The Karabakh Conflict, 1988–1994

Abstract

This chapter provides a chronological overview of the Karabakh conflict, beginning with the development of ethnic violence in the late 1980s and continuing through the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The initial phase of unrest in Karabakh was met with Soviet military aggression, particularly against Armenian villages that were known to support separatists. Thousands of Armenian and Azeri refugees fled Karabakh and relocated to urban areas where their stories of persecution stoked retaliatory violence. As Soviet power began to wane, military equipment from the Soviet army began to filter into different militia groups, fueling more intense violence that rapidly accelerated into nation-state warfare after the collapse of the USSR. As the war intensified a severe economic and humanitarian crisis unfolded that left thousands of refugees without heat, hot water or medical services throughout the region.

3.1 Ethnicity and Nationalism

Population data from the Soviet era indicates that the Karabakh region was slowly urbanizing in the second half of the twentieth century, and the ethnic mix was shifting to a higher proportion of Azeri residents. Urban populations increased from 26,973 to 97,410 from 1959 to 1989, while rural populations decreased from 103,433 to 90,353 during the same time (NGK Census 2005). Reports suggest that a push to move ethnic Azerbaijanis into NGK was initiated by the Azerbaijani SSR in the space left by the changing demographics in NGK. This is supported by the increase in Azerbaijani population from 14 to 22% from 1959 to 1989. During the same time, the ethnic Armenian population in NGK decreased from 84 to 77%. The opening of factories by Azerbaijan in areas in and around NGK is thought to have occurred to entice ethnic Azeris into these regions (Horizon 2019).

Throughout the Soviet era Armenians repeatedly petitioned Moscow for a new political geography of ethnic reunification. Lingering cultural trauma from the early twentieth-century genocide added urgency to these requests.¹ When Soviet power began to falter in the late 1980s, Armenian nationalists again pressed Soviet leaders to reassign Karabakh to the territory of Armenia. When these efforts were unsuccessful, tensions increased. Residents of NGK formally passed a resolution to reunify with the Armenian SSR in the summer of 1988 (de Waal 2013). They subsequently held a national referendum on independence and soon formed the Republic of Artsakh.

The contraction of Soviet power in the late 1980s, however, meant that the Soviet response to Armenian separatism was disorganized, heavy-handed and ill conceived (Croissant 1998; de Waal 2013). The expansive informal economy in the region also meant that local biznesmen were powerful enough to subvert Soviet power through informal channels and had sufficient resources and procurement networks to supply local militias with contraband weapons (Kaldor 2007; Kohler and Zurcher 2003b: 161). The waning of Soviet power also meant that longstanding patronage networks became destabilized, and valuable resources circulating in the informal economy could be considered up for grabs. As Nora Dudwick described,

Despite the apparent bankruptcy of the state budget, there are enormous sums to be made during this period of rapid unpredictable change. Well-placed people are scrambling to secure their access to this wealth by buying and selling of state holdings which are being privatized, asserting control over natural resources, and establishing trade and production monopolies … new authorities can demand which impunity whatever bribes or payments the market will bear. (1997: 90)

The violence that erupted in Karabakh was originally articulated in ethnic terms, but several scholars have argued that economic competition between rival entrepreneurs in the informal economy—biznesmen-patrioty—also played an important role (de Waal 2013; Koehler and Zurcher 2003; Zurcher 2007). As Koelher and Zurcher described, “…[T]he initial conflicts [in Karabakh] were not new nor about ethnic belonging. Instead, they were more about the control of lucrative segments of the ‘shadow’ economy by competing networks” (2003b: 149). Zurcher has also explored the links between Karabakh’s early ethnic armies and pre-existing criminal groups operating in the informal economy. “They brought in an expertise in organizing violence … and quite often also a taste for fighting in the name of the nation” (2007: 216). He described similar patterns in the organization of violence in the neighboring Chechen and Georgian conflicts (2007: 216). The pattern of ethnic movements intensifying to form an “emergent substate” during periods of political collapse has been documented for a number of other regions experiencing separatist conflict in the 1990s (Mandic 2021).

