Keywords

1 Introduction

While our authors were struggling over terminology, theories, and interpretations of the European Values Study (EVS) 2017 data, the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. Countless disputes and conflicts over appropriate legal regulations and measures to combat the pandemic have accompanied social, media, and political discourse ever since. Like a burning glass, the pandemic crisis has revealed social and political cleavages that had been fermenting for years. This also applies to the values conflicts that became apparent during the pandemic crisis. Freedom, solidarity, justice, and the common good were some of the values referred to by opponents in these debates. While in some countries the state refrained from restrictive COVID-19 measures in the name of freedom and appealed to the individual responsibility of citizens, others saw this as a severe lack of solidarity towards those vulnerable groups who were exposed to a higher risk of infection due to their age, occupation, income, housing, or health conditions compared with those who could protect themselves better, for example, in their home offices. While some refused vaccination in recourse to individual freedom, others saw their freedom restricted precisely by those who refused vaccination and thus burdened the health systems and the common good.

It seemed that in the context of the pandemic conflicts, many people were ‘reclaiming’ their values and fighting for political recognition, admittedly not always based on an exchange of arguments and in the struggle for consensus, but in the use of values to assert their interests and in the context of pseudo-scientific argumentation or crude conspiracy myths. Interpreted with Hannah Arendt (2021: 55), the fronts that emerged within these conflicts gave the impression that the recourse to a commonly shared reality based on factual truth, which is the fundamental basis of human coexistence and every reasonable political debate, is no longer possible. This erosion of common ground also affects the reference to and the use of values.

What was remarkable was the return and politicisation of the discourse on values on a broad social level. However, values were not argued; rather they were used as a means to assert political interests. The struggle for an explicitly ethically responsible translation of abstract values into legal norms and concrete political practice was thus rendered extremely difficult. In turn, the extent of values pluralisation in European societies became apparent, closely connected to the worrying impression that there seems to be virtually no generally binding consensus on the theoretical and practical interpretation of values and on a common recognition of normative or universal values. Values have turned into opinions and identity markers. Qualified debates over ethical argumentation on pandemic policy measures seemed to remain reserved for select expert circles, such as European and international ethics councils (cf. WHO 2022: Statements by National Ethics Committees) or social ethicists and theologians (e.g. Kröll et al. 2020).

Observing these developments against the background of the results of our empirical results, one will not be surprised by the current break-up in seemingly irreconcilable conflicts of values. The contributions to our volume clearly demonstrate that the map of European values is not only highly pluralised, but also shaped by significant values cleavages, especially regarding political attitudes and the ambiguous but significant effects of religion on these. Concrete and drastic events – such as the COVID-19 pandemic – have turned these cleavages into dramatic lines of active conflict. Whether and how these values cleavages will affect populations’ reactions to the political measures taken by the European governments to stop Russia’s war against Ukraine must remain open for the time being. At the time of final editing of this book, this catastrophe has been ongoing for 1 year. As our empirical results suggest, it is not surprising that the initial solidarity has become fragile and conflicting values orientations again shape public discourses the longer this war and its economic consequences last.

Against this background, we select four thematic areas based on our volume’s results that we consider relevant and deserving of increased attention in debate by society, political actors at local, national and EU level, religious communities, and interdisciplinary values research. Recourse to values alone will not solve the expected multifold crises; but both the pandemic conflicts and the war prove the importance of values. While the pandemic reveals a massive fragmentation of values and a lack of a shared normative and universal understanding of values, Russia’s war against Ukraine puts the values of the European Union to a hard test of probation (Pollack 2022) and is in turn ‘legitimised’ by Vladimir Putin with a cynical appeal to values such as nationalism, Christian values, and the right to fight for ‘the good’ by means of violence (Assheuer 2022). Moreover, Putin’s war against the so-called ‘Western values’ values is supported by relevant leaders of the Orthodox Church in Russia.

The four selected areas do not claim to represent either the wealth of values challenges in Europe’s values discourses or the results from our volume. The chosen topics also do not result from a theological interpretation of the empirical results. But value developments in society or the impact of religious on political attitudes are also of eminent practical-theological relevance, since they span the space of church action and have an enormous influence on pastoral ministry and tasks. However, a comprehensive practical-theological analysis of the results of the EVS – comparable to Paul Zulehner’s practical theology of Europe ‘Europa beseelen (Animating Europe)’ (2019) – is reserved to subsequent studies.

So, the following sections reflect primarily the results of the discussions with our team of authors and the expert group on the possibilities, limits, and results of the EVS 2017 as I have summarised, structured, and interpreted them. Furthermore, the following reflections focus on the level of values and the role of religion among the European people with the aim of encouraging societal, political, and religious stakeholders and disseminators to take them more seriously. They do not claim to represent results of academic political science or politics of religion, which are beyond the scope of this volume. Rather, the following reflections are intended as a stimulus for further inter-and transdisciplinary debates and are aimed at a broader audience of disseminators who are concerned with promoting a qualified values discourse in Europe. The urgency of such discourse is proven by the contemporary multifold crises. Both the results of our volume and the years of crises since we started reveal enormous risks for social cohesion, democracy, and a peaceful coexistence based on European values and human rights. In turn, these very crises could also open a window of opportunity to understand afresh the necessity of normative and universal values and their ethical argumentation (Polak, Chap. 2, this volume). Facing war in Europe might raise a new awareness for those values that Europe has developed in the course of its history and which have found expression in the documents of the European Union. These require practical and political reinterpretation in the context of current catastrophes. As practical theologians, we, the editors of this volume, interpret these developments as ‘signs of the times’ to which the Christian churches also have a duty to respond. Some options for action for the churches are therefore also identified in the following chapters. Although the starting position of the churches in Europe is currently extremely difficult, we hope that in the future they can act as critical-loyal ‘drivers’ of those values for which the European Union stands as well as the biblical tradition and many Christian organisations and communities in Europe engaging for universal solidarity, justice for the poor and peace among the nations.

2 The Ambivalent Power of Values in Politics: The Crisis of Liberal Democracy

Values will not only, but must, play a central role in society and politics in the years to come. However, the success story of the concept of values will continue to unfold under new and challenging circumstances. In particular, living together in intercultural diversity, the distribution of economic resources, climate change, liberal democracy, solidarity, and poverty – identified as central issues of values conflict in Europe (see S. Pickel and G. Pickel, Chap. 5; Quandt and Lomazzi, Chap. 7; Aschauer, Chap. 12; Bréchon, Chap. 8, this volume) – demand ethically qualified public debate and discussion on how the values of the European Union can be communicated and better argued in these contexts. The observable gap between these values and the political attitudes researched in the EVS indicate a massive call for action. For the governance of the EU, a societal and political confrontation with the values of Europeans, therefore, represents an enormous challenge, which goes far beyond legal values or regulation, implementation, or administration. What is at stake is the securing and further development of the future of European values in the context of a globalised world and humanity (Bauman 2015) – values, which represent an appreciation of and a self-critical reflection on Europe’s history (Polak, Chap. 2, this volume).

Admittedly, concern and scepticism are more than justified given this ambitious goal. The list of problems and obstacles to qualified values discourses discussed in our volume is long:

  • the widespread historical amnesia towards the origin, genesis, and meaning of European values (see Weymans, Chap. 3; Mandry, Chap. 9; Polak Chap. 2 in this volume), which results in their being turned into abstract appeals and contested interpretations;

  • the lack of context sensitivity to the contemporary plurality of values in the diverse regions of Europe while communicating and implementing them without paying enough attention to historically heterogeneous value traditions and semantics;

  • the paradox of the political instrumentalisation of values for interests other than ethical or legal ones while simultaneously depoliticising them by reducing European citizens to consumers of efficient EU policies and thereby withdrawing values discourses from the public debates of citizens (Heschl 2016; Polak, Chap. 2, this volume);

  • the criticism of historians, philosophers, ethicists or lawyers who consider the concept of values to be insufficient in solving ethical, political, and legal problems and challenges (Polak, Chap. 2, this volume);

  • the contradictoriness between political recourse to values and experienced practice – be it concerning human rights vis-à-vis, for example, refugees and migrants, the experience of democracy within the EU and nation states, or the lack of solidarity between and within European states;

  • and last but not least, the heterogeneous landscape of values in Europe, permeated by numerous cleavages and (potential) polarisations.

In this troubled context, it will be difficult or even impossible, not least for the EU, to postulate or implement the normativity and universality of European values. Without the participation of social actors and institutions in the fields of education, economy, and civil society, etc. that promote values, a purely political communication of European values will fail, given the distrust towards political actors revealed during the pandemic crisis. The mobilising power inherent in values (see Weymans, Chap. 3, this volume; Foret and Calligaro 2018 quoting Smith 2016: 8), then, is in danger of exacerbating rather than resolving conflicts. The strength of their vagueness, which can stimulate discourse (Weymans, Chap. 3, this volume), can become a weakness, which threatens to tear societies apart internally and can trigger massive political conflicts between and within states. Values not only unite; they can also divide, especially in times of crisis.

This thesis is based on a finding that many contributions to our volume document: the crisis of liberal democracy. In particular, S. Pickel and G. Pickel (see Chap. 5, this volume) express clear concern about the weakened sustainability of liberal democracy on which EU policies are based. They observe dynamics in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe especially that undermine the values of liberal democracy. These developments can be recognised above all in attitudes that support right-wing policy, which is a massive threat not only to the liberal understanding of democracy but also to the cohesion of the EU as a whole. In this, they share an assessment expressed by Claus Leggewie and Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski (2021), who describe Victor Orban’s understanding of the Hungarian system of government as an ‘illiberal democracy’ and a ‘democrature’. While the Hungarian government is still legitimised through elections, civil society and the free media are restricted, and state institutions are eroded from within. Similar processes of democratic deconstruction can also be observed in the Visegrád states of Poland, Slovakia, and Czechia. Although the Russian war against Ukraine has led to a certain dissolution of this Visegrád alliance – as Viktor Orbán, for example, tends to pursue a pro-Russian policy, while Poland is clearly on the side of Ukraine and the West – the values landscape in this region still reveals a precarious liberal democratic situation.

However, the crisis of democracy seems to be not only an Eastern European problem, but a transnational trend that is deeply embedded in contemporary economic, social, and cultural conditions (Przeworski 2019) and rooted in historical traditions and institutional realities (Schmidt and Kleinfeld 2020). It is thus not only a political problem, but intrinsically connected with values of citizens, as our volume documents. If values are taken into account more, these anti-democratic developments could be analysed in depth. Some aspects that we discussed with our experts are listed here, and require further values research.

2.1 The EU Liberal Project: A Real Experience?

The EU is a liberal project based on liberal democracy representing the normative ideal. But in the course of economic globalisation, liberalism is currently experienced by many citizens primarily as the liberalisation of markets and the deregulation of social welfare systems, which since the financial crisis of 2008 have exacerbated social inequality and placed significant sections of European societies in precarious living situations (Bréchon, Chap. 8, this volume; Mak 2019). The globalisation shaped by a neoliberal economic paradigm has divided the European middle classes and threatened them with social relegation since the start of this millennium (Bude 2014). The current Europe-wide inflation will accelerate this process. Trust in meritocracy, that is, the promise of social advancement resulting from performance, is shaken deeply by these developments, in particular in Eastern European states, some of whom still suffer from kleptocratic and oligarchic political systems and experience the hardness of a neoliberal market, which leaves the individual to fend for themselves (Krastev 2017). Financial crises, bank bailouts, and corruption scandals among the political and economic elite have not only shattered confidence in the national and international elite, but have led to a pre-revolutionary mood or even revolt in parts of the global and European population (Eyal 2021). Right-wing and extremist groups have exploited the anxiety and fears resulting from these dynamics and appeal to those who no longer feel represented politically by the classical liberal parties. The demonstrations against COVID-19 pandemic regulations with their conspiracy myths and occasional violent excesses can probably also be seen as a political eruption of this pattern. But this critical perception of concretely experienced neoliberal market liberty does not affect only those who become losers or who feel as such; it must be assumed that mistrust and resistance can already be found throughout the different strata of the population. This fragile pattern must be seen as one of the main roots of the crisis of liberal democracy. For many people, the practice of liberal democracy is not a real-life experience, as it is restricted and given lie to by the laws of the global liberal market. It must remain to be seen if and how the socio-economic and political consequences in the wake of the Russian war against Ukraine will intensify this fragile situation and strengthen or weaken attitudes towards liberal democracy. The announced military rearmament of the EU may strengthen authoritarian attitudes. But the experience of war in Europe may also result in a new politicisation of a democratic way of life and strengthen the willingness to fight for liberal democracy – after an epoch of a ‘democracy without enemies’ (Beck 1995) that has degraded democracy to a service to be consumed for too many people (Nassehi 2022).

