Skip to main content

Threshold Private Set Intersection with Better Communication Complexity

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2023 (PKC 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13941))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Given \(\ell \) parties with sets \(X_1, \dots , X_\ell \) of size n, we would like to securely compute the intersection \(\cap _{i=1}^\ell X_i\), if it is larger than \(n-t\) for some threshold t, without revealing any other additional information. It has previously been shown (Ghosh and Simkin, Crypto 2019) that this function can be securely computed with a communication complexity that only depends on t and in particular does not depend on n. For small values of t, this results in protocols that have a communication complexity that is sublinear in the size of the inputs. Current protocols either rely on fully homomorphic encryption or have an at least quadratic dependency on the parameter t.

In this work, we construct protocols with a quasilinear dependency on t from simple assumptions like additively homomorphic encryption and oblivious transfer. All existing approaches, including ours, rely on protocols for computing a single bit, which indicates whether the intersection is larger than \(n-t\) without actually computing it. Our key technical contribution, which may be of independent interest, takes any such protocol with secret shared outputs and communication complexity \(\mathcal {O}(\lambda \ell {{\,\textrm{poly}\,}}(t))\), where \(\lambda \) is the security parameter, and transforms it into a protocol with communication complexity \(\mathcal {O}(\lambda ^2 \ell t {{\,\textrm{polylog}\,}}(t))\).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    All existing protocols can easily be adapted to output secret shares of the output instead of the output itself.

  2. 2.

    Throughout the paper we will use random functions for the sake of simplicity, but we stress that all of our constructions and arguments work equally well with pseudorandom functions, where the key is known to all parties.

  3. 3.

    This communication complexity can be obtained, without using fully homomorphic encryption, by using the construction of Ghosh and Simkin [GS19] in combination with an observation due to Badrinarayanan et al. [BMRR21].

  4. 4.

    We assume that the communication complexity is a deterministic function of the inputs and parameters of \(\varPi \).

References

  1. Branco, P., Döttling, N., Pu, S.: Multiparty cardinality testing for threshold private intersection. In: Garay, J.A. (ed.) PKC 2021. LNCS, vol. 12711, pp. 32–60. Springer, Cham (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75248-4_2

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  2. Badrinarayanan, S., Miao, P., Raghuraman, S., Rindal, P.: Multi-party threshold private set intersection with sublinear communication. In: Garay, J.A. (ed.) PKC 2021. LNCS, vol. 12711, pp. 349–379. Springer, Cham (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75248-4_13

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Cramer, R., Damgård, I.: Secure distributed linear algebra in a constant number of rounds. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 119–136. Springer, Heidelberg (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44647-8_7

    Chapter  MATH  Google Scholar 

  4. Dong, C., Chen, L., Wen, Z.: When private set intersection meets big data: an efficient and scalable protocol. In: Sadeghi, A.-R., Gligor, V.D., Yung, M., (eds.) ACM CCS 2013: 20th Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Berlin, Germany, 4–8 November 2013, pp. 789–800. ACM Press (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Duong, T., Phan, D.H., Trieu, N.: Catalic: delegated psi cardinality with applications to contact tracing. In: Moriai, S., Wang, H. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2020. LNCS, vol. 12493, pp. 870–899. Springer, Cham (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64840-4_29

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Freedman, M.J., Nissim, K., Pinkas, B.: Efficient private matching and set intersection. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 1–19. Springer, Heidelberg (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24676-3_1

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Ghosh, S., Simkin, M.: The communication complexity of threshold private set intersection. In: Boldyreva, A., Micciancio, D. (eds.) CRYPTO 2019. LNCS, vol. 11693, pp. 3–29. Springer, Cham (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26951-7_1

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Kolesnikov, V., Kumaresan, R., Rosulek, M., Trieu, N.: Efficient batched oblivious PRF with applications to private set intersection. In Weippl, E.R., Katzenbeisser, S., Kruegel, C., Myers, A.C., Halevi, S., (eds.) ACM CCS 2016: 23rd Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Vienna, Austria, 24–28 October 2016, pp. 818–829. ACM Press (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Kissner, L., Song, D.: Privacy-preserving set operations. In: Shoup, V. (ed.) CRYPTO 2005. LNCS, vol. 3621, pp. 241–257. Springer, Heidelberg (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/11535218_15

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Lindell, Y.: How to simulate it-a tutorial on the simulation proof technique. In: Tutorials on the Foundations of Cryptography, pp. 277–346 (2017)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Marlinspike, M.: The difficulty of private contact discovery (2014). https://www.whispersystems.org/blog/contact-discovery

  12. Meadows., C.A.: A more efficient cryptographic matchmaking protocol for use in the absence of a continuously available third party. In: Proceedings of the 1986 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, USA, 7–9 April, pp. 134–137 (1986)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Nagaraja, S., Mittal, P., Hong, C.-Y., Caesar, M., Borisov, N.: Botgrep: Finding P2P bots with structured graph analysis. In: 19th USENIX Security Symposium, Proceedings, Washington, DC, USA, 11–13 August 2010, pp. 95–110 (2010)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Pinkas, B., Rosulek, M., Trieu, N., Yanai, A.: SpOT-light: lightweight private set intersection from sparse OT Extension. In: Boldyreva, A., Micciancio, D. (eds.) CRYPTO 2019. LNCS, vol. 11694, pp. 401–431. Springer, Cham (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26954-8_13

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  15. Pinkas, B., Rosulek, M., Trieu, N., Yanai, A.: PSI from PaXoS: fast, malicious private set intersection. In: Canteaut, A., Ishai, Y. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2020. LNCS, vol. 12106, pp. 739–767. Springer, Cham (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-45724-2_25

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  16. Pinkas, B., Schneider, T., Segev, G., Zohner, M.: Phasing: Private set intersection using permutation-based hashing. In: 24th USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2015, Washington, D.C., USA, 12–14 August 2015, pp. 515–530 (2015)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mark Simkin .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 International Association for Cryptologic Research

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Ghosh, S., Simkin, M. (2023). Threshold Private Set Intersection with Better Communication Complexity. In: Boldyreva, A., Kolesnikov, V. (eds) Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2023. PKC 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13941. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31371-4_9

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31371-4_9

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-31370-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-31371-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics