Political Values and Religion: A Comparison Between Western and Eastern Europe

Abstract

Against the background of successful right-wing populist movements in recent years, a question arises as to whether the democratic political culture remains stable in Europe’s democracies. The EVS 2017 confirms that a high level of legitimacy is still attached to democracy, but that there are differences in support for the current democratic system. In Eastern Europe, we find a strong openness to alternative anti-democratic systems, which helps right-wing populists to gain influence and power. Prejudice provides a bridge between right-wing populists and religion. While socially engaged believers are pro-democratic, fundamentalist have an elective affinity with anti-democratic beliefs. Gender identities that do not follow the heteronormative pattern of binary couple relationships in particular prove to be a bridge to right-wing beliefs (Schneider et al., Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik (ZRGP) 5(2), 2021). It is possible that the ongoing progress of secularisation and modernisation in Western Europe is conducive to this. The validity of the secularisation theory must be assumed, because the East-Central European states had swung into line with Western European secularisation shortly after an upheaval of religiosity directly after 1989. If in the Russian region and Southeastern Europe the revitalisation process is confirmed, many Eastern European states have now reached the ‘normal’ level they would have had without socialist repression.

1 Introduction – Political Values and Political Culture as the Nucleus of Stable Democracies

Sincere thanks go to all those who gave us guidance for this text, especially to Prof. Dr. Regina Polak and Patrick Rohs for their further comments and suggestions.

This text base on work in the BMBF project network ‘Radical Islam versus Radical Anti-Islam’ led by Prof. Dr. Susanne Pickel at the University of Duisburg-Essen and the BMBF-funded research project ‘Political Cultural Change? Legitimacy of Democracy and Social Cohesion in Times of Increased Populism and Rising Islam Rejection’ at the Research Institute for Social Cohesion, project identifier: LEI_F_08. Thanks to the BMBF for its funding.

In recent years, Europe has been the scene of an extensive debate about the potential end of liberal democracy (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). The successes of populist parties (especially right-wing parties) and movements worked as the main triggers. Just as questions were being raised about whether liberal democracy was still relevant at all, the anchoring of democratic values among citizens seemed to be crumbling and a political-ideological polarisation was spreading among many populations in Europe. Occasionally, there has been talk of a new cleavage forming along the lines of attitudes toward globalisation: cosmopolitans with an affinity for globalisation and modernisation are opposed by communitarians who feel overwhelmed by these developments (Norris and Inglehart 2019). These disputes have found their way into the image of a split in the European Union (EU) and the question of its general survival. Driven by divergent ideas toward migration and migration policy, as well as an emphasis on national autonomy and a strong sense of nationalism, a new rift between Western and Eastern Europe began to emerge after 1989. This is no longer an iron curtain, as it was 30 years ago, but a conflict of values that separates the two sides. Gradual but quite considerable differences are becoming entrenched regarding the anchoring of democratic values. In various Eastern European states, right-wing populist parties have been elected to government (Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017; Muno and Pfeiffer 2021; Stockemer 2019), undermining basic principles of democracy or even aiming to eliminate them, undoubtedly with the consent of larger parts of the population (Pickel et al. 2020). They find cooperative partners in almost all Western European countries, especially Denmark, France, Italy, Sweden, and Germany. Here, right-wing populist parties are either part of governing coalitions or are the strongest opposition party.

Remarkably, with the support of religiously influenced political groups, right-wing populist parties have succeeded in undermining democratic values and norms. This has been the case in Poland and Hungary, with PiS and FIDESZ-KDNP as governing parties respectively, and in Slovenia with NSi as a coalition partner. Coupled with the rise of right-wing nationalism, there appears to be a revival of pacts between churches suppressed during the socialist era and would-be autocrats. The question here is whether religion and religiosity act as obstacles to anti-democratic developments, or, guided by pragmatic opportunism, combine with often traditionalist-oriented positions of right-wing populists and anti-democrats. Does a religiously influenced electorate share value concepts with right-wing populist parties in the sense of elective affinities? Can it be that such common goals are based on electoral affinities, especially between the values of religious people and right-wing populists (for example, in family values)? Do religious values perhaps combine with a desire for stronger political leadership and an emphasis on the national over the democratic? What remaining significance, if any, does religion have for European societies? Do such connections and a strengthened nationalism perhaps counteract the secularisation we have seen in Europe over recent decades (Pickel 2009, 2017; Pollack and Rosta 2017)?

If an ‘alliance’ between religion and nation were to occur, democracy in the countries mentioned would be in even greater danger than previously assumed, especially as the stability of democracies is based on democratically shaped political cultures. Thus, it is not only democratic institutions that are needed, but also a civic culture with political support for democracy by a majority of citizens. The way in which democracy is exercised is anchored in the respective political cultures, and shapes not only the actions of political elites but also the voting behaviour of citizens. The right-wing populists did not make their way to power in Hungary, Poland, or Slovenia by coup, but were elected by the people. This legitimate acquisition of power raises the question as to whether, after 2015, the crisis of legitimacy for democracy that has been invoked for decades (Watanuki et al. 1975) is finally manifesting itself, especially in the young democracies of Eastern Europe, and bringing with it an erosion of democracy.

Only an empirically robust, comparative examination of political cultures in Europe can provide real information on this question. Fortunately, this is possible with the European Values Study 2017, including comparison over time with earlier survey waves (1990). Thus, for this chapter, we pose the research question: How do political culture and democratic values compare across Europe in 2017? In doing so, we would like to use the understanding of democracy as a reference for our comparison of political values to enable us to classify the approval of democracy, the current political system, political institutions, and authorities. In this context, 2017 seems to us a very good time to examine the endangerment of democracy in light of the Europe-wide strengthening of right-wing populism, which gained further momentum with the 2015 arrival of many refugees in Europe (Mudde 2019). We would like to extend this examination of political values to include the relevance of religious values or religiosity for democratic political culture. Thus, our second research question is: What is the significance of religious values for political values under conditions of advancing secularisation?

One thesis is that the success of right-wing populism is linked to a longing for (strong) leadership that varies regionally and counteracts the rule of law and the principles of liberal democracy seemingly anchored in Europe so far (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). A second thesis assumes that the higher potential for success of anti-democratic aspirations in the young democracies of Eastern Europe is due to the self-discovery processes of national communities. In this process, anti-democratic values – which are often not seen as contradictory to democracy – can increasingly be seen in some (especially Eastern European) populations. In order to resolve the cognitive dissonance between the perception of anti-democratic political decisions and their justification with the desire to strengthen democracy, people accept narratives such as that of a managed democracy or an illiberal democracy that deviate from the liberal democratic order based on the rule of law. A third thesis relates to the relationship between religion and democracy: we assume that, despite all ongoing secularisation movements, a dogmatic religiosity and a rejection of religious plurality unleashes anti-democratic potential.

2 Political Culture and Understanding of Democracy – Theories and Conceptions

2.1 Understanding of Democracy

If one wants to debate the end of the contemporary nature of liberal democracy, one must first clarify its meaning. Minimalist concepts get by with the fact that ‘elections’ are held regularly in a political system (Schumpeter 1950). Intermediate, procedural definitions require a few more characteristics – freedom, equality, and control (horizontal and vertical accountability; Lauth 2004; Merkel 2004). Maximalist or substantive concepts add output and outcome elements to the definition of democracy (for example, social democracy; Fuchs 1999; Møller and Skaaning 2013). The key element of free, equal, direct and secret elections, often also referred to as fair, is common to all concepts – there is no democracy without genuine choice.¹ Political systems that fulfil at least this criterion, along with many democratic processes that function only poorly, are called electoral democracies (Diamond 1999; Merkel 2004; Møller 2006). The procedure of (genuine) selection from at least two candidates is so legitimising that even autocracies sometimes resort to it, giving themselves the veneer of being at least somewhat democratic (Wahman et al. 2013). Terms such as façade democracy work quite well here (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019).