The EU seems to be aware of the crisis of democracy and values, as in 2022 the ‘Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values Programme’ was started, which ‘aims to protect and promote Union rights and values as enshrined in the EU treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights’ and thereby ‘contributes to sustain and further develop open, rights-based, democratic, equal, and inclusive societies based on the rule of law’ (CERV 2022). But despite this ambitious aim, the question might arise as to whether and to what extent citizens experience EU policy as being based on the principles of liberal democracy. Do European citizens experience the freedom to participate and co-create political space and coexistence that is guided by their own values? It might be assumed that from the point of view of many citizens, their own cultural, ethnic, or religious values remain invisible or are not adequately recognised in the EU’s discourse framework. This assumption can be argued, for example, by the fact that attitudes directed against the values of liberal democracies are clearly connected to religious attitudes and thus to questions of values and identity (see S. Pickel and G. Pickel, Chap. 5; Halman and Sieben, Chap. 4, this volume). It is probably not the concrete religious beliefs alone that have anti-democratic effects, but the ways of life of religious communities, which are usually oriented towards more relational, local, and communally embedded coexistence. Liberality and liberalisation could thus be experienced as a political project forced ‘top-down’, and could consequently be rejected, as they appear to be destroying traditional cultures and ways of life. If we, for example, interpret the crisis of liberal democracy in the theoretical framework of Axel Honneth’s (1994) ethical reflection on the contemporary ‘struggle for recognition’, one could observe a paradoxical pattern: the EU prescribing liberal democratic values is resisted in the name of these values in the struggle for the recognition of one’s own cultural, religious, and national identities and values. Since, so far, only right-wing parties have reacted politically to this understandable concern, they can use these fears and worries for their own political interests.

Would alternatives be conceivable here? Could concepts of liberal democracy be strengthened that also take better account of the cultural and national memory of European regions and can be developed more autonomously, admittedly with subsidiary support from the EU? Could society support dialogue platforms where people can reflect on and discuss whether and how liberal values can be combined with traditional cultural and religious values?

A blanket moral disqualification of those parts of the population that evade the democratic policy guidelines of the EU – as can be observed in both European intellectual circles and public media elites – seems to be counterproductive. Of course, the crisis of liberal democracy must not be glossed over, and anti-democratic attitudes such as intolerance against minorities or illiberal, authoritarian government policies must not be played down or even legitimised. But precisely to cut off the value-based sources that support the success of right-wing and authoritarian parties and politicians, alternatives must be developed. People with anti-democratic attitudes probably do not need moral sermons or to be treated like victims of right-wing parties. If their wishes for more direct and embedded democracy are taken seriously, easily accessible places are needed where values debates and conflicts can be discussed in equal footing and people can experience the value of a liberal democracy, with parties in the discussion willing to discuss values other than their own, including, of course, arguments and conflicts.

In addition to such values discourses taking place with parties on an equal footing, it will also be most important to work on the causes of the loss of confidence among significant parts of the population in the political and economic system. This requires public debate on the structural reasons for the moral failure of politicians and entrepreneurs observed during the financial crises (Mak 2019) and corresponding policies that prevent such situations. Moreover, politicians and entrepreneurs need values education, which is of public and democratic interest and must be established structurally. Furthermore, policies of redistribution, including combating structural reasons of poverty, must be put on the agenda of public and political discourse. It is remarkable that the preferences for redistribution are quite high in nearly all countries of Europe (Aschauer, Chap. 12, this volume), while this topic is not reflected adequately in political discourse at either national or EU level. Increasing social inequality and a growing gap between those two-thirds who benefit from the previous economic system and the one-third who are economically excluded (Piketty 2020) pose an enormous danger for liberal democracies. As long as only the richer classes benefit from the current political and economic system, the promotion of democracy will remain untrustworthy.

2.2 The European Union as a Subsidiary Institution: A Real Experience?

Although the EU was not conceived as a ‘super state’ superior to the nation states, but as an association of states guided by the structural value of subsidiarity, it could be assumed that a significant proportion of European citizens do not experience subsidiarity in their political life. They may not have experienced the way in which diversity policies, the promotion of the rights of minorities, or the policies of gender equality have been implemented at a national level as a support for the necessary further development of values, but rather as an attack on their own, unreflective values and as a non-discussable stipulation from above.

As Linda Woodhead and Greg Smith’s (2018) studies on Brexit document, Brexit can, for example, be seen as an expression of resistance against excessive interference on the part of the EU in a culture in which individual freedom traditionally plays a high role. Regardless of the content of European values, this resistance could therefore promote the success of nationalist parties. Similarly, the support of right-wing, illiberal, and autocratic parties by large parts of the population in the Visegrád states, which have a deeply rooted cultural suspicion of supranational institutions as a result of their history with the Soviet empire, can possibly be understood as one of the root causes of the rejection of European values. As values decisions are rarely based on rational arguments but on emotions and ‘mental infrastructures’ (Welzer 2021: 110), the lack of participation in public values debates then results in regression to autocratic values and policies. Social media becomes not a space of democratic discourse but of democratic withdrawal, self-assurance, and identity affirmation, including combating the values of others.

These developments can also be exacerbated in those regions of Europe where populations have reservations about state and political interventions for historical reasons. But the impression that the EU is trying to regulate more and more areas of life, such as culture, identity and language, politics of history, or values may be shared not only by parts of the populations of the former communist states, but also by Great Britain and the conservative milieus in Europe. Even if it can be assumed that such resistance to EU values policy is more likely to be related to the protection of hegemonic privileges (for example, with regard to gender policy, minority rights, or asylum policy), to the maintenance of national political power, or to the refusal of national self-criticism than to the protection of values, these concerns must be taken seriously and need more and diversified efforts on the part of all societal institutions. Otherwise, there is a danger that European values will be rejected simply because of how they are communicated and argued and because of who is communicating and arguing them. Even if the values of the European Union correspond to a universal and human rights-based ethos: without the possibility of broad and voluntary appropriation by the population in democratic discourses, they will be perceived as a discourse of domination and therefore will not find acceptance in significant parts of the population.

2.3 Globalism Versus Tribalism: Struggle Between Universal and Particular Values?

As discussed, (Sect. 14.2.1), the crisis of liberal democracy must be seen in the context of neoliberal globalisation. By the turn of the millennium, globalisation had not only significantly reduced global poverty, increased education levels – not least those of many women – and given rise to a new global middle class (Bude 2014; Eyal 2021), but it had also produced a new class of global super-rich and multinational corporations with imperial power. These processes have also had destructive effects, however: the exploitation of labour and natural resources, the emergence of a global class of ‘superfluous’ human beings useless for economic aims (Bauman 2015), and the emergence of ‘exploitation hubs’ (Eyal 2021: 70), where cheap and polluting goods are produced and workers have no rights and suffer as a result of air or other pollution.

This neoliberal economic dynamic has a universalist tendency which threatens and sweeps away historically developed cultures and thus local and particular cultural and religious values. Traditional ways of life are disembedded and uprooted. Furthermore, nation states lose their political power, as they must operate in the context of neoliberally organised markets. Nation states are no longer capable of fully keeping their promise to protect their citizens from economic strokes of fate, which was at the heart of the idea of social welfare states. To the victims of these globalising dynamics of leveling cultural and religious values and individualising the risk of poverty, the new cosmopolitan elite, with their universal values, may appear not only detached from the reality of daily life but also as attacking traditional values. Even if the recognition of individual and diverse values is part of this universal cosmopolitism, many people can get the impression that universal values are a privilege for the rich. For example, certain values such as an eco-conscious lifestyle must be affordable, and consequently they are rejected. Globalisation dominated by neoliberal logic has a democracy-threatening effect and weakens the willingness to recognise an equally globalised ethos which is urgently needed given global threats.

But the moral tribalistic protest resulting from this rejection, claiming the recognition of particular values based on group interests, is equally dangerous to democracy. The emergence of radical political groups that want to assert nationalist or regional interests, regional secessionist movements (as in Spain or Great Britain), or the recourse of governments to nationally formatted values and identity policies may therefore be seen as a reaction of resistance to the experience of globalisation. Both people and national governments try to regain political power by referring to traditional values. Particular values such as nation, culture, religion, or the assertion of group interests are then seen as superior to universal values that are constitutive of liberal democracies, such as recognition of diversity, the protection of minorities, or procedural values such as participation.

The central problem does not seem to be the constitutive tension between particular and universal values, therefore, but the fact that values mutate into a political means in the struggle to assert recognition and interests. The lack of discourse spaces and processes in which arguments are used to mediate between universal ethical claims and legitimate particular interests and values then has the effect of endangering democracy. Additionally, the framing and embedding of value conflicts in a globalised world view that perceives rivalry, competition, and the agonising struggle for hegemony as immutable laws of nature and history and as the essential nature of human beings, exacerbates this danger. In this ideological context, rational negotiations, or transformations of values for ethical reasons, can easily be perceived as capitulation or defeat. From this perspective, the anti-democratic value developments documented in our volume can be seen as a kind of ‘backfiring’, reacting to global political and economic developments.

2.4 Division Between Western and Eastern Europe?

The polarisations associated with these conflictual dynamics are most clearly visible in the value cleavages between Western and Eastern Europe, especially between the pre-and post-2004 EU member states. The political developments in the aftermath of the migration crisis in 2015 have confronted the EU with long-fermenting, deep-rooted values conflicts that were quite foreseeable with regard to earlier EVS studies – that is, widespread nationalist attitudes, pronounced intolerance towards foreigners and homosexuals in Eastern European countries, or the rejection of ‘gender policies’ in the Visegrád states. Since then, the recourse to international human rights on the one hand and national values on the other is almost irreconcilable; Christian values and Islamic values, European values and values of Arab culture, secularist and religious values face each other on frontlines. Conflicts about the extent of solidarity, about the understanding of gender justice, and about the recognition of diverse sexual identities or lifestyles other than the heterosexual seem to polarise Europe between West and East.

But the more one looks at the values landscape in a differentiated way, the more inadequate a simple interpretation of the situation as an East–West conflict appears. In our volume, value cleavages can also be seen between Southern and Northern Europe as well as within individual countries and regions. Depending on the topic, the above-mentioned attitudes are significantly related, for example, to demographic variables such as age, gender, income, and place of residence. It is, therefore, more than reductive to interpret these values conflicts in Europe primarily along the East–West axis. The causes lie deeper and affect the whole of Europe.

Without playing down the value patterns that endanger liberal democracy and the cohesion of the EU in Eastern European countries, these developments must be analysed in a more differentiated way. For example, the sharp dividing line that is often drawn between West and East in these values debates should be questioned. More than 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, such a comparison does as little justice to Eastern Europe as does an assessment of the values landscape of this region using Western criteria. In several studies on religion and values in Central and Eastern Europe, András Máté-Tóth and his colleagues (Máté-Tóth and Rughiniş 2011; Máté-Tóth and Rosta 2016) have shown that attitudes and values in this region must be interpreted according to theoretical paradigms other than those of Western Europe, because of the specific political history and culture of this region. There is no doubt that the long communist era has left massive traces; Máté-Tóth (2019) speaks about ‘wounded identities’. These traces of history also affect values and attitudes. For example, they result in a specific susceptibility to authoritarianism and (ethno)nationalism in times of crises. Moreover, the process of nation-building after 1989 took place during a rapid political and economic transition to neoliberal capitalism with its consequent growing social inequality and poverty. Religion as a means of identity-building has played a central role in this process (Máté-Tóth 2006; Pickel and Sammet 2012) and led to an increasing political power of the Catholic and the Orthodox Church in some countries, including new alliances between states and churches.

