The Invisibles: Religious and Political Values Among Different Social Classes

Abstract

Poverty and social exclusion can be defined as an accumulation of impediments: lack of work and income, bad housing, low education, maltreatment, disempowerment, loss of dignity. Types of poverty are indeed diverse, with the poor including both those who have inherited poverty and those who are newly poor in the age of globalisation. The first group is probably less visible than the second, more claiming. The poor present specificities of values. At the religious level, they are rather more believing – particularly in relation to paradise, and they practise their religion more. The discrepancies between social groups are greater when it comes to political matters. The invisibles are more individualistic and less individualised. They are less politicised but nevertheless more dissatisfied with those in power, and they mobilise less strongly in public action (voting and political protest). They do not easily trust others or institutions. They are less attached to democratic values, and they demonstrate greater xenophobia and nationalism. They therefore share many features of populism. These specificities of political values essentially correspond to perennial trends in poor classes. Differences in religious and political values between countries and geographical areas are also very large. But in each part of Europe, we observe value differences between social groups.

With the development of industry, the social question emerged in the nineteenth century among many thinkers who were concerned about the situation of workers, especially children. In France, Victor Hugo’s (1862) novel Les misérables was an eloquent testimony both to the misery of the time and to the emotion it aroused in the population, an emotion that transcended borders, since this work was very quickly translated into several languages. In England at the same time, Charles Dickens (1861) achieved similar success by recounting the lives of workers and the poor in, for example, Great expectations.

1 Sociology of Social Classes, the Poor, and Underprivileged

The nascent sociology also looked at the fate of workers. This was notable in the work of the French conservative Frédéric Le Play, a social reformer who militated for the moral education of workers. The attention paid to the workers, an emergent social category, is also found in socialism and particularly in the work of Karl Marx. Marx insisted on the existence of two fundamental classes in conflict, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, with the former exploiting the latter. But in his historical and political works, he identified a large number of classes or parts of classes according to the position of social actors in events. If the proletariat could become aware of its exploitation and the spearhead of the revolution, it would remain a fringe of the marginalised, the lumpenproletariat or rabble proletariat, often unemployed, with no class consciousness or political activity and proving to be completely apathetic. Their image was not good: Marx and Engels judged them as unstable, lazy, and uneducated. Potentially violent, they were sometimes used as strike-breakers in the pay of the most conservative capitalist reaction. The working class continued to be a subject of study for the nascent sociology, as shown, for example, by the work of Maurice Halbwachs (1912, 1933), a disciple of Durkheim. He developed a very objectivist approach, studying the transformations of the budgets of this social group in several countries (Germany, the United States, France): food expenses decreased while clothing and housing expenses increased, bringing the working class lifestyle closer to that of the employees. At the same time, the German sociologist Georg Simmel (1908) developed a relational analysis of poverty. The poor were not defined by a very low objective income level and very poor living conditions, but by the way in which they were considered by society. Society defined the poor as isolated, lacking in integration, and potentially dangerous, and they therefore had to be provided with help so that social order could be maintained.

In the US in the 1920s, the Chicago School developed empirical sociological studies based on a participatory observation methodology, particularly adapted to penetrate a social milieu of marginalised people. Anderson (1923), who was himself a hobo for a long time, exposed the lives of day labourers who moved from one temporary job to another on construction sites or in the fields, highly mobile geographically – moving illegally on freight trains – and generally young and single. Their world was characterised by resourcefulness and implicit moral rules regulating the social relations of their isolated community. This type of approach, close to romantic narratives, had an undeniable posterity. It was, for example, the approach of Lewis (1959) in Mexico, who explained that poverty in his country was not fundamentally different from that in other countries of the world. Photography was also used to document the situation of the poor in the US in the 1930s (Walther 2016).

In the context of the ‘Glorious Thirties’, the problems of precariousness tended to be somewhat forgotten. Some sociologists insisted on the evolution towards gentrification of the working class (Goldthorpe et al. 1969). With the increase in standard of living and school education, the working class would move closer to the middle classes. But it would partly retain the values and culture linked to its origins. Similarly, for Richard Hoggart (1957) there was an original culture of poverty – specific cultural forms that identified this population. Popular culture was not a substitute for the culture of the dominant classes; it was not simply the result of conditioning – a receptacle of mass culture – but had its own dynamics.

Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) analyses were quite different. The working classes were dominated by values without real originality, as values were infused by the dominant class. They certainly had a ‘popular taste’, but were also described as vulgar and barbaric. This position could be seen in culinary tastes, an attraction for what was nourishing and cheap – bread, starchy foods, and pot au feu – but also red meat. Taste was also linked to representations of the body, which had to be fleshy, full of strength, and virile! This applied on the political level too. The working classes had no real political culture and therefore could only be dominated; they excluded themselves from the political field. Bourdieu was interested in the working classes, but not really in the poor and excluded, except in La misère du monde (Bourdieu 1993). His theories were structuralist and therefore did not change much, since the same structures lasted over time. In contrast, those of Alain Touraine et al. (1987) during the same period were much more dynamic. He insisted on the internal differences within the working class. May 1968 was not carried by the traditional working class but by engineers, technicians, and highly qualified, educated workers who demanded a different society and were the agents in an anti-technocratic revolution.

In recent decades, the sociology of poverty has often been associated with action research in charitable organisations. Among them, we can take the example of ATD Fourth World,¹ which stands out for its sociological analysis:² extreme poverty and social exclusion are defined as an accumulation of impediments: lack of decent work, insufficient and insecure income, material and social deprivation, social and institutional maltreatment, unrecognised contributions, suffering in body, mind and heart, and disempowerment (ATD Fourth World 2019). The movement refuses simple assistance and wants to involve excluded populations in actions to help them regain their dignity. Working with institutions, ATD Fourth World defends access to the rights of individuals and their families in terms of housing, health, schooling, professional training, culture, and citizen participation, etc. It also wants to change the way society views the excluded. Jean Labbens (1978) has studied poverty in the slums of different countries. He underlines the lack of will of the populations concerned, who have experienced failure since childhood and have become fatalistic about their future.

