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Hardware Trojan Insertion

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Abstract

A Hardware Trojan is a malicious addition or modification of an integrated circuit (IC) which could be inserted at arbitrary stages in the design and fabrication cycle to compromise the security of the entire system. In this chapter, readers will gain hands-on experience in the hardware Trojan insertion. Readers will learn how a typical hardware Trojan-inserted AES (advanced encryption standard) cryptographic implementation is implemented at RTL (register-transfer level) and triggered through bitstream tampering on an FPGA platform. Also, we demonstrate how to detect the malicious functionality with security property verification methods and present approaches to insert and detect malicious logics on an FPGA device, respectively.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, USA

    Mark Tehranipoor & Farimah Farahmandi

  2. Continental Automotive Singapore, Security & Privacy Competence Center, Singapore, Singapore

    N. Nalla Anandakumar

Authors
  1. Mark Tehranipoor
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  2. N. Nalla Anandakumar
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  3. Farimah Farahmandi
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Tehranipoor, M., Nalla Anandakumar, N., Farahmandi, F. (2023). Hardware Trojan Insertion. In: Hardware Security Training, Hands-on!. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31034-8_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31034-8_5

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-31033-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-31034-8

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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