But the impact of history on values goes back much further. It must therefore be taken into account that, in addition to the centuries-old division between the Latin West and the Byzantine East, the permanent change of power between empires, which repeatedly (and often violently) drew new dividing lines in an ethnically and religiously plural society and put these societies in a state of permanent transition, makes it impossible to speak of a culturally uniform or politically homogeneous region. The attempt to define Central and Eastern Europe as a ‘self-evident geographical, topographical, historical or even political unit’ thus proves impossible; this region is ‘a created space’, ‘a constructed area’ (Máté-Tóth 2016: vii). Politically, these ‘societies belonged to one or another empire and tried to gain sovereignty and autonomy in forms of separate nation-states’ (Máté-Tóth 2016: vii). Today, this struggle takes place within the European Union – or, as Máté-Tóth puts it, ‘concentrating on the recent identity-building factors, the nolens volens belonging to the European Union plays the central role’ (Máté-Tóth 2016: vii). Behind this background, scepticism towards the European Union can be understood better: despite the legal constitution and reality of the EU, it can be experienced as a new empire.

Without going into the complex history here, this historical self-perception must be taken into consideration when interpreting and judging the empirical results. This recognition could be a first important step in enabling the common struggle for the recognition of EU values to be more successful. Empirical research on the values in this region (Máté-Tóth and Rosta 2016; Pickel and Sammet 2012) documents that there are indeed ‘typical’ Eastern European value sets in terms of political attitudes, but it also becomes clear that there are different value clusters within the region, which in turn overlap with developments in Western European regions. If the value cleavages between West and East are to be dealt with, it is therefore necessary to put an end to the rhetoric of a sharp dividing line between West and East. It is necessary to search for the tendencies and causes that affect the whole of Europe and result in the increase of anti-democratic values throughout Europe.

Additionally, the history of Central and Eastern Europe must be recognised explicitly in public values discourses. Historical amnesia has an extremely negative effect. If we want European values to be accepted better in this region, they must also be interpreted in memory of, for example, the mass murders or the Gulags of the Soviet empire or with the willingness to discuss the capitalist turbo-revolution after 1989. Even if some self-perceptions, such as the dominant ‘victim narrative’, can be critically questioned, they must be listened to. It will be possible only based on the public recognition of Eastern European history to discuss critically the self-inflicted causes of anti-democratic attitudes, such as unwillingness to reflect self-critically regarding, for example, co-responsibility for the Shoa (Judt 2012), the authoritarian and corrupt ruling structures, or the anti-democratic dimensions of nationalist narratives and traditional values – including religious ones.

A self-critical approach to historical narratives and self-perceptions is, of course, also required from Western countries. Western success stories, such as the permanent progress of modernity, or the proud discourse on European and liberal democratic values or human rights, must also be questioned. The history of modernity is deeply connected with violence and mass murder (Bauman 2002; Imbusch 2005); democratic values and human rights values are neither respected by the whole European population nor fully recognised by all Western politicians and governmental policies, particularly regarding the legal and political rights of migrants, discrimination against marginalised groups, poverty alleviation, gender equality, or asylum policy.

Only guided by the readiness to listen to the historical narratives of the other, the effort to understand the values of the other, and the willingness to be self-critical and to learn from the other will dialogue about shared and common European values be possible, including those involving conflict based on ethical arguments.

The indispensability of such a struggle for mutual understanding of the regionally heterogeneous genesis and meaning of values is exemplified in three areas that are central to the heart of liberal democracy and to the continued existence of the EU: the neo-authoritarian temptation, the rejection of cultural and religious diversity, and the lack of universal solidarity (S. Pickel and G. Pickel, Chap. 5; Quandt and Lomazzi, Chap. 7; Polak and Schuster, Chap. 6, this volume). These tendencies threaten democracy at its core. It must be assumed that the legacies of nineteenth century ethno-nationalism and twentieth century fascism and totalitarianism still have an impact on the values of significant parts of the European population and thus are central roots for anti-democratic attitudes. Though this impact differs between European regions, these legacies can be reactivated in the context of global crisis anxiety – be it in the desire for a strong, sovereign nation state that protects the population from the effects of globalisation or the desire for a strong and powerful Europe that protects its citizens from non-European migrants and refugees or enemies. In times of crisis, the desire for security can strengthen authoritarian and anti-democratic values. But it is also possible that the experiences during the pandemic and the war in Ukraine will lead to a revival of liberal democratic values, the return of a united EU, and the intensification of international cooperation. As we observed in our study, political promotion and institutional and legal support of values such as tolerance can change people’s attitudes and allow the recognition of diversity to increase, as has happened in selected Western European states and cities (Aschauer, Chap. 12, this volume). So why should such a practical political commitment not work for other values of liberal democracies too? It is therefore necessary to gain the trust of those governments that oppose these values and to jointly develop good practice models.

3 The Role of Religion: Problem or Component?

The ambivalent impact of religious attitudes on political attitudes documented in our volume (S. Pickel and G. Pickel, Chap. 5; Polak and Schuster, Chap. 6, this volume) became clear also in the context of the pandemic: priests, imams and rabbis who declared vaccination a religious duty while being criticised by their colleagues and followers who referred to the integrity of the human body; churches opening vaccination stations to support the common good while believers demonstrated in the streets against pandemic measures in the name of freedom; disputes over the right to freedom of religion or belief and government requirements and regulations to restrict or prohibit physical attendance at religious services in churches, synagogues, or mosques. Again, values played a significant role.

From both a theological and a sociological perspective, these ambivalent consequences of religious attitudes are not surprising. With its claims to the truth, the sacred, and their plural and contradictory interpretations, religion has always had the potential to both cause conflict and violence and foster peace and reconciliation (Scott Appleby 2000; Krech 2011). Also, from a historical perspective, the politicisation of religion is not a new phenomenon given the centuries of alliances between churches and governments in Europe. It is not surprising, therefore, that our volume documents that religiosity is a politically relevant factor of influence. It is a heritage deeply inscribed in the cultural matrix and collective memory of Europe, even in times of churches losing their influence over the life and values of people. In particular, Christian denominational values, as propagated by the Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox churches for centuries, continue to shape the attitudes of the population even when people no longer participate actively in church life and have a significant impact on other than religious values (Polak and Schachinger 2011).

The progressive disembedding of religion from everyday cultural life (Polak and Schuster, Chap. 6, this volume) makes religion susceptible to identity, socio-political, and state-political interests and framings. Religion is a resource in the struggle for values – and, depending on the interpretation of values, it can be both a ‘problem or a component for public policy’ (Foret 2022: 329) and thus a challenge for liberal democratic societies. Religious attitudes can therefore strengthen or weaken the acceptance of the values of the EU, as we can see, for example, in resistance against the recognition of same-sex partnerships on the one hand or, on the other hand, in the support of human rights by religious actors and communities.

As this ambivalence can be observed not only in the relationship between religions and secular society but also within religious communities, an interpretation of these developments as secularisation falls short. Rather, it makes sense to interpret these contradictory phenomena as a rival struggle over the role of religion in value conflicts referring to politics. Given the growing recourse to religious values on the part of religious communities in politics, which are becoming involved in socio-political debates to get more recognition, and a tendency on the part of the EU to diminish the influence of religion in public and political discourses and decisions (see, for instance, the debates on the right to abortion or assisted suicide), it is more accurate to speak of a liberal-secular matrix (Amir-Moazami 2018), that shapes the European Union’s policy. This matrix is opposed by a growing fundamentalist tendency in some religious communities, in particular with an international neo-authoritarian, fundamentalist Christian network (Wäckerlig 2019), in which the focus is the pushing back of liberal democracy, pluralism, and Islamic influence in Europe. Parts of the Orthodox churches can be found in this field, as well as (neo-)right-wing Free Churches, Catholic and Protestant movements. A secularist understanding of values, in which religion should only be a private matter and have no social or political influence, and a fundamentalist understanding of religious values, which recognises a threat in secular values and fights them, stand opposed.Footnote 1

But there are also other developments, such as the growing EU interest in the contribution of religions and the establishment of structures of dialogue with religious actors (for example, European Commission 2022; Leustan 2022; Foret 2022). Secular governments or international organisations such as the OSCE also strengthen dialogue and cooperation with religions (Schreiner 2016: 273) or support interreligious dialogue (IJRT 2020). Religious leaders and communities are increasingly seen as partners to implement European values and human rights such as the support of democracy, tolerance, environmental protection, or migration and anti-racist policies. The relationship between religion and politics is currently undergoing a massive upheaval. What contribution to this upheaval do our results reveal? And what questions do they raise?

3.1 Religion Matters – But Which One?

The EVS concept of religion focuses on a few selected attitudes, beliefs, explicit religious practices, and affiliations and is, moreover, an abstracted form of a Christian understanding of religiosity. Religiosity defined in this way has different effects on pro-democratic values: in combination with social practice and active involvement in religious communities, it supports pro-democratic attitudes – but more so in Western countries. In Eastern Europe and among people without religious practice, religiosity often combines with anti-democratic attitudes such as xenophobia, homophobia, and the desire for a homogeneous culture (S. Pickel and G. Pickel, Chap. 5; Polak and Schuster, Chap. 6, this volume). But the more deeply one analyses them, the more complex and contradictory these connections become. In some countries, the influence of religiosity on political attitudes seems stronger or weaker than in others, sociodemographic factors seem to be more powerful, and religiosity exerts its influence only in combination with these. Regarding attitudes towards same-sex relations and other life values, the influence of religiosity seems to be decoupled simultaneously (Halman and Sieben, Chap. 4, this volume). Local, regional, historical, and religious-political contexts have a significant influence. It is a fact that religiosity plays a role, but formulating general meta-theories for the whole European region based on these findings is becoming increasingly difficult and calls for more interdisciplinary research.

Also, the question of which practices religiosity is associated with is not considered and thus remains mostly invisible in our volume. In many Christian Orthodox dominated countries in Eastern Europe, religiosity is (still) much less a matter of individual decisions of faith than it is in Protestant countries of Northern and Western Europe. In Christian Orthodoxy, religiosity is still embedded in everyday culture and is thus less self-reflexive (Polak 2017), while for Western Christians it is sometimes just part of a world view that has little impact on daily life and cultural habits. Furthermore, religiosity can be theologically educated, intellectually formatted, or spiritually deepened, but can also be just part of cultural socialisation. It can promote the commitment to altruistic values, but can also foster nationalist or tribal values. It can strengthen or weaken positive attitudes towards members of other religions. For example, in countries that have had a historical tradition of living together in religious diversity, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina before the Yugoslavian war, or in countries where the culture is shaped by the public presence of religious symbols of different religious traditions, the attitude towards religiously plural coexistence is more positive than in countries where a publicly present religiosity is historically less pronounced, like in France. In addition, European countries have different historical or religious-political narratives about minority religions that shape the perception of religious diversity and thus can strengthen or weaken tolerance and solidarity (Quandt and Lomazzi, Chap. 7, this volume). Finally, discourses within religious communities also shape the social functions and semantics of religion – through their interpretations of holy scriptures or through public statements by religious leaders. To integrate all of these nuances around how religiosity is shaped culturally and historically and then influences political values while reflecting on the EVS data would not only go beyond the scope of our volume but is also impossible because of the design of the EVS. This calls for further research.

In practical terms, the proven fact of religiosity influencing political attitudes requires more self-reflection on and sensitivity to cooperation between political and religious actors. Religious communities should critically reflect on how their values are used in the service of political interests, irrespective of whether these interests are nationalistic or secular. Religious communities should take care not to abuse their cooperation with political actors and parties to assert their own power interests and values and unquestioningly place themselves in the service of political interests. Of course, there are differences between religious communities regarding this self-positioning – because, for example, Jewish communities need cooperation with the state for security reasons – but every denomination should reflect on its cooperation with governmental authorities and policies according to their fundamental religious beliefs and the needs of society.