According to one analysis, the ethnic dimension of the Karabakh conflict also emerged as a secondary effect of local marriage patterns (Dudwick 1997; Koehler and Zurcher 2003). Despite living in neighboring towns for decades of Soviet rule, an ethnic boundary was maintained between Armenians and Azeris through the preservation of ethnic intermarriage. These cultural practices were of minor importance during the secular Soviet period. But kin relations and religious practices became revitalized as Soviet power waned, and ethnic identity emerged as a key institution linking families together in networks of shared beliefs, traditions and trust. While there were examples of neighboring Azeri and Armenian families providing shelter and aid to one another during early outbreaks of ethnic violence, the geographic segregation created by ethnic removals and forced migration made such relationships increasingly difficult to sustain after 1991 (Goltz 1998).

3.2 Early Phase Conflict, 1988–1990

In the early phase of the conflict between 1988 and 1990, the territory of Karabakh was repeatedly assaulted by informal ethnic armies operating outside the Soviet system. This phase was low intensity, with poorly equipped militias engaging with other poorly equipped militias. Thomas Goltz described several of the early Azeri armed groups, for instance, as “composed more of extended families than soldiers” (1998: 150). Reports of ethnic violence in Karabakh, however, reverberated in the capital cities of Baku and Yerevan, leading to urban protests, riots and retaliatory pogroms. Biznesmen-patrioty increased their support for ethnic violence, mobilizing resources from diaspora communities and the “shadowy Azeri mafia” (Zurcher 2007). Broers has described this phase of intensifying ethnic violence as “a crucible forging a national identity in the capital [of Baku] where an alternative cosmopolitan identity was strongest” (Broers 2021: 133).

An ill-fated Soviet crackdown began in January 1990 with troops marching into Baku and killing over one hundred protestors. Communal violence was high and Armenian enclaves in Baku were targeted by angry mobs, leading to a mass exodus of refugees. The Armenian population of Baku declined from approximately 180,000 residents in 1989 to only 13,000 after the violence of “Black January” in 1990 (Broers 2021; de Waal 2013: 93).

The rapid exit of Armenians and Azeris from formerly cosmopolitan cities of Baku and Yerevan left each city ethnically homogenous and struggling to accommodate thousands of impoverished refugees. Karabakh remained multi-ethnic, but with internal segregation by town. Raiding, arson and hostage-taking between Armenian and Azeri villages soon became common (Broers 2021: 141). Refugees from Karabakh arrived in urban areas that were poorly equipped to provide them with housing, jobs or humanitarian assistance. As social services buckled under the strain of new arrivals, refugees became “a radicalizing force that fueled bloody inter communal clashes through 1990” (Croissant 1998: 28).

A group of Soviet officials also traveled to the Armenian enclave of Stepanakert where they were besieged by separatists. Annoyed by the display of ethnonational independence, the Soviets arrested a group of Armenian nationalists and also replaced the leadership of the Azeri Communist Party (de Waal 2013; Zurcher 2007). These actions intensified the growing convergence of anti-Soviet sentiment and ethnonational violence. Soviet soldiers also anticipated the impending fragmentation of the USSR and began informally selling high grade military weapons and supplies to various combatants in the Caucasus (Zurcher 2007: 217). Ethnic militias also attacked Soviet military installations in order to acquire rocket launchers, grenades and automatic rifles (de Waal 2013).

Between 1990 and 1991 the entire southern Caucasus region witnessed repeated rounds of low intensity conflict and heavy handed Soviet retaliation. At one point a joint operation between Azeri and Soviet forces called “Operation Ring” was launched to disarm Armenian militias and cut off support from rural enclaves. Armenian villages in Karabakh were encircled by Soviet and Azeri troops and residents were forcibly deported. Azeri settlers were then brought in to populate newly vacated houses and farmland.

