Keywords

1 The Rise and Fall of the Concept of Value in Philosophy and Ethics – A Historical Problem Outline

Talk of values is so familiar and common in everyday speech that it must appear remarkable that the concept of value is rather marginal in philosophy and theology. Indeed, the concept of ‘value’ is a newcomer in philosophy and theology, in a sense even an upstart, having begun its rise in the middle of the nineteenth century. This was followed, from the middle of the twentieth century, by a fall every bit as swift. Both this short boom and the persistent relevance of values in everyday speech make sense when one considers the changed problematics of the situations in which axiology, or the philosophy of value, arose.Footnote 1 Philosophy adopted the concept of value from the field of political economy when the concept of goodness lost its integrative power as the importance of German Idealism waned after the death of Hegel, and the elements of that concept – being, truth, and beauty – entered the discourse as topics in their own right. A little more pointedly, one might say that Being no longer implied duty, nor truth and beauty, taking away the metaphysical correlation understood within idealism. Ever since, Being is understood as factuality with no inferred duty. Conversely, the concept of goodness, previously so central to philosophy, lost its ontological pre-eminence. This situation gives rise to various philosophies of value. Neo-Kantian philosophies of value assume, on the one hand, that values do not ‘exist’ but rather ‘apply’, whilst insisting, on the other hand, that they are something objective. Philosophies of value, which recognise not only ethical but also theoretical and aesthetic values, are chiefly an attempt to respond to the relativism that results from objectivity being reduced, more and more, to the factuality of Being. The surge of interest in the concept of value received a huge boost from Nietzsche’s provocative proclamation of the ‘revaluation of all values’ (Schnädelbach 1999: 197; 203–204), in which Nietzsche appears to expose all evaluations as subjective, voluntaristic determinations serving solely the advancement of the ‘will to power’. Philosophy of value, in contrast, justifies the objective validity of evaluations by these being derived from values which are in some way the preconditions for the possibility of those evaluations; the values are conceivable without reference to the subject to be valued. Here, already, we see the central problem that neither neo-Kantian philosophies of value nor Scheler’s phenomenological philosophy of value can convincingly solve: how, exactly, can we imagine an ‘ontological status’ for values that is distinct from both ‘Being’ and ‘Duty’? This unsolved ontological problem was, in the end, the point at which the philosophy of values failed. It was already mistrusted by contemporaries, such as Max Weber, who insisted that the sciences must be free from value judgement. Weber (2019) did, however, concede that the realm of evaluation continues to exist as the battleground of settlements.

The philosophy and ethics of values had lost their importance by the end of the 1950s at the very latest.Footnote 2 Admittedly, this debate left an unresolved problem which continued to be addressed, along lines that are significant to today’s research in the field of ‘values’, even if the concept of value is barely deployed at all in that research. With the resurgence of the empirical sciences, along with the philosophy of logical positivism and its successors in the philosophy of language, ethical statements – norms, commandments, prescriptions – were in danger of becoming the preserve of the non-scientific and the non-rational. How can one demonstrate that ethical norms are distinct from wishes and preferences, and that reasoned arguments can be made for or against their validity?

The ethical debate after the Second World War was thus focused, on the one hand, on the justification of ethical duty. On the other hand, however, there was criticism of the narrow concentration of ethics on duties and norms. The ‘revival of virtue ethics’ points to two weaknesses of deontological ethics and its concentration on rational justification: the rational justification of a norm may prove its validity, but it is not capable of motivating actual obedience. Norms, meanwhile, command the performance or cessation of certain acts, but are incapable of suggesting fulfilling life aims and lifestyles that are worth living. Here we have identified two subjects that bring us back to the concept of value, even when, as already stated, this features so rarely in the ethical discourse of philosophy and theology. Modern approaches to virtue ethics in fact address the question of motivation for ethical conduct along with the question of a life plan and the structure of an effective life. MacIntyre (1985) thus falls back on Aristotelian thinking to defend courses of action and life plans against the accusation of relativism. They are good, in the sense of virtuous, if they conform with the behavioural standards of a community, which is thereby seen as a moral community. Individual freedom takes a form that is worth living within the context of a community. Charles Taylor (1994), in contrast, abandons Aristotelian virtue Ethics, positioning his thoughts within the development of modern subjectivity. An individual behavioural approach can no longer simply derive from purportedly ‘objective’ precepts. Rather, a viable individual behavioural approach must be born out of authentic personal convictions. Having said that, authentic individual convictions themselves are not established purely by decision, but must also be recognised within a social setting, so that they are both socially embedded and individually authentic. Taylor draws here on Harry G. Frankfurt’s (1971) differentiation between first-order and second-order desire, which he develops as strong and weak evaluations. Weak evaluations, according to Taylor, are evaluations in which a person refers to their own desires and ranks, or prioritises them in order to realise them more successfully. In contrast, strong evaluations take place when a person judges their desires on a qualitative basis, assessing whether or not they are actually worthy of desiring, that is, if they are authentic desires. Strong evaluations give birth to a form of ‘moral map’, on the basis of which a person can assess their own conduct and life and judge whether they are following the path of their strong evaluations. They are thus capable of authentic self-evaluation rooted, ultimately, in their moral identity. The rationality of strong evaluations and moral maps is not to be understood in the same way as rational norms with their basis of logically compelling arguments. Rather, the rationality of moral maps and moral identities is to be understood historically. It is, in essence, connected with the personal identity, which Taylor understands intersubjectively: an individual identity develops in relationship with other individuals, to whom one relates by means of differentiation. Moral identities can only develop when they learn what can be adopted as meaningful, that is, they recognise the composition of the spectrum of possibilities for a meaningful and fulfilling life. At the same time, this implicitly includes the possibility of an individual life plan being recognised by others as meaningful and authentic. Communication about this is possible in the form of weak rationality, specifically by means of narrative, explanation, and validation, showing why particular desires and life goals appear as meaningful and attractive to someone. Hans Joas (2000) also builds on this last point, focusing on liberating values from the suspicion of both existential determination and a pure adoption of societal expectations. He, too, insists that values are something considered by someone to be valuable and important, and that this attribution of value is not trivial for the person concerned but rather of eminent importance, without which that person would not be who they are. In contrast to moral norms, however, the commitment to values is not seen as a limitation of freedom but indeed as the exact opposite, a gain in freedom, because the committed attribution of value opens up attractive ways of living. The commitment to values takes place not as a consequence of a decision or of compelling argumentation. Rather, it is the attraction of the value itself that drives the commitment, triggered by an experience in which this value, in some way, imposes itself. Joas characterises this as a combination of self-formation and self-transcendence: a person commits to values that they experience as valuable and attractive, and at the same time transcends themselves, because the experience of values is connected with the fact that the values are, so to speak, valuable ‘in themselves’. This means that the experience that they are valuable for me is connected with the fact that their value does not absorb in it, but goes beyond me and my way of life. The association with experience thus both ensures the significance for the individual and establishes a situation in which it is possible to discuss values. Joas calls this ‘value generalization’ (Joas 2013: 178–181). Because values are connected to experience, which subjectively guarantee their significance for the individual, and because these experiences can be narrated, the conviction of value can be shared and made comprehensible intersubjectively. Underlying this is an awareness that values expressed in abstract terms (such as freedom, tolerance, recognition, a love of peace) may be validated by a multitude of experiences, and that this may be the basis for generalisation of values.Footnote 3