Conversely, politicians should also keep their distance and take care not to become captive to religious communities. They should also refrain from trying to discipline the latter for their political interests, even if they are pro-democratic. Empirical studies on interreligious dialogue in European countries (IJRT 2020), for example, document that governments primarily cooperate with those parts of religious communities that serve their interests, which sometimes results in conflicts within and division between religious communities. In turn, from the perspective of religious communities, cooperation that is too close to governments creates dependency on state resources and weakens the critical and resistant potential of religion. Positively formulated, mutual respect and a carefully protected distance between the religious and political realm can enrich both religious communities and political actors and governments if guided by a mutually appreciative dialogue. Religious communities can support the normative values of the EU, but criticise their ideological interpretation, that is, if the latter, for example, endanger the common good or threaten the lives of vulnerable groups (the unborn, children and youth, the elderly and sick, the poor, migrants, etc.). Conversely, if political actors criticise human rights violations in religious communities, such as discrimination against women or people with other than heterosexual identities, they can spur religious communities to question their own religious traditions self-critically and to develop them further. The conflicts that necessarily arise in this process of mutual critical dialogue would be beneficial for religious and political actors as well as society – so long as they are not conducted in an atmosphere of mutual enforcement and the will to defeat each other but aim instead to protect the dignity and rights of every human being and strengthen freedom, justice, and the common good.

Hence, the understanding of religion in Europe should not be the subject of debates among experts such as academics, religious leaders, or politicians alone. Debating the relationship between religion and politics and their values is an issue of social relevance and requires public discourse and the improvement of religious literacy among all participants. Translating the meanings that religious values hold for modern societies and, in turn, translating secular values into religious language, can have positive effects on the development of democratic societies, both in terms of processes and content. Values that endanger human life and coexistence, democracy, and human rights can be detected and subjected to rational critique. As our volume documents, religion will remain a relevant factor in the political space in the near future, in particular when traditional forms of religion erode and new political functions arise. Therefore, those understandings of religion that threaten the essence of European values must be discussed and, in turn, religious arguments must be taken into account more seriously when interpreting European values.

3.2 Religion: A Resource for Promoting Values

The results of our volume might give the dominant impression that religion is primarily a problem, especially for liberal democracies. In contrast, a look at the history of Europe shows that Christian values have also had numerous positive effects, not least with regard to the emergence of democracy in Europe (Mitterauer 2010), the theological appreciation of democracy (Norwood 2019), the emergence of human rights and their complex relationship to Judaism and Christianity (Nelson 2011; Wittreck 2013), or the constitution of the EU (Altermatt 2008).

Why are these positive effects seldom reflected in the results of quantitative religious sociological studies? Is there a bias in the approach of research on religion? Or is it impossible to measure these positive effects when they cannot be defined precisely with traditional concepts of religion which focus on the commitment and religious practice of individuals only?

Long before the founding of the EU, international religious movements were already engaged with universal values. For example, since 1928, the Christian-Jewish Dialogue movement, which held conferences in Oxford in 1946, Seelisberg in 1947, and Fribourg in 1948, advocated for common universal ethical norms that should hold societies together, such as freedom, responsibility, and justice as pillars of the common good (Simpson and Weyl 2009). International Christian-Jewish organisations also played an essential role in the human rights discourses of the 1940s (Simpson and Weyl 2009).

Moreover, numerous religiously motivated movements, organisations, and projects are currently advocating values that overlap with the secular self-understanding of modern societies and shared interests. Mention should be made here, for example, of the commitment to human rights-based migration and refugee policy on the part of the Christian churches (for example, the Working Group of Migration and Asylum of the COMECE (2021) and the Churches Commission for Migrants CCME (2018)), international organisations to combat poverty and injustice (for example, Caritas Europa), or, most recently, the call for (global) solidarity in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic (Goshen-Gottstein 2020).

Why are these positive contributions of religious communities often overlooked in empirical research, in public discourses on values, or in the media? Why does this pro-democratic engagement of religious communities not have a significant visible effect on the political values of religious people? Of course, there is research on the contributions of religious communities to civil society (Nagel 2015; Strachwitz 2020); but on the whole one can get the impression that – compared with the problematic dimensions of religious communities – the positive contribution of religiosity on pro-democratic values is a blind spot in values discourses and values research. This situation might point to a blatant lack of historical and religious knowledge, especially among many secularist protagonists, including intellectuals and researchers, who do not consider religion to be a relevant political interlocutor.

Conversely, religious communities must also critically reflect on whether and how they promote pro-democratic values. Christian churches and their leaders in particular have tended to support those political parties that seek to preserve and strengthen traditional, sometimes even authoritarian, and fascist social orders, religious homogeneity, and values such as authority and obedience. Fear of and resistance to atheistic communism and scepticism towards the traditionally religion-critical leftist parties play a central role in this aversion to new and alternative political ideas. This stabilising interest of church leaders leads to the fact that social innovation ideas promoted by religious people or communities tend to emerge yet remain invisible in public discourse and mainstream media. Also, theological studies on political topics are discussed primarily in expert circles. Pro-democratic research and projects provided by religious communities and theological intellectuals therefore remain among elites and do not reach most believers. Political and media discourses referring to Christian values that are abused to delegitimise democratic values and devalue minorities such as Muslims have a visibly stronger effect on the population and get much more attention. But this gap between academic and popular knowledge does not affect religious issues alone. It also raises the fundamental question of the dissemination and reception of intellectual discourses in the population and politics and requires a self-critical assessment and increased development of Third Mission projects on the side of political and religious actors and institutions on how to strengthen the participation of the majority of religious people in academic and intellectual debates.

Moreover, religious communities and their leaders should ask themselves self-critically whether and how they support the democratic education of their believers. They should reflect on their conscious and unconscious contribution to the political education of believers. How do the religious values that are promoted in communities willingly or unwillingly support an educated and active participation in a democratic society? Religious communities need not be afraid of being politicised while responding to this responsibility if they engage in the task in dialogue with their own religious traditions. Nor must they give up the critical potential of religious values if they accept responsibility for both the political and religious education of their believers. Political actors, on the other hand, should be aware of the inner diversity of religious communities and enter into dialogue with all strands of religious communities, but in particular with those religious intellectual groups, international religious organisations, or academics who want to play a constructive role in promoting the values of the EU.

3.3 Religion as a Powerful Amplifier of Value Cleavages

Traditional religiosities have a negative effect on pro-democratic values and can thus reinforce value cleavages in Europe. Religious fundamentalism in particular demonstrates great proximity to (neo)authoritarian political concepts. But according to our volume, religiosity does not prove to be the central source and cause of anti-democratic attitudes, but rather unfolds its influence only in the context of other factors (Polak and Schuster, Chap. 6, this volume). These multi-causal connections would need to be researched more closely. Moreover, in the context of a Europe-wide erosion of individual religiosity, religiosity generally seems to lose its central function as a source of values and attitudes, in particular among the younger generations. Neo-authoritarian and xenophobic tendencies can also be identified as independent of religious developments in some states. This raises several questions.

First, the reasons for the rejection of European values by religious people should be explored in depth. What are they directed against in concrete terms? It can be assumed that religious people have the impression that European values policy restricts their right to freedom of religion and belief and that their identity is thus devalued, threatened, and pushed back into the private sphere. This lack of public recognition is a powerful source for the rejection of European values. Particularly in those states where attachment to religious communities has provided protection, comfort, or political resistance in times of communist repression, or where religiosity plays a key role in the context of ethno-geographical or ethno-national values, a liberal values policy can be experienced as the humiliation of a religious way of life. The so-called ‘moral panic’ theory (Cohen 2011) could also explain this rejection: ‘moral panic’ arises when ‘a condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests and authoritarian parties or even religious leaders stylise themselves as fighters against this threat and present themselves as “moral entrepreneurs”’ (Cohen 2011: 1). This dynamic can currently be observed in an extremist version in the ideological legitimisation of the Russian war in Ukraine, which is framed as a ‘metaphysical’ war against the decadent values of the secularised West, which is accused of putting itself in the place of the sacred (Assheuer 2022) – supported by Patriarch Kirill, who even speaks of a fight against ‘evil forces’ that threaten the Christian Church (Sooy 2022).

Also, the classical ‘social network theory’ (Liu et al. 2017) allows us to better understand this reaction. Religious communities, which in many (especially Eastern European) countries still have central social functions – transmitting information, channelling personal or media influence, or enabling attitudinal and behavioural change – can feel their power and cohesion threatened by liberal-democratic value politics. They then resist to protect their grouping and power, which can again be taken up by political parties in the promise to protect and maintain this power in exchange for the support of religious people for their own political interests. Religion then becomes collective residuum and a medium of political protest and maintenance of power. In conjunction with political narratives that then refer to the ‘Christian heritage’ and ‘Christian values’ (mostly emptied of content or referring primarily to family values and nation), religion can then be linked to right-wing and authoritarian attitudes. We can observe dynamics like this in Poland, Hungary, or Austria, but also in secularised states such as Czechia or Eastern Germany. This abuse of Christian values is supported by the fact that traditionally only right-wing parties consider religion to be a socially relevant factor, while liberal and left-wing parties usually have nothing to offer religious people and their concerns and needs. Conversely, traditional religious communities have a long historical heritage of patriarchy and authoritarianism, both in their theologies and structures (for example, the hierarchical understanding of the priest in Catholicism and Orthodoxy; traditional women and family values; considering homosexuality as a sin, etc.), which favours affinity with such parties.

Furthermore, the historical amnesia concerning the role of Christianity in the emergence of the EU and a one-sided, primarily negative perception of religion by secular protagonists make it easy for right-wing authoritarian parties and governments to refer to this forgotten and ignored heritage. Correspondingly, many Christians in Europe lack theological education and are religiously illiterate. They identify Christian faith with the Christian culture they were raised in. Without education, this ignorance can then easily be used politically with reference to the protection of the ‘Christian cultural heritage’. Conversely, Christians for whom their churches provide theological education, such as in Austria, Germany, or Switzerland, participate in socio-political discourses in a committed way and on the basis of democratic values.

For religious disseminators and political actors, numerous tasks arise from this diagnosis. The need for religious education is central; it must be of interest for both the religious communities and public and political actors and institutions. Historical knowledge as a reflected examination of the political dimensions and implications of faith could also provide important protection against the political instrumentalisation of religion. Religious communities must reflect on questions of power and structure within their institutions and on the extent to which they support or prevent the development of democratic conduct. Privatisation of religiosity can become highly counterproductive in terms of the implications for democratic values – be it promoted by secular policies or religious actors who want to depoliticise faith. In any case, the influence of religion on political values cannot be erased or prevented; it must be reflected upon.

In conclusion, religious citizens must be able and supported to feel part of the European project. They must be able to find their values reflected in it. This necessarily includes conflicts which should not be avoided, but it needs structures, spaces, and platforms for dialogue. Such conflicts do not aim at assimilation from either side, but at listening to each other, understanding each other, and together developing overlapping values and commonly shared universal values and norms while identifying and recognising differences that do not harm human rights and the common good. If the rule of law, fundamental rights and obligations, and democracy, etc. are to be recognised, there is no way around such public debates on values on an equal footing. Such values debates could even build bridges to better resolve the political conflicts with the Visegrád states in particular. For the values of the EU are not Western values, but were formulated jointly by Western and Eastern Europe and therefore claim to be valid for all.

3.4 The Role of Religious Institutions and Leaders

In secular societies, the idea that religion is a private matter is widespread. Also, in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam the decision to believe in God is considered a deeply personal and free choice. This personal freedom is not interpreted in private terms, however, but is intrinsically connected with social relationships and public responsibility. Therefore, religious institutions and leaders play a key role in shaping the content and practice of individual religiosities and should not be underestimated in their influence. They interpret and transmit the content of sacred texts; they teach religious doctrines and commandments; they lead rituals and introduce people into other religious practices. Religious leaders thereby also influence the political attitudes, norms, and values of their believers – be this through explicitly political appeals or the indirect impact of religious values. In this respect, religious leaders can promote or weaken democratic self-understanding and positive attitudes towards political parties or the state. They can encourage political engagement and positive relationships towards society or other religious communities, and they can promote values such as freedom, solidarity, tolerance, forgiveness, reconciliation, etc. (Nagel 2015; KAIICID and ECRL 2021).