With the slowdown of the economy from the 1980s onwards, the sociological analyses of social classes once again insist on the development of precarious and insecure categories of population. In the public debate, there is even frequent reference to the ‘new poor’ and more recently to the ‘losers of globalization’ (Kriesi et al. 2006). Globalisation is giving rise to a new structural divide between its winners and losers, and it recomposes the political space of different countries. These new poor are often ‘downgraded’, thrown into precarious, part-time, or dead-end jobs, sometimes in poverty, by the transformations of the economy, the loss of jobs, and the deskilling of workers. Exclusion and extreme poverty seem to be on the increase today. Many people are losing their sense of social integration, with its stable employment, numerous social relations, and security in life. They are in the process of becoming precarious, with fragile and partial employment, often without insurance and decent incomes, and they have strong fears concerning their future situation (Duncan and Paugam 2002; Gallie and Paugam 2002; Promberger et al. 2018) or that of their children (Guio et al. 2020). The marginal social categories are therefore very diverse, consisting of the traditional poor with an inherited poverty – the fruit of decades of living in misery and accumulating impediments – and the new poor, precipitated into this situation on a regular basis as a result of economic transformation. The former are little talked about: they are invisible and do not have the necessary resources (notably education) to assert their place in society. This lack of resources leads to a feeling of inferiority, social isolation, low politicisation, poor understanding of the world, and high levels of abstention from elections (Braconnier and Mayer 2015).³ The latter are more likely to protest, as the yellow vest movement in France in 2018 and 2019 clearly highlighted (Guerra et al. 2019). If we refer to Hirschman’s (1970) categories, the inherited poor are on the exit side in terms of political culture, whereas the categories in the process of becoming precarious are more on the voice side. Neither of the two would be strong supporters of loyalty to institutions.

2 The Values of the Disadvantaged: Assumptions and Methodology

All that we have just recalled concerning the poor and the excluded, both in the literature and in sociological analyses over the last two centuries, shows quite clearly that social conditions have an important effect on people’s values. And this has already been demonstrated for a long time, notably by Inglehart (1977, 2018). He develops a theory of the evolution of a country’s values in relation to the security felt by the population. With the entry into an era of plenty, people’s main goals in life change, with more and more Westerners wanting above all a better quality of life, opportunities for self-expression, and more participation in democratic decisions. With economic recessions, backlashes occur, generating a return to materialist concerns and populism (Ignazi 1992; Norris and Inglehart 2019), characterised by authoritarianism and anti-systemic and anti-elite attitudes. Obviously, these attitudes affect the most disadvantaged populations in particular, while the winning categories of globalisation still carry post-materialist values and a desire for individual autonomy (Welzel 2013; Gonthier and Bréchon 2017).

The objective of this chapter is therefore to analyse the values of the disadvantaged categories of the European population, particularly in terms of their religiosity and political values. Given that surveys on the values of Europeans have not been constructed with this aim in mind, it is first of all necessary to discuss the most suitable European Values Study (EVS) variable for this research – without forgetting that the precarious are probably undervalued in all surveys because people in these categories have little appetite for responding to sophisticated quantitative survey questionnaires. However, it can be hypothesised that the results of these surveys allow us to understand the values of the precarious by comparing them to those of the privileged circles. The invisible people outside the survey would be even more typical of the value system identified among the precarious people present in the survey.

Several socio-economic classifications are available in the EVS data file: the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08), the Standard International Occupational Prestige Scale (SIOPS), the European Socio-Economic Classification (ESEC), the EGP class schema (from the name of their creators Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero), and the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) (Züll 2016). These scales are strongly related to each other, with Cramer’s V ranging from 0.50 to 0.70, indicating an extremely strong relationship.⁴ We have chosen to use the ISEI classification (Ganzeboom et al. 1992; Ganzeboom 2010) because it is the most comprehensive and synthetic measure of the individual’s social situation, taking into account as it does not only occupation but also family income⁵ and education levels, controlled by age. Moreover, it has the great advantage of being a continuous scale.⁶ We recoded this scale of social positions into four groups of roughly identical size, to isolate the most disadvantaged quartile, which can then be compared with the three most advantaged groups.⁷ This threshold is obviously arbitrary. In reality, there is not one precarious group at the defined boundaries; rather, the level of precariousness is a continuum. The presentation in four groups, however, makes it possible to clearly show the differences between the bottom and top of society.

The religious and political dimensions to be taken into account must also be considered. Concerning religion, are the popular categories and the precarious more or less religious? According to a commonplace, the precarious should be less religious since religion displays a strong osmotic relationship with the culture of domination, against which the exploited working classes struggle. On the contrary, it could be thought that they would be more religious because they are more subject to the hazards of life and therefore have a greater need for religious comfort and the promise of happiness beyond this world. But they could also be more religious because they are more traditional, adopting new attitudes and values less easily. To try to separate these theories, several dimensions will be used – a global scale of religiosity, but also a scale of belief in God, a scale of belief in an extra-worldly future, a measure of practice (prayer and attendance at services of one’s faith) – as it is possible that the precarious are more religious on one dimension of religiosity and less on another.

In relation to political values, we will test the theory of apathy and populism of the most popular classes. The political apathy of the working classes has long been emphasised by many authors (Almond and Verba 1963; Di Palma 1970): the low level of education of the working classes is said to explain their low political competence and the lack of confidence in their legitimacy to express themselves in the political field. Precarious populations should be weakly politicised and participate less than other social categories through voting or protest forms of demand.