With this survey of contemporary thinking on values, we have reached a point in the discourse where there is a solid conceptual basis for the European debate on values whilst specific questions remain open. The insights attained include, first, that values are always the values of someone who appreciates them and finds them attractive. Second, values are not to be equated simply with desires or preferences; rather, they are those convictions that are critically applied to one’s own desires and conduct. Values express the aspirations one has for one’s own actions, not because of any rational requirement or societal expectation, but because they form part of an authentic self-image. And in this way, values are, third, intrinsically connected with a person’s moral identity. This does not, however, imply that the only values that are authentic are those with which one differentiates oneself from others. Shared values may be based on shared or common experiences; shared values may also arise in the course of value generalisation, if the sharing of different experiences leads to shared value convictions. The unresolved questions are related to the fact that, until now, we have only considered values from an individual perspective: what are the value convictions of a single person? First, it is, however, not clear if there are also collective values, and, if so, if they arise in any way other than as the aggregation of individual values. Do communities also have values of a different nature to the individual, in a sense private, values of their members? Or do members in their role as citizens have independent values? Ultimately, this is suggestive of the quasi-objectified values in state institutions – for example, in constitutional and legal systems and in the structures of the welfare state. Second, consideration must be given to the relationship of collective experiences and narrative to values. The historical experiences of the peoples of Europe are indeed very different, and their views of history and of themselves are shaped by their respective narratives. What does this mean for shared values and for the possibility of value generalisation? Third, a weighty question relating to the legitimacy of values remains to be addressed. It is, in the end, conceivable that even authentic values may be morally worthless, and experience may cause very different values to be subjectively plausible. How is value criticism and justification that does not take the form of a mere external set of demands for value convictions possible? And we have not yet even looked at the concrete values that form the primary focus of European value discourse. Value discourse does, in fact, also encompass competing values – freedom and authority, human rights and traditional values, individuality and loyalty to the community. And where the values themselves are not contested, the frameworks of the cultural and/or religious world views in which they are defined and interpreted are. What role can shared values play in a modern Europe, culturally pluralist and socially diverse, where we must expect that values will always be contested? In this setting, a reflective examination of the political context and function of the European value discourse is essential.

2 The Political Context of the European Value Discourse

The motivation behind the question posed by the European Values Study (EVS) on shared values in Europe is not purely academic; there is a political context here. The study is about the foundations of a European cohesion, which in its turn may serve as the basis for the political community of the European Union – however one may choose to define the nature of this community. Behind the scenes of the enquiries into European values there are continual negotiations about whether there is a basis for the political integration of the European states, how robust this basis is, and how political processes have in turn influenced the value convictions of the citizens of Europe over the decades during which these studies have been conducted. The implicit assumptions deserve to be clearly stated. First, it is taken as given that the foundations for political integration are to be found at the level of individual attitudes and convictions (rather than being primarily located at the level of the member states). Second, it is taken that the issue is the values of the citizens (rather than their interests, fears, cultural conditioning, or experiences). Finally, and this is perhaps not quite as obvious, the focus is also on the potential reciprocal interplay between values and European political developments: on the one hand, we have values underlying and (more or less) supporting political integration, and, on the other hand, we have the processes of European and national politics influencing values, changing, strengthening, or weakening the commonalities within the value profiles of the European people. These interrelationships will be discussed below from the perspective of philosophical and theological research on Europe. How can we interpret the cohesion of Europeans which supports and bears European integration into a European Union – a precarious cohesion, for it is historically not at all obvious but rather extremely improbable? Why is such cohesion expected from something as vague as ‘values’?