The EVS does not provide information on whether and how religious institutions and leaders influence the values of their believers. However, the results suggest that this direct influence is waning (Halman and Sieben, Chap. 4, this volume). In contrast, in some European countries the recourse of political actors to religious norms and values seems to have a stronger impact than does the influence of religious leaders (Polak and Schuster, Chap. 6, this volume). But despite their shrinking impact on individuals, religious institutions and leaders continue to be relevant yet contested political actors who shape public discourse. Particularly in social and climate policy issues, they are sought-after interlocutors at state and EU level. But in other fields, such as migration policies, gender policies, and policies on same-sex relationships, abortion, etc., their influence is highly contested. For example, it is decreasing in migration issues throughout Europe (Rosenberger 2022) and in policy fields on sexuality in Western Europe, yet increasing in some Eastern European states.

This new and complex situation is forcing religious institutions, in particular Christian churches, to reposition themselves in society and politics. Traditional coalitions, such as the alliance between Christian Democratic parties and churches in Western Europe (van Kersbergen 2022) are diminishing in importance; new coalitions are forming, such as in Eastern European countries in the course of nation-building; new conflicts between religious communities and the state are breaking out, for example, conflict over denominational religious education provided by the state in Austria, the wearing of headscarves in public institutions, or legislation on religious slaughter and circumcision concerning Jews and Muslims in Northern European States.

The progressive collapse of individual religiosity throughout Europe poses a further challenge and, above all, a threat to liberal democracy. Detlef Pollack’s and Gergely Rosta’s (2022) worldwide study of the sociology of religion confirms the developments we observed in the EVS: A dramatic secularisation is taking place in Europe – even in its religious strongholds. The authors provide empirical evidence that religion and churches gain in importance when religious identities are combined with political, economic and national interests. In particular, however, the combination of religious and political interests contributes to dechurching and weakens religious integration. As in Poland, for example, the liberal sections in particular then turn away from the churches. At the same time, there is a danger that the churches in particular will turn into traditionalist, right-wing authoritarian and anti-democratic communities that are socially isolated and become meaningless as a religion.

Religious institutions and their leaders must therefore reflect on what role they can, or want, to play politically in the future. Which political concerns and parties may be supported in a theologically responsible way, but where must Churches also resist? What organisational structures and strategies need to be developed in order to introduce religious values and interests into the political discourse? Based on which argumentation are these values and interests to be communicated? How can genuinely religious values be translated into secular terms and made comprehensible? Who are possible cooperation partners and from whom religions must distinguish? And what relationship should they want and do they want to share with the state and government? Listening to the debates and conflicts within religious communities, in episcopal declarations, synodal processes, conferences, and religious educational programmes and curricula, these debates have already started, and new coalitions – for example, between different religious communities or with civil society organisations – are emerging. But the churches still have intensive internal debates and disputes ahead of them.

Looking at the value developments among young people, a substantial transformation becomes also highly necessary. In all religious communities, many young people distance themselves from religious institutions, in particular from those religious communities that they perceive as patriarchal and homophobic (Inglehart 2021). If one looks at the sociodemographic composition of international civil society or human rights organisations and movements (for example, ‘Amnesty International’, ‘Greenpeace’, ‘Black Lives Matter’, ‘Fridays for Future’, etc.), one will notice that these are the places where young people – particularly young educated women – engage for justice, solidarity, peace, or human rights. In contrast, Christian churches are dominated by elderly people – a process that according to the EVS has also commenced in highly religious countries such as Poland or Romania. Politically interested young people are increasingly not choosing religious institutions as a space of engagement, but instead are contributing to those institutions in which they can find their values represented.

As a result, but also because of demography and religious pluralisation in European societies, religious communities are gradually losing their function as important locations of value formation for young people. Thus, research is needed into which contemporary institutions take over this function of value formation today, and into which sources in particular young people look at to acquire their values. In this regard, the reference to human rights seems to play an important role as a source of values, particularly for well-educated young people. For many, human rights provide a modern system of values – even though human rights themselves do not claim any ‘“transreligious” overarching authority’ or provide an ‘international humanitarian “civil religion”’ (Bielefeldt 2011: 237). They do not form a comprehensive belief system, but have a practical purpose, as they should enable ideologically different groups to join with their respective specific motivations and world views. Value formation is, of course, rooted in many other sources besides human rights, such as family relations and friendships, educational institutions, work and leisure, a culture dominated by economy and consumerism, and specific life experiences, etc., which have been identified as relevant factors of value formation (Verwiebe 2019a), but cannot be elaborated on here.

From the internal perspective of religious communities (in particular Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), social and political engagement, for instance, for justice and solidarity, is an elementary component of religious self-understanding and therefore a central source of value formation (Bucher and Krockauer 2006; Körner 2020). Even if the practical responsibilities, tasks, and duties resulting from this conviction lead to highly controversial discussion within and between religious communities, religious institutions and authorities must recognise their role as value educators in political terms too. Whether it is conscious or not, even if they encourage their believers to withdraw from active political engagement, they shape people’s political values. Consequently, they must reflect on their influence and include political education on their religious education agenda and curricula. But political education based on both democratic and religious and theological principles is also an essential factor in contributing to society politically in a competent and responsible way and in strengthening understanding and recognition of religious values.

Admittedly, these ideas sound very idealistic and will be difficult to realise in practice given the different situations of churches and religious communities in European countries. Christian churches and Jewish and Islamic communities and institutions have highly heterogeneous political self-understandings, values, and interests, for theological reasons but also as a result of majority and minority relations. So, for example, Jewish and Muslim communities in Northern European countries will strive for the religious freedom to practise their religious traditions (regarding headscarves, religious slaughter, or circumcision, for example), while Christian churches in Germany and Austria need to further develop the legally guaranteed cooperative model which is criticised by a growing number of non-religious citizens. State churches in the Nordic countries and in Great Britain face greater challenges with their non-believing members than does the Catholic Church in Poland or the Orthodox Church in Romania, where the latter have enormous importance for national self-image and will probably reject the urgency of these questions. Also, for the Christian churches in Hungary, such fundamental theo-political discussions will be a threat, as the churches are privileged both financially and symbolically, while at the same time being put under pressure to support Hungarian policies. Even within a state, discourses on the political role of the church will be conflictive, as for example in Germany, where the churches in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) are generally more sceptical about cooperation with the state than are the churches in Western Germany. But despite these different starting points and conflicts, these debates on the future role of religious institutions in society and politics must be held for theological reasons and because of the ambivalent impact they have on political values. If churches do not want to lose the credibility of their values and norms in the long run, there is no alternative to wide-ranging fundamental reflections with their members at all levels.

Yet religious communities face another challenge, too. Religious beliefs, norms, and values clearly have an implicit political dimension and effect. But in their theological self-understanding they are not political actors in the sense of political science. First and foremost, they define themselves as institutionalised representations of the theologically constitutive relationship between the human being and the sacred, a transcendent or divine reality, or God. With their narratives of meaning, symbols, religious practices, and ethics they offer ways of giving this relationship a defined content and a structured and organised form. Religious life is therefore at the very centre of religious institutions and communities; political life is only an indirect – but inevitable – consequence. These theological arguments cannot be elaborated on here, since they vary according to religion. But religious institutions and actors who ignore or forget their primary responsibility are in danger of becoming political activists who legitimise their political actions with religion. Moreover, by giving political activism priority over their genuine religious duties, they risk destroying the impulse that a religious reference to transcendence holds for all political action: religions can remind human beings and society that human life cannot be reduced to political action. There are also areas of life that can and must be free from politics: for example, responsibility, friendship, and love for each other, and love for, gratitude towards, and praise of God. From the perspective of almost all religions, human beings cannot be reduced to being determined exclusively by society and politics. Human beings are ‘more’ than the results of their social and political circumstances; they are able to transcend their reality and are free to create different realities. In societies that are primarily orientated towards the immanence of reality based on the laws of nature, such a belief in a transcendent vocation is eroding, including the will to accept its existence and the ability to communicate about it in a rational way. So, as belief in the revelation of a God as testified in the holy scriptures of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is diminishing, dialogue and academic discourse about the human relation to transcendence becomes more difficult. For religious traditions, this is a massive challenge.

Therefore, religious communities must reflect on the question of how a transcendent reality can be explained and translated into the language of secular societiesFootnote 2 – not only on a philosophical or theological level for academic insiders, but on a broad and public level too. To put it in Christian theological terms, how is it possible to speak about God in a rational way, so that faith in a transcendent reality can be neither instrumentalised politically nor used as a stopgap for unsolved human problems or as a tranquiliser? What can a public discourse on God look like if not reduced to a practical, individual function, but one that offers ways for society to discuss forgotten truths such as the vulnerability and finiteness of all life and creation, the meaning of suffering, or the realities of evil and guilt? And which political impacts do such discourses have?

These difficult questions have long been discussed within theology; meter-long bookshelves can be filled with academic literature about these topics (one of the best-known theologians in this regard is, for example, Johann Baptist Metz). Discussing them lies beyond the scope of this contribution. Currently, a revival of the question of God can be observed in German theology (Bucher 2022; Röser 2018). If religious communities do not want to reduce themselves to value promoters alone to legitimise their existence, however, but want societies to understand the sources and reasons for their values, these genuine religious and theological questions belong centrally in their internal debates.

4 Values, Education, and Religion

As ethical debates are currently conducted within the framework of values, values education needs much more attention: it is an issue of public and political interest. Social transformation processes such as digitalisation, the climate crisis, the rapid change in science, technology, and the economy, urbanisation, and the influence of social media on values need values education to enable all citizens to handle these challenges in ethical terms. Additionally, the enormous mental and psychological problems that have increased during the pandemic, the war, and the ongoing economic crisis are a call for values education, as problems and burdens can be better endured and for longer if moral orientation and ethical standards are available. The magnitude of the multiple crises also threatens moral substance and is at risk of leading to indifference, resignation, or cynicism. Young people are faced with challenges for which many of their ancestors’ values no longer seem sufficient. Older people often see their traditional values no longer represented in contemporary values discourses. We can therefore assume that the intergenerational transfer of values is no longer guaranteed – a problem which also puts intergenerational solidarity and social cohesion at risk. Our volume also documents such intergenerational cleavages and thus potential conflicts, not least in relation to religion. While, for example, values already take on the status of a religion in many schools in Great Britain, heterogeneous concepts of religious education are being developed in other European countries in order to react to the transformation of religion in Europe (Jäggle and Rothgangel 2011–2020).

Therefore, values education will require central attention in the future – on the part of educational institutions and political actors, but also on the part of academia and other societal institutions such as companies, recreational facilities, the media, etc. As values are always embedded in (more or less conscious) societal contexts, the lack of values education for all could exacerbate value conflicts. Without the educational struggle for reflective and well-argued values, societies are threatened with disintegration. Values education therefore includes fostering competence in ethical judgement through comprehensive educational measures that support the ability of people to formulate and argue well-founded value judgements both independently and in communication with others. But values education also refers to a complex process that affects all people throughout their lives, not just young people. Values education is a ‘lifelong process of the emergence and change of individual value attitudes’ (Verwiebe 2019b: 4), which takes place not only in the primary socialisation of the family but also in other areas of life and society. However, empirical research on such comprehensive processes of value formation is still relatively new and should be intensified. In a narrower sense, value formation is a well-researched topic, especially in the field of pedagogy and educational sciences with a view to young people.

4.1 Values Education as a Public, Social, and Political Concern

The European Union is already aware of these challenges and has developed recommendations and programmes that promote values education in school education: the ‘Council Recommendation on Common Values, inclusive education, and the European dimension of Teaching’ (2018) ‘aims to promote a sense of belonging – conveying common values, practising inclusive education, and teaching about Europe and its Member States to help increase a sense of belonging to one’s school locality, country as well as the European family’. According to this recommendation, which was adopted in 2018, common values should be promoted at all stages of education. The Council Recommendation claims that members States should:

  1. 1.