Much more is required, however, to earn the designation liberal democracy. Citizens must enjoy full political and individual freedoms; civil rights must be guaranteed; citizens must have equal access to political decision-making; citizens must be equal before the law; and the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches must function fully (procedural definition; Merkel 2004). We use this definition of a liberal democracy as our root concept. Restrictions on these rights and principles relegate the corresponding political systems to the realm of defective democracies. Depending on the restriction, they can be described as illiberal democracies (restriction of the rule of law); enclave democracies (veto players deprive elected representatives of access to certain policy areas); exclusive democracies (parts of the adult population are excluded from the right to vote); or delegative democracies (governments override parliament and interfere with the judiciary) (Merkel 2010). Defective democracies already bear characteristics of autocracies. If these characteristics increase, they become hybrid political regimes.

We determine the so-called informed understanding (Shin and Kim 2017, 2018; Cho 2013, 2014, 2015) to correctly assess citizens’ understanding of democracy. Citizens should be able not only to identify the attributes of democracy – the cognitive ability to recognise the essential attributes of democracy – but to distinguish them from the attributes of non-democratic systems (discrimination). From this type of questioning, it is possible to determine ‘how well or poorly people understand democracy’ (Shin and Kim 2018: 230–231), how broad the underlying concept of democracy is, and which attributes are preferred. We can also identify whether characteristics of democracies and autocracies are mixed. Welzel (2013) deduces the specific understanding of democracy of population groups from the combination of mentions of the characteristics of democracies and autocracies and identify four concepts of democracy: liberal (equal freedoms); social (redistributive justice); populist (provision of ‘bread and butter’); and authoritarian (additional powers for the military and/or religious leaders). A liberal core understanding of democracy (freedom and civil rights) includes the criteria of ‘free elections, equal rights, civil rights, and referendums’ (Schubert 2012: 242; 2016: 289). Dalton et al. (2007: 147) write that ‘[a] basic understanding of democracy has apparently diffused widely around the globe (...) democracy embodies human values and (...) most people understand these principles’, though not all equally within their respective societies.

When we speak of liberal democracy, we understand democracy as ‘freedom, equality, and control’ and ‘liberal democracy’ (Welzel 2013) as an ‘informed’ or ‘enlightened’ understanding of democracy (Cho 2015; Norris 2011).

Autocracies, in contrast to democracies, are more diversely organised. Hadenius and Teorell (2007) distinguish five main types depending on how political power is maintained. First, they identify the three modes of power maintenance in autocracies as inheritance (1); threat or use of military coercion (2); and election (3). The five main types of regime are then monarchies, with inheritance of rule according to fixed rules (1); military regimes in which the dominant political actors are military officers with a monopoly on the use of force (2); and electoral regimes that hold (semi-)pluralistic elections without political parties (3), with one party (4), or with limited multiparty systems (5). Subtypes also allow for hybrid regimes that carry characteristics of both autocracies and democracies. Other classifications of authoritarian regimes consider the rulers, for example, party, military, individual (Geddes 1999; Lauth 2004; Kailitz and Köllner 2012) and the forms of rule, for example, theocratic-authoritarian regimes (Merkel 2010). The minimalist definition at Polity 5 (Marshall and Gurr 2020) describes autocracy simply as the opposite of democracy.² Its exercise of power is characterised by closed or restrictive rather than open procedures, and the structure of rule ranges from semi-pluralistic to monistic. Access to the ruling political, military, or monarchical elite, which claims a monopoly on power, is not gained through free and fair elections. The legitimation of rule is based on world views – ideologies or (pseudo-)religion – or on mentalities rather than on the sovereignty of the people. The claim to rule is extensive to total, for example, it spills over from the sphere of the political into the sphere of the private. A repressive to arbitrary mode of rule is not subject to any control or limitation by the rule of law (Merkel 2010). Autocratic understandings of political rule are characterised by a positive attitude toward strong leaders; one-party rule; the establishment of military rule if the government proves incompetent; the rule of religious authorities; and an obedience to authority. Characteristics of consent to authoritarian rule thus show features of a restriction of popular sovereignty, political rights, and civil liberties; subordination to (political) hierarchies; and the surrender of universal suffrage.

2.2 Theory of Political Culture Research

Political culture research serves as a good organising unit for political values that support such a liberal democracy. But what is meant by political culture? According to classical political culture research, political culture is the attitudes and value orientations of the citizens of a (usually nationally conceived) collective that are oriented toward political objects (Almond and Verba 1963; Pickel and Pickel 2006). Or, to put it differently, the citizens’ collected attitudes and value orientations toward the political system of a country form a political culture. The attitudes are a consequence of historical processes and similar individual socialisation within a certain society or collective. A political culture maps the subjective side of politics in a society without placing the attitudes of individual citizens at the centre of consideration. This collective statement is achieved via an aggregation of the citizens’ beliefs, which are surveyed in a representative manner. Thus, the main substantive goal of political culture research is to record the subjective framework conditions that promote or endanger the stability of a (democratic) political system. Political culture research resorts to an analytical understanding. In other words, every country has a political culture. The only question is what form it takes (democratic, parochial, participative, subjective, authoritative, etc.) and how the political culture relates to the political structure (congruent or discongruent).

Nevertheless, political culture research is not free of norms: If there is a lack of at least a positive-neutral attitude toward the political system, then in the event of a crisis (regardless of whether the crisis is economic, political, or social) the political system is subject to the risk of collapse. The majority of citizens are no longer willing to actively stand up for the current system and follow the existing rules and norms (Pickel and Pickel 2006, 2021; Fuchs 2002). The political structure transforms (this is reform) or collapses (this is collapse or revolution). The political structure – for example, the institutional system – must therefore meet the expectations of the citizens. The key point of reference for the stability of a political system is the correspondence between political culture and structure: a democratic institutional system needs a democratic political culture in order to survive in the long term. The culture-structure congruence applies to all types and subtypes of political systems. Thus, a monarchy needs recognition just as much as military rule needs it if it wants to exist beyond a period of effective coercion, albeit a limited one. While the entire population does not have to share the same attitudes, the assumptions of political culture research aim at the beliefs of the majority of the population or at least politically relevant groups of sufficient group size. Only if no larger groups in a political system actively reject it, or even more problematically for the system want to abolish it, is its survival assured over a longer period of time (Diamond 1999). Conversely, it is assumed that the bulk of the population has political values that support the existing political system.

Since political culture is strongly value-based and is established through socialisation, a political culture usually develops slowly. In line with the considerations of value change research, these are processes that generally take place over generations (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). Political objects can be valued in principle or in the short term and based on performance. For this, Seymour M. Lipset (1959, 1981) focused his attention on the interplay between legitimacy and effectiveness. Legitimacy, borrowing from Weber’s (2002) considerations, reflects the fundamental conviction of the legitimacy of the political system. It embodies a diffuse attitude of individuals toward the political system, usually accumulated over a long period of time (beginning with socialisation), which has a high degree of inertia toward outside influences and a high degree of consistency. Effectiveness also involves perceptions of political objects, in this case political authorities. There, the actual performance of the system and its actors is subjectively evaluated. Perceptions of effectiveness can be divided between political effectiveness and economic effectiveness. In the first case, the ability of political authorities to make effective political decisions is assessed; in the second case, their ability to produce positive economic outcomes is evaluated. While legitimacy should be relatively stable over time, assessments of effectiveness are subject to fluctuations and external influences. In democracies, a typical response to a crisis of effectiveness would be to replace political personnel by voting the government out of office. Only when this does not prove to be a successful strategy against the negatively assessed effectiveness of the political system do problems arise at the level of the general political order of a system – for example, a legitimacy crisis of the political system (Watanuki et al. 1975; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Different political objects in the political system can serve as reference points for political values and attitudes. Their distinction is based on considerations of David Easton (1975).

Easton systematises the form and goal of the relationship between citizens and political objects. By political support Easton understands an attitude with which a person orients themselves towards a (political) object. Like the term ‘political culture’, ‘political support’ is an analytical and not an evaluative term. According to Easton, all political objects can be positively or negatively supported. However, to maintain the persistence of a political system, positive political support must predominate among the population. According to Easton’s system-theoretical input-output model, the political regime receives support mostly when the citizens’ demands on the system are met. Easton (1965) also identifies three objects of political support: the political community comprises the members of a political system and their basic value patterns. A sense of community and an overarching object classification (such as the nation and the people living in it) are the basis of this component of the political order, which manifests itself in a sense of belonging to the collective and a mutual loyalty among community members (Easton 1975). The support object, the political regime, includes the basic structure of the institutional system. The orientations refer to the institutions themselves – for example, the office roles – rather than the specific role holders. Political support of the object of political authority applies to the holders of roles of political authority. They receive political support because of the acceptance of the decisions they make. Citizens’ evaluations result from their satisfaction with the outputs of the political system or political authorities (Pickel and Pickel 2006). According to Easton, authorities are the key object of specific support, which largely corresponds to Lipset’s (1981) assessment of effectiveness. Diffuse support is to be distinguished from specific support: it denotes an approval of objects for their own sake and is further divided by Easton into the components of legitimacy and trust. Legitimacy is the product of citizens’ perceived congruence between their own values and perceptions of the political system and its structure. Trust involves the hope that these objects, or the people supporting them, are making their decisions ‘for the common good’, and is based on socialisation experiences and generalised output experiences.