The rest of this analysis shall proceed as follows. First, the discussion of European values is placed within the conceptual concept of the debate about the political identity of ‘imagined communities’ – for in the context of European integration the question of European values is about the identification of the citizens with the ‘project’ of European unification, which is the argument of this chapter; put simply, it is about the European (political) identity. Next, this is then sketched historically on the basis of two questions. When did the subject of a European identity appear on the European political stage? What are the terms of the discussion around this identity? As will be shown, the subject of identity came to be articulated in a semantic of values relatively late. This historical survey of the discourse will then be subject to a brief evaluation in terms of the specific European values identified in the political discourse and how the function of these values and the value discourse are to be judged. Following from this, a number of systematic questions will be discussed. What is the level of tension between universality and particularity within ‘European values’? What is the relationship between the obviously politically normative value discourse and empirical value research? How can the normative function and potential power of European values be determined between the moralisation of politics and the trivialisation of ethics? The chapter concludes with an outlook encompassing the current plight of the European Union and the challenges for a European ‘political imaginary’ (see Castoriadis 1987).

3 The European Union as an ‘Imagined Community’

One of the philosophical and sociological insights of the last century is that a political community is not a ‘natural’ entity that exists, in a sense, in and of itself; rather, states and communities must be understood as contingent (see, for example, Langewiesche 2000; Paul 2020; Wimmer 2013; Yack 2012). This means that political units are not self-explanatory but essentially require explanation. This has been demonstrated primarily using the example of the modern state. The concept of nation is, in Benedict Anderson’s influential term, an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 2006). The number of members is too large for cohesion to arise from personal connections. Furthermore, the division of labour in a modern community means that the members are primarily connected with one another by means of anonymous cooperative relationships. As a consequence, the cohesion must refer to imagined commonalities. These mental concepts – a shared history, a common culture, an essence that binds – are historical in nature: they are subject to transformation, they arise and change on the tide of social and economic processes, reflecting in part profound cultural images. It would appear obvious to interpret them as constructions produced by social discourse processes. This draws attention to the fact that they are, on the one hand, the result of supra-individual developments, reflecting economic, cultural, and general social change, and, on the other hand, also influenced by social discourse, the object of, as a rule, mediated disputations. These disputations are eminently political in the sense that they are concerned with defining the ‘Us’ by means of outward, and often also inward, demarcation. Belonging to a political community, and demarcation as separate from those who do not belong, is in itself a political process. It is plain to see, in the light of European history, that this can take on extremely violent characteristics. We will return to this when we examine the function of values in this context.

Before this, however, it is worth noting that one cannot assume that cohesion will ever be completely beyond dispute in modern societies. Rather, the questions of the purpose of a polity, the interpretation of one’s own history, and the legitimate focus of an appreciative relationship to the polity – that is to say, of the identification as a citizen with the polity – are always contested. These questions are fundamental, politically and ethically, because they exist at the level of facilitating bases for a democratic society and a democratic political structure. In this context, French intellectual Ernest Renan spoke of the ‘plébiscite de tous les jours’ (Renan 1882), a general desire to belong and to assume the role of citizen in mutual recognition. Renan can be interpreted as saying that democratic culture is a demanding form of society and government, as it does not arise from cultural necessity and is not stabilised by fear and compulsion (as a dictatorship). Rather, it depends upon the active, if not always express, resolution (in the sense of an attitude of resoluteness) of its citizens in favour of this specific polity. In contrast to the role of a simple subject, democracy requires a decisive commitment of the citizens to their own role. And this incorporates the recognition, at least implicitly, of a shared responsibility for the polity. Where this fails, the erosion of the democratic society cannot be resisted: the democratic is in a sense always fragile.

These insights are probably more relevant now than it could have appeared in the decades after 1989, when Europeans celebrated the expansion of democracy in Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Today, democracy is no longer unchallenged, either in Europe or globally; on the contrary, it is competing with other social systems which represent variants of authoritarian regimes. Democracy and democratic attitudes are at present not uncontested within Europe. For the European Union, the problem of the ‘imagined community’ is compounded. We assumed that a political community depends on an idea of belonging. This is relevant to the European Union insofar as it is intended to represent a political unit and not just an economic system. It is not clear, however, which of the familiar, culturally defined concepts of imagining oneself is suited to producing a vision of society with a genuine sense of European cohesion. Popular concepts such as people (‘ethnos’) and nation are not viable, for there can be no question of the existence of a European nation or a European people. Rather, there are many European peoples and nations, namely the member states. While there is some dispute as to what exactly the European Union should represent, whether it is a confederation, a federal state, or a political unit ‘sui generis’, there is no doubt that it is built on the foundation of the member states and their peoples; it does not supplant them. There is no European supra-nation. It is the contention of this chapter that European values, and the characterisation of the European Union as a community of values, can in a sense fill the void, providing the concept for imagining a political European cohesion. As will be shown, however, values are in no way the most obvious candidate for this role, representing instead a compromise solution. Whether, and to what extent, values may provide a viable foundation for European unity, shall ultimately be a matter for discussion.