    Increase the sharing of the common values set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union from an early age and at all levels and types of education and training in a lifelong perspective to strengthen social cohesion and a positive and inclusive common sense of belonging to local, regional, national and Union level;

  2. 2.

    continue to implement the commitments of the Paris Declaration, notably through

    1. (a)

      promoting active citizenship and ethics education as well as an open classroom climate to foster tolerant and democratic attitudes and social, citizenship and intercultural competences.

    2. (b)

      enhancing critical thinking and media literacy, particularly in the use of the internet and social media, so as to raise awareness of risks related to the reliability of information sources and to help exercise sound judgement;

    3. (c)

      using existing or, where necessary, developing new structures that promote the active participation of teachers, parents, students, and the wider community in schools; and

    4. (d)

      supporting opportunities for young people’s democratic participation and an active, critically aware and responsible community engagement;

  3. 3.

    make effective use of existing tools to promote citizenship education, such as the Council of Europe’s Competences for Democratic Culture framework.

For the EU, values education is considered as a constitutive dimension of democratic education in schools and is embedded in a comprehensive didactic concept, where theoretical knowledge is intrinsically connected with practical concepts, such as exemplary learning, cooperation, and participation. Values education is therefore a social and political concern, though the implementation in the various countries is still very heterogeneous (Polak, Chap. 2, this volume). It is currently focused primarily on the area of schools and the education of young people. Theoretical ethical education is an essential part of values education. In Germany and Austria, ‘ethics’ is a school subject; in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, values issues play an important role in citizenship education.

However, for people and groups who have a more traditional understanding of values and see values education as the primary responsibility of sub-state institutions, especially as a right of the family or of ethnic or religious groups, this kind of ‘political pedagogy’ can generate resistance. Despite the professional and science-based initiatives and didactical tools provided, some groups may perceive political values education as expropriation. Therefore, subsidiarity and cooperation between societal institutions should be strengthened regarding values education too. Which institutions and actors are responsible for values education and in what way? What do the state and society need from educational institutions to support those overlapping values, which are necessary for social cohesion? In addition, what are the limits of state or political interference in values issues? Furthermore, intergenerational dialogue and exchange on values issues should be strengthened.

Simultaneously, values education stakeholders should also be aware of the problematic dimensions of value formation. As we see in Great Britain, for example, values such as democracy, rule of law, individual liberty, mutual respect, and tolerance of difference are declared ‘British values’ and form a kind of umbrella to tame plurality. They take on a universal function, but without corresponding concepts of reflection and education they can mutate into a kind of religious substitute (Polak, Chap. 2, this volume). This is highly ambivalent, as values then serve, as for example in British schools, as commitments to which all teachers and pupils must orient themselves, legal penalties included. Values take on the function of social control and no longer serve the common understanding of ethical orientation, but rather the control of behaviour. To avoid such problematic ways of dealing with values, the reception of educational research would be necessary, which would also provide didactics on how values can be taught and learned in a pedagogically responsible way. To avoid the reduction of values to a kind of pseudo-religious declaration, ethical and philosophical education, historical education, but also religious, literary, and artistic education would need to be promoted in addition to embedding values education. There is a need for an interdisciplinary, comprehensive concept of values education that takes seriously the deep anchoring of values in human existence and life culture, which cannot be reduced to moral and political convictions and creeds alone. Values education always aims at an attitude towards life, the meaning of life, and the understanding of reality, the human being, and the world. For this reason, values education never takes place only in subjects specifically designed for this purpose, but is a cross-cutting issue for which all subjects as well as social institutions, in particular the labour, economic, and media sectors, share responsibility.

A politically explosive problem that arises in the context of politically and state-propagated values formation is the question of how to deal with those minorities that represent contradictory or different value attitudes than the majority, such as conservative Christian minorities in the area of ‘life ethics’ (divorce, abortion, assisted suicide, etc.) or Muslim minorities. Conflicts arise, for example, with denominational schools that claim to want to teach their own values, or in the area of healthcare when denominational hospitals reject any form of euthanasia for religious reasons. From the perspective of European values and governmental values education based on them, there is the sometimes justified fear that ‘value minorities’ violate human rights and the rule of law and are prone to radicalisation and extremism. However, based on the principles of pluralism and tolerance and the freedom of religion or belief, attitudes that deviate from the societal norm must also get the possibility to be discussed in public – within the framework of European values, liberal democracy, and human rights, of course. In many European states, we can currently observe conflicts around the question of what the criteria are from which the limits of tolerance and the freedom of religion and belief should be drawn; most prominent are the conflicts about the wearing of headscarves in public or state institutions (Berghahn et al. 2009). These conflicts are extremely politicised and fought out primarily on a legal level (see for example, the judgment of the European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) on 15 July 2021 on the wearing of any visible political, philosophical, or religious sign or the wearing of conspicuous, large-sized political, philosophical, or religious signs in the workplace, which requires the legitimacy of the policy of neutrality adopted by the employer and the need to establish economic loss suffered by the employer, see InfoCuria 2021). But for the understanding and recognition of the values that such conflicts and judgments are based upon, legal solutions should be accompanied by public and democratic value debates (Konrath, Chap. 11, this volume), which can foster but also need values education.

4.2 Religion in Value Formation

With the erosion of everyday religious life and its value-shaping power as well as the weakened position of churches as value-shaping institutions, religious communities come under pressure to legitimise themselves. They need to ask themselves, what role may, can, and should religion play in values education when value debates are increasingly secularised? Our empirical findings prove that religious communities bear great responsibility for value formation. At the same time, their influence in values education discourses is discussed quite controversially or even decidedly rejected, especially in the field of religious education for young people (Schweitzer 2008). Moreover, most young people will probably prefer to choose their values themselves and not have them prescribed by a religious community.

In six volumes, the project ‘Religious Education at Schools in Europe’ (Jäggle and Rothgangel 2011–2020) documents the different models of religious education and heterogeneous forms of organisation of religious education in Europe. The results not only document the immense diversity of religious education and how it consists of more than values education, but also show that religious education continues to be important in Europe. But this importance is not only a result of the empirical results. It can also be argued with Art. 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where in paragraph 2 it reads: ‘Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance, and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace’ (Universal Declaration of Human Rights: United Nations 1948). Because religion is an essential dimension of the personality of religious people, and substantial understanding among religious groups requires knowledge and education, religious education can and must be considered an essential part of human rights education. In a world of cultural and religious pluralism, it is an essential contribution to sustainable and peaceful coexistence.

But religious communities are and will continue to face fierce debates. Which institutions are responsible for religious education? Which content should state curricula contain? How shall religious education be organised by states in the context of religious pluralism and secular societies? Is religious education a matter of state education policy or a private matter? Should religious education be offered by religious scholars or by religious communities? Different states in Europe already have different institutional answers (Jäggle and Rothgangel 2011–2020). But in the context of secular societies, the ideologies, policies, pedagogies, and practices for religious education at secular schools need far more critical research, such as that provided by Byrne (2014) for Australia in comparison with other developed nations. In the face of secularist and fundamentalist developments, the need for religious literacy calls for a public and political debate on the contemporary practices of religious education in the context of socioreligious transformation. Religious communities and institutions should be regarded as partners in this regard. In turn, religious communities need to reflect and find their new position and thus should become more actively involved in these debates – not only to protect their own interests, but also to contribute to the need for religious and values education in a globalised world of multiple crises.

Scholars of religious pedagogy have been aware of this precarious situation for decades and therefore can provide theoretical and empirical research on religious education, in particular on the connection between education, values, and religion (Grümme, Chap. 13, this volume; Elsenbast et al. 2008; Naurath et al. 2013), which can also contribute to public and political debates. From the perspective of religious education, values education based on religious beliefs has a secondary character (Schweitzer 2008). In recourse to religious traditions, people are given the opportunity to (self-)critically reflect on the values and value practices they have acquired in their primary value socialisation and to further develop them in dialogue with the ethical conceptions of the religious traditions. That means that religious education does not aim at convincing people of religious values as beliefs. Rather, it wants to strengthen their competence to critically develop personal values in dialogue with religious beliefs and values. As values are formed in the interplay between concrete everyday experiences and institutional mediation (through family, school, society, media, religious communities, etc.), they require ethical reflection and learning, which are at the centre of religious values education. Personal freedom and reason-based arguments thus play a central role in religious education when personal values are brought into dialogue with religious convictions and their ethical implications.

As an academic matter of course, there are different approaches to the question of how religion is thematised in values education processes (Schweitzer 2008: 33–34), which cannot be discussed here. For a plural society with its diverging values, an approach that leads to dialogue sensitive to differences and practical cooperation seems most suitable (Schweitzer 2008: 34). This approach assumes that there are lasting differences between different religions and world views, which should neither be abolished nor even resolved through religious education. Rather, such a concept aims at a ‘continued reconciliation’ and a ‘difference-sensitive understanding’ in the medium of dialogue and cooperation. With this practical approach, religious communities and their institutions consequently play an important role in religious education. They are considered as concrete localities, that is, spaces where values are lived and can be experienced in concrete terms. Unlike secular-universalist approaches, which aim at an abstract consensus or at conclusively identifying guiding values to whom everyone must submit, values education is interpreted as an inconclusive practice, which requires permanent communication and reflection and enables people to formulate overlapping consensuses of values themselves while at the same time recognising differences and distinctions.

Such an approach to the role of religion in values formation can avoid religious indoctrination and any kind of enforcement of an abstract unity. Therefore, religious education can contribute significantly to values education and to a democratic practice in the context of pluralism. At the same time, people with a religious self-image learn to actively participate in the discourse on values in secular societies, as they are trained in dealing with the diversity of world views. It is evident that such an understanding of religion in value formation also has an effect on political attitudes. The participants can experience that value pluralism is constitutive for secular societies, that conflicts based on arguments are necessary and possible, and that the permanent struggle for the recognition of universal values is indispensable for peaceful societies.

Denominational schools have a special responsibility in this regard. If they open spaces where the tension between the values of a specifically religious tradition and the plural-secular values of democratic societies are discussed, reflected upon, and worked upon, they can present themselves as role models for society. They can initiate educational processes in which the universal values of the EU are concretised in a particular, ideologically bound context and at the same time offer critical impulses for the further development of values against the background of the respective religious tradition.

4.3 Strengthening Universal Solidarity in Values Education

Our volume documents that there are various values that need to be given more attention in value formation. But in view of the global crisis phenomena, the promotion and strengthening of universal solidarity is of particular relevance. The results presented by Quandt and Lomazzi (Chap. 7, this volume) are a call for action in this regard, but they also give reason for hope. Despite the successive economic and migration crises before 2017, levels of attitudinal solidarity have not been generally decreasing in the European countries. The stability of solidarity in European countries – and in some countries even a modest increase in solidarity – documents that Europeans are ready to offer solidarity to others, at least to people of their own society. The crises have had no effect on universal solidarity and it seems that as a normative, moral attitude, universal solidarity seems to become even more important (Quandt and Lomazzi, Chap. 7, this volume).

However, looking at the detailed results, concerns must be expressed. Compared with close solidarity, universal solidarity is relatively low throughout Europe, in particular in ex-communist and ex-Soviet European countries. This lack of universal solidarity is connected with low income, education, and economic reasons. Additionally, our empirical in-depth analyses document other precarious areas regarding values (see Part II, this volume): the understanding and acceptance of European values as universal values and norms, and the widespread challenge of xenophobic attitudes, in particular prejudices against migrants and Muslims. Tackling these value crises at all levels of society will require increased attention in values education.

The non-recognition of liberal democratic values, the extent of xenophobia, the value cleavages in the areas of intercultural coexistence, and the lack of universal solidarity indicate that significant parts of the European population do not recognise the normative and universal character of the values of the EU or that they draw their normative understanding of values from other sources, such as group-related, national, or religious values. The solidarity of a majority of respondents applies to particular groups and makes a clear distinction between in-groups and out-groups, which are then granted solidarity in a graduated manner (Quandt and Lomazzi, Chap. 7, this volume). This lack of solidarity is not only a problem among people with low incomes or less education, but can be observed throughout society. As recent studies on solidarity discuss, the lack of solidarity is also a result of the erosion of social welfare systems in Europe, which have turned from systems of redistribution to systems of individual insurance, in which tax systems and wealth taxation increasingly serve the interests of the upper two-thirds of society or international companies (Süß and Trop 2021). So, while solidarity is a highly accepted value, it is highly contested when it comes to concrete practice, and different interpretations split societies (Altreiter et al. 2019).