Easton, however, did not assume a difference between normative legitimacy – the recognition of a democracy with set characteristics (mostly equality, freedom, and control; Lauth 2004; Merkel 2010; Pickel et al. 2015) – and its factual recognition by citizens, empirical legitimacy, which is shaped by citizens’ conception of a democracy. Accordingly, citizens do not grant recognition to the ideal form of democracy, but to how they imagine a democracy to be. The degree of divergence between the expectation of how a democracy (or political system) should be and how the current democracy (or political system) actually functions in one’s own country contributes to citizens’ satisfaction/dissatisfaction with democracy, along with economic performance. This complexity, including its interrelationships, is illustrated by a recent model (Fig. 5.1) by Susanne Pickel (Pickel 2016; Pickel and Pickel 2016).

Fig. 5.1

Political culture, understanding of democracy, and political attitudes. Source: Pickel and Pickel 2016: 553; Pickel 2016; including ideas of Fuchs 2002: 37; Norris 2011: 24, 44

There are numerous interrelated patterns of attitudes between the actual understanding of democracy, what citizens imagine democracy to be, and the diffuse and specific support for democracy (Ferrin and Kriesi 2016; Pickel et al. 2015). Perceptions of democracy shape perceptions of legitimacy and support for the current configuration of democracy in one’s own country through a match between citizens’ ideals and the real political system. In addition, attachment to the political community as the basis of the political system is reintegrated into the model. The political system in the country can be supported just as citizens must trust its institutions. Short-term, specific support for the performance of the political system generates long-term trust and provides a reservoir of political governance that citizens can help shape by voting for and against specific political authorities. On the basis of the model (Fig. 5.1), the various dimensions of political culture become just as apparent as their realisation and the specific attitudes of citizens. The question of legitimacy and the more lasting components of research on political culture includes the question of the specific political values of a political community. Identification with this political community, the legitimacy of democracy and, to a slightly limited extent, attitudes toward the current political system (trust and system support), map these values as political attitudes.

2.3 Socialisation of Political and Social Values

In the presentation of the basic principles of political culture, the importance of the socialisation of (political) values has already been discussed. Easton and Dennis (1969) had earlier demonstrated the relevance of political socialisation for political culture. More recently, following the studies on value change by Ronald Inglehart (1977), the idea of shaping the people of a generation in their youth and early socialisation regarding their values became more firmly established. This includes religious and political values. Norris (2011) summarises the socialisation processes of a person’s formative years (up to about age 29) as being framed by the socialisation agencies of family, school, and media. It is here that patterns of attitudes and references to political objects are formed and stabilise until the end of post-adolescence (Schuknecht et al. 2003). The political ideology and political system to which a person is exposed during this formative period, when they acquire basic, recurrent political experiences, become anchored in their value systems over the long term and hardly change even when the political system changes fundamentally, for example, through democratisation or the collapse of democracy. The media and school form the framework for the political information that individuals (can) receive. The freer these media are and the more openly they can report on political processes, the more likely consumers of these media are to learn about democratic principles and values (Norris and Inglehart 2009). This positive assumption is counteracted by the spread of false reports and ‘alternative facts’, especially in social media. There, no one checks whether what is being spread is true. One could say that for every assertion there is also a supporting opinion. This significantly changes the conditions surrounding political socialisation.

However, socialisation agencies do not convey political values alone. Just as political values are embedded in basic social value structures – such as self-expression or emancipation (modernisation), obedience, social equality, and national pride – so religious values and religiosity also correspond to them. Self-expression values and religious values do not seem to correspond well. This has also led to religious values being identified as traditionalist or materialist (Inglehart 1977), and a connection to other traditionalist views of life – for example, in the areas of family and sexuality. In this way, religious values interact with both social and political values, because religious values are also politically situated, through parties and associations. Adherents to religious values can therefore promote inclusion as well as exclusion or defend the status quo or progress, which illustrates the connection between religious and political values. If one were to follow the social capital approach according to Putnam (2000; Putnam and Campbell 2010), then religiosity would act as a strengthening factor for social capital, bringing with it trust and pro-democratic tolerance for plurality. However, if one follows the line of a connection between religiosity and traditionality that has been pointed out, this democracy-promoting effect is certainly questionable.

2.4 Hypotheses About the Formation of Democratic Political Values and Attitudes

In the following, we will reformulate these and related considerations into research theses. From these assumptions on the formation of democratic political values and attitudes, we can deduce that a preference for democratic political values is socialised in a democratically shaped social and school environment. Thus, a more extensive, higher education should have a pro-democratic effect.

• 1. The higher an individual’s (school) education is, the more likely it is that their conceptions of democracy will correspond to the ideal characteristics of a democracy.

Considering the above thoughts, on a more fundamental level we assume effects of different value concepts. In this context, we assume that the desire for freedom is the main attraction of liberal democracy, which is widespread in Europe (Welzel 2013). Conversely, we can draw on the foundation of the theory of authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950), which assumes that political values are conveyed precisely through the form of education. With an upbringing increasingly oriented toward values of subordination and a traditional, occasionally even violent, socialisation, the tendency toward authoritarianism increases, going through the stages of authoritarian submission, conventionalism, and authoritarian aggression (Decker and Elmar 2020). A basic authoritarian attitude therefore increases the willingness to advocate autocratic values, while a loving upbringing that does not have too many sanctions and has the educational goal of self-realisation promotes a positive attitude toward democratic values.

• 2. The more an individual emphasises self-expression values in their upbringing, the more likely it is that their conceptions of democracy will correspond to the ideal characteristics of a liberal democracy – and the more likely it is that they will support this form of rule.

This thesis corresponds with Ronald Inglehart’s reflections on the change in values: materialists, according to Inglehart’s scale of values, tend increasingly toward autocratic values, while post-materialists tend toward democratic values. What matters here is the possibility of obtaining and processing information (Inglehart 1977).

• 3. The more an individual consumes free media in the form of newspapers, radio, and television to obtain political information, the more likely it is that their conceptions of democracy will correspond to the ideal characteristics of a liberal democracy.

• 4. The more an individual consumes social media to obtain political information, the less their ideas of democracy will correspond to the ideal characteristics of a democracy.

In this context, a nationalist, or especially a völkisch (folkish) nationalist, character often runs counter to these aspirations for a liberal democracy and leads to an exaggeration of national interests and one’s own national or völkisch community (Eatwell and Goodwin 2018). This is also true when other characteristics, for example, socialist or equality-oriented understandings of democracy, take hold.

• 5. The more strongly an individual’s values are oriented toward emphasising the supremacy of their own nation, the less their conceptions of democracy will correspond to the ideal characteristics of a liberal democracy and the more autocratic the values found will be.

It becomes dangerous for a democracy and a democratic political culture when the political-ideological fringes of the political spectrum grow and gain approval.

• 6. The closer to the fringes of the political ideological spectrum an individual is, the less their ideas of democracy will correspond to the ideal characteristics of a democracy.

Something similar can be assumed, as stated above, for the relationship between religious values, or religiosity, and democratic political culture. Picking up the ideas of Adorno et al. (1950) and Allport (1979) some hypotheses can be formulated:

• 7. The more religious an individual is, the less their ideas of democracy will correspond to the ideal characteristics of a democracy and democratic values than non-religious people.

• 8. The more a religious person is involved in religious networks and religious communities, the less open they are to anti-democratic values and prejudice.

The effects of such relationships are changing as a result of changes in the level of religiosity and ecclesiasticism. With regard to the development of religion in Europe, we refer to the considerations of secularisation theory, in its path-dependent orientation (Norris and Inglehart 2012; Pickel 2009; Pickel 2010a).