Populism is a difficult concept to define (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017), but can be characterised by strong support for a series of connected values: nationalism, xenophobia and mistrust of immigrants, authority, leader worship, distrust of elites who do not understand popular expectations. The most precarious would be expected to show dissatisfaction with power and have little trust in institutions and more generally in others, who are easily seen as a threat. They are expected to be more xenophobic than the average population, as they compete with immigrants in the labour market. They may also be less attached to democracy and prove to be more authoritarian, in line with the analyses of Stouffer et al. (1949), Adorno et al. (1950), Eysenck (1954), and especially Lipset (1959).

In previous publications, I have distinguished two major value orientations: individualisation (that is the tendency to value the autonomy of individuals) and individualism (that is the pursuit of one’s personal interest in all circumstances) (Bréchon 2017, 2021a). The EVS 2008 data clearly showed that disadvantaged social categories were more individualistic and less individualised. One can expect the same trends to be observed in the EVS 2017 data.

For the analyses, we have selected 22 European countries in EVS 2017 (where the survey has been carried out since at least 1990), which can be grouped by geographical area into Western Europe (Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, The Netherlands), Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia), Southern Europe (Italy, Portugal, Spain) and Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden).

All results will be weighted according to the country’s population size and sociodemographic variables.

3 Who Are the ‘Precarious’?

According to Eurostat, at the threshold of 60% of the median income of each country, 17.3% of the Union’s population lived in poverty in 2016. At the threshold of 40%, which can be considered a threshold of extreme poverty, it was 6.4%. But the gaps between countries are wide. At the 60% threshold, they range from 11.6% in Finland to 25.3% in Romania, and at the 40% threshold from 2.2% in Finland to 13.5% in Romania. The poor are most numerous in Romania, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. By contrast, the Scandinavian countries and France have the lowest rates. These poverty percentages also provide a comparative picture of the degree of inequality between countries.

In the EVS 2017, for the lowest ISEI quartile, 40% are located in income deciles 1 and 2 and only 5% in income deciles 9 and 10 (Cramer’s V⁸ = 0.25). They also have fewer qualifications: among people with only primary education, 53% belong to the precarious category, whereas this is the case for only 4% of individuals with a master’s or doctoral degree. There is an overrepresentation of people who have experienced unemployment and have been receipt in social benefits among the precarious: while 22% of people who have not experienced these situations are in the ‘precarious’ group, 41% of those who have known both are in the precarious group. But being currently unemployed is also an important element of precariousness. The rate of precariousness rises to 42% among the unemployed and to 34% when it is the spouse who is concerned, while having a part-time job (less than 30 h a week) does not change the level of precariousness, either for the interviewee or for their spouse. And precariousness is significantly higher among people of foreign nationality (34% versus 24% among nationals).

We can also verify the weight of family socialisation on current precariousness. This can be seen first of all at the economic level: among the interviewees whose parents ‘had difficulty making ends meet’ and ‘replacing broken things’, the rate of precariousness rises to 37%, while it is only 17% among those whose parents had no financial difficulties. We also observe the impact of family socialisation at the cultural level. Six questions asked whether the father and mother ‘liked to read books’, ‘liked to follow the news’, and ‘discussed politics’ with the respondent. In this way, a scale of family culture can be constructed. The rate of precariousness rises from 39% among those whose parents were not at all educated to 12% among those whose parents were highly educated (V = 0.18). The survey also provides information on the level of education attained by the father and mother; here again, the link with the respondent’s precariousness is quite strong: when the father and mother have a low level of education, the rate of precariousness rises to 33%, whereas this rate is only 9% when the father and mother have a high level of education. These results show that there is indeed an inherited precariousness that is transmitted from one generation to the next.

Moreover, precariousness is more rural than urban. When the respondent lives in a municipality of fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, the precariousness rate is 35%, whereas it is only 18% in cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants (V = 0.11).⁹ The explanation is most certainly linked to the social composition of rural areas, with less schooling, more low-skilled jobs, and lower incomes.

At the family level, precariousness seems to be associated with a high number of children: it is 21% for people without children, but 33% for three and 39% for four or more children. Regarding family status, precariousness is particularly high among widows (40%) or separated people (34%). Part of the precariousness rate among single parents can be assessed by looking at two-person households consisting of a single adult living with a child aged 16 years or younger. Here, 32% of the parents are classified in the ‘precarious’ group compared to a rate of 24% in the survey as a whole.

Depending on age, precariousness is greater among old people, particularly among those aged 70+ (36%), but there are apparent variations depending on the country and social policies in relation to seniors. Precariousness is very similar among men and women.

It should be added that the underprivileged have a certain awareness of their situation, since more of them recognise that they are not happy: 54% of the underprivileged say they are little or not at all happy, compared with only 36% of the most privileged quartile. Awareness is, however, very relative, since 46% of those in precarious situations say they are quite happy.

4 Precariousness and Religious Attitudes

4.1 Global Religiosity According to Social Position

The survey includes a large number of indicators of religiosity. I selected ten that allow us to construct a very solid scale to measure the average level of religiosity of individuals.¹⁰ When we consider this level of religiosity according to social position for the 22 countries (Table 8.1), it becomes clear that the differences are small, even if they are statistically significant. For an average level of religiosity of 3.7 in 2017, it is 4.1 in the most disadvantaged group and only 3.4 among the most privileged.¹¹ These small differences are found in all geographical zones, but are weaker in Western Europe and Nordic countries. The underprivileged thus appear in many countries as a little more religious than do the other social categories, but the differences are much smaller than those generated by the geographical area because of an extreme religiosity in Eastern Europe and a very weak one in Nordic countries.

Table 8.1 Average religiosity index^a by social position^b and geographic area (EVS 2008 and 2017)

For the last 10 years, global religiosity seems to have been stable for the whole of Europe, with the same average of 3.7 in EVS 2008. However, this stability hides contrasting trends. Religiosity has continued to decline slowly in Western Europe (−0.2) and the Nordic countries (−0.4), but it has risen sharply in Eastern Europe (+1.0) and a little in Southern Europe (+0.2) (Pickel & Pickel, Chap. 5, this volume). Globally, there was a slight trend in EVS 2008 towards a stronger religiosity of the precarious, but rather smaller than in EVS 2017.