In view of global developments, this crisis in values orientation not only threatens national and European democracies and coexistence, but also sustainable peace. The recognition of human rights and value plurality presupposes the recognition of universal norms and also requires the willingness to practise solidarity that transcends one’s own reference group and supports welfare systems based on the principle of structural solidarity. However, Martha Nussbaum (2013) pointed out that the ability and willingness to accept universal values and norms and practise universal solidarity are not innate, but require comprehensive individual and collective education.

This includes, on the one hand, a well-founded ethical education, which, in addition to cognitive knowledge of philosophical concepts and ethics, must also encompass the emotional dimension, that is, the promotion of mindfulness, compassion, and love. Martha Nussbaum emphasises that the recognition of normative values such as justice or solidarity requires not only a rational debate but also a positive, emotional attachment to these values. Emotions must not only not be excluded, but must be an explicit component of value formation. Emotions must be taken seriously in their significance for political attitudes.

On the other hand, the social and political dynamics that hinder the development of the ability to feel, understand, and practise the normativity and universality of values such as solidarity must be identified. The experience of stable social bonds and trustworthy institutions is an essential structural fundament to enable a person and make them willing to practise, for example, solidarity. But globalisation and the dynamics of a neoliberal economic system have weakened social bonds and released individuals from their traditional social contexts into the global market (Bauman 2006: 11). Radical individualisation undermines social cohesion and solidarity. In such a context, values then relate less to ethical action and turn instead into an identity-stabilising factor (Polak, Chap. 2, this volume). Values are then used more as a medium for making statements about identity and belonging and less as an ethical starting point for social action. In recourse to values, values serve as identity markers and as boundaries between different groups. Values as identity markers can consequently strengthen prejudices and xenophobia and limit the scope of solidarity, which can be observed, for instance, in the negative effect of diversity on solidarity, which was mainly present for close solidarity and clearly weaker or even absent for universal solidarity (Quandt and Lomazzi, Chap. 7, this volume). Though our results demonstrate that religiosity – that is, the dominant denominational and confessional identities – is not the dominant driver for differences in close solidarity levels (Quandt and Lomazzi, Chap. 7, this volume), it is particularly linked to identity and belonging, and can reinforce dynamics of exclusion and marginalisation when combined with demographic indicators. Facing this empirical reality, religious leaders and theologians must consequently remind their believers that the monotheistic religions in their teachings and convictions aim at a universal understanding of solidarity and formulate normative ideas of values. As denominational belongings to a certain extent shape universal solidarity attitudes among believers (Quandt and Lomazzi, Chap. 7, this volume), it can be assumed that this religious resource does already have certain effects.

There may be further reasons for the difficulties in accepting universal norms such as solidarity that lie in a paradox: the historical amnesia of the origins of European values and the simultaneous increasing awareness that values and norms have been changing throughout history may lead many people to lose confidence in generally binding values and norms. It can be assumed that postmodern discourses, with deconstructive and genealogical approaches in their socially truncated reception, may have led to the conclusion among parts of society that truth no longer exists, that generally valid norms can no longer be stated, and that values and norms are therefore only a matter of individual and subjective decision. Because the philosophical discourses on the necessity of justifying norms, the ethical claim to the universalisability of ethical norms, and the nature and rules of so-called truths of reason (Polak, Chap. 2, this volume) are unknown to most people as a result of a lack of appropriate ethical education, the capacity for moral judgement is largely undeveloped – a deficiency that marks the crisis in ethical thinking.

This crisis of the capacity for ethically reflective moral judgement is also connected to political and media developments, as Hannah Arendt presciently described in her essay ‘Lying in Politics’ (Arendt 2021/1971). The reduction of politics to management and performance, the loss of trust in political actors as a result of scandals and lies, the transformation of factual truths into opinions, and the atomisation of society lead to people losing their sense of moral direction. What Hannah Arendt described at the time in relation to the transformation of evil into good by totalitarian systems and in the analysis of her era appears to be highly relevant today, for the social and political conditions that support enlightened ethical judgement have deteriorated considerably since then. The shaking of confidence in political actors in the face of banking and financial crises; pandemic policy; the weakness of national states and governments in protecting their populations from the dynamics of a globalised, extraterritorial market and the shifting of risk to individuals (Bauman 2006: 11); the refusal to solve the migration and climate crisis in a spirit of solidarity; and the economic power of multinational companies, etc., all leave the individual with feelings of ‘liquid fear’ (Bauman 2011) and powerlessness. They can result in cynicism and resignation concerning the validity of values and norms. They can destroy the moral substance of a society and lead to moral confusion. In such a situation, values no longer serve as stimuli for ethical and political action, but as anchors of belonging, instruments of protest, and sometimes weapons in the struggle against others.

Differentiated discourses on values will be difficult in such a context, because the interstices in argumentative discourse become narrower. Instead, the focus of value debates is on asserting, maintaining, or gaining power. The everyday experience of a working world characterised by a conflictual, competition-based understanding of the economy, in which profit and gain dominate, reinforces these developments. If one wants to deal with the crisis of ethical thinking, the social, political, and economic conditions must therefore be transformed. First and foremost is the struggle to restore the credibility of political actors, democratic institutions, and other social elites. Any attempt on the part of politicians to promote the recognition of the universality and normativity of (European) values will only be fruitful if this is also reflected in their own actions. In addition, remedying the value cleavages of the European population requires that the underlying socio-economic divisions that have emerged in the course of a neoliberal globalised economy and austerity policies are politically addressed. The economic crisis in the wake of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine – inflation, rising energy and cost of living prices, debt reduction – makes this task even urgent. It can be assumed that the readiness for solidarity and the recognition of universal norms and values will only increase if there is also a structural change in society, politics, and the economy that can be experienced in the lives of people.

Moreover, ethical behaviour must also be practically possible and requires corresponding structures in society and its institutions. It needs spaces of freedom, reliable belonging structures, existential security, and a stable societal order. Values inherent in institutions and structures have a stronger impact on human behaviour and frequently counteract ethically based insights and judgements. It has always been minorities alone who, on the basis of their idealistic ethical judgements, have acted counterfactually to those values that are rewarded by social institutions and experienced as normative in everyday life (Welzer 2021). The (passive) approval of the National Socialist policy by the German population towards Jews is just as much a historical memorial to this empirical fact as today’s dominant social and economic recognition of competitive or climate-damaging behaviour which shapes human action more strongly than individual ethical convictions or appeals to solidarity and other universal values.

But our results show that there are also other dynamics in parts of the population. The increasing tolerance of cultural plurality in cities and among young people, the growing recognition of lifestyles other than heterosexual, the desire for a fair distribution of economic resources, the willingness to change lifestyles in the face of the climate crisis, and the stability of solidarity – these are also part of Europe’s reality (see Halman and Sieben, Chap. 4; Aschauer, Chap. 12, this volume). Similarly, the issue of values is already addressed in the field of economics or education in the context of global and solidary values and human rights (see Grümme Chap. 13; Coudenhove-Kalergi, Chap. 10, this volume).

Invisible in our volume, but definitely worth mentioning, are all the civil society movements and projects that operate on the basis of universal solidarity, values, and norms and which engage to represent marginalised groups, the poor, or human rights. Research has also documented that there are certain social, political, economic, and cultural conditions which favour the practical commitment to universal values (for example, International Panel on Social Progress 2018). International organisations such as the OSCE have also developed numerous tools that can contribute significantly to the recognition of human rights and solidarity values (ODIHR 2022). The promotion of cooperation between states, governments, and civil society organisations and academia; the financial and mental support for national and international civil society commitment to solidarity projects; and educational measures and training for social and political disseminators, which also include religious communities, can support people in committing to universal values and norms such as solidarity and lead to a decrease in xenophobic attitudes. Moreover, national, and international platforms and coalitions of different ethnic, cultural, and religious communities or human rights activists open up spaces for encounters in which people can practise solidarity and experience the power of developing commonly shared universal values. The promotion of a universal and normative value orientation also requires teaching materials in schools that reflect the history and reality of a global world that can only survive based on universal solidarity. Discourses on identity should be opened up and promote the formation of dynamic, learning, changing, and multiple identities that can only develop in dialogue with others. In such dialogues it is possible to connect particular and universal values and experience, so that one can be a member of a city and a citizen of a nation, of Europe, and of the world, and at the same time practise solidarity beyond social, ethnic, cultural, religious, and ideological borders. Political actors, the media, and religious communities play a central role in this process, as they can provide such projects and further establish societal structures and institutions to enable the learning and practising of universal solidarity. Christian churches and Jewish and Islamic communities with their international networks and structures could also make a significant contribution in this regard and open spaces for experiencing and reflecting on the necessity and power of universal and normative values and the practice of solidarity.

5 Challenges of Interdisciplinary Values Research

In the course of our project, we also identified some scientific challenges for the European Values Study and, in general, for interdisciplinary values research.

5.1 Concepts

In the interdisciplinary interpretation of the results of our explorative study, the terminology and guiding paradigms of the EVS proved to be a challenge time and again. The differences between the participating disciplines with their guiding conceptual traditions and (often taken for granted) theories opened numerous innovative insights, but also raised critical questions about the understanding and theoretical premises of the concepts of values, politics, and religion as they underlie the EVS. Criticisms included the vagueness of the concept of values, the narrowness and traditionality of the concept of religion, and the focus of the concept of politics on attitudes towards liberal democracy. Positively stated, future research desiderata can be identified in the debates on the guiding concepts.

The discussions about the contested concept of values concerned the tensions between an empirically based, a hermeneutic and an ethical or a legal understanding of values, the necessity of distinguishing between different categories of values, the question of the function as well as the normativity and universality of values, and the understanding of ‘European values’. The lack of an ethical reflection on the empirically surveyed values and of possibilities to state what influence values have on behaviour in the concrete life of interviewees was also criticised (for details see Polak, Chap. 2, this volume). The need for increased interdisciplinarity in values research became just as clear as the topics to which values research could devote more attention in the future. These include, among other things, empirical studies that are more strongly oriented towards the differentiated understandings of values provided by other disciplines – especially ethics and philosophy – in order to be able to describe and distinguish more precisely which genuine ethical and normative convictions people orient themselves towards, how values and ethical norms are justified, and with which ideas of meaning they are connected or which practical implications values and norms have. Studies that explore in more depth the approval or rejection of normative European values and underlying motivations would also be of interest. Cultural and historical studies on the results of the EVS, in turn, could fertilise theories that explain the heterogeneity of the European values landscape more precisely, not least the value cleavages between Western and Eastern Europe. Last but not least, (social) ethical studies that critically analyse the results of the EVS (or are already involved in the conception of the questions) would be helpful in drawing ethically and politically responsible practical consequences from the results.

The findings on the crisis of liberal democracy and the role religion plays in it, in turn, suggest that cooperation with political science should be considered both in the conception and evaluation of values studies. Given that the EVS is not a political science study, it could benefit from such cooperation, as, for example, solid statements could then be provided regarding the impact of political processes, institutions, discourses, and actors on political and religious attitudes and values, which we can assume but cannot argue with our data. Cooperation with political science, for example, would be helpful in providing empirical evidence for the theses of the ‘politicised religion’ (Ivanescu 2010: 309) and the ‘religionisation of politics’ (Bauman 2006: 161). Our results (S. Pickel and G. Pickel, Chap. 5; Polak and Schuster, Chap. 6, this volume) do suggest that right-wing and populist discourses, which instrumentalise the topic of religion for their interests and means, have an influence on the formatting of subjective religiosities – but we cannot prove this unequivocally. Similarly, parts of the population with a religious self-image seem to bring genuine political interests (such as social justice, the right to cultural and national identity, protection of life, etc.) into the social discourse by referring to religious values, but in this respect, too, the EVS data allow only speculation and no representative statements.