• 9. Religious affiliation, religiosity, and religious values continue to decline in Europe, as described by secularisation theory. The developments are path dependent.

For comparative analysis in particular, this form of secularization theory is more viable than the individualization thesis of religion, which is shaped by the sociology of knowledge. Nevertheless, its assumption of privatization is not ruled out, but it takes a back seat to secularization in the macro-level comparison. In the following, we will explore these theses using data from the European Value Study.

3 Spread of Democratic Political Culture in Europe

3.1 Distrust in Political Elites, and Occasionally a Yearning for Leaders

What is the real state of democracy’s legitimacy in post-2015 Europe? Has the crisis of the legitimacy of democracy, which has long been invoked, finally begun (Watanuki et al. 1975; Pharr and Putnam 2000)? Even at first glance (Fig. 5.2), it is evident that there is an overwhelming recognition of democracy as the best political system and a broad desire for democracy in all populations in Europe.

Fig. 5.2

Legitimacy of democracy in 1995 and 2017; own calculations. (WVS 1995; EVS 2017)

Only in Russia does less than 80% of the population recognise democracy as the best form of government, despite an enormous increase since 1995 (when it was less than 60%).³ In addition, a few other regional fluctuations can be seen, but these all turn out to be moderate at a high level. In this context, it is important to note that the legitimacy of democracy is linked to an almost equally widespread desire for a democratic system. This is evidenced by a comparison – not listed here – with a question in the EVS wave 2017 that focuses on how important it is for respondents to live in a democratic political system. The high legitimacy of democracy has remained markedly constant for many years, as a comparison with 1995 shows. The difference between 1995 and 2017 is most striking in Slovakia, where it amounts to only about five percentage points. This development corresponds with the theory of political culture research, which identifies a high temporal consistency of legitimacy as the starting point for the long-term survival of a democracy (Lipset 1981). Acceptance of the political values of democracy by citizens – this is what legitimacy is about – does not yet allow a direct conclusion to be drawn regarding the stability of a particular regime. To draw such a conclusion, one must look at the attitudes and values that affect existing democracies. An important aspect besides legitimacy is trust in political institutions (Easton 1965), as Fig. 5.3 shows.

Fig. 5.3

Trust in political institutions. (EVS 2017, in per cent)

And indeed, a look at the results on trust in institutions reveals the differentiated nature of the political culture. The closer citizens’ judgements come to the politics of the day, the less favourable they are. Conversely, institutions such as the courts benefit from being able to keep their distance from day-to-day politics. Trust in the courts, for example, is the highest of the measured expressions of political trust in all European countries, except for Azerbaijan. Only executive institutions like the armed forces or the police, which are not listed here, can claim similarly high values. The civil service is usually in second place. By contrast, there is great distrust of political parties almost everywhere in Europe. This is also reflected in the generally low level of trust in parliaments. From the point of view of a democratic political culture, this is quite alarming: the core legislative institution of a (representative) democracy, its heart and soul if you will, has only limited access to the necessary political support (Easton 1975). The central instance for the mediation of citizens’ interests in the political will-forming process in representative democracies, legitimised by elections, is not supported to the extent that would be necessary for a lasting stability of democracy over several generations (see Bréchon, Chap. 8, this volume). The extremely low trust scores in Albania, Croatia, Serbia, and Czechia raise concerns about a certain vulnerability of the democracies there during periods of crisis or when under pressure from charismatic leaders or populists (Lorenz and Anders 2021).

In Croatia and Albania, at least, this low level of trust may correspond strongly with people’s assessment of their own countries as less democratic. They share this unfavourable but perhaps correct attitude with the citizens of Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia. If one adds the attitudes in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Romania, then in Southeastern Europe in particular one’s own country hardly seems to give the impression of being a democracy. In view of the limitations on democratic rights and the functioning of institutions recorded by independent indices for determining the quality of democracies (Freedom house, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2021; Freedom House 2021), Transparency International’s Global Corruption Index (2021), Varieties of Democracy (2021), etc.), these assessments by citizens appear to be quite realistic. The good self-assessments of Belarus and Azerbaijan are somewhat different. Here, an experience with population surveys conducted in autocracies manifests itself: citizens express a high degree of satisfaction with their own system, which is judged to be democratic, even though it is an autocracy. In contrast to these attitudes, the existence of basic principles of democracy is doubted or denied in externally determined indices. Fear of surveillance when filling out questionnaires or the actual conviction of living in a democracy (as suggested in the state-directed media) are causes for these expressions of misjudgement. Accordingly, such assessments by citizens of the degree of democracy (Fig. 5.4) must always be interpreted carefully and with consideration of the contextual conditions (Pickel 2010b).

Fig. 5.4

Democracy in own country. (EVS 2017)

Corresponding attitudes are also found to a considerable extent in satisfaction with the current democracy, and satisfaction with the democratic system is lowest in countries that are not regarded by their citizens as democracies. One can see this as an obvious threat to the current political systems, but one can also take something positive from the result: Because no support is given to the current conditions (which are seen as undemocratic), and there appears to be an implicit demand for more democracy (Fig. 5.5).

Fig. 5.5

Satisfaction with democracy in Europe in 2017. (EVS 2017)

Let us return to political trust. For a long time, distrust of the central institutions of democracy was ignored in political considerations because of the lack of notably popular alternatives to democracy. The assumption was that parties belong to representative democracy, and they essentially pursue the interests of their voters and do not harm democracy. With the emergence of populist movements and (right-wing) populist parties in Europe, what had already been practised many times in Latin America, among other places, started to take place here (Mudde 2019). Alternatives to the established parties, in the form of charismatic leaders with slogans and programmes that are clearly different from those of established parties, make voters believe that they – unlike the familiar and established ‘elites’ – care about them (Diamond 1999). Apparently, the people experience a revaluation; they are heard and their wishes are taken into account. Real participation, however, is not the populists’ primary goal. Rather, this line of argument serves to delegitimise the ruling parties, especially those from the bourgeois spectrum, and to mobilise dissatisfied voters for themselves. It depends on building important narratives and making use of them. One such narrative, essential for right-wing populists, is the rejection of migration and immigration (Pappas 2019). At the same time, right-wing populists are not interested in broadening social participation in the long term, as the examples of right-wing populist governments in Hungary and Poland show. There, the focus is rather on a strong homogenising and nationalistic nationalism as well as centralisation of a charismatic leader personality (Fig. 5.6).

Fig. 5.6

Support of a strong leader in 1995 and 2017; own calculations. (WVS 1995; EVS 2017)

To put it bluntly, the demands of populists and their supporters have a connection. A strong, charismatic leader makes decisions without parliamentary compromise, now and then with the help of referendums, because he usually knows what is good for his people. While the desire for a leader has risen slightly in Hungary since 1995, it almost surprisingly turns out not to be particularly high at all in Poland and Hungary. The situation is different in Portugal, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Serbia, North Macedonia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Montenegro. In all of these countries, in 2017 at least half of the population wants a strong person to solve existing problems (for them). In all of these countries (except Portugal), the desire for a central leader has risen sharply since 1995. Together with the values from Fig. 5.9, this results in negative forecasts for the future of democracy in these countries: in times of political and economic uncertainty, citizens do not seek their salvation in increased participation and personal initiative, but instead desire a centralised solution to problems, although they actually prefer democracy as a political system (Fig. 5.2).

When all aspects of political support are considered together, there is strong support for democracy as the ideal and desired form of government. However, this is realised very differently in Europe – at least in the eyes of the citizens. Particularly in the successor states to the USSR and in Southeastern Europe, we find decidedly poor assessments of the quality of people’s own democracy and dissatisfaction with the current democratic system. However, we also find considerable dissatisfaction with the reality of a democracy and distrust in key political institutions in Western Europe. Here, the mechanisms and institutions seem to be more firmly anchored and more resistant to hostility, from populists, for example, than in many Eastern European countries. Nevertheless, considerable potential for dissatisfaction cannot be denied, especially with regard to the parties and politicians. Both are not given much credit. Thus, the lack of alternatives to democracy, as well as the strong desire to live in a democracy, often keeps the democratic political system alive. But what do citizens actually understand by democracy?

