Competition Cases in the Digital Economy

Zelger, Bernadette

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-31339-4_6

Bernadette Zelger²⁴

Part of the book series: Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation ((SEELR,volume 25))

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Abstract

In light of the previous chapter, the question is whether and to what extent the particularities of the digital economy alter the actual contextual backdrop against which practices are to be assessed and, as a consequence, also changes the latter’s qualification. Hence, could it be that a measure that qualifies as object infringement of competition in the analogue world is not, however, to be qualified as such given an online environment? Put differently, to what extent leads the online environment to changes which require, considering the very same conduct offline, a refinement of its assessment from a competition law perspective in the online context? Moreover, are there (new) practices put forth by the digital economy, which do not fit into any of the existing categories developed by the law as illustrated in the Chaps. 3 and 4?

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Notes

1.
Holzweber (2018a), pp. 342–243.
2.
Akman and Sokol (2017), p. 146.
3.
Case C-74/14 Eturas et al [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:42 (Eturas).
4.
Coty (Chap. 3, n 158).
5.
See below Sect. 6.2.3.
6.
Google Search (AdSense) (Case AT.40411) Commission Decision of 20 March 2019 (Google AdSense).
7.
Google Android (Case AT.40099) Commission Decision of 18 July 2018 notified under document number C(2018) 4761 final (Google Android).
8.
Eben (2018), p. 130.
9.
Google Shopping (Chap. 4, n 52).
10.
Petit (2015) shedding light on analogue cases containing a self-preferencing element. The author mentions cases, such as, for example: Case T-229/94 Deutsche Bahn v Commission [1997] ECLI:EU:T:1997:155 (Discrimination according to Article 102(2)(c) TFEU as legal basis for self-preferencing); Microsoft (Chap. 4, n 81) (Tying according to Article 102(2)(d) TFEU); Chiquita (IV/26699) Commission Decision 76/353/EC [1975] OJ L95/1 (Unfair trading conditions according to Article 102(2)(a) TFEU as legal basis for abusive self-preferencing; in the case at hand: unfair pricing).
11.
Microsoft (Chap. 4, n 81).
12.
Microsoft COMP (Chap. 4, n 49), para 979.
13.
Microsoft (Chap. 4, n 81), para 1088.
14.
For more details to this effect, see below Sect. 6.3.2.3.
15.
OECD (2020), Abuse of dominance in digital markets, available at <abuse-of-dominance-in-digital-markets-2020.pdf (oecd.org)> accessed 6 February 2023 (‘OECD Dominance in Digital Markets Report’), p. 8.
16.
Lithuanian Railways (Chap. 1, n 42); Lithuanian Railways ECJ (Chap. 1, n 42).
17.
Colomo (Chap. 4, n 1), p. 734.
18.
That is, loyalty rebates and reverse payment settlement agreements.
19.
See above under Sects. 3.7.4 and 4.4.2.
20.
Digital Markets Act (Chap. 5, n 34).
21.
US Congress House, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Antitrusr, Commercial, and Administrative Law, Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets: Majority Staff Report and Recommendations (United States 2020).
22.
Eben (2018), p. 135.
23.
OECD Dominance in Digital Markets Report (n 15) 7.
24.
Eturas (n 3).
25.
Coty (Chap. 3, n 158).
26.
See below Sect. 6.2.3.
27.
E-book MFNs and related matters – Amazon (Case AT.40153) Commission Decision of 4 May 2017, C(2017) 2876 final (Decision Summary published 2017 OJ C264/7) (Amazon).
28.
With a focus on German cases.
29.
FCO decision of 26 August 2015, case B2-98/11, approved by the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, decision dated 5 April 2017, VI-Kart 13/15 (V), ECLI:DE:OLGD:2017:0405.VI.KART13.15V.00, approved by the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), decision dated 12 December 2017, KVZ 41/17, ECLI:DE:BGH:2017:121217BKVZ41.17.0 (Asics).
30.
FCO decision of 27 June 2014, case report dated 19 August 2014, case B3-137/12 (Adidas).
31.
Coty (Chap. 3, n 158).
32.
FCO (Bundeskartellamt) decision of 20 December 2013, case B9-99/10 (HRS).
33.