The differences by country seem to be due less to the level of economic development than to the dominant religion of the population. Table 8.2 shows that Protestant and multi-faith countries have the lowest religiosity, while religiosity is much higher in Orthodox countries. Religiosity in Catholic countries seems average, but is in fact very heterogeneous, ranging from 2.6 in Czechia to 6.2 in Poland, because of truly diverse, national histories and cultures (Polak & Schuster, Chap. 6, this volume). However, small differences in religiosity according to social position can be found in almost every national culture (except in Germany, Estonia, and Slovakia).

Table 8.2 Average religiosity index by social position and dominant religion in the country (EVS 2017)

Let us now consider specific dimensions of religiosity to see if this slightly stronger sensitivity of the precarious to religiosity comes from belief in God, belief in an extramundane future, or simply from more frequent practice.

4.2 Precarious People Believe a Little More in God

Three questions provide a fine measure of belief in God (Table 8.3). According to the first question – which is quite simple, since it is dichotomous – 65% of Europeans believe in God. However, this percentage rises to 72% among those in precarious situations and falls to 57% for the highest social positions. The second question is a little more precise: 28% say they believe in a personal God and 38% in a kind of spirit or life force God, while 18% are non-believers and 16% agnostics. The precarious believe more often in a personal God and less in a life force.

Table 8.3 Beliefs in God according to social position (EVS 2017)

The third question measures the importance of God in one’s life on a scale from 1 (not at all important) to 10 (very important). Here, four Europeans out of ten attach a high importance to God, while the same proportion finds God not important. The gap according to social position is confirmed.

In total, the differences in belief in God according to social position are slightly larger than for overall religiosity. A synthetic scale based on the three questions shows that strong belief in God is 37% among the precarious and only 24% in the highest category.

4.3 Precarious People Believe More in a Future Beyond This World

Those in precarious situations have more expectations and beliefs about the world to come (Table 8.4). Here, 53% believe in an afterlife (44% for the betteroff), 52% believe in heaven (only 31% for the betteroff), and 37% believe in hell (20% for the betteroff).¹² As for reincarnation, it is probably not (yet?) sufficiently anchored in European culture to seduce many, whatever the social category.

Table 8.4 Beliefs in an extramundane future^a (EVS 2017)

It is therefore for belief in heaven and hell that the differences according to social position are the most marked. One may be tempted to explain these stronger gaps by the situation of the precarious: living with difficulty in the present, they may have more reason to hope for salvation beyond this world.

4.4 Precarious People Are a Little More Often Followers of a Religion and a Little More Assiduous in the Practice of Their Religion

In the precarious group, 65% said they belonged to a religion, compared to 56% of the advantaged group, and 48% say they trust the church compared to 38% in the most advantaged group. They claim less atheism than others (8% of convinced atheists in the precarious group, 16% in the most advantaged group): 29% attend a religious service at least once a month (compared to 22% at the other extreme) and 41% say they pray every week, compared to 29% of the most advantaged. Thus, in terms of both group and individual practice, those at the bottom of the social scale are somewhat more religious. Their religiosity is therefore not marked by anti-institutionalism. Rather, they are conventional believers. This is in line with a stronger explanation for their religiosity and their greater difficulty in adopting new values.

After taking into account all the dimensions of religiosity tested in the survey, we can conclude that the responses are very consistent. Regardless of the dimension, the same phenomenon is observed: a slightly greater importance is given to religious attitudes by the disadvantaged categories of the population. The commonplace expectation that religion would be strongly implanted among the bourgeois while popular categories would be more secularised is therefore not at all verified. Perhaps this representation may have been true in the past, but in any case, it is no longer true. It must be added, however, that the differences are generally quite small. This tends to mean that the consolations of religion – making people hope for another world that would be more favourable to them – do not constitute a very powerful driver of their religiosity. The explanation for this slightly stronger religiosity of the precarious would instead lie in more traditional and more conventional value systems, with a weaker propensity for change. An examination of the political attitudes of the precarious makes it possible to confirm this interpretation.

5 Precariousness and Political Attitudes

If the links between precariousness and religious attitudes are not extraordinarily strong, do we find a stronger relationship between precariousness and political values? Let us begin by examining the general attitudes of those who are precarious.

5.1 More Individualistic But Less Individualised Precariousness

In previous works (Bréchon and Galland 2010; Bréchon 2017, 2021a), I have shown that individualisation should not be confused with individualism, as is extremely common. The values of individualisation correspond to a desire for autonomy in choices in all areas of life, especially in relation to sexuality, the body, and death (Halman & Sieben, Chap. 4, this volume). More and more, each person wants to choose their own future and to overcome social constraints. ‘Each person has their own choice’ could be the maxim of individualised people. Individualism corresponds to a very different attitude, consisting in always seeking one’s own interest and never acting in solidarity with others. The maxim of individualists is ‘each person for themselves’. From surveys on values, one can distinguish the two attitudes and thus construct two different scales of attitudes.

The individualisation scale has 15 indicators: five relate to permissiveness of morals (accepting homosexuality, abortion, divorce, euthanasia, suicide); three relate to the meaning given to work (it allows one to have initiative, to achieve something, to have responsibilities); five take into account essential qualities to be encouraged among children (independence; responsibility; imagination; tolerance and respect for others; determination and perseverance); and two relate to essential objectives to be prioritised for the country (freedom of expression and citizen participation in political decisions). Aggregated, these 15 indicators synthesise the will of individual autonomy in all areas of life (Cronbach’s α¹³ at 0.75, 23% variance explained on the first factor of a principal components analysis). The individualism scale is constructed with 17 indicators: nine measure lack of solidarity with others (not feeling concerned about one’s neighbours; people in the region; members of the same country; Europeans and the whole world; the elderly; the unemployed; immigrants; and the sick and disabled); two concern the degree of interest in politics; four are about political non-participation (not signing petitions; not participating in boycotts, demonstrations, and strikes); one concerns the lack of associative participation; and the last one concerns not wanting to give money to prevent environmental pollution. Again, aggregated, a consistent measure of individualism is obtained (α at 0.86, 33% variance explained).