4 Historical and Political Contextualisation in European Integration After 1945

It is interesting to note that ‘values’ in no way played a continuous central role in European integration after 1945 (see Weymans in this volume). This becomes clear when examining treaties and other official documents, analysing the semantics used where the motivations, goals, and foundations for European integration are described. Such political, programmatic statements are found mostly, although not exclusively, in the preambles to the treaties. Initially, in fact, values are barely mentioned in a specific way, with value semantics only becoming established relatively late in the official European discourse, so that at the end the European Union is described as a ‘community of values’. Three phases of varying lengths can be identified with reference to values in significant documents of European unification: a short first phase, driven by political motivation, from 1948 to 1954; a longer phase focused more on economic and technocratic integration, where values play a reduced role; and finally, a third phase from around 1990 until the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), where European values become a central point of reference for discussions of European unification.Footnote 4

4.1 Values in the Context of the Far-Reaching Integration Plans 1948–1954

In Europe, the years following the Second World War were characterised on the one hand by the establishment of geopolitical blocks, resulting in the division of Europe and the Cold War. The establishment of these blocks, on the other hand, led to the Western integration of the states of Western Europe, first and foremost the Federal Republic of Germany, with wide-ranging consequences for the economic and social reconstruction of Western Europe and the political integration of the democratic states. This situation allowed the pan-European movements, most of which traced their beginnings to the time before the Second World War, to significantly bolster the case for European integration (Gilbert 2012: 16–20; Maras 2021; Schmale 2019). The years 1948–1953 seemed to be completely driven by European unification, even to the point of a European Federation – admittedly in terms primarily of Central and Western Europe. The Council of Europe was founded in 1948, conceived as a nucleus for a federated Europe, followed in 1951 by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and, a short time later, the European Political Community, intended to incorporate both the ECSC and a European Defence Community (Volkmann and Breccia 1985; Loth 2015: 20–74). These plans collapsed in 1954 when the French national assembly said no to the European Political Community. For the purposes of our question, however, we can clearly state that, first, the plans for European unification in the early phase after the Second World War were aimed at quite extensive political integration and in no way purely economic, and, second, that reference to European values was very much present. A look at the Council of Europe, established as a step towards European unification, is worthwhile in this context. The preamble to the Statute includes the words:

Reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy. (Council of Europe 1949)

Admittedly, it soon became clear that the United Kingdom would not itself participate in European integration within the Council of Europe. In view of the apparent willingness of the US and the UK to agree to German rearmament, France adopted a change of strategy to protect itself from a militarily and economically reinvigorated Germany. French and German heavy industry was to be placed under the control of a joint authority and thus outside national control. This approach – the Schuman Plan – instigated the ECSC, established by treaty in 1951. The preamble to that treaty states:

Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared. (Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 1951)

Again, in the Treaty Establishing the European Defence Community, the signatory states refer to ‘the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples’ (Preamble, fifth recital). Considered in the context of our question as to the evaluative concepts underlying the ideas of European unification, these statements from the treaties afford various observations. First, the goal of ensuring peace in Europe and in the world is repeatedly singled out. This is contrasted with ‘age-old rivalries’ and ‘bloody conflicts’. Undoubtedly, this can be explained in terms of the situation in the immediate post-war period and the Cold War. Second, the treaties – with the exception of the ECSC Treaty – refer to the topos of shared spiritual and moral values, understood as a ‘common heritage’. Alongside the semantics of value, reference is also made to principles and ideals, which are largely used synonymously. It is true that these shared values are not seen as a secure foundation for unification but rather as endangered; unification itself is intended to protect and uphold this heritage of values. As such, they are far more a motivation for unification as a prerequisite. Third, the treaties mentioned present themselves as part of a long line of steps towards a more united Europe, equipped to face a ‘shared destiny’. The European ‘community of destiny’, then, is not a diagnosis of the times from which we infer integration; rather, it is of the future, something aimed for by bringing the political fields in question under communitarian control. Fourth, it is not at all clear what constitutes the European heritage and what the spiritual and moral values consist of. Faith and intellectual traditions such as religion, Christianity, the Enlightenment, and human rights – things that will later become very controversial – are not mentioned. Where values and principles are mentioned, they can best be seen as an open list, at the head of which are individual and political freedom, peace, democracy, and the rule of law. More clarity appears unnecessary in this historical situation, as the meaning was to an extent self-evident for the signatory states to these treaties: the overthrow of communism/Stalinism and fascism.

4.2 The Phase of Economic Integration and the Gradual Recognition of a Value Vacuum

After the unification ambitions centred on the Council of Europe and the European Defence Community and European Political Community failed in 1954, sector-based economic integration shaped the path out of a political dead end. This approach dealt considerably more gently with the national sovereignty of the treaty states. Following the example of the ECSC, the treaties signed in Rome in 1957 established the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). Free trade, customs union, and the harmonisation of social laws were pursued, things favourable to an open market with cross-border competition. In accordance with this reorientation, the leadership role passed from the pan-European movements to the experts in economic and administrative processes – European civil servants and parliamentarians. This was the age of the European technocrats (Joerges and Vos 1999). These communities could in fact be seen as further steps towards European unification, but this was only addressed in a very reserved way in the treaties. Both the EURATOM and EEC treaties are completely silent on the subject of values, and they do not focus on principles or ideals. In their place we find aims and purposes which are closely focused on the respective treaty objects. Overarching aims are limited to expanding prosperity and furthering economic and social progress, and even peace in Europe is given a subordinate place if mentioned at all. This represents a significant change from the mood in earlier years and the tone of the early treaties. Of the three regimes, the EEC is the most important and at the same time the most functional and sober; many see it as a pure partnership of convenience. During this phase, the idea of a political community appears for the most part absent from the political arena.