3.2 Diverging Values – Diverging Understandings of Democracy?

To answer this question, we examined indicators of citizens’ understanding of democracy (essential characteristics of democracy), some of which were included for the first time in the EVS 2017. Take, for example, the items free and fair elections, civil rights (‘freedom’ and ‘control’), and the legal equality of men and women, which are generally regarded as basic values in a democracy. How do these combine with autocratic understandings of democracy (depicted by the introduction of military rule)? If the government turns out to be incompetent and the rule of religious authorities and an obedience to authority lead to a pattern of ideas about what the correct characteristics of a democracy are? For this purpose, we subjected the variables to a dimensional analysis, then recoded them, and finally calculated them into the index ‘democracy minus autocracy’. The variables were all reversed in one direction – essential characteristics of democracy. Then the index democracy minus autocracy was formed in which the sum of the values of all six variables used was divided by six. The result is an autocratic understanding of democracy (values −4 and − 5) versus an informed understanding of (liberal) democracy (values +4 and + 5). We excluded the variable ‘People receive state aid for unemployment’, because it reflects an understanding of social rather than liberal democracy, and social benefits appear desirable in both democracies and autocracies. Accordingly, it does not contribute to a better understanding of the differentiation between autocratic and democratic understandings (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Two dimensions of political systems (EVS 2017)

We call such respondents who score 4 and 5 on the index – for example, those who agreed to a high degree with all the actual characteristics of a democracy and at the same time rejected to a high degree the characteristics of autocratic regimes as characteristics of a democracy – informed democrats (enlightened democrats according to the enlightened understanding in Cho 2015). They recognise not only the actual characteristics of a democracy – free and equal – when they are presented to them, but also which characteristics of political regimes do not belong to democracy (Fig. 5.7).

Fig. 5.7

Informed understanding of democracy in Europe. (EVS 2017, v133–v144)

Only seven European countries have more than 50% informed democrats: Albania, Austria, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Mapping informed democrats against supporters of a strong leader (Fig. 5.8) shows that the attitudes go hand in hand, although multiple answers are possible. In almost all countries where there are few informed democrats, there is a correspondingly high level of leader support. In some countries, such as Spain, Portugal, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Russia, citizens get lost in the middle of nowhere between the political systems of autocracy, leader state, and liberal democracy (Aschauer, Chap. 12, this volume).

Fig. 5.8

Strong leader vs ‘democracy minus autocracy’ index. (EVS 2017)

But does an informed knowledge of democracy lead one to view democracy as more legitimate? And what are the reasons for developing a positive view of democracy and an informed understanding of democracy?

3.3 Core Values, Frustration, Legitimacy, and Political Trust?

Who are the enlightened democrats, who are the autocrats, and who is longing for a strong leadership? Political attitudes do not stand alone. They are socialised through so-called socialisation agencies: family, school, friends, workplace, and the wider social environment as well as the media. In addition to political values, a person’s value structure also includes social, family, and religious values. Together, they form a web of values in which the ideas of good political governance, in our case a democracy, are integrated. Which value systems produce which conception of democracy, and which people are more likely to be satisfied with democracy and have political trust? We derive the basic values identified from the European Values Study survey from educational goals, which primarily represent the value spectrums of self-expression and traditionalism (Table 5.2). However, other factors may also have an influence. We have listed these in our theses. In the following, let us attempt an explanation of an informed understanding of democracy.

Table 5.2 Informed understanding of democracy (‘democracy minus autocracy’ index, EVS 2017)

Since a breakdown across different country analyses would go beyond the scope here – and yielded barely any deviating results in the empirical test – we present the cumulative model of an individual regression across all respondents of the EVS 2017 (Table 5.2).

The result is clear: previously, the early researchers on political socialisation (Easton and Dennis 1969; Adorno et al. 1950) had been correct in their assumption that the transmission of political values in youth is of great importance for a person’s later relationship to democracy. In this context, the understanding of democracy is the key mediator in the acceptance of democracy. Thus, the learned values of tolerance and respect prove to be a main explanatory factor for an informed understanding of democracy. The educational goal of a sense of responsibility and the existence of post-materialistic values also promotes an informed understanding of democracy. In contrast, a high level of religiosity, racist prejudices, and traditionalist educational values works against an informed understanding of democracy. The same applies to a rather right-wing position on the political-ideological spectrum and high consumption of social media.

Why is it important to know how a certain understanding of democracy comes about? Why is the understanding of democracy as such important? Does knowing democracy mean loving democracy? Those who have an informed knowledge of democracy and define it as free, equal, and electoral also perceive democracy as more legitimate (Table 5.3). At the same time, this means that citizens perceive the democracy they imagine as legitimate. Accordingly, they are critical of political institutions: they place less trust in parliament and government the more informed they are about the actual characteristics of a liberal democracy. This influence of the understanding of democracy on the perception of legitimacy is more significant than that of any other orientation toward a political object.

Table 5.3 Informed democracy and legitimacy (EVS 2017)

If democracy in a person’s country deviates from this conception, they are accordingly dissatisfied. However, perceptions of democracy have less influence on satisfaction with democracy than trust in parliament and government. Trust, in turn, arises from positive political experiences (satisfaction with democracy) and a general trust in political institutions and authorities. Trust also provides a certain degree of satisfaction with the current political system. The understanding of democracy thus essentially affects the perception of legitimacy, although other political objects – the current political system and its institutions – are also influenced by it.

3.4 Interim Conclusion – The Return of Different Political Values

Our analyses show that there are different distributions of understandings or informedness in relation to democracy. These are based predominantly on educational processes and general values. Religiosity also plays a role, but in a different way than one might wish from a liberal perspective. A high level of religiosity, for example, combined with a more traditional orientation of values, promotes authoritarian political values, which tend to be favourable for autocracies and unfavourable for democracies. These effects also have a mediated effect on the desire for democracy – namely, they have an inhibiting effect.

4 … and Religion?

4.1 Secularisation, Pluralisation, and Religious Revitalisation?

What is the significance of religion for the development of political values? It is worth taking a look at religious development. For Europe, there are three theoretical lines that can claim explanatory power (Pollack 2003, 2010a; Pollack and Rosta 2017; see also Polak and Schuster, Chap. 6, this volume).

Secularisation theory assumes a loss of social significance of religion, which arises as a consequence or accompanying phenomenon of modernisation processes (Bruce 2002; Pickel 2010a, 2017). In addition to the spread of rationalisation since the Enlightenment, it is the processes of functional differentiation, urbanisation, and the ongoing increase in wealth that make religion less relevant to the social life of modernising societies (Norris and Inglehart 2011). Secularisation is linked to the social and socio-economic context, is driven by multiple factors, and is also a slow, generational process (Bruce 2002; Pickel 2009; Voas and Doebler 2011).

Secularisation does not describe the disappearance of individual religiosity, but the decline in the importance of religion for society. Nevertheless, proponents of this approach see the effects of a loss of social significance on subjective religiosity: if religion loses social significance, then one’s own religiosity is also likely to lose relevance for structuring one’s own everyday life. At the very least, the number of factors that animate subjective religiosity decreases. Since religious socialisation takes place relatively early in life and a certain biographical stability is assumed, a breakdown of personal religiosity and religious vitality occurs via generational change (Norris and Inglehart 2011; Pickel 2017): with constantly progressing modernisation, the degree of secularity in a society increases from generation to generation (Pollack et al. 2012; Pollack and Rosta 2017; Pickel and Sammet 2012).

Supporters of individualisation theory reject the assumption of a ‘rub-off’ of institutional processes of secularisation on personal religiosity. Their central justification is the assumption of personal religiosity as an anthropological constant of human life: one cannot be human without transcending (Luckmann 1967). Accordingly, a decline in subjective religiosity is impossible, but a loss of meaning for the church and a decline in ecclesiality is. However, the supporters of this theory see themselves as differing from the secularisation theory; in their view, it is a transformation of the religious rather than secularisation that is taking place. With growing individualisation, ‘selfcrafted’ religiosities and new, private forms of religion are becoming established. There is no decline of religiosity, only of the (Christian) churches. A return of religiosity results partly from the fact that the personal forms of alternative religiosity have been invisible to the eyes of researchers until now. Only the recognition of new forms of religiosity (and spirituality) allows the idea of a return to emerge.