The two scales are, depending on the country, either almost statistically unrelated or inversely proportional: the more individualised one is, the less individualistic one is. For the sample as a whole, the Pearson’s r is −0.34. Thus, the desire for individual autonomy is more frequent among people who are open to the world and concerned about the future of others. But what about precarious populations: are they more or less individualised, more or less individualistic than privileged categories?

For individualisation (Table 8.5), the answer is clear whatever geographical area is taken into account: precarious populations are much less attached to the values of individual autonomy than privileged categories (from Western Europe to the Nordic countries: V = 0.22, 0.17, 0.16, 0.19). However, the table also shows that the differences according to geographical area are significant and even slightly higher overall: from very low to very high social position, the relationship with geographical area shows V at 0.22, 0.24, 0.22, 0.26. Low individualisation is most common among the disadvantaged in Eastern Europe (less developed and more religious countries) at 85% (with the exception of Czechia), whereas it is much rarer among the wealthiest in the Nordic countries (highly developed and highly secularised countries), at 8%. A country’s economic development, the personal situation of individuals, and level of religiosity are probably the most explanatory variables relating to the level of individualisation.

Table 8.5 Low individualisation (in per cent; EVS 2017)

The answer is just as clear concerning individualism (Table 8.6): whatever geographical area is considered, precarious populations are more individualistic than privileged categories (from Western Europe to the Nordic countries, V = 0.18, 0.11, 0.13, 0.11), the relationship being the most intense in Western Europe. Here again, strong differences are also observed according to geographical area: whatever the social category considered, the relationship with geographical differences indicate V = 0.14, 0.14, 0.15 and 0.17 respectively.

Table 8.6 Strong individualism (in per cent; EVS 2017)

The two tables above therefore have a very similar structure because of the inversely proportional link between individualisation and individualism. A country’s low economic development and the precariousness of individuals lead to a greater focus on oneself (and therefore less value placed on solidarity with others) and a low value placed on individual autonomy. These results should not lead to the stigmatisation of countries or social groups, but an attempt should be made to explain the differences recorded. It is possible to think that the material situations of individuals play a strong role in their value system, even if other influences are significant. For example, strong religiosity, which greatly hinders the valorisation of individual autonomy, on the contrary favours the values of solidarity somewhat: among those in precarious situations, strong individualism goes from 62% among the most religious to 71% among the most secularised (V = 0.07). The relationship is significant but nevertheless weak.

The most individualised people value the rights of individuals more than they do their duties. So, it can be expected that the precarious population categories, like the most religious, will remain attached to a culture of duty. The sense of duty can be measured through three questions that can be used to construct a scale: considering work as a duty for society,¹⁴ having children, and taking care of one’s elderly parents. This is what is observed in the results: the most precarious are 49% in relation to valuing a sense of duty compared to only 30% of the most privileged (V = 0.10).

5.2 Low Politicisation Level of Precarious People

Even if politicisation is a dimension included in the scale of individualism, it is interesting to consider more specifically the level of politicisation of the precarious. Two questions measure this level fairly well: attaching importance to politics in one’s life and being interested in politics, each with four modalities of response, which makes it possible to construct a scale. Here, 36% of precarious people are very weakly politicised compared to only 11% of the most privileged quartile. The relationship is therefore quite strong, especially in Western Europe (Table 8.7). This relationship is hardly surprising, since all surveys – for a long time – have shown that there is quite a strong link between politicisation and level of education. But it should also be noted that the geographical area has almost as strong an effect on politicisation as does social position. And it can be observed the relatively strong politicisation of precarious people in the Nordic countries. These have long implemented a policy of politicising disadvantaged groups that has been successful (Milner 2002). But the phenomenon can also be explained by the Protestant culture of these countries (Bréchon 2021b).

Table 8.7 Very low politicisation (in per cent; EVS 2017)

5.3 Strong Political Discontent of the Precarious, Low Political Participation

Two questions, with scales from 1 to 10, measure the degree of political dissatisfaction of the population: are people satisfied with the way the country’s political system works and do they think the country is democratically governed? The two measures are closely related (V = 0.31) and can therefore be analysed together by isolating the most dissatisfied part of the population (Table 8.8).¹⁵ Those at the bottom of the social scale are more dissatisfied than others, but the differences are relatively small (V = 0.11). In fact, this relationship is sensitive only for Western Europe and the Nordic countries¹⁶ (V = 0.14 and 0.16). For Eastern and Southern Europe, there is no difference according to social position: almost the whole society is very dissatisfied with political functioning.

Table 8.8 Strong political discontent (in per cent; EVS 2017)

If Europeans are often quite dissatisfied with the policies of their governments, do they express this in action? Political participation has two distinct components – a more conventional form through the frequency of voting and a more active form through citizen actions. Concerning voting, the EVS 2017 questionnaire asks respondents to say whether they always, often, or never vote in three distinct situations: local, national, and European elections. An index of electoral participation can thus be constructed. Concerning active participation, such as protest, four forms of commitment are taken into account: signing a petition, boycotting products, demonstrating, and going on strike.

For electoral participation, a distinction was made between those who say they always vote in all three types of elections and those who are much more abstentionist (Table 8.9). The two least favoured categories are more abstentionist than the others. The relationship exists regardless of the geographical area (V = 0.15, 0.12, 0.13, 0.17). This result is consistent with what is observed in all surveys. The low voter turnout of the popular categories is explainable by their low political competence, which is itself linked to their level of education.