FCO (Bundeskartellamt) decision of 22 December 2015, case B9-121/13 (Booking).
34.
Amazon (n 27).
35.
Eturas (n 3).
36.
Alfonso Lamadrid, ‘ECJ’s judgement in Case C-74/14, Eturas (on the scope of “concerted practices” and on technological collusion)’, Chillin’Competition Blog, available at <https://chillingcompetition.com/2016/01/22/ecjs-judgment-in-case-c-7414-eturas-on-the-scope-of-concerted-practices-and-on-technological-collusion/> accessed 6 February 2023.
37.
Ibid.
38.
Eturas (n 3), para 43.
39.
In Whish and Bailey’s words, ‘the inclusion of concerted practices within Article 101 means that conduct which is not attributable to an agreement or a decision may nevertheless amount to an infringement’; see Whish and Bailey (2021), p. 117.
40.
As regards an analysis on the scope of ‘concerted practices’ and the ECJ’s judgement in Eturas, see Lamadrid (n 36).
41.
Asus (AT.40465) Commission Decision of 24 July 2018.
42.
Denon & Marantz (AT.40469) Commission Decision of 24 July 2018.
43.
Philips (AT.40181) Commission Decision of 24 July 2018.
44.
Pioneer (AT.40182) Commission Decision of 24 July 2018.
45.
European Commission Press Release, IP/18/4601 (24 July 2018).
46.
See above Sects. 3.3 and 3.1.3.
47.
Genuine recommended resale prices (and not tacitly agreed upon) as well as maximum resale prices are considered being a harmless form of RPM; see in this respect Vertical Guidelines (Chap. 3, n 84) para 187 et seq.
48.
Ibid.
49.
European Commission Press Release, IP/18/4601 (24 July 2018).
50.
Arguing similarily, Colangelo (2017), p. 13.
51.
For example, Akman and Sokol (2017); Ioannidou and Nowag (2015).
52.
OECD, ‘Roundtable on Resale Price Maintenance’ (2008), DAF/COMP(2008)37, available at <https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/43835526.pdf> accessed 6 February 2023, pp. 29 et seq.
53.
Ioannidou and Nowag (2015), p. 11.
54.
Akman and Sokol (2017), p. 136.
55.
United States Supreme Court in Leegin (Chap. 3, n 78).
56.
Vertical Guidelines (Chap. 3, n 84).
57.
Vertical Guidelines (Chap. 3, n 84), para 197.
58.
Coty (Chap. 3, n 158); for an extensive analysis of the decision in Coty see: Zelger (2018). Hence, the main reasoning here is similar to my argument in the aforementioned publication.
59.
Coty (Chap. 3, n 158), para 15.
60.
Ibid.
61.
Coty (Chap. 3, n 158), para 15.
62.
Zelger (2018), p. 446.
63.
Coty (Chap. 3, n 158), paras 24 et seq and 38; Zelger (2018), p. 446.
64.
The notion is to be understood as a selective distribution system meeting the criteria rendering it lawful/compliant with Article 101 (1) TFEU as established by the ECJ in Metro (Chap. 3, n 156).
65.
Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 2010 (Chap. 3, n 164).
66.
Zelger (2018), p. 461.
67.
Zelger (2018), p. 448.
68.
Pierre Fabre (Chap. 3, n 10).
69.
See above under Sects. 3.3.2–3.3.2.2.
70.
Coty (Chap. 3, n 158) 38.
71.
Full particulars as regards this argument, please see Zelger (2018).
72.
Coty (Chap. 3, n 158) 58.
73.
Zelger (2018), p. 454.
74.
Zelger (2018), p. 455.
75.
See Sect. 3.3.2.3.
76.
Javico (Chap. 3, n 171).
77.
Javico (Chap. 3, n 171), para 21.
78.
Yves Saint Laurent Parfums (Case No IV/33.242) Commission Decision 92/33/EEC [1992] OJ L12/24 (Yves Saint Laurent Parfums) para II.A.5.
79.
Ibid.
80.
Zelger (2018), p. 4457.
81.
Full particulars as regards this argument, please see Zelger (2018) under 3.2 Selective distribution and export bans – lessons to be learnt from “real world” markets?.
82.
Ibid.
83.
