diversity, cosmopolitanism and anti-discrimination, promoting a model of “good citizenship” through the acceptance of dual citizenship, naturalisation, and the legalisation of the undocumented, and struggling to make refugee status more accessible. In receiving countries, civil society has played an important role in defending access to rights, but this has always been a work in progress. In countries of origin, the emergence of forms of migration diplomacy in international forums has also led to greater inclusion for migrants.

The presence of “illegals” underscores the failure of states to control their borders at the global scale, and the lack of international governance on this issue. Human rights associations draw attention to the daily life of the so-called undocumented in camps, “jungles”, and other contexts of abject living conditions and social exclusion.

4.2.2.7 Citizens But Not True Citizens: Discrimination and Autochthony

What Michel Wieviorka defines as “differentialist racism”, and which other sociologists name “institutional racism from institutions of authority”, relates to discrimination based on denying citizenship to some citizens because they are considered as being illegitimate. In France, as in many immigration countries, some white, generally poor citizens claim that they are “true citizens”, owing to their roots in that country (in France, the term “Français de souche” is used in this context) (Wieviorka, 1994), in comparison with other citizens whom they consider as being “less French”, because they are visibly racialized, Muslim (although France is a secular country), and belong to a distinct group. The manifestations of institutional racism appear frequently: police discrimination leading to police violence committed by police officers towards visibly racialized people (especially young people walking in groups in inner city areas), discriminatory use of stop-and-search powers, systemic racist discourse related to the Algerian War, and confusion between individuals and the ethnic groups to which they are assumed to belong. Generalised fears become legitimised by instances of terrorism, urban riots, and problems within communities. A certain proportion of the population does not see the nation in terms of social and political cohesion, but in terms of a division between those who are truly French and those who are not. In the public sphere, there has long been a tolerance towards institutional racism committed by the police and the army. The UK and the US began to try to address problems of institutional discrimination earlier than in France, but it remains a problem in both cases (as highlighted by the case of the murder of George Floyd by a police officer, and the social divisions that it exacerbated) (Body-Gendrot & Wihtol de Wenden, 2014). Most immigration countries use ethnic statistics as a tool against these kinds of discrimination. In France, an increasing number of voices are arguing that this practice could help to fight against systemic discrimination. However, the Constitutional Council rejected this proposal in 2007, arguing that it would be contrary to the image of France as indivisible, and would therefore legitimate ethnic determinisms in a country which has never defined itself in terms of ethnic belonging. Since 2000, EU directives have prohibited discrimination, mainly at work, but street and institutional racism are still far from being recognised and punished.

4.3 Conclusion

The contradictions inherent in a world in which everything is free to circulate except humans have been analysed by Sigmunt Bauman, who refers to Kant’s definition of universal citizenship, while distinguishing between the right to visit and the right to settlement (Bauman, 2000). Citizenship becomes a problematic concept in a world characterised by mobility, since the classical definition of citizenship does not easily fit with this global context. Thanks to migration, debates on the various forms of citizenship, both above and below the level of the nation state, have been totally renewed.