Table 8.9 Low voter turnout (in per cent; EVS 2017)

The more people are regular voters, the more likely they are to express themselves actively in the public space. For each question about so-called protest participation, three answers are possible: has already done so, could do so, will never do so. By constructing an additive scale (ranging from 3 to 12), it is in fact the protest potential of individuals that is measured (Table 8.10). The table shows the low protest potential (from 10 to 12), representing 40% of the population. This is much lower among those in precarious conditions than in the more privileged categories (V = 0.24). The relationship is more intense than with voting. It may be thought that, for the precarious, it is easier to vote than to protest. Voting costs little, and the invitation to fulfil one’s electoral duty is strongly reminded by the authorities and by the candidates during the campaign. Protesting requires a more costly commitment and the social incentives to engage are weaker. It is known that even in social movements to defend the popular groups, it is generally not the most disadvantaged who mobilise the most. Popular discontent with politics generally seems to lead to withdrawal from action rather than mobilisation.

Table 8.10 Low protest potential (in per cent; EVS 2017)

The low protest potential is particularly high in Eastern Europe, while in the Nordic countries citizen action is much more frequent. In these countries, again there are smaller differences according to social position. Precarious groups in these countries seem to be much more capable of mobilising for political action than in other parts of Europe. National political cultures, which are the result of regional histories (and in particular their religious matrix), strongly influence individual protest potential.

5.4 Low Trust in Others and in Institutions

Trust in others is a very important element of social cohesion and of the dynamics of societies, as well on the economic, social and political level. People who trust others are also more open and tolerant, and are much more sociable and active in associative life. By contrast, mistrust of others promotes attitudes of withdrawal (Zmerli and van der Meer 2017). Precarious categories, which seem to have fewer economic, human, and social resources, could well be characterised by low trust in others.

The survey includes first of all a general dichotomous question on trust in others: can most people be trusted, or should we always be careful with them? Respondents are then asked whether they themselves trust different categories: neighbours, people they know personally, people they are meeting for the first time, members of another religion, and finally those of another nationality. These six indicators are strongly interrelated and can be summarised in a confidence scale (α = 0.83, 48% variance explained on the first axis). Table 8.11 shows that precarious people admit to less trusting others. The relationship is particularly strong for Western Europe (V = 0.24), but weaker elsewhere (respectively V = 0.17, 0.13, 0.16).

Table 8.11 Low trust in others (in per cent; EVS 2017)

The phenomenon can be explained according to a mechanism once put forward by Ronald Inglehart (2018): when you are poor, there are many risks in spontaneously trusting those you do not know, and being abused by them would have serious consequences for someone who is precarious. By contrast, it is much easier for economically advantaged individuals to take risks in their social ties. We can broaden the explanation: to trust others, one probably needs first to have sufficient confidence in oneself, and above all to ‘know how to deal with’ others in order to negotiate what is expected of them. Those who do not have the know-how and interpersonal skills are likely to be more fearful, to feel inferior, and to favour cautious attitudes. However, trust in others also depends on national cultures. Here again, there are huge variations by geographic area, with Eastern Europeans showing enormous mistrust of others, probably due to the long communist era, while Scandinavians show very strong trust in others. Precarious people in the Nordic countries trust others much more than the advantaged categories in Eastern Europe.

When one trusts others, one also tends to have more trust in collective institutions. One might therefore expect that precarious people, who have just been shown to trust others less, would be more critical of institutions. Trust in institutions is measured in fine detail using a long list of 18 collective institutions. The results show that, as in previous EVS waves, trust is generally strong for the institutions of the welfare state (education, health, and social security systems) and the maintenance of public order (army and police), but medium for the intermediate bodies and low for the central institutions of the political system. Nevertheless, the more one trusts one institution, the more one tends to trust others as well. So, a global scale of trust can be built in order to analyse its relationship with the social position of individuals and to see whether the ‘precarious’ are indeed less confident in collective institutions¹⁷ (Table 8.12).

Table 8.12 Low trust in institutions (in per cent; EVS 2017)

Rather surprisingly, this is not really the case at the European level: there is no gap in institutional trust for three out of four social categories. Only the very advantaged show slightly less distrust. In fact, the results should be considered by geographic area. Trust in institutions is much lower in Eastern Europe. And in these regions, precariousness loses all influence on institutional support because society in its entirety does not trust institutions, which are looked down upon.¹⁸ For Western Europe and the Nordic countries, by contrast, the expected relationship is observed, even if it is not very strong (V = 0.12 and 0.11): the precarious have less confidence in institutions. But national cultures remain very strong. Here again, the Scandinavian precarious appear much more confident than those in other geographical areas.

Given the strong diversity of the institutions taken into account, are there greater differences between precariousness and certain types of institutions? This is not the case. Even for the institutions of the welfare state, the precarious do not show greater trust than the other categories. Theoretically, these institutions should be favorable to them, since they give them free access to essential common goods. But they may also be aware of the shortcomings of these organisations and their insufficient openness to disadvantaged groups. It is only in the Eastern countries that a fairly large difference can be observed: the low level of trust in these welfare institutions is 44% among the precarious but rises to 62% among the more privileged. It is impossible to know whether this phenomenon can be explained by strong criticism by the rich of institutions that consume a lot of credit and contribute to taxes that are considered too high, or by a greater awareness among the disadvantaged of the benefit that these institutions would give them in less developed countries than in the rest of Europe.

5.5 Not Very Sensitive to the Left–Right Divide and More Often to the Right

Political values can also be identified through ideological orientations. The left–right scale is the most classic tool for measuring this orientation in a global manner (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Knutsen 1995). In the EVS survey, everyone is asked to place themselves on a scale ranging from 1 for the left to 10 for the right. For the sample as a whole, the most striking fact is the importance of non-response among people at the bottom of the social scale: 23% of the most precarious say they cannot position themselves, compared with only 7% in the most advantaged group. Moreover, the most precarious people are less clearly on the left than the most affluent (Tables 8.13 and 8.14). On the other hand, there is almost no difference for the centrists (5–6) and the right (7–10). The precarious of today thus appear in line with what Karl Marx said about the political values of the lumpenproletariat; they do not at all constitute a conscientised proletariat, the spearhead of the revolution.