Multilevel social science models (Muth et al. 2021) and (neo)institutional theory approaches (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; DiMaggio and Powell 1983), as applied in research on the influence of external conditions on religion, could also be applied to values research and help in interpreting the European values landscape in more depth. Additionally, reflections on the empirical results through political ethics would support the development of research-based practical consequences. Transdisciplinary research approaches that also cooperate with political institutions and actors and take their knowledge and experience into account could contribute to making the findings of the European Values Study more fruitful for political practice. Moreover, inter- and transdisciplinary projects around the EVS could stimulate a broad discourse on the normative and universal values of the European Union – a concern that is also legitimate from a social science perspective, since these can also generate empirical research on normative values. A broader, scientifically and practically well-founded understanding of politics could offer political actors essential foundations for a values policy that is evidence-based and ethically reflected. Moreover, values research could also contribute to the self-critical reflection and further development of the values guiding the actions of political actors and institutions, organisations, or parties, with the help of experts. A transdisciplinary approach to researching political values would also offer opportunities to involve the population.

Finally, the very narrowly defined concept of religion in the EVS requires a comprehensive revision – especially as a result of the transformation in the socioreligious field and the growing and ambivalent significance of religion in the political sphere. The focus on religion as personal religiosity and a traditional, Christian-formatted understanding of religion are simply no longer sufficient to adequately describe developments in the light of comprehensive changes. The pluralisation of religious self-understandings, including the field of institutionally unbound spirituality, which is largely invisible in the study; the complex interplay of religious identities with social, political, and economic processes; and local, regional contexts and their historical patterns must be taken much more into account. The same applies to the perception of religion as ‘public religion’ (Casanova 1994), which remain unclear because of the narrowness of the concept of religion. International quantitative studies on religious sociology, such as those published by Pollack and Rosta (2017), Inglehart (2021), or the ‘Religionsmonitor’ (2007; 2012), set quality standards that the EVS should also strive for, even if it is not focusing exclusively on religion.

5.2 The Paradigm of Secularisation

The paradoxical developments in the field of religion as well as the contradictory influence on political attitudes make it necessary to critically question or differentiate the paradigm of secularisation on which the European Values Study is traditionally based upon. In our study, this primarily describes the loss of meaning at the individual level, which does not exclude social and political relevance (S. Pickel and G. Pickel, Chap. 5, this volume). Nevertheless, because of the understanding of religion in the EVS, there are certain limits to such attempts, since, for example, no questions are asked in the questionnaire that would allow us to explore a deeper understanding of what exactly the respondents mean by defining themselves as ‘religious’ or ‘non-religious’. For example, what does the ‘non’ refer to when someone rejects a religious self-concept? Does it imply the rejection of religion as such or the dissociation from a certain understanding of religion, or is it an expression of an agnostic attitude? In view of the fact that the ‘Nones’ represent a growing group in Europe, a differentiation here would be urgently necessary.

In everyday language as well as in the EVS, the term ‘secular’ is usually interpreted as a proxy for the clear rejection of traditionally religious ideas and values as well as for a post-religious and sometimes also for an anti-religious self-image. In sociology of religion there are hard and controversial theoretical debates on the concept of secularisation. While Detlef Pollack and Gergely Rosta still insist on the validity of this theoretical concept (see Pollack and Rosta 2017: 10–12, criticising Casanova 1994; Berger 1999; Stark and Finke 2000 and many others), José Casanova (1994) and Hans Joas (2009) argued that secularisation processes affect several levels of society in a highly heterogeneous way: they can affect the level of individual lifestyles, the relationship between the state and religious communities, and social transformation processes when these result in negotiation around common and binding values or cultural forms of expression and thereby escape control by religious communities. In addition to the structural level, secularisation can also affect the level of content. The anthropologist Talal Asad (2014), for example, describes secularisation as the ‘independence of individuals, the state and other social spheres from religion and the detachment of social values and norms from religious beliefs’. Given these debates, one can assume that the proxy function might not correspond to the transformations in the socioreligious landscape. The classical secularisation thesis, that is, the idea that modernity inevitably leads to the complete disappearance of religion, is, of course, hardly represented in the sociology of religion anymore. While sociologists of religion such as our author Gert Pickel develop the secularisation thesis further and integrate regional as well as national cultural and confessional development paths and thus still attribute great importance to it (like Pollack and Rosta 2017), other researchers have long since developed alternatives such as the pluralisation thesis (Berger 2014) or prove from a global perspective that modernisation processes in other world regions do not necessarily have to entail secularisation processes (Joas and Wiegandt 2009). Based on the observation that an increasing number of respondents in empirical studies define themselves as ‘spiritual, but not religious, but not secular’ (Boaz 2018), the sociologist of religion and theologian Tomáš Halík (2022: 133) also formulates the thesis that secularisation does not make religion disappear, but rather transformed its hermeneutic form and social and political function. He distinguishes three transformations in this regard: the transformation of religion into a ‘politically identarian ideology’, ‘into spirituality’ and the emergence of a growing number of people who commit themselves neither to an ‘organized religion’ nor to atheism. A team of authors led by Hubert Knoblauch (2020) argues in a similar direction, speaking of a ‘refiguration’ of religion. According to this theory, religion is neither experiencing a renaissance nor is it dissolving into a postmodern form. Rather, it stands in a dynamic, process-related relationship to ‘civilization-wide sociogenesis’ (Knoblauch 2020: 11), that is, to ongoing transformations in the relationship between the individual and society. In contrast, Charles Taylor (2007) speaks of a ‘secular immanent frame’ that has expanded globally and thus describes, from an anthropological perspective, a modern, cosmic, and moral concept of order that follows a rationality without any reference to a transcendent, divine reality. The cosmic order is interpreted as a reality that must be demythologised, explored, and influenced technically. Consequently, the social order is understood as a rational, humanly constructed balance of interests between individuals. The moral order revolves around a disciplined and rational self, which is guided by immanent maxims. These ‘closed world structures’ do not describe a sociological dynamic but a fundamental change in human consciousness, in which belief in a transcendence becomes implausible and therefore accountable. This fundamentally changes the status of religion. Religious people are now challenged to explain the meaningfulness of faith and justify it in secular terms. Religion loses its self-evidence and is sometimes questioned as irrational and pre-modern. However, representatives of such a radical secular position do not always advocate for the disappearance of religion in society, but rather claim its withdrawal from public and political spaces. Moreover, it can be assumed that alongside such secularist tendencies there are also atheists who accept a public role for religion or religions as political actors within the framework of liberal democracy and because of the social activities of churches and religious communities. Conversely, religious actors too might have quite heterogeneous understandings of secularity, given our volume’s observance that in Western countries the influence of church attendance has a positive effect on pro-democratic attitudes, while in Eastern Europe a religious self-image has negative consequences (Halman and Sieben, Chap. 4; S. Pickel and G. Pickel, Chap. 5, this volume). It might be assumed that secularity is perceived as a threat to religion in Eastern Europe and also among conservative religious people in the West. This negative perception requires further research and its understanding will be crucial to preserving liberal democracy.

From a Catholic and Protestant theological perspective, a secular self-understanding is not necessarily in exclusive opposition to a religious one, since a secular legal and social order understands secularity as a theological necessity for religious freedom and thus is recognised by numerous religious people. Moreover, secularity can be interpreted as the common ground of human communication and an essential dimension of a world created by God (Wenzel 2013). A secular and a religious self-understanding therefore do not have to be mutually exclusive (Berger 2014): there are religious people who live within a secular world view and recognise its values in political questions, and there are atheists who recognise religious people. A theological approach can therefore contribute to overcoming classic sociological dichotomies and granting a secular society its own dignity and justification from a religious perspective.

Even secular jurisprudence or human rights law are by no means anti- or post-religious, but recognise religious communities as social actors and religion as a source of motivation for the recognition of human rights within the framework of religious freedom. At the same time, given the decline of individual religiosity, it can be assumed that the number of people who reject not only a religious self-image but also the political commitment of religious communities in an atheistic manner will be increasing. The ambivalent role that religion plays in the politics of the theocratic Islamic states of the Middle East or in the war against Ukraine, which is ideologically backed by the Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill (Sooy 2022), will probably fuel this development and give rise to the rejection of organized religion and atheism.

Unfortunately, the EVS data do not allow for in-depth analyses in this regard. For example, it remains unclear how far Europe’s societies are drifting apart in religious terms and whether there are cleavages that could lead to a split between religious and atheist contemporaries. Also, the question must remain open as to the extent to which religious communities are fragmented within themselves. For the sake of social cohesion among countries, for European integration, and for peace, it is necessary to understand more deeply if the plurality in secular and religious world views is developing towards conflictual, irreconcilable opposition or if there are overlaps which allow for coexistence on a commonly shared ground and within a framework in which religious people and atheists can come to a common understanding about their shared world. Classical theories of secularisation reach the limits of their explanatory power when it comes to questions like these.

Thus, we need more theories and studies (such as, for example, Fox 2019) that not only relate to the number of religious and non-religious people but also explore how religious people and religious communities interact with society and the state, and how conflicts – between religious individuals and religious communities and between religious communities and states – are tackled. In particular, the increasing conflicts between a secularist and a religious self-understanding (especially in questions of life values) require expanded interpretative paradigms, as these are to be interpreted less in the course of progressive secularisation, but rather suggest more of a politically formatted rivalry and competition between political secularism and the conservative and fundamentalist parts of the religious communities, both of which want to assert their respective values.

The question of whether Europe is more or less religious is therefore less important than the question of the interaction between religion and society and the understanding and discussion of the guiding conceptions and arguments of the world views the antagonists refer to. To answer such questions, it is necessary to think outside the ‘secularisation box’ and develop alternative paradigms.

5.3 Practice of Values Research: Science Communication

The claim for increased inter- and transdisciplinarity and the promotion of public values discourses is as old as the EVS itself. However, the high degree of differentiation and specialisation of science and the rapid dynamisation of social and political institutions seem to make it increasingly difficult to open spaces for in-depth discussion and cooperation. While politicians usually have too little time to receive and debate the results of values research and are more interested in results than in complex conceptual understandings or value formation processes, values researchers within their respective disciplines are exposed to the pressure of increasing competition in the development of ever more complex theories. Politicians and other social actors then use the results or discuss them on the basis of theories and concepts that are scientifically outdated or problematic, while scientists sometimes lack structured and continuous communication with societies, citizens, and politicians. These systemic deficiencies impede a broad and well-founded discourse on values and thus processes of substantial social and political value formation. Increased dialogue and cooperation within the framework of (financed) Third Mission projects, which would also have to be rewarded more in academic evaluations, could be helpful. Moreover, there is a need for corresponding processes of language learning and translation between public, political, and scientific values discourses, which require more time and space. If scientific values research wants to contribute its findings and narratives, the logic and language of political values discourses in particular must be understood. Conversely, through dialogue and cooperation with scientific values research in the medium of values discourses, political actors can raise fundamental questions in public discourse for public debate: the identity, history, and memory of Europe, questions of meaning, goals, and ideas of the good life, including peaceful and just societies, or ethical questions of good and evil. It is essential to involve other actors in such discourses – educational institutions, civil society organisations, and not least the media and business enterprises, etc. – as they play a key role in communicating values.

The crises that Europe is facing at the time of the completion of this study – the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economic crisis, the climate crisis, the war in Ukraine, including a refugee crisis – cannot be explained or resolved by values discourses exclusively. But values have and will continue to have an enormous impact on how the European Union and its citizens will be able to face these crises. Whether we are conscious of it or not, they will shape the debates on how to resolve social, cultural, political, and economic conflicts. Our volume offers an insight into the values landscape before the pandemic. We can assume that these numerous crises will also reshape the values landscape, even though we do not yet know in which direction. If these value changes are not accompanied by appropriate societal and political discourses and educational measures, we must fear that the problems and cleavages that were identified pre-pandemic will tend to intensify. Conversely, insight into the situation before the pandemic and the war offers opportunities to face the expected value debates based on a solid research base. Times of crisis always transform entrenched systems of order and thus shatter and liquify value systems. This can open windows of opportunity to reinterpret, reshape, and understand European values more deeply as a normative framework on a broad societal level, which now has to prove itself. May our volume be a contribution to this.