As Thomas (2006) has shown, however, this changed during this phase in which ‘Europe’ was largely understood as an economic project. This arose as a consequence of various applications to join or associate with the EEC lodged by non-democratic governments. On the matter of conditions of admission, Article 237 of the EEC Treaty states tersely that: ‘Any European state may apply to become a member of the Community’. Initially, only economic criteria were discussed as conditions of admission. This changed in 1962 when Spain, at the time still ruled by Franco, applied for association, with the goal of later taking out full membership. Driven by economic interests, most EEC member states, above all France and Germany, were positively inclined towards the Spanish application. Resistance was voiced only by members of the European Parliamentary Assembly, particularly the Social Democrats and Socialists. The question now needed to be addressed as to whether membership of the EEC could be considered purely on the basis of economic fit and economic interests, or whether in fact the European communities should see themselves, beyond this, as an alliance of democratic states with a shared, solid, and ultimately normative concept of state and society. In 1961, the Political Commission of the European Parliamentary Assembly established a working group to look into this matter. This produced the Birkelbach Report, named after the group’s chair. The report’s recommendations included the following conditions of admission: a democratic form of government, respect for human rights, and recognition of the principles of the rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. Unions and civic groups also participated in the subsequent political discussion. In view of the problem that the EEC Treaty was silent on these conditions of admission, other sources were cited in the debate. These included the constitutions of the EEC member states, with a consensus on the principles mentioned: was it not then clear that those principles must also apply to European integration? In addition, the preamble to the EEC TreatyFootnote 5 and the Statute of the Council of Europe took on the character of reference texts containing the foundational political principles of European unification, already recognised by the member states. In October 1962, the Commission deferred the Spanish application. In the years that followed, this fundamental argument about the political nature of the EEC and its associated values resurfaced several times – for example, when the EEC suspended its Association Agreement with Greece after a military junta overthrew the democratic government in Athens in 1967 (Thomas 2006: 86–87; De Angelis and Karamouzi 2017).Footnote 6

Even in this second phase, where values scarcely played a role in the political debate, various observations may be made. First, it is clear that the fundamental self-image of European integration as a political process amongst democratic states had to fight for acceptance. The system integration, implemented by technocrats, had left the normative political questions implied by integration undefined. At issue was the insight that even as an economic partnership of convenience, the EEC is at the same time an alliance of democratic states and that membership therefore requires more than mere economic fit. Second, such fundamental normative expectations of political action can only be effective when they are discussed and demanded in parliamentary forums and in public. Civil society, in this case unions and exile groups, must join the debate. Third, the debate reveals the significance of reference texts. In this case, these were the Preamble to the EEC Treaty and the Statute of the Council of Europe. The public debate requires recognised points of reference for discussions of the expectations and the reality of political processes. Finally, it must be pointed out that European unification was not ‘always’ a value-based process. Rather, this insight had to assert itself. Only through a public political process could it be established that European integration, initially an economic nexus of increasing depth and expanding membership, is also a political project, and that this project must reflect the values that define its member states as (Western) democracies. The European Community (EC) becomes a community of values to the extent that this insight shapes political debate and political reality. Looking back, this can be recognised in the formative period of this second phase. Value semantics are not at the core but rather secondary. ‘Values’ were still a conservative issue. This did not change until the 1970s, when the transformation of values in Western societies and social pluralism became topics of debate.Footnote 7

4.3 Reunified Europe’s New Interest in Values

The third phase must therefore be understood in the context of a generally increased awareness of values. This can also be seen in the growing importance of value semantics in European political and institutional discourse. The period from the late 1980s to the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) was shaped by sweeping political events and developments. Above all, of course, there were the events of 1989. As the division of Europe came to an end, the international balance of power shifted. By this time, after several rounds of expansion, the EC already encompassed 12 members. It soon became clear that the states of Central and Eastern Europe saw their future ‘within Europe’. The eastward expansion to 25 states, completed in 2004, was thus already under way from 1989. Other decisive events include the Balkan wars from 1991 to 1995 (Bosnia) and to 2001 (Kosovo, Macedonia): war and conflict were taking place in the heart of Europe. These wars posed far-reaching questions for the peace narrative of European unification. What do commitment to peace and striving for peace mean in such circumstances? What can the basis and criteria be for taking sides and possibly even engaging militarily for humanitarian purposes? (Glasius and Kaldor 2006; Hayden 2013). Two distinct lines of discourse come together in this context: the question of a ‘European identity’ and the question of the constitutive values and principles of European unification.