Table 8.13 Non-positioning on the left–right (in per cent; EVS 2017)

Table 8.14 Positioning on the left (1–4) on the left–right scale (in per cent; EVS 2017)

The differences between social groups in non-positioning are quite strong whatever the geographical area: the strong non-positioning of the precarious, which may be due to a lack of political competence as well as to a rejection of party politics, seems to be to the detriment of the left. The differences according to cultural area are also very important: the non-positioning is strong in Eastern and Southern Europe, in connection to the weak politicisation in these two geographical areas. And positioning on the left is minimal in Eastern Europe: the memory of the communist era could explain this disavowal of the left. The left–right positioning is a very synthetic value measure, and certain groups can be on the left in certain political dimensions and on the right in others. So, we must now consider more specific political dimensions.

5.6 Xenophobia and Strong Nationalism Among Vulnerable Populations

Data show that left–right orientation is fairly predictive of xenophobic attitudes, which are much more developed on the right and among people who are weakly politicised. Xenophobia is measured using five questions that encompass: wanting to reserve jobs for nationals when they are scarce and not wanting to have as neighbours people of another race, foreign or immigrant workers, Muslims, and Jews. In this way, 22% of the population are considered as having a high level of xenophobia. The links are important in terms of both social position and geographical area (Table 8.15).

Table 8.15 Strong xenophobia (in per cent; EVS 2017)

Eastern Europe appears very specific, with an enormous level of xenophobia,¹⁹ probably partly explained by the very strong nationalism of this geographical area, where the national community and the ethnic inter-self are privileged, in a context of recurrent conflicts towards national minorities. But, independently of this geographical factor, for each zone, xenophobia is much stronger at the lower end of the social scale. The explanation often put forward is the competition for employment between precarious nationals and foreigners, which fuels their enmity. But the explanation also lies in the weaker school education and a general orientation towards more authoritarian and nationalist values among the precarious (Bréchon 2012).

Xenophobia and nationalism are very generally coupled (here V = 0.28). There is also a link with the left–right scale (V = 0.14). And so, as might be expected, the precarious are much more nationalistic than the advantaged categories. The scale used in relation to nationalism includes a question on national pride and five questions on the conception of nationality: being born in the country; having national origins; respecting the law and institutions; speaking the language; and sharing the culture (α = 0.73). Nationalism is strong everywhere, but with significant differences according to social position and geographic area (Table 8.16).

Table 8.16 Strong nationalism (in per cent; EVS 2017)

Because of its history and also because of current events, Eastern Europe is very strongly nationalistic, whereas the Nordic countries are not so. Whatever the geographical area, the precarious are more nationalist than the other social categories. It is probably their low education level that explains both their xenophobia and their nationalism (Hjerm 2001). This low level of education probably also explains their lack of openness to Europe and the world: while 37% of the disadvantaged say they have little attachment to Europe and the world,²⁰ this is the case for only 22% of the most advantaged group.²¹ Being in positions of identity withdrawal, one might also expect that the precarious would be more favourable towards the death penalty than other social categories. This is indeed what is observed. Only 42% of those in precarious situations say it is ‘never justified’, compared to 54% of the most privileged. And those in favour of the death penalty (on a scale from 7 to 10) represent 27% of the most disadvantaged, compared to only 14% of the most advantaged.²²

5.7 A Very Relative Attachment to Democratic Values

It was previously noted that dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system was very high and that the precarious were even more dissatisfied than the others. But are the precarious people strongly attached to democratic values and are they more or less attached than other social groups? Several questions help to answer this question. At first glance, democracy seems to be well entrenched in the political culture of Europe as a whole (Table 8.17): 95% consider democracy to be a very or fairly good political system and, on a scale of 1–10 to measure whether it is important to live in a democratically governed country, 61% choose the maximum answer. But doubts about a true commitment to democracy arise when one observes that a government of experts is considered a good political system by 54%, that leadership by a strong leader (who does not depend on Parliament and elections) can satisfy 28% of the population, and governance by the military can satisfy 11%.

Table 8.17 Importance of democratic government compared to support for other political systems (in per cent; EVS 2017)

Precarious populations tend to broadly share a positive vision of democracy with society as a whole, considered a good system by 91%. However, significantly fewer find democratic governance very important, and there is greater sympathy for a government of experts or that of a strong leader. To refine the diagnosis, a scale was constructed with the four types of political systems considered in the questionnaire to distinguish between those who exclusively support democracy (find it a very or fairly good system and find the other three very or fairly bad) and those who also accept an undemocratic system, two or three. Only 40% of Europeans are ‘exclusive democrats’, 37% support at least one undemocratic political system, and 23% two or more. Consider the latter group to discern its importance by social position and geographic area (Table 8.18).

Table 8.18 Finding very or fairly good at least two undemocratic political systems (in per cent; EVS 2017)

Anti-democratic attitudes are much more common among precarious populations, regardless of the geographical area considered, even in Eastern Europe, where the anti-democratic culture is the most widespread.²³ Here again, school education certainly plays a major role.

5.8 Precarious People Who Are a Little More Social and Less in Favour of Economic Liberalism

The political values of left and right generally have an economic and social dimension, with those on the left denouncing social inequalities while those on the right defend freedom of enterprise and competition between economic actors. In the EVS survey, one can construct a scale of attitudes opposing liberal economic orientations to social positions.²⁴ The scale is not very coherent (α = 0.51), which shows the complexity of opinions in these areas (Gonthier 2017). Here, 45% of the sample expressing the most social orientation are retained (Table 8.19).