According to Luo et al. ‘[a] typical shopping scenario nowadays is that shoppers browse and try the products offline and then buy them online from a competing retailer. This phenomenon is commonly described as “showrooming”.’ (Luo et al. 2014).
84.
See Zelger (2018).
85.
Pierre Fabre (Chap. 3, n 10).
86.
Asics (n 29).
87.
Adidas (n 30).
88.
Full particulars as regards this argument, please see Zelger (2018).
89.
Vertical Guidelines 2010 (Chap. 3, n 165), para 54; for details see Zelger (2018), pp. 457–458.
90.
Vertical Guidelines (Chap. 3, n 84), para 208 et seq.
91.
Amazon (n 27).
92.
HRS (n 32).
93.
Booking (n 33).
94.
Baker (1996), p. 519.
95.
Akman and Sokol (2017), p. 137.
96.
Baker (1996), p. 519.
97.
See, for example, Colangelo (2017), p. 5 and particular the references made in note 11.
98.
French Competition Authority (Autorité de la concurrence), decision 15-D-06 dated 21 April 2015 (Booking France); Italian Competition Authority (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato), decision dated 21 April 2015 (Booking Italy); and Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket) Decision 596/2013 dated 15 April 2015 (Booking Sweden).
99.
FCO decisions in HRS (n 32) and Booking (n 33).
100.
German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), decision dated 18 May 2021, KVR 54/20 (German Federal Court of Justice Booking).
101.
The case concerned clauses that were wide in scope. Thus, they qualified as ‘wide MFN’ (see below Sect. 6.2.5.2).
102.
FCO (Bundeskartellamt), decision dated 26 November 2013, case B 6 – 46/12 (Amazon Germany) and FCO decision in Booking (n 33); Office of Fair Trading (predecessor of the UK Competition and Markets Authority), case CE/9692/12 closed November 2013 (Amazon UK).
103.
In Austria, France Italy and Belgium; for details see below under Sect. 6.2.5.3.
104.
VBER (Chap. 3, n 159).
105.
Vertical Guidelines (Chap. 3, n 84), paras 356 et seq.
106.
For a detailed overview and analysis of the amendments (on the basis of the Commission’s draft of new VBER and new Vertical Guidelines) see: Zelger (2021).
107.
Arguing similarly and shedding light on the risk of fragmentation of EU competition law more generally: Alfonso Lamadrid, ‘Against the Fragmentation of EU Competition Law: A Proposal for Reform’, Chillin’Competition Blog, available at <https://chillingcompetition.com/2021/05/31/against-the-fragmentation-of-eu-competition-law-a-proposal-for-reform/> accessed 6 February 2023.
108.
E-books (AT.39847) Commission decision of 12 December 2012 (Apple E-books) and Amazon (n 27).
109.
Apple E-books (n 108).
110.
European Commission Press Release, IP/12/1367 (13 December 2012).
111.
Chappatte et al. (2018).
112.
Amazon (n 27).
113.
Chappatte et al. (2018).
114.
VBER (Chap. 3, n 159).
115.
Vertical Guidelines (Chap. 3, n 84).
116.
Argued similarly: Zelger (2021), pp. 180 et seq.
117.
A Report Prepared for the OFT by LEAR – Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione: ‘Can “Fair” Prices be Unfair? A Review of Price Relationship Agreements’ (2012) available at <http://www.learlab.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Can-%E2%80%98Fair%E2%80%99-Prices-Be-Unfair_-A-Review-of-Price-Relationship-Agreements.pdf> accessed 6 February 2023 (LEAR).
118.
Which was, by way of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, succeeded by the Competition and Markets Authority as well as the Financial Conduct Authority.
119.
LEAR (n 117) 1.
120.
LEAR (n 117) 2 et seq.
121.
Akman and Sokol (2017), pp. 133 and 138.
122.
Akman and Sokol (2017), pp. 137 et seq.
123.
Ibid.
124.
Akman and Sokol (2017), pp. 137 et seq.
125.
Akman and Sokol (2017), p. 137.
126.
Ibid.
127.
Peeperkorn (2017), para 24.
128.
Johnson (2017).
129.
Johnson (2017), p. 1.
130.