At least 17 Armenian villages in the Karabakh region were targeted for forced depopulation during this time, with over 5000 Armenians deported and several dozen killed by Soviet and Azeri forces (de Waal 2013: 118). There were reports of Armenians trapped in villages without sufficient food, water or electricity for months at a time (de Waal 2013: 119). A few months later, Armenian forces succeeded in retaking some of these depopulated villages, forcing the recently settled Azeri residents to flee. Over time, these dynamics created “empty spaces, bereft of inhabitants” (Broers 2021: 141).

Repeated rounds of rural depopulation, exodus and resettlement also intensified the housing and humanitarian crisis in Armenia, which was still reeling from the effects of the 1988 earthquake. A 1991 USAID report noted over 400,000 Armenian earthquake victims were still “living in tents, garages and other makeshift shelters,” and aid promised by the Soviet Union had failed to materialize (Vartain 1991). The “tragic situation” was further compounded by an influx of over 300,000 Armenian refugees fleeing violence in Azerbaijan and Karabakh. The report estimated Armenia was struggling with a population of 750,000 homeless people out of a total population of only 3.5 million. USAID officials working in Armenia summarized the complexities of providing humanitarian assistance in the late Soviet period as follows,

The way the Soviet transportation and supply system was set up under Stalin (which is still operative today), all goods except air cargo coming into Armenia must go through the republics of either Azerbaijan or Georgia. All railroads (which carry most of Soviet goods) into Armenia go through those two republics. All commerce with the rest of the world must pass through the Soviet Union, Turkey or Iran. At present, Turkey and Iran are not viable routes, although a highway route through Turkey to the Black Sea is presently under negotiation. Highway transportation infrastructure in the former Soviet Union is not as well developed as in the West, and is much more subject to hijacking and other abuses than rail transport. … the Republic of Azerbaijan, through which most supplies have come during the last 70 years, simply refuses to allow goods to pass into Armenia. Natural gas and other fuels from the Azeri oil fields are thus in very short supply, and other goods are diverted into both the Azeri economy and the hands of private, illegal groups and individuals … The Azerbaijani government remains in the hands of hard line ‘former’ communists, hostile to both Armenia and democracy, who are taking full advantage of their position in the supply chain to damage Armenia. The border between the two republics is in a state of civil war which the Center has done little to curtail. This complex combination of factors has produced shortages of everything except rocks and Armenians, both of which are plentiful in Armenia. (Vartain 1991)

3.3 Soviet Collapse and Nation-State Warfare, 1991–1994

Just a few months later the Soviet Union underwent its final collapse following a failed coup attempt against Premier Gorbachev. Almost immediately Armenia, Azerbaijan and Karabakh declared themselves independent nations. The semi-autonomous Azeri region of Nakhichevan elected former Soviet Central Committee member Heydar Aliyev as its Chairman, and according to one analyst he ruled the area “as his own private fiefdom, cultivating commercial ties with Turkey and Iran” (Croissant 1998: 90). Armenia acted quickly to retake several of the villages lost during Operation Ring.

The fragile new governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan also began enacting punishing sanctions against one another. Azerbaijan imposed an energy embargo that cut off Armenia’s supplies of natural gas at the beginning of a freezing winter season. Within two weeks, life in Yerevan was “at a virtual standstill” (Croissant 1998: 45). Armenia’s only nuclear power plant was still offline due to the earthquake and almost no imported goods were available due to the transportation blockade. To retaliate against Azerbaijan’s energy embargo, Armenia cut off all access to the Azeri town of Xodjali, leaving the Azeri inhabitants with no electricity, heating oil or running water (Croissant 1998; Goltz 1998: 120).²

Around this time, USAID officials in Armenia began to complain about widespread theft and hijacking of supplies shipped through Russia and Georgia. Living conditions in the capital city continued to deteriorate. Power outages were common and heating fuel was scarce. One US medical professional working in Yerevan described conditions in January 1992 as follows,