Adherents of the market model of religion focus on the dependence of religious vitality on supply in an open religious market (Stark and Bainbridge 1987; Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and Iannaccone 1994). The basic condition of this approach is a constant demand for religious offers. Like the individualisation thesis of the religious, in this model every person is intrinsically religious and in search of religious offers that are suitable and exclusive to them. Religious vitality, which from the point of view of the market model oriented towards the rational choice theory mainly depicts religious actions, varies solely because of the competitive situation in the religious market. A diverse offer best meets the increasingly pluralist – but exclusive – demand of the seeking believers. This is most likely to come about under the framework conditions of a situation of religious competition uninfluenced by the state. A restriction of the religious market on the part of the state is problematic. This happens through systematic suppression of religion (see socialism in Eastern Europe), but also through conditions that look favourable, such as a state religion or a traditional preference for individual religions in certain countries. A close connection between state and church is seen as problematic, as it suppresses the religious pluralisation that increases religiosity (Casanova 1994). The search for exclusive offers provides opportunities for exclusive, clearly profiled providers who are interested in creating an identity for customers. Such an identity includes a strong community concept and an affective bond in the group. Such an understanding of religious identity is opposed to popular church concepts that are understood as non-exclusive. From the point of view of the market model, popular churches are not able to develop exclusive offers, as they have too broad a spectrum of members. A return of the religious and of religions (the spread and attractiveness of different faiths) occurs through the expansion of the plural religious offer. New providers are entering the market, occupying vacant niches, and increasing the overall religious vitality of the population through their new offerings.

If one looks at all three approaches, there is substance in each of them to explain the current developments of the religious, although it could be that they are differently suited to explain the situation and development in Europe (Pickel 2017). It is possible, even very likely, that all three processes are taking place – just not with the same strength. Let us now look at the empirical findings. The first thing to say is that in recent decades, mostly in Western Europe, attachment to religion has steadily declined. In line with earlier observations, Western European churches, especially the dominant Christian churches, are steadily losing members (Pickel 2010a; Halman and Draulans 2006). Attendance at religious services is also declining, and even the number of people who consider themselves religious has been falling steadily in Western Europe since 1990 (Table 5.4; Table 5.8 in Appendix). It seems that secularisation is overshadowing the simultaneous processes of individualisation and pluralisation (Inglehart 2018).

Table 5.4 Theoretical explanatory approaches for religious change in the sociology of religion; own composition (Pickel 2009)

These processes take place in Europe against different cultural backgrounds. We speak of path-dependent development processes (Norris and Inglehart 2012; Pickel 2011, 2017; Halman and Sieben, Chap. 4, this volume). These vary not only in pace, but also in their starting point. In the early stages, Martin (1978) pointed out the influence of political positioning towards religion and cultural differences between the dominant religious communities. This can be seen in the different developments in Eastern Europe. The starting point in Eastern Europe is different from that in Western Europe. Religious affiliation and religiosity were (unnaturally) reduced in most Eastern European states before 1989 as a result of the repressions of socialist regimes, which varied in intensity from country to country. Thus, all indicators of religiosity and ecclesiality were at a lower level in 1989 than they would have been without repression, simply because of social, cultural, and socio-economic developments. Accordingly, a return of religiosity in Eastern Europe was to be expected (Tomka and Zulehner 1999).

In parts, such revitalisation can be observed in Eastern Europe. Two trends have become apparent in recent years. On the one hand, there has been a constant revitalisation of religiosity and ecclesiasticism in the successor states of the USSR and in Southeastern Europe. On the other hand, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are moving towards the secularisation process of Western Europe, in part after brief revitalisation processes directly after 1989 (Pickel 2009, 2017; Zulehner and Denz 1993; Polak and Schuster, Chap. 6, this volume). Cultural differences between religious cultures (mainly Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox in character) and country-specific historical developments (for example, Poland, Czechia) produce differences in the state of religiosity, religious practices, and affiliation. Of course, it must always be kept in mind that all Christian faiths already have different directions in themselves. Thus, the internal diversity of the Protestants and the Orthodox Church is legendary. However, the trends are stable: the Central Eastern countries, which are catching up quickly from a socio-economic perspective, are adapting to Western European secularisation, despite pro-religious political activities (see Poland), while Eastern European countries that are socio-economically worse off and countries where religion has a high significance for national identity (cultural defence; Bruce 2002) either maintain a high level of religiosity or can even expand it. The picture of a far-reaching path-dependent secularisation in Europe is confirmed, with policy- and culture-specific deviations in Southeastern Europe and the successor states of the USSR (Table 5.5; Pickel 2009, 2010a; Pollack et al. 2012).⁴

Table 5.5 Religiosity in European comparison (state and development; EVS 1990/1991, 2017)

Development is one side. Another side is the level of religiosity. Just as secularisation continues unabated, we are by no means dealing with a secular Europe. Halman and Draulans (2006: 264) write that ‘[s]ecularisation may well be a European phenomenon, but this does not imply that Europe is homogeneously secular’. A deeper diffusion of religious ideas can only be found in East Germany, Czechia, Estonia, and perhaps more recently Sweden. Sweden presents an interesting case. Not only did the former Protestant state church not succeed in retaining its members, but there was a far-reaching loss of faith and commitment within the structures of the church. The case of Sweden makes it clear that secularisation is not necessarily a phenomenon that solidifies after people leave the church; even before leaving the church, they undergo occasional processes of detachment from the faith. In this case, the belief in God still occupies an independent position that remains for a while beyond religious practices or self-assigned religiosity, but then – according to the effect model of secularisation theory – also fades away through the change of generations (Inglehart 2018; Voas and Doebler 2011).

Contrary to what is assumed in the individualisation theory of religion, church membership, subjective religiosity, and faith are closely related. Thus, it is the social institutionalisation of socialisation and knowledge transfer that supports faith. Charles Glock (1954) previously pointed out the interdependencies of the dimensions of religious knowledge, religious experiences, religious practices, and religious belief (Huber 2003). This is shown by high correlations between the items measuring religiosity, but this is also impressively shown by a reliability analysis in which various indicators of religiosity (belief in God, belief in heaven, personal prayer outside of worship, worship attendance, importance of religion, importance of God) almost form a dimension of religiosity (Cronbach’s α = .787, which corresponds to a strong scale with uni-dimensionality; similar findings Halman and Draulans 2006). This is not to say that there is no differentiation between church orientation and subjective religiosity: thus, the number of believers exceeds that of practising believers. However, the idea of ‘believing without belonging’ (Davie 2002) only works to a limited extent, since discontinuities in religious practices, but even more so in religious involvement (and identity), lead to delayed diffusion of faith.

If we return to the European situation for religiosity as it presents itself in 2017, we can speak of developments that are shaping the religious landscape more and more along the level of modernisation of the countries. In the Eastern European countries, the former repression of the socialist governments has been overcome and a very high degree of religiosity has now been achieved. Since the previous state was quasi ‘abnormal’, these revitalisation developments cannot be used as a strong argument against the secularisation thesis (Pickel 2010a). A countermovement is the increasingly observable interlocking of one’s own national identity with religion in Eastern Europe. This can be seen in the identity formation and identity assurance processes of the Eastern European states, some of which ‘re-emerged’ after 1989.

4.2 Religious and Political Values – Signs of Covariance?

But what does this change in religious values mean for political values? If one follows the sociological classic Emile Durkheim (2008), one should assume an integrative power of religion. Not only does religion provide overarching group norms, but certain aspects of its content are also assumed to be socially positive and thus immunising against anti-democratic ideas. However, this positive assumption about the effect of religion and religiosity, especially regarding Christianity and its idea of ‘love of one’s neighbour’, has come under repeated pressure. Although the Catholic Church moved away from its critical position on democracy with the Second World War, the danger of religions as conflict engines or ‘fire accelerants’ of conflict has been increasingly discussed since the 1990s (Fox 2004). Samuel Huntington’s book on a Clash of Civilisations, which was widely and critically discussed, changed the view of religion (Huntington 1996). But even earlier, the ambivalences of the effect of religiosity were observed. As Gordon Allport put it, ‘religion bears no univocal relationship to prejudice. Its influence is important, but it works in contradictory directions’ (Allport 1979: 455; Allport and Ross 1967). And Theodor Adorno (Adorno et al. 1950) identified superstition and esotericism as closely linked to an authoritarian personality, though socially bound Christians were not. Overall, the relationships between religion, religiosity, and democracy seemed complicated. Not surprisingly, only a limited number of studies have addressed this relationship with a solid empirical basis in recent years (Fox 2016; Liedhegener et al. 2021; Pickel 2017; Pollack and Rosta 2017). However, it is precisely this relationship that is significant against the background of the often formative power of religion and faith for individuals and groups. Thus, one can also ask in a very practical way why right-wing populists and anti-democrats in Eastern Europe suddenly seek proximity to religious communities.