Johnson (2017), p. 3. For details as regards the wholesale and agency model as well as other business models, namely the franchise and consignment model see Johnson (2017), pp. 2 et seq.
131.
Peeperkorn (2017), para 24.
132.
Akman and Sokol (2017), p. 139.
133.
LEAR (n 117) Executive Summary, para 0.37.
134.
Colangelo (2017), p. 6.
135.
Ibid.
136.
Ezrachi (2015), p. 489; Colangelo (2017), p. 5.
137.
Ezrachi (2015), p. 506.
138.
Colangelo (2017), p. 13.
139.
German Federal Court of Justice Booking (n 100).
140.
See above Sect. 6.2.5.1.
141.
HRS (n 32) and Booking (n 33).
142.
Akman and Sokol (2017), p. 139.
143.
Ezrachi (2015), p. 519.
144.
Colomo (2020c) para 20.
145.
Akman and Sokol (2017), p. 148.
146.
Akman and Sokol (2017), pp. 137 et seq.
147.
VBER (Chap. 3, n 159).
148.
Vertical Guidelines (Chap. 3, n 84).
149.
Addendum to the Unfair Competition Act (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb) Z 32 amended by Federal Law (Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb 1984 – UWG und das Preisauszeichnungsgesetz geändert werden) Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) I Nr. 99/2016 (in force since 1. 1. 2017).
150.
See Z 32 Addendum of the Austrian Unfair Competition Act.
151.
Loi n. 2015-990 du 6 aout 2015 pour la croissance, l’activite et l’egalite des chances economiques (which entered into force on 1 October 2016).
152.
Article 50, Legge annuale per il mercato e la concorrenza, 04/08/2017 n° 124, G.U. 14/08/2017 (in force since 29 August 2017).
153.
Act on pricing freedom for tourist accommodation operators in contracts concluded with online reservation platform operators, adopted on 19 July 2018.
154.
Website of the European Competition Network available at <https://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/faq.html> accessed 17 December 2019.
155.
Monti and Augenhofer (2018), p. 21.
156.
Ibid.
157.
VBER (Chap. 3, n 159).
158.
Vertical Guidelines (Chap. 3, n 84).
159.
Argued similarly in Zelger (2021), pp. 180 et seq.
160.
Akman and Sokol (2017), p. 146.
161.
See Sects. 6.2.2 and 6.2.4.
162.
See Sects. 3.6 and 3.7.
163.
See Sect. 6.2.3.
164.
Amazon (n 27).
165.
VBER (Chap. 3, n 159).
166.
Vertical Guidelines (Chap. 3, n 84).
167.
Terhechte (2020), p. 570.
168.
Google Shopping (Chap. 4, n 52).
169.
Google Android (n 7).
170.
Google AdSense (n 6).
171.
Commission Proceedings in Case AT.40437 Apple – App Store Practices (music streaming) (Apple Music Streaming); Commission Proceedings in Case AT.40652 Apple – App Store Practices (e-books/audiobooks) (Apple E- and Audiobooks).
172.
Case AT.40462 Amazon Marketplace (Amazon Marketplace); Commission Proceedings in Case AT.40703 Amazon Buy Box (Amazon Buy Box).
173.
Regulation 1/2003 (Chap. 3, n 17).
174.
See to this effect, above Sect. 5.2.1; Cremer et al. (2019), p. 112; Furman et al. (2019), p. 75; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, ‘Digital Platforms Inquiry: Preliminary Report’ (December 2018), available at <https://www.accc.gov.au/focus-areas/inquiries-finalised/digital-platforms-inquiry-0/preliminary-report> accessed 6 February 2023, p. 35; Heike Schweitzer et al, German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, ‘Modernising the law on abuse of market power – Summary of the report’s recommendations’ (4 September 2018), available at <https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Studien/modernisierung-der-missbrauchsaufsicht-fuer-marktmaechtige-unternehmen-zusammenfassung-englisch.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3> accessed 6 February 2023, p. 2.
175.
Canon (2020). A motion to dismiss the case from Facebook was denied by the US Disrtict Court Coulumbia in January 2022: U.S. Federal Trade Commission v. Facebook Inc., 20-3590.
176.
Digital Markets Act (Chap. 5, n 34).
177.