Table 8.19 Favouring a social orientation of policies (in per cent; EVS 2017)

Whatever the geographical area, the precarious are a little more demanding of social policies, but their anti-liberalism is not virulent. Basically, one can consider the precarious as quite ambivalent. They want social policies that are favourable to the poorest, but they also wish to improve their situation within the framework of the liberal system in place. Precariousness does not often lead to radicalism but rather generates moderation in political expectations. The above statement is confirmed by the results of several other items about income equalisation, and on the need for a society to eliminate major income inequalities as well as to guarantee basic needs for the entire population and to recognise people on their merits. While a weak relationship exists with the ISEI index for the two questions on income inequality, there is no difference for the latter two. Demanding social policies, precarious people also expect economic growth and job creation. One question invites a choice between the priority given to environmental protection, even if it slows growth and some lose their jobs, and the priority given to economic growth and job creation, even if the environment suffers in one way or another; 45% of those in precariousness give priority to economic growth, compared with only 25% of the most advantaged. Once again, there is a significant gap in all geographic areas, with the Nordic countries being particularly sensitive to environmental protection, while those in Eastern Europe are not very sensitive.

5.9 Intolerance of Deviance: Small Differences by Social Position

The survey tests a range of behaviours usually considered deviant, such as incivility. The results show a massive rejection (Table 8.20). White-collar deviances (acceptance of bribes and false tax declarations) are even more stigmatised than blue-collar incivilities (fraud with social benefits and public transport).

Table 8.20 Never finding deviance justified (in per cent; EVS 2017)

One might have thought that the precarious would be particularly severe in relation to white-collar deviance and indulgent for blue-collar fraud. However, there is very little difference according to social position: tax cheating and bribes are equally condemned according to social position; benefit fraud is condemned a little less by precarious people, but precarious people, by contrast, are a little more severe with regard to incivilities regarding transport tickets. These moral judgements are therefore not strongly dependent on the social positions and interests of the precarious. They broadly share common morals and would even be more conformist, especially with regard to drugs: they are much stricter in this area, whereas the privileged tend to be much less so, whatever the geographical area.

5.10 How Have the Political Values of the Precarious Evolved Over the Last 40 Years?

Using data from EVS 2008 and earlier waves, I demonstrated (Bréchon 2012) that the level of authoritarianism of the working class had been fairly stable since 1981²⁵ and that the difference with other social groups has been erased because of a reinforced authoritarian demand in the privileged circles. At the same time, the anti-democratic and nationalistic workers were on the rise, but their xenophobia was declining (though mainly among skilled workers). Table 8.21 shows that, from EVS 2008 to 2017, the strong valorisation of authority increased in the sample as a whole (+7 points), but there is a very small difference according to the social position of individuals. Anti-democratic attitudes have moved very little (except among the most privileged), and the same is true for nationalism. Xenophobia is declining in all social categories, with the same gap of social positions. The precarious are always more favourable to undemocratic political systems and more strongly nationalist and xenophobic.

Table 8.21 Level of anti-democratic attitudes, nationalism, and xenophobia (in per cent; EVS 2008 and 2017)

Let us now consider the changes between 2008 and 2017 for the other political values taken into account, and first for individualisation and individualism (Table 8.22). Individuals’ desire for autonomy has increased slightly and this slow evolution is observed in all social groups. By contrast, evolution concerning individualism is very clear: it is strongly decreasing in all social categories, but nevertheless more at the top of the social ladder than at the bottom. So the social gap is stronger than before.

Table 8.22 Political values and social position (in per cent; EVS 2008 and 2017)

The level of politicisation is very stable, which is hardly surprising. As for political discontent, we have seen that it is significantly more developed among the precarious; the same scale cannot be constructed for EVS 2008, but a comparable question is selected, measuring dissatisfaction with the way democracy functioned in the country (1 to 4 on a 10-point scale). This strong critical tendency towards politics was therefore already present in EVS 2008. And, as in EVS 2017, criticism did not very often translate into action: precarious people said more than others that they would abstain if a general election were held next Sunday,²⁶ and they are still very reluctant to show their anger through political action, even though, overall, the potential for protest is growing.

Table 8.23 continues the comparison with EVS 2008. The scale presented in Table 8.11 could not be constructed at that time, but the classic dichotomous question distinguishing between trust in others and caution towards them was present in the two waves. A wide gap between social categories can be observed. The general attitude of caution is therefore permanent among the precarious.

Table 8.23 Political values and social position (in per cent; EVS 2008 and 2017)

The low level of trust in institutions has risen sharply since 2008,²⁷ in roughly equal proportions for all social categories. This weakening is therefore a general phenomenon linked to the loss of trust in elites.

The orientation between left and right was already a dimension of values that was not always understood and accepted by the Europeans. The non-response rate was already very high in 2008. For those who express an orientation, there is a decrease to the left at the bottom of the social scale and an increase to the right. The left appears to be losing popular categories, in line with the rise of right-wing populism in these popular categories. At the same time, expectations of social orientation are slightly increasing in all social groups. Finally, it should be noted that intolerance to deviance is increasing in all social groups.

6 Summary

Even considered globally, without being able to take into account all the internal specificities of precariousness, our analyses show that people at the bottom of the social ladder present specificities of values. At the religious level, the precarious are slightly more religious and practice more than the more privileged categories. This is an unexpected result in relation to the commonplace expectation that popular categories would be more secularised than the well off. I have tended to explain it by a slightly stronger conformism in the popular categories.

Differences in political values are more important than in religious matters. The precarious are more individualistic but less individualised. They are less interested in politics and they position themselves less often on a left–right scale, probably because of a lack of knowledge and insufficient political landmarks among some of them to display a general political identity. This does not prevent them from being more dissatisfied with those in power, but they mobilise less strongly in public action, whether through voting or social and political protest. They do not easily trust in others and in institutions. They are less inclined to left-wing values, they show greater xenophobia and nationalism, and they are less attached to democratic values. However, they are a little more supportive of social policies and a little less supportive of economic liberalism. These specificities of values are not epiphenomena, but correspond essentially to perennial trends, which are deeply rooted in the sociology of this group.