Abstract
The main misunderstanding of the etiological conception of the concept of function is to confuse this notion with the concept of adaptation. The explanations by natural selection do not justify function attributions: They explain the configuration of an organic structure by considerations that, among other elements, also include references to the functional performance of this structure. That is why, the best manner of characterizing them is to say that they are design explanations. However, for a correct formulation of the idea of design, it will be necessary to adopt a conception of the function attributions that could avoid the difficulties of the etiological conception. For this, it will be necessary to think of functions as causal roles.
This chapter resulted from the discussion held during my lecture “Explication fonctionelle et explication sélective,” which I gave on 20 June 2006 during a session of the Séminaire Structure et Fonction – L’inférence fonctionnelle organized by Jean Gayon and Phillippe Huneman at the Institut d’histoire et philosophie des sciences et des techniques of Sorbonne. To both organizers, and to all those who participated in the discussion, my sincere thanks. In addition, I also must thank the valuable observations made by the reviewers of Signos Filosóficos: They allowed me to improve my work. This was originally published, in Spanish, in the issue 24 of that Mexican journal (cf. Caponi, 2010), which has been generous enough to allow its inclusion in this volume.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Cuvierian Paleontology always made function attributions to fossil bones, denying, at the same time, any history of the biological structures.
- 3.
The concept of function should not be confused with that of raison d’être. Contrary to what is assumed by the defenders of the etiological conception, the function of something is not always its raison d’être. Even designed devices can fulfill functions that do not explain their existence: A bottle, for example, can function as a projectile.
- 4.
Concerning this aspect of Kant’s thought, see Rosas (2008).
- 5.
Prima facie, the idea of organic teleology, based on the assumption of goals intrinsic to living beings, seems more restrictive than the notion of teleology proposed by Margarita Ponce. This is so because the first position assumes that the goal in question does not depend on a mere theoretical choice but on something that is proper to or inherent in the object of study. Nevertheless, if we accept that the recognition that a particular physical system constitutes an organism presupposes a functional analysis of its parts in which these are considered by virtue of their causal contribution to the operation and constitution of the whole, that difference is diluted (cf. Kant, 1995 [1790], § 66; Merleau-Ponty, 1967, p. 165; Polanyi, 1962, p. 359). The organic teleology may be thought as just a special case of that generalized teleology pointed out by Ponce.
- 6.
For the configuration of a selective pressure, two factors are needed: The environmental factor is needed, which can be a threat or an opportunity for the living beings affected; it is also needed the existence of hereditary variants that favor a better or worse response to this threat or a better or worst harnessing of this opportunity. The ecological variables, by themselves, do not configure selective pressures. A poison that kills indiscriminately and a resource that everyone can use equally are important variables in the ecological environment of a population, but they do not define the selective environment that guides the evolution of the lineage to which that population belongs.
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Caponi, G. (2023). Function, Adaptation, and Design in Biology. In: Gayon, J., de Ricqlès, A., Dussault, A.C. (eds) Functions: From Organisms to Artefacts. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, vol 32. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31271-7_9
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