Interestingly, the topic of European identity entered the political stage in 1973 with the Copenhagen ‘Declaration on European Identity’ published by the nine EC foreign ministers (Copenhagen European Summit of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 1973). In view of the developing aim to steer Europe towards a non-economic area of activity, specifically foreign affairs, the member states felt the need to formulate the foundations of such political harmonisation. The declaration was targeted both inwards, for the political discussions within the member states, and outwards, for partner states with whom the EC wished to manage its relationships. After the disagreements of the past, according to the statement the unity of the EC member states was now built on values arising from a shared heritage which should now also form the basis of further shared trade:

The Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety of their national cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity. (Copenhagen European Summit of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 1973: I.1)

Combining unity with cultural and national diversity was thus declared to be a special feature of European identity. The connection was particularly influential in the budding field of European cultural politics. This encompassed practical matters such as extensive cultural exchange and the selection of a succession of cities as ‘European Capital of Culture’ (Patel 2014) as well as symbolic matters, with a flag, anthem, and other political symbols bringing a tangible experience to unity and cohesion in diversity. In this context, the ‘European heritage’ and European values take on the function of statements of a political identity, that is, they should enable, support, and strengthen the identification of citizens with an imagined European community.

The other line of discourse – the question of constitutive values and principles for membership in the EC and EU – also increasingly relates to values. At the end of this discourse narrative, the European community of values became an established expression and a statement of identity. The ‘Austrian Crisis’ in the year 2000 served as a catalyst for this development (Karlhofer 2001). The 14 other EU members considered it necessary to take diplomatic measures against Austria when a government including the right-wing FPÖ party came to power there for the first time in 2000. The reaction in other member states, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council, and also in Israel was characterised by unease and outrage when this populist party, associated with xenophobic, racist, and antisemitic polemics, joined the government of a member state. Could this be reconciled with the spirit and values of European unification? Was this not in conflict with the foundational principles of the EU? After a great deal of outrage and diplomatic escalation, the decision to de-escalate was taken and a report commissioned from a committee of ‘wise men’. On the basis of this report, the measures were revoked in 2000. The whole process significantly invigorated the debate on European values and the EU as a community of values (Hummer and Pelinka 2002; Mandry 2009a: 93–96). At the heart of the dilemma was the fact that, on the one hand, it was considered problematic when a (democratically legitimised) party of government in a member state openly campaigned against migrants, minorities, and European integration, whilst on the other hand EU law did not provide any means of imposing official sanctions. The constitutional law of the EU clearly did not allow for action against a member state whose political direction was seen to be irreconcilable with the values, ideals, and principles of Europe. Two issues were now in need of clarification. First, what exactly constituted the values of Europe? Second, rules and processes for situations of conflict had to be developed and incorporated in EU law. In clarifying the question of values, the EU treaties, the Statute of the European Council, and the European Convention on Human Rights again played an important role. The report of the ‘wise men’ had already comprehensively established the role of these reference texts; methodologically, it continued the approach of the aforementioned Birkelbach Report. From these texts, and from the draft of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,Footnote 8 produced at the same time, the discussion distilled those principles of EU constitutional law already accepted and seen as constitutive into a set of values to serve as the foundation for membership in the EU and for the cohesion of the EU itself. Reference texts thus once again played a decisive role in the debate. Furthermore, rather than principles and values existing alongside one another, the value semantic now took pre-eminence. The official description of the EU as a ‘Community of Values’ is firmly established.

The values of the Union were once again discussed in detail during the EU constitutional convention, which met from 2002 to 2003 to produce a coherent constitutional treaty for the EU. At this time, there was already wide-ranging agreement on these values; the disagreements were primarily related to embedding the values in an overarching historical, religious, and world view setting in the preamble. We will return to this discussion briefly later. In the end, the Article in the constitutional treaty containing the values of the Union was incorporated unchanged in the Treaty of Lisbon. Ever since, the EU treaty has stated that:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. (TEU: Art. 2)

The treaty convention represents the high point to date in debates on European values. Intensive parliamentary, political, and public discussions explored how to comprehend the value foundations of Europe, and the extent to which they present an evaluative basis for affirming European unification as a political project. This question may remain controversial, as was already seen when referenda in France and the Netherlands rejected the constitutional treaty. Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the ‘European values’ are a significant point of reference in European debates about the Union. Can the EU essentially be accepted as a political unit above the many European states? Do European values describe an attractive political model worthy of affirmation and, if necessary, defence (Voßkuhle 2018; Koskelo 2020)? And finally, do the politics of the EU actually honour these values? Since 2003, this last function has been the most frequently invoked, calling on European values as a critical standard for specific policy (Ferreira et al. 2016). Examples include the EU’s refugee and migration policy (Ceccorulli and Fassi 2022), international trade and development policy, and foreign and security policy (Merkl and Koch 2018).