Presently we get three hours of electricity alternating with three hours off. The warmest my room/office gets is 60-65F and during the shut off period it gets down to 48-50F … The general economic situation here is getting worse and worse. As a result of the price increases, the cost of living has increased at the very least by 10 fold while salaries have only been increased by 50%. Consumer goods and food stuffs are becoming increasingly incredibly priced. People are justly worried as to how they will make ends meet next month … Unfortunately there is still room for the situation to get worse before it starts to get better … (Fax sent from Stella Grigorian to Aryeh Cooperstock, Henryka Manes, Gabrielle Brook January 29 1992)

By the spring of 1992, Armenia managed to gain the upper hand in the conflict. Most Azeri civilians had been expelled from Karabakh, and Armenia seized enough territory to create a land bridge uniting the country into a single geographic unit. Some of this success was due to the fact that many Armenian military leaders had previously occupied high ranking posts in the Soviet army and were skilled professional soldiers. Soviet discrimination against Muslim republics like Azerbaijan meant Azeris who served in the Soviet army were rarely promoted to high rank and were instead relegated to the “notoriously undisciplined construction battalions” (Koehler and Zurcher 2003: 162). These dynamics led to disarray in the Azeri forces as professional solders did not want to serve “under the dubious command … of warlords with no military education whatsoever” (Koehler and Zurcher 2003: 162). In spring 1992 the Azeri defense minister gave a speech to Parliament in which he described the conditions facing the country,

We have no army at present. We called for 20,000 volunteers, but in real terms we have less than 5,000. The borders are weak, and even towns under attack have not bothered to fortify positions. There is no plan, no sense of tactics, no idea of what equipment is available or even who knows how to use it. (Quoted in Goltz 1998: 143–144)

Azerbaijan’s internal conflicts and factionalism were exacerbated by the discovery of billions of dollars’ worth of oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea. This drew the attention of multi-national oil companies who sent envoys to negotiate deals with Azeri leaders for exploration and pipeline construction (Goltz 1998).³ Political office in Azerbaijan suddenly became more desirable and different factions began competing for the spoils of oil and gas concessions (Broers 2021). Russia remained involved in the conflict, allegedly playing both sides in order to maximize its own position and reassert its “traditional spheres of power” (de Waal 2013; Goltz 1998). Not long after taking office, Azerbaijan’s President Elchibey accused Russia of “pitting different groups of our population against each other in order to prevent us from creating a truly independent state” (quoted in Goltz 1998: 146).

In spring 1992 there were reports of Armenian troops approaching Nakhichevan and the border area near Turkey. Russia immediately warned that if Turkey attempted to enter the conflict or demonstrated hostilities against Armenia it “could trigger a Third World War.” Turkey was a NATO member and Russia still considered Armenia to be its regional and strategic ally (Croissant 1998: 82). There were also rumors that Iran was supporting a new Islamic party in Azerbaijan (Goltz 1998: 183).

In November 1992 a helicopter carrying Russian and Kazakh officials on their way to implement a peace deal was shot down in southern Karabakh, allegedly by Armenian fighters. Soon after, Azerbaijan’s National Council voted to revoke Karabakh’s status as an autonomous region and declare it a formal province of Azerbaijan (de Waal 2013: 176). Armenia retaliated by holding a referendum for Karabakh’s independence and launching a major military offensive to regain lost territory (Croissant 1998). Soon after, Azeri saboteurs began attacking a key gas pipeline in Marneuili, a region of neighboring Georgia populated by Azeris. These energy disruptions left Armenia “in complete darkness” and without heat, phone service, cooking fuel or public transport during the coldest months of winter (Isaryan 1994). During the siege of Stepanakert, residents lived in basements with only candles for light, and urban residents had to hand carry water from distant springs (de Waal 2013: 188). In February 1993 USAID advisors issued a press release stating, “The humanitarian situation in Armenia is reaching critical proportions, as extreme shortages of fuel, food and medical supplies continue to define the daily lives of the Armenian people” (Marshall 1993).