Let’s take a closer look at the relationship between a democratic political culture and religiosity (Table 5.6). If we carry out a simple correlation analysis across all EVS countries, the results are somewhat worrying from a democratic perspective. All religious indicators, be it on the value level or on the behavioural level, are in tension with democratic political values and in a kind of electoral affinity with anti-democratic positions. There are clear correlations especially with the anti-democratic orientations of strong leadership and military rule. Security, order, and a certain tendency towards authoritarianism seem to be more widespread among more religious people than among less religious people throughout Europe. Opinions differ, above all, on the approval of the preferred system – for example, support for the system. While subjective religiosity works against a democratic political culture, albeit to a moderate degree, members of religious communities who are actively involved in it or in a religious organisation take an exactly opposite, democracy-supporting position. In line with social capital theory (Putnam 2000), a pro-democratic attitude is more frequently formed among religious members who are actively involved in face-to-face relationships. This contrasts with the more passive religious church members or religious fundamentalists.

Table 5.6 Democratic political values and religiosity – a difficult correlation (EVS 2017)

On the one hand, one can assume that committed believers have a social understanding of religion. This is also integrated into civil society, which is closer to a civic culture than a subject culture (Almond and Verba 1963). Above all, however, it is the values that differ between church members. Among active members, these point to plurality in society – a central feature of modern democracy. It is precisely this openness to plurality that is rejected by very religious people, or dogmatic or even fundamentalist believers. They orient themselves to traditions and are sceptical of corresponding modernisations. The more orthodox their religious attitude, the more this is the case (Roof 1974). Here again we find a distinction between the religiously committed and the religious (Table 5.6). Just as tolerance seems to decrease with increasing religiosity, so networking in the religious space has a positive effect on the spread and perception of tolerance. This then also defines positions on (pluralistically viewed) democracy (Allport 1979; Pickel 2019). Religious commitment and a social religion prove to be a bridge to civil engagement and civil society. A strongly individualised, perhaps even dogmatic religiosity, on the other hand, tends to create a separation from other social groups and people – and from democracy.

However, part of the effect found in global calculations is generated by differences between Western Europe and Eastern Europe. If one controls for region, the differences diminish, sometimes almost beyond recognition. The structure of the effects remains largely the same (religiosity and churchgoing) in relation to political ideas aimed at security, subordination, and control by authorities, without fundamentally and profoundly counteracting democratic values. Here, references to the approach of authoritarianism are obvious (Adorno et al. 1950). There is a striking West–East difference in the relationship between active members and the anti-democratic alternatives (strong leader, army rule). While this correlation is clearly negative in Western Europe, it is positive in Eastern Europe: the forces active in people’s religion in Eastern Europe are closer to anti-democratic forms than those in the lives of non-active believers or the non-denominational, whereas in Western Germany these forces have an inhibiting effect on openness to alternative, anti-democratic, systems. Here one must perhaps also bear in mind that right-wing populists in some Eastern European countries are not the opponents of the system, but are actually in government. These country differences also show up in a simple aggregate data analysis (Fig. 5.9). Thus, perhaps with the deviations of Belarus and Poland, the micro contexts are mirrored at the macro level. In other words, in countries with a religious culture we also find a greater proximity to authoritarianism – and anti-democratic positions.

Fig. 5.9

Global connections between anti-democratic positions and religiosity; data in per cent per country. (EVS 2017)

These findings are in line with country-specific findings from research on the relationship between religiosity and right-wing populism or religion and the election of right-wing parties (Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Billiet 1995; Huber and Yendell 2019; Pickel and Yendell 2018; Öztürk and Pickel 2022). But how is it that Christian religiosity does not seem to have an immunising effect against anti-democratic offers across Europe? One reason may be the proximity of Christians to certain value orientations. In the worst case, they represent the bridge on which religious people approach people with radical right-wing, right-wing populist, and anti-democratic attitudes (Johnson et al. 2011; Küpper and Zick 2011). These values, which are seen as unifying, are group-related prejudices and resentments (Tajfel 1982; Quillian 1995). Corresponding bridging constructions between right-wing extremists and religious people can be found in ethnocentrism, the rejection of migrants and people who are seen as culturally different, and racism, but also in a fierce defence of heteronormative thinking (Billiet et al. 1995; Pickel and Öztürk 2020). This is also confirmed by analyses with the European Values Study 2017 (Table 5.7).

Table 5.7 Bridging values to anti-democratic thinking (EVS 2017)

Just as corresponding prejudices and social distances promote or correspond to anti-democratic positions, so they are also seen in relation to religious ideas. There is a significant relationship between a lack of political support for democracy and social distancing (or rejection) of Muslims or people of other ethnicities (Polak and Schuster, Chap. 6, this volume). Relationships are particularly strong between anti-democratic positions and rejection of homosexual parenthood.

Now we can have a look on the effects of religiosity. The higher the belief in God, the stronger the rejection of homosexuals. Deep faith elicits rejection of non-binary heterosexual gender identities, which has also been demonstrated in alternative studies in single countries (Fulton et al. 1999; Pickel and Öztürk 2020). The effect is the strongest in relation to prejudice. It seems that religious people are not only very traditional in their view on matters of sexuality, but they are also more open to a strong (and anti-democratic) prejudice (such as the advocacy of a strong leader, Fig. 5.10). The scatter diagram shows the distributions over European countries and demonstrate the social climate in the countries. This position (of anti-homosexual prejudice) harmonises with an anti-feminism embedded in right-wing populism and right-wing extremism, a thinking that finds favour among a not inconsiderable number of believers in Europe. However, social religiosity in the form of congregational ties and social commitment in the church sector diametrically opposes these expressions of religiosity. Following Robert Putnam’s social capital theory, structures exist in the church space which provide the opportunity to counteract prejudices. Together with a dogmatic religiosity that is more burdened by prejudice, this produces the ambivalence of religiosity that was noted early on (Adorno et al. 1950; Allport 1979). Comparing reference groups, prejudice against non-heteronormal gender identities is significantly more common among dogmatically religious people than is prejudice against other social groups, including Muslims and migrants.

Fig. 5.10

Rejection of homosexuals as neighbours and advocacy of strong leaders in Europe; data in per cent per country. (EVS 2017)

Looking at the country differences in Fig. 5.11, the Western European countries differ considerably from the Eastern European countries in the existence of corresponding prejudices and resentments. Here illustrated by attitudes towards homosexuals. As the enclosed scatter diagram shows, both approval of a strong leader and rejection of a homosexual as a neighbour are low in the Western European countries under study, with variations. These tolerant perceptions are largely a result of efforts of civil movements and politicians in recent years, as the frequencies show (Table 5.9 in the Appendix; Figs. 5.10 and 5.11). The situation is different in Eastern Europe, where prejudice against homosexuals and preference for a strong leader often harmonise at higher levels. Here, the rejection of homosexuals as neighbours reaches values of up to 90% rejection (Azerbaijan) (Fig. 5.11; Table 5.9 in Appendix). The relationship structure at the macro level is striking: although there is no completely linear connection, Albania and Portugal also fall outside the window that is being mapped, and a relationship between an authoritarian anti-democratic conviction and homophobia can be seen with slight fluctuations.