5 Analysis: European Community of Values

In European values and the concept of a community of values, the European value discourse has found a political and ethical solution for a political problem. The challenge was to make a political community conceivable that was solid and robust enough to form a basis for the acceptance and affirmation of a democratic, supranational European Union. The community of values is intended to characterise the ‘we’ of Europeans, mutually recognising one another as citizens of the EU; only in this way can the EU function as a democratic system rather than merely an economic partnership of convenience. The extent to which the adoption of European values for this purpose is a compromise solution remains to be determined, however. The answer to this question is twofold. The first part has already been mentioned: the European values were all that remained when the alternatives for this function had been eliminated. In political imagination, other dimensions normally play the decisive role in constituting the ‘we’. First and foremost, one turns to the nation, a unifying history, a common culture, and language. A European nation and a common language can be discounted immediately; it is less clear with a common European culture and European history. There has indeed been a lot of discussion about both, most recently in the context of the European constitutional convention. We can only look at the result of the debates here. In terms of culture, there were two discursive problems. The first was that, whilst everyone assumes the existence of a shared or unifying European culture, it is very difficult to reach a consensus about what it actually is. Many cultural assets were discussed: Greek philosophy, Roman law, Gothic architecture, European networks of art and literature, Europe’s classical music, the culture of the Enlightenment, Jewish and Christian faith traditions, and much more. But what is actually characteristic of European culture? The problem is not that it is notoriously difficult to reduce culture to content, but rather that European culture is so diverse that the identification of specific cultural assets or traditions would necessarily have inserted a hierarchy into this variety. To put it another way: ‘culture’ is not viable as an imagined basis for political cohesion because it is associated with ideas of centre and periphery. The second problem here is that it is hardly possible to keep religious traditions out of European culture, but the importance of religion in general, and of Christianity in particular, is one of the most controversial topics in European discourse. The double ‘preamble battle’ during the two European conventions (on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and on the Constitution) showed that it is simply impossible to formulate a consensus on the ‘cultural roots’ of Europe or of European values, because the discourse participants, depending on their point of view, either insisted on incorporating the recourse to religion or religions or insisted on not doing so (Schlesinger and Foret 2006; Leustean and Madeley 2009; Barbulescu and Andreescu 2009; Mandry 2009b). In the end, the only solution was to not mention any cultural, religious or world view tradition in the preamble.

The second part of the answer is that ‘values’ are particularly suitable as a compromise solution, because they make it possible to avoid the conflict over the differences just outlined. Values such as human dignity, freedom, equality, and the rule of law are attractive and sufficiently profound, and at the same time abstract. Taken together, these characteristics make them amenable to being perceived as the result of varying cultures and traditions. In a sense, the value semantic builds a discursive bridge between different notions of European culture because it can be conceived as the abstraction of the moral content of very different traditions. It is also striking that pluralism, tolerance, and non-discrimination were all given prominent positions in the list of European values. It has already been pointed out several times that the self-image regarding foundations for cohesion in modern societies will always remain controversial. Values such as tolerance, pluralism, and non-discrimination attain their significance specifically in such societies and for such discourses. For as ‘differential values’ or ‘meta values’, they are values for conducting controversial discourse, such as discourse about values, culture, and history (Mandry 2009a: 215–222). As such, they must therefore be considered amongst the fundamental values of a democratic and pluralist polity, in stark contrast to authoritarian regimes, where they have no place.

In this context, we can now explore the discourse context between European values and European history. During the Constitutional Convention, as well as elsewhere in the European identity debates, the reference to history has played an eminent role. European unification is understood both as a consequence of the cataclysmic martial past with its dictators and totalitarianism, and as a guarantor against a relapse into the violent resolution of conflicts and anti-democratic activity. Between 1989 and the early 2000s, this was the dominant Europe-wide narrative, a continuation of the beginnings of the pan-European movement immediately after 1945. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, European values appeared evident, and for the Central and Eastern European politicians of that time (and that generation), returning to Europe meant reconnecting with cultural and civil common ground that had been so violently torn away, politically expressed through democracy, the rule of law, human rights, equality, etc. Admittedly, it was already plain to see that the historical experiences of the various European societies were very diverse. It did indeed make a difference whether a country found itself east or west of the Iron Curtain, and whether, in the Second World War, a country had caused or experienced occupation, devastation, and the extermination of large portions of the population. The value discourse, and the self-description of Europeans within the ideal of the community of values, made it possible to bring these diverse experiences and narratives together at a more abstract level. As different as the experiences may be in detail, they are nevertheless intertwined as the experiences of Europeans, and they can be narrated in such a way as to lead to a better, more attractive future, subject to European values. Thus, European political identity is indeed characterised essentially by demarcation; yet this demarcation is first and foremost not a demarcation from that which is outside, but rather a demarcation from internal history, the dark sides of which are to be kept at a distance. In the sense of Joas, we have thereby achieved a value generalisation.

Today, separated from the debates of the European Constitutional Convention by almost 20 years, we can see that the roof of European values, arched above the differences between the EU’s member states, is fragile (see Polak Chap. 2 in this volume). European values are undoubtedly an important pillar in the European self-understanding, and it is scarcely possible to conceive of the constructive-critical Europe discourse without the EU’s expectation of itself to be a community of values. The fact that the zeitgeist has changed cannot be ignored, however. Today, it would perhaps not be possible to achieve the same level of consensus on the foundational values of Europe and the EU. This is also related to the fact that history has not stood still, and Europeans have had new experiences of membership. The experiences in the individual member states are not only very different; they are also narrated in different ways. For the experiences of the present continue and extend the prior narratives. We can see here that political processes such as globalisation, with its competitive pressure and the relocation of jobs, along with migration within and to Europe, are experienced very differently and framed in very different narratives. In particular, the migrations of the period 2010–2015 have touched on the understanding of sovereignty in many states, making a lasting impact on political debate (Krastev 2017). The strengthening of populist forces in almost all EU member states, and the right-wing governments in Poland and Hungary, with their EU-critical programmes, clearly show that the European values have lost some of the historical experiential justification. In the context of the Russian attack on Ukraine and the very different political reactions in Poland and Hungary, it is clear that there is far more at play here than just the political stability of the EU – namely, the continued existence of a free and democratic Europe. Without a commitment to hold fast to European values, and to strive for them, this will not be possible. For the history of European integration is identical to the expansion and establishment of democracy in Europe. The European values are therefore not just some picturesque element in an elite European discourse, merely camouflaging a realpolitik with very different motives; rather, they form the absolute political and ethical foundation for responsible, liberal politics.