Despite the energy crisis and destruction of key infrastructure, Armenia was able to retake a good deal of territory after Azeri warlord Surat Husseinov removed his troops from the strategic Kelbajar region in March 1993. Demoralized Azeri soldiers abandoned the town and hundreds of refugees were forced to travel along a snowy mountain road where many died of hypothermia (de Waal 2013: 224). In April the Armenian military opened a second offensive south of the Karabakh region and managed to seize control of 18 additional villages, some of which were located close to the Iranian border. Tens of thousands of Azeris fled the region and crossed the border into Turkey. The growing proximity of the conflict to geopolitical risk zones in Turkey and Iran led to increased pressure from the UN Security Council for a full cessation of hostilities (Croissant 1998: 87).

In May 1993 Surat Huseinov began attacking Azeri government forces when he attempted to seize weapons, ammunition and equipment from departing Russian soldiers in the city of Ganja. Huseinov told his troops to take control of all nearby villages, essentially holding them hostage to compel negotiations with President Elchibey. Elchibey responded by sending military helicopters to attack Huseinov’s forces but without warning all three pilots suddenly switched sides, potentially paving the way for Huseinov to seize power with help from the armed forces (Goltz 1998). Huseinov’s army then began marching toward Baku, threatening civil war. President Elchibey mysteriously disappeared around this time, leading some to speculate he was “drunk or drugged” while his government teetered on the brink of collapse (Goltz 1998: 364). A second Azeri military commander also staged a small rebellion in the Lenkoran region and declared a short lived autonomous “Talysh-Mugham Republic” (de Waal 2013: 227).

Azerbaijan’s internal political fragmentation was eventually stabilized when former Soviet Central Committee member Heydar Aliyev maneuvered himself back into power following Elchibey’s resignation in June 1993. One of Aliyev’s first executive acts was to appoint warlord Surat Husseinov as Prime Minister, then cancel all of the oil contracts negotiated by President Elchibey (de Waal 2013). One former Azeri official complained to the Los Angeles Times that “feuding warlords have ousted two presidents and frustrated seven defense ministers in less than two years of independence” (Los Angeles Times, July 20, 1993).

The Armenian military took advantage of the internal fractures in Azerbaijan to seize additional territory, including the city of Agdam and surrounding towns (Croissant 1998). Armenian troops then advanced south to capture areas outside of Karabakh (Croissant 1998: 92). Around 350,000 Azeris were displaced by these new incursions, “one of the biggest refugee exoduses in Europe since the end of World War II” (de Waal 2013: 228). In desperation Azerbaijan requested refugee resettlement aid from the United Nations (Goltz 1998: 398). Armenia continued its advance and began targeting areas intended for Azerbaijan’s oil pipeline construction, sending another 20,000 refugees across the nearby border into Iran (Croissant 1998: 93).

By the fall and winter of 1993 both sides accused one another of breaking cease fire agreements and the most intense phase of the conflict began. The Azeri army was now largely consolidated under Aliyev and reinforced by fighters from Afghanistan. Turkey supplied Azerbaijan with 150 military advisors and Russia provided 200 more (Croissant 1998: 96). These reinforced troops undertook a major offensive to reclaim territory north, south and east of Karabakh. Russian pilots were hired as mercenaries, even though they allegedly “had a habit of dropping bombs on Azeri cities just as peace was breaking out” (Goltz 1998: 434). Armenia received a good deal of support from its extensive diaspora community as well as from Russia. Late in 1993 Armenia pushed southward propelling thousands more Azeri villagers across the Araks River into Iran (de Waal 2013: 239). Fighting raged until the spring of 1994, when a peace agreement was brokered in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

After the cease fire in 1994 a line of contact was established and the Republic of Artsakh was formed. This was a new territorial configuration, not recognized by Azerbaijan but under control of Armenia. No peacekeeping patrol was established, however, and both countries occupied the line with forces. Attempts to resolve the conflict stalled and the region became embedded in one of many “frozen” post-Soviet conflicts (Lachert 2019).