Monopolies Commission Report (Chap. 5, n 36), paras 578–602.
178.
OECD Dominance in Digital Markets Report (n 15), p. 7.
179.
Google Shopping GC (Chap. 1, n 8).
180.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8).
181.
Case T-334/19 Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google AdSense) pending.
182.
Case C-48/22 P Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Shopping) pending.
183.
Case C-738/22 P Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Android) pending.
184.
FCO decision of 6 February 2019, case B6-22/16 (Facebook) and the respective appeal decision of the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court, decision dated 26 August 2019, VI-Kart 1/19 (V).
185.
Case C-434/15 Asociación Profesioneal Élite Taxi v- Uber Systems Spain SL [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:981.
186.
Google Shopping (Chap. 4, n 52), para 378.
187.
Google Shopping (Chap. 4, n 52), para 341.
188.
Google Shopping (Chap. 4, n 52), para 606.
189.
Google Shopping (Chap. 4, n 52), para 607.
190.
For more details as regards the argument that the EC did indeed not comply with the required standards for anticompetitive effects, see immediately below Sect. 6.3.2.3. Moreover, on the controversy regarding the notion of ‘anticompetitive effects’ and the respective standard of proof as developed by the EU Courts, see Colomo (2020b) and Colomo (2020a), pp. 33 et seq, in particular at 35.
191.
MEO (Chap. 4, n 477); Deutsche Telekom (Chap. 4, n 84); for more details and examples to this effect, see Colomo (2020b), pp. 35 et seq.
192.
Google Shopping GC (Chap. 1, n 8).
193.
Google Shopping GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 176.
194.
Google Shopping GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 283.
195.
Google Shopping GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 176.
196.
Case C-48/22 P, Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Shopping) pending.
197.
To name just some: Holzweber (2018a); Petit (2015); Eben (2018); Colomo (2020a), Vesterdorf (2015); Akman (2017); Jones et al. (2019), pp. 527 et seq; Kokkoris (2017), pp. 313–333; Caro de Sousa (2020); Marsden (2020), pp. 553–560; Graf and Mostyn (2020), pp. 561–574; Achleitner (2022), pp. 253–270; Holzweber (2018b), p. 96.
198.
For example: Akman (2017), p. 370; Eben (2018), p. 143; Colomo (2019c), p. 532.
199.
Eben (2018), p. 147.
200.
Colomo (2019c), p. 533.
201.
See under 6.1(iii).
202.
Akman (2017), p. 370.
203.
Google Shopping GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 169 et seq.
204.
Colomo (2020a), p. 4.
205.
Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, ‘The General Court in Case T-612/17, Google Shopping: the rise of a doctrine of equal treatment in Article 102 TFEU’, Chillin’Competition Blog, available at <https://chillingcompetition.com/2021/11/10/the-general-court-in-case-t%e2%80%91612-17-google-shopping-the-rise-of-a-doctrine-of-equal-treatment-in-article-102-tfeu/> accessed 6 February 2023.
206.
Google Shopping GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 224.
207.
Oscar Bronner (Chap. 4, n 82).
208.
Google Shopping GC (Chap. 1, n 8), paras 212 et seq, in particular para 229 et seq.
209.
Colomo (2019c), p. 535.
210.
Ibid.
211.
Oscar Bronner (Chap. 4, n 82).
212.
Oscar Bronner (Chap. 4, n 82) Opinion of AG Jacobs ECLI:EU:C:1998:264, para 57.
213.
Google Shopping (Chap. 4, n 52), paras 606, 607.
214.
Colomo (2020a), p. 35; See the ECJ’s case in MEO (Chap. 4, n 477).
215.
Colomo (2020a), p. 35.
216.
Google Shopping (Chap. 4, n 52), paras 341, 606.
217.
Ibid.
218.
Colomo (2020b), p. 5.
219.
Ibid, 61.
220.
Zelger (2020b), p. 280.
221.
See above under Sect. 4.6.
222.
Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) Commission Decision 24 May 2004 notified under document number C(2004) 900 (Microsoft COMP), para 835–954.
223.
Intel Commission Decision (Chap. 4, n 9), paras 1597–1616.
224.
Prokent/Tomra (Case COMP/E-1/38.113) Commission Decision of 29 March 2006 (Decision Summary published 2008 OJ C219/11), para 20 (Tomra Commission Decision).