6 Universal Values? An Outlook

Finally, we need to return to a question posed at the beginning, namely, the tension between the universality and particularity of European values (see Polak, Chap. 2, this volume). On the one hand, values could appear insurmountably particular. This is related to their being grounded in experience, and to the fact that values do not exist without people that appreciate them and make them a component of their own (individual) identity. In the case of European values, which we have characterised as political values, there is the additional matter of them motivating European cohesion. The EU, however, is a particular political community. On the other hand, the European values such as human dignity, democracy, freedom, and human rights are in essence universal values, and there is no sense in attempting to claim them as in some way European cultural assets or particularly European characteristics. If, however, they are universal, how can they serve as central points of reference for the particular European political identity? This tension is, however, very easily resolved. We have already shown above, with Joas, that values as abstract concepts point beyond the experiences that make them so valuable for an individual or a community. As soon as they are expressed as values, the claim is also expressed that they are valuable for others and could be connected with their experiences, too. This applies even more to those values whose attractiveness inherently encompasses the claim of universality, as is the case with human dignity, freedom, and human rights. The fact that universal values are adopted and appreciated on the basis of particular experiences is thus not contradictory but in fact logical. In a somewhat different way, this also applies to the question as to whether, and how, universal values can in fact be central to a particular identity or a particular community. As was shown with reference to Taylor and Frankfurt, strong evaluations are qualitative (moral) assessments of one’s own desires, judging them on the basis of authenticity, that is, whether they genuinely belong to the self-image of a person or community. The demarcation associated with every identity is thus not primarily outwards, looking to other persons, but rather inwards: it is a demarcation from the other person that I could be but do not wish to be. It is a cantus firmus of European discourse by which, with the European values, Europeans demarcate themselves from the Europe that determined their past. This past, and the political style it represents, is a dark, ever-present temptation. In principle, the states of Europe could at any time relapse into rivalry, totalitarianism, and warlike assertiveness. With their commitment to values, they express the desire to no longer be like this, but instead, in solidarity, to follow the path of peace and democracy. This special motivation for these universal values alone differentiates the European community of values from other states or communities committed to the same values. Furthermore, universal values are universal because of the generality and abstractness of their normative expectations, but the moment they actually guide behaviour and are decisive in terms of policy, they become connected with specific history and institutions. Their realisation is therefore by necessity particular, and the identification with universal values is combined with their implementation in specific institutional arrangements. The European model of welfare state furnishes an example here: for Europeans, this is a specific realisation of the values of equality, human dignity, solidarity, and non-discrimination, and a means of demarcation from other liberal democracies such as the US (Kaufmann 2012; Kleinman 2002).

A further problem, associated in a different way with the universality of values, is more difficult to deal with. So far, our discussion has been mostly restricted to why Europeans are motivated by these values, which we could describe as values of social and liberal freedom, and why they see them as central to their political community. In view of the global conflict between value systems, however, the following question cannot be avoided. Should they not consider themselves bound by these values simply for moral reasons? For are not human dignity, democracy, and freedom simply valuable and right? What could we hold against persons, political movements, or governments, when they state that they interpret their history and their recent experience very differently and in consequence do not adopt European values, instead finding authoritarian, undemocratic values attractive and valuable? Intuitively, many would contend that it does indeed make a difference whether one feels bound by universal values that emphasise the dignity and freedom of all people, or instead prefers chauvinistic and narrow-minded values. The problem lies in the fact that the normative expectation of universal values on the one hand is (for some people) the source of their essential attractiveness, but on the other hand the universality goes normatively beyond attractiveness and is overshadowed by an expectation of duty. For insofar as values judge and determine behaviour, they have a normative core: they express a duty. The expectation of duty of universal values can be ethically and rationally argued, in contrast to the expectation of validity of particular value systems. Unfortunately, however, the fact that universal values can be justified in logical argument does not provide a way out of the dilemma. This may explain why they are morally superior, but this in itself does not provide a motivation for considering them binding. It would, however, be rash to conclude that it is therefore pointless to seek discourse in the event of a conflict in values. For a commitment to values does not arise by itself; rather, it depends on a cultural, narrative, and discursive context which imbues experience with language and comprehension. One of the essential tasks and challenges of democracy, and, indeed, of free societies, is to care for the language, narrative, and possibilities of experience that are essential to authentic commitment to democratic (European) values. This also includes a speaking about European values that demonstrates their universality as valuable and preferable, rather than making them trivial and ridiculous. Maintaining value convictions experienced as valuable, keeping them alive in new social and political situations, is a long-term task. An essential argument here is that universal values can be ethically justified. The fact that the European values surely offer Europeans a better future than the values currently being paraded in the attack on Ukraine bridges the gap with experience. An essential insight from the European value discourse of the last 70 years must be that there is also a responsibility for values. Commitment to values does not arise by itself; nor can it survive by itself. Commitment requires decisive effort. It demands earnest, imaginative, and convincing value discourse which does not shy away from confrontation and at the same time realises the values under discussion by the very way in which the discussion is conducted. The EVS investigates the value systems of Europeans. It thus produces valuable insights into the situation in which this responsibility for values must be accepted by acts of discourse and narrative.