A map of the spatial distribution of confirmed conflicts between 1988–1994 shows that fighting occurred mostly around the mountainous NGK region (Fig. 3.1a). Conflicts were especially prevalent in the northern and eastern rayons. However, there were significant conflict sites outside of this area, particularly along the northern borders with Azerbaijan and Georgia, which were close to strategic energy pipeline corridors. Other battles occurred in regions south of NGK which is an important corridor along the Iranian border (Fig. 3.1a). Beginning in 1992, heavy fighting was occurring in Kalbajar, Agdam and Tartar rayons in the north and east of NGK. This led to hundreds of thousands of residents fleeing these areas (Fig. 3.1a).

Fig. 3.1

(a and b) South Caucasus region highlighting the estimated locations of known conflict sites and deaths during the Karabakh wars taken from the UCDP-PRIO dataset v22.1 (www.prio.org). (a) The approximate locations of conflict sites in Armenia and Azerbaijan from 1989–1994 (orange) and 2020 (yellow). (b) The estimated deaths per conflict site from 1989–1994. The historical Nagorno-Karabakh region (1990), the line of contact (LOC) from 1994. The Republic of Artsakh as well as the new Nagorno-Karabakh region (2020) are also indicated. Numerous conflict events per specific location occurred and therefore estimates per conflict event are stacked for some locations

Numerous conflict sites resulted in low estimates of casualties (Fig. 3.1b). However, there were many conflicts with high casualties, especially in the eastern regions of Nagorno-Karabakh and neighboring regions of Azerbaijan, including Agdam, Fuzuli and Tartar. Other conflict sites with large numbers of casualties occurred near the major cities of Stepanakert and Shusha, as well as in areas in the southeast of NGK bordering Iran (Fig. 3.1). Some of these areas are predominantly agricultural with a high density of villages.

Over 600 thousand ethnic Azeri IDPs from regions in and around NGK were displaced to cities, regions and/or settlement camps in Azerbaijan by the end of 1994 (UNHCR 2009). Most of these IDPs were settled in and around Baku, however, many others settled in one of several IDP camps facilitated by humanitarian organizations (UNHCR 2009). Additionally, several hundred thousand ethnic Armenians living in Azerbaijan were displaced by the end of 1994 (UNHCR 2008). As Armenia regained control of many areas around NK in 1994, many displaced ethnic Armenians from regions east of NGK, Baku, and Sumgait in Azerbaijan, slowly began to return to NGK and surrounding provinces (UNHCR 2008).

Since 1994, several resettlements of IDP in Azerbaijan have occurred (UNHCR 2009). In the early 1990s many camps and other improvised settlements were located far from the conflict in areas with different environmental and agricultural settings. In addition to being unfamiliar topography, these areas placed these populations in vulnerable health and economic conditions (UNHCR 2009). As a result of the resettlements that began in 2003 many IDPs relocated to areas closer to NGK, including Ganja, Agdam and Fuzuli. A geospatial analysis of IDPs in Fig. 3.2, shows the concentration of IDPs in regions to the east and south of NGK as of the mid-2000s. This placed IDPs into areas that more closely resembled their place of living prior to the conflict. The government of Azerbaijan in 2008 estimated that provinces surrounding NK, including Lachin, Agdam, Ganja and Fuzuli had nearly 160 thousand IDP combined.

Fig. 3.2

Overview of the South Caucasus showing the spatial distribution of UNHCR settlement camps and internally displaced persons (IDPs) by rayon in Azerbaijan as of 2005, according to reports from the Azerbaijan government and UNHCR. The historical Nagorno-Karabakh region (1990), the line of contact (LOC) from 1994, as well as the new Nagorno-Karabakh region (2020) are also indicated