225.
Zelger (2020b), p. 280.
226.
Ibid.
227.
See to this effect Colomo (2020a), p. 35.
228.
Colomo (2020a), p. 2.
229.
Ibid.
230.
See pages 155–156.
231.
See above 6(iii).
232.
Holzweber (2018a), p. 364; Colomo (2020a), p. 2; Petit (2015), p. 2.
233.
For example, Joined Cases 6 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents v Commission [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:18; Case 311/84 CBEM v CLT and IPB [1985] ECLI:EU:C:1985:394.
234.
Petit (2015), pp. 2 et seq; Akman (2017); Vesterdorf (2015), p. 4.
235.
Colomo (2020a), p. 4.
236.
Ibid.
237.
Colomo (2020a), p. 4.
238.
Colomo (2020a), p. 36.
239.
For an extensive illustration of this argument and analysis of the respective relevant case law see: Colomo (2019c).
240.
For a comment on the case, see: Caffarra (2022); Achleitner (2023).
241.
Google Android (n 7), para 4.
242.
Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, ‘The Android decision is out: the exciting legal stuff beneath the noise’, Chillin’Competition Blog, available at <https://chillingcompetition.com/2018/07/18/the-android-decision-is-out-the-exciting-legal-stuff-beneath-the-noise-by-pablo/> accessed 6 February 2023 comparing the respective clauses with obligations in a franchising agreement ‘to protect goodwill around a business’.
243.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 802.
244.
Microsoft (Chap. 4, n 81).
245.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 284 et seq.
246.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 295.
247.
See to this effect as regards offline markets under Sect. 4.4.3.1 as well as with respect to online markets below under Sect. 6.3.3.2.
248.
See to this effect under Sect. 4.4.3.
249.
Ibid.
250.
As regards the various different assessment categories, see Sect. 6.1.
251.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 295.
252.
Ibid.
253.
Case C-738/22 Google and Alphabet v Commission, pending.
254.
Microsoft (Chap. 4, n 81).
255.
Google Android (n 7) para 1036; Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 892.
256.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 893.
257.
Ibid.
258.
Google Android (n 7) para 1076 et seq, 1092 et seq; Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 893.
259.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 893.
260.
Ibid.
261.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 657.
262.
INTEL (Chap. 1, n 43).
263.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 639 et seq.
264.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 800.
265.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 802.
266.
INTEL (Chap. 1, n 43), para 139.
267.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 693; the GC dealt with the market coverage criterion already in its decision in Case T-286/09 RENV – Intel Corporation v Commission [2022] ECLI:EU:T:2022:19, para 499, by which the latter annulled the Commission’s decision.
268.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 800.
269.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), paras 734 et seq, 752, 800.
270.
With respect to this argument as regards the Intel case see under Sect. 4.4.2.4.
271.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 752.
272.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 800.
273.
See, for example, the ECJ decisions Hoffmann LaRoche (Chap. 1, n 40) and in INTEL (Chap. 1, n 43). Moreover, see the Commission’s decision in Google Android (n 7), paras 1188 et seq; arguing similarly Friso Bostoen, ‘The Commission’s Android decision: Google cements its dominance in search… to the benefit of consumers?’, CoRe Blog, available at <https://www.lexxion.eu/coreblogpost/google-android-decision/> accessed 6 February 2023; also see Colomo (n 241) labelling the exclusivity payments as ‘perhaps least exciting’ of Google’s practices.
274.
BPB Industries (Chap. 3, n 297).
275.
INTEL (Chap. 1, n 43).
276.
See under Sect. 4.4.1.4.
277.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 657.
278.
For the respective relevant case law, see above Sects. 4.4.1 and 4.4.3.
279.
Google Shopping (Chap. 4, n 52).
280.
Microsoft (Case COMP/C-3/37.792) Commission Decision 24 May 2004 notified under document number C(2004) 900 (Microsoft COMP), para 835–954.
281.
Intel Commission Decision (Chap. 4, n 9), paras 1597–1616.
282.
Prokent/Tomra (Case COMP/E-1/38.113) Commission Decision of 29 March 2006 (Decision Summary published 2008 OJ C219/11), para 20 (Tomra Commission Decision).