Fig. 5.11

Openness toward homosexuals in European comparison; data in per cent per country. (EVS 2017)

Similar patterns can be found for the rejection of members of other religious communities (Jews and Muslims) (Table 5.9 in Appendix). Here, historical-cultural circumstances promote differences, such as a predominantly Muslim culture. Nevertheless, in the predominantly Christian states of Eastern Europe, a widespread rejection of Muslims can be identified as an important factor for the success of right-wing populists as a result of anti-democratic positions (Adida et al. 2016). Here, political theming seems to be of great importance; otherwise the differences in Eastern Europe would also be difficult to explain. If the high rejection rate or social distance from Muslims in Armenia is still understandable because of conflict linked to religious affiliation there, other explanations are needed for the high prevalence in Lithuania, Czechia, and Slovakia (Table 5.9 in Appendix). In addition to political instrumentalisation, the low level of contact with Muslims, for example, for cultural reasons, also plays a role in the high level of distance (Allen 2010; Pickel and Öztürk 2018, 2020; Polak and Schuster, Chap. 6, this volume; Schmiedel and Smith 2018; Strabac and Listhaug 2007; Yendell and Huber 2020). In this context, Muslims and migrants are readily equated, as the classifications of the refugee movements in 2015 showed (Pickel and Pickel 2018, 2019). It is difficult to discern the clear share of religious imprinting and tradition, even if anti-Muslim demonstrations are carried out as a ‘defence of the Christian West’, where they fall back on early images of Islam and ‘the Orient’ and combine them with current prejudices (Said 1978). Cross-European structural references become clear on the macro level, as do connections between certain religious convictions and prejudices on the micro level.

4.3 Interim Conclusion – More Secularisation, More Religious Pluralisation, More Prejudice?

Overall, it becomes clear that religious development in Europe follows several lines. The overarching development is determined by processes of secularisation. In line with theory – modernisation, especially socio-economic modernisation – works in the direction of a loss of social significance of religion (Norris and Inglehart 2012; Halman and Draulans 2006; Pickel 2010a). This primarily concerns the number of believers and church members, but also religious practices and a religious self-image. Belief in God is still the most enduring, but even this is not protected from a diffusion process, which in the long term leads to the fading of belief in God among more and more Europeans. Secularisation continues to follow culturally, politically, and economically predetermined paths. This path dependency is linked to different rates of secularisation. It is accompanied by a religious individualisation and pluralisation. In Western Europe and East-Central Europe, this leads to visible secularisation processes, while in Southeastern Europe and the successor states of the USSR, processes of return to the ‘normal religious state’ and collective identity processes promoted by political-religious entanglements surpass the still weak secularisation processes that are also taking place (Pickel 2010a). This development still leads to a colourful picture of religious entrenchment in Europe in 2017. Above all, the picture of a less religious Western and Central Europe and a religious Eastern and Southeastern Europe is now increasingly emerging in 2017.

If one approaches the relationship between religion and religiosity and a democratic political culture, one could almost be inclined to see this development as positive. The reason is that there are relationships between religiosity and anti-democratic convictions across Europe. Especially in Eastern Europe, this (uncanny) proximity can be confirmed. However, it is an ambivalent relationship: just as exclusivist, dogmatic or fundamentalist believers cross the bridges of different prejudices to oppose liberal pluralist democracy, on the opposite side are socially and pluralistically minded religious people and church members who are among the strongest advocates of democracy. This difference is found in the relationship with members of other religious communities, as well as in attitudes towards other gender identities. The levels of approval, as well as the relationships, differ by country. The revitalisation is partly combined with an increasing closeness to nationalism and thus rather authoritarian structures, which cannot be reconciled well with a liberal democracy. The political coalitions of interest between churches and right-wing populist rulers in Eastern Europe also play a role here.

5 Conclusion – Democracy and Regression of Religion in Eastern Europe?

The results of our analyses of the EVS 2017 confirm trends such as that of progressive secularisation for Western Europe and East-Central Europe at least, but also that of a high legitimacy of democracy. A closer look reveals a mixed, if not ambivalent, picture at the level of political culture in 2017. On the one hand, the importance of and approval for the ideal – albeit diffuse – image of democracy is high. So there seems to be no crisis of legitimacy for democracy, as it sometimes seems in public discourses. But massive differences in satisfaction with democracy – for example, support for the current democratic system – show to some extent the fragility of this legitimacy. Low levels of satisfaction with the implementation of democracy can be found in Eastern Europe especially. In the long run, despite the legitimacy of democracy as an ideal, this is a problem for the survival of democracy in everyday life. Dissatisfaction undermines aspects of a liberal democracy in particular. It helps that democracy can be understood in different ways. In Eastern Europe, and therein countries of the Russian region as well as Southeastern Europe, we find a strong openness to alternative systems that are anti-democratic. Thus, the desire for a strong leader and partial authoritarian rule is seen as compatible with democracy. This is clearly shown by the results of the index we constructed. In this way, right-wing populists also manage to gain influence and power, especially in Eastern Europe. They can mobilise citizens for themselves with corresponding ideas, mostly about collective horror scenarios. The important thing is to maintain the appearance of democracy, but a democracy of their own, nationalistic character. This way of thinking not only contradicts the definition of democracy, but also its most widespread liberal practice in Europe.

Prejudice and collective defence, such as those exercised against migrants and people who do not share established traditional values, provide a bridge for proximity to right-wing populists, but also a bridge to religion. Religious ideas work in two directions here: while socially engaged and thinking believers are pro-democratic and against prejudice, fundamentalist and dogmatic believers develop an elective affinity with right-wing beliefs that are anti-pluralist and then also anti-democratic. Above all, gender identities that do not follow the heteronormative pattern of binary couple relationships prove to be a bridge to right-wing beliefs and a problem for dogmatic and orthodox religious believers. These kinds of rejection are widespread in Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, on the other hand, they have decreased massively in the last three decades, which leads to a strong difference between Western and Eastern Europe in terms of structures of prejudice.

It is possible that the progress of secularisation in Western Europe is conducive to this. However, it is not possible to work out this relationship exactly and it may also be an ecological fallacy generated by a third variable – modernisation. The ongoing difference in development between Western Europe (secularisation) and Eastern Europe (mostly revitalisation) is recognisable. In Western Europe, a continuous dimishing of the importance of religion is also found in 2017. At least from here, the validity of the secularisation theory must be assumed, while the assumptions of the market model of the religious and the individualisation theory of the religious clearly fall short of this explanatory power (the same finding can be seen in Halman and Draulans 2006). The East-Central European states had already swung into line with Western European secularisation shortly after the upheaval. The end of anti-church repression in 1989 was only briefly enough to bring about a recovery of religious ideas there. Presumably, considerations of secularisation theory, which see socio-economic gains as the central driving force for secularisation, are at work here. This is precisely what can be observed in East-Central Europe. In the states of the Russian region and Southeastern Europe, the revitalisation processes are confirmed. In the meantime, they have mostly flattened out. Many Eastern European states have now reached the ‘normal’ level they would have had without socialist repression, simply because of the combination of cultural imprints and the level of modernisation (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). The increasingly recognisable fraternisations of religious communities with political leaders also contribute to an interlocking of religion and nation as well as a nationalist revival of religiosity. In the sense of the ‘cultural defence’ formulated by Steve Bruce (2002: 39), a symbiosis is taking place. Corresponding developments can be observed in Russia, Poland, Croatia, and other countries. With a view to the research question posed at the outset – how do political culture and democratic values compare across Europe in 2017? – just as in Northern and Central Europe democracy still has a stable anchoring in the population and the understanding of democracy largely excludes anti-democratic elements, in Eastern Europe we increasingly find signs of a penetration of the understanding of democracy by anti-democratic, mostly authoritarian, ideas. Existing and fuelled prejudices and ideas of inequality in the population serve (most strongly in Eastern Europe, but not only there) as an element of mobilisation for (anti-democratic) right-wing populists. Regarding our second research question – what significance do religious values have for political values under conditions of advancing secularisation? – the picture is clear on the one hand and ambivalent on the other. Just as clear effects of religiosity on political values, mediated via the bridge of prejudices, can be discerned, so too, these have the opposite effect to some extent. While socially committed believers oppose prejudices and anti-democratic attitudes, dogmatic, orthodox, and fundamentalist believers more often come into electoral affinity with anti-democrats (Allport 1979). Against the background of a still widespread revitalisation in Eastern Europe, this relationship – viewed with some caution – appears to be a cause for concern if one looks at it from the perspective of a supporter of liberal democracy. There is thus a need for further research, especially in an international comparative approach.

Appendix

Table 5.8 Religiosity in European comparison (state and development) – additional indicators; own calculations EVS/WVS 1990/1991; 2017

Table 5.9 Expressions of social distance in Europe; own calculations EVS/WVS 1990/1991; 2017