283.
Zelger (2020b), p. 280.
284.
In this vein, see Konstantinos Stylianou, ‘Help Without Borders: How the Google Android Case Threatens to Derail the Limited Scope of the Obligation to Assist Competitors’, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2766062> accessed 6 February 2023; Aguilera Valdivia (2018), pp. 43–68; Colomo (n 241).
285.
Colomo (n 241).
286.
Bostoen (n 272); Colomo (n 241).
287.
For the respective relevant case law, see above Sects. 4.4.1 and 4.4.3.
288.
As regards the defined Categories I-III, see above under Sect. 6.1.
289.
Colomo (2019c), pp. 537 et seq.
290.
Colomo (n 241); also see OECD Dominance in Digital Markets Report (n 15) 41 et seq illustrating that ‘digital products feature modularity or linkages with other products’ and the particularities in the assessment deriving thereof.
291.
Eicher (2019), p. 428.
292.
Colomo (2018b), p. 10.
293.
For an overview as regards the academic debate to this effect see Jones et al. (2019), pp. 480 et seq with further references.
294.
Microsoft (Chap. 4, n 81).
295.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8).
296.
See to this effect Sect. 4.4.3.1.
297.
Ibid.
298.
See to this effect Sects. 6.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2.
299.
Microsoft (Chap. 4, n 81), para 1054.
300.
Google Android GC (Chap. 1, n 8), para 280 et seq.
301.
Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, ‘The notion of abuse after the Android judgment (Case T-604/18): what is clearer and what remains to be clarified (I)’, Chillin’Competition Blog, available at <https://chillingcompetition.com/2022/09/28/the-notion-of-abuse-after-the-android-judgment-case-t%E2%80%91604-18-what-is-clearer-and-what-remains-to-be-clarified-i/> accessed 6 February 2023.
302.
Google Search (AdSense) (AT.40411) Commission decision of 20 March 2019 notified under document number C(2019) 2173 (Google AdSense) Decision Summary published 2019 OJ C369/6 (Google AdSense Decision Summary), para 11.
303.
Google AdSense Decision Summary (n 301), para 12.
304.
Google AdSense Decision Summary (n 301), para 13.
305.
Google AdSense (n 6), para 456.
306.
Google AdSense (n 6), paras 563 and 623.
307.
Google AdSense (n 6), paras 362, 494 and 573.
308.
Google AdSense (n 6), paras 345, 362.
309.
As regards the law on exclusivity in the analogue world, see above under Sect. 4.4.1.
310.
As regards the defined Categories I-III, see above under Sect. 6.1.
311.
Google AdSense (n 6), paras 362, 494 and 573.
312.
See under Sect. 4.4.1.1.
313.
See for example: INTEL (Chap. 1, n 43) Opinion of AG Wahl ECLI:EU:C:2016:788, para 75; Gormsen (2013), p. 245.
314.
As regards the defined Categories I-III, see above under Sect. 6.1.
315.
See above 6(iii).
316.
Colomo (2020a), p. 36.
317.
See above 6(iii).
318.
Colomo (2020a), p. 36; Petit (2015), pp. 2 et seq.
319.
Vesterdorf (2015).
320.
Petit (2015), p. 3.
321.
Petit (2015), p. 6.
322.
Servier (Chap. 3, n 249).
323.
Cartes Bancaires Commission Decision (Chap. 3, n 370).
324.
CISAC Commission Decision (Chap. 3, n 370).
325.
Commission Decision ISU (Chap. 3, n 90).
326.
See to this effect under Sect. 4.4.3.
327.
Colomo (2019c), p. 537.
328.
Pending cases at the General Court in Google AdSense (n 181); furthermore: Commission Proceedings in Apple Music Streaming (n 171); Apple E- and Audiobooks (n 171).
329.
Digital Markets Act (Chap. 5, n 34).
330.
Akman and Sokol (2017), p. 146.
331.
OECD Dominance in Digital Markets Report (n 15) 7.

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Department of European Law and Public International Law, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria
Bernadette Zelger

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Zelger, B. (2023). Competition Cases in the Digital Economy. In: Restrictions of EU Competition Law in the Digital Age. Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31339-4_6

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