The literature on irregular migration often deals with migration policies and the role of states. A smaller body of literature focuses on the role that irregular migrants themselves have, or can have. This chapter will explore the agency that irregular migrants have to influence their own migration trajectory. Moreover, it will discuss how irregular migrants can use their agency to become incorporated into the societies in which they reside despite their irregular status. By using a broad notion of citizenship, we will consider how irregular migrants can use their agency to obtain forms of inclusion, other than through regularisations, work, or marriage, and how they can have the capacity to trigger political and social change despite their irregular status.

6.1 The (Political) Agency of Irregular Migrants

In recent years, the literature on the agency of irregular migrants has evolved considerably. In the past, irregular migrants were often portrayed as passive or inactive, and little attention was paid to describing how they have ‘agency’, i.e., the ability to intentionally intervene in the world, and the possibility to reflect on this intervention (Johnson, 2003: 413). The recent literature furnishes a more nuanced picture of the extent to which irregular migrants can exercise agency.

Nonetheless, a dominant view of irregular migrants as victims continues to exist. Public policies often fuel this victimisation of irregular migrants, but, notably, human rights activists can also play a role in the victimisation of irregular migrants. They believe that, in order to have any hope of being accepted, irregular migrants must appear to be “pure victims” (Anderson, 2008). In this discourse, irregular migrants are often portrayed as the victims of war or (political) persecution or victims of human trafficking or malicious smugglers, or as victims of harsh and exclusionary border regimes and integration policies. As already described in Chap. 5, migrants who want to cross borders irregularly are closely dependent on the smugglers and the smuggler-networks available, which causes the power relations between migrants and smugglers to be highly unequal. However, despite these unequal power dynamics, Van Liempt and Doomernik (2006) challenge this widely shared view that irregular migrants are only victims of their smugglers. They describe how the agency of irregular migrants, during the migration, often consists in finding the right smuggler for them. Migrants act upon stories from other migrants about the smugglers, whose reputation often derives from how they work, whether they take care of their clients, provide food or shelter, and their results or success rate, whether they have good contacts at the border, or provide good documents (Van Liempt & Doomernik, 2006). In a way, this nuances the idea of human smuggling. It sees the agency of irregular migrants in their decision to migrate, and in the decisions of how to migrate and which smuggler to use. While irregular migrants are dependent on unequal, exploitative and often dangerous networks of smugglers, as we already highlighted, they are often not necessarily ‘kidnapped’ over borders fully against their will.

Moreover, irregular migration could also be seen as a form of agency. In this form of migration, people move despite the restrictions that states impose on their movement (Squire, 2010). Media and right-wing politicians tend to frame this form of migration agency negatively. Irregular migrants are depicted as deliberately and maliciously breaking laws by ‘illegally’ crossing borders. Anderson and Ruhs (2010) nuance this image of irregular migration as a ‘choice’. They argue that seeing the agency of irregular migrants as “their decision to migrate in an irregular manner” without paying attention to the structure/agency relationships in the process of illegalising migrants oversimplifies irregular migrants as either victims or villains. The agency of irregular migrants should be understood as a combination of decision-making, the existing room for manoeuvre, opportunity structures, and migrant trajectories. Representing irregular migration as a ‘choice’ by irregular migrants risks presenting the phenomenon in an overly simplistic way (Anderson & Ruhs, 2010: 177–178). Economic migration theories might tend to see migration decision-making as a rational choice. However, current sociological and anthropological scholarship paints a more refined picture. The ‘decision’ to migrate is influenced by many factors and cannot simply be seen as a voluntary decision to leave one’s country of origin or community behind. These factors include extensive global processes. Saskia Sassen, for instance, argues that the processes of globalisation and increasing (global) economic inequality can be seen as drivers of migration (Sassen, 2014). Faist (2019) even calls the interstices, or in-between space, between the global South and the global North – and how this is expressed in movements of people searching for a better life or trying to escape “unsustainable social, political, economic, and ecological conditions” – the new or contemporary social question (Faist, 2019: 1). Other scholars pay attention to how factors that are ‘closer to home’ – like family obligations or community expectations – influence the decision to migrate (Paret & Gleeson, 2016). This decision could be called a ‘constrained choice’ that leads to benefits and sacrifices (Abrego, 2014). Moreover, this ‘choice’ to migrate irregularly cannot be seen as separate from processes of border closure and the decreased possibilities to migrate regularly.

Furthermore, within this process of crossing borders despite the constraints imposed on it, another form of agency that irregular migrants can use consists in the tactics of circumventing border control mechanisms. In Chap. 2, we described three types of agency: adaptation, reframing, and mobilisation. This chapter will focus predominantly on mobilisation. However, the overlap among the types is inescapable. Irregular migrants can express their agency through individual acts of non-compliance (Ambrosini, 2018). By not collaborating with what states and border enforcers want, or by actively sabotaging formal migration policies, irregular migrants can influence this process. Some scholars even argue that this circumventing of border controls challenges sovereign state power. In addition, when we look at the political discourse on irregular migration, we can identify precisely this sentiment: for instance, when we consider former president Donald Trump’s desire to build a border wall or the actions of the former Italian minister of the interior Matteo Salvini, who closed Italian harbours to migrant vessels and rescue-ships. Both politicians legitimised their ideas by using a discourse of national sovereignty, arguing that only the state ought to decide who enters the country.

Broeders and Engbersen (2007) state that when surveillance and identification are the most prevalent government tactics regarding irregular migration, “the most important strategy to protect oneself against the state’s inquisitive eyes is to hide one’s personal (legal) identity” (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007: 1597). In this regard, Ellermann (2010), for instance, describes various tactics that migrants can use to avoid the process of identification by immigration officers – what she calls ‘identity stripping’. These tactics include throwing away passports or other identification documents, but also, as we saw, mutilating fingertips to circumvent biometric identification. While these tactics can be seen as ‘coping mechanisms’ (see Chap. 3), they are also ‘weapons of the weak’, and can be seen as ways in which migrants can influence their migration process, and therefore as forms of agency. However, at the same time, one wonders whether they are acts of empowerment or whether they tend to be acts of desperation (Ellermann, 2010).

The agency of irregular migrants is apparent during their migration and in their settlement. Everyday forms of agency include the daily practices and social lives of irregular migrants (see, for instance, Sigona, 2012). An essential aspect of the settlement of irregular migrants is their incorporation into the labour market. A recurrent theme in this Reader is the discrepancy between the political rhetoric of closed borders and restricted access to the labour market for irregular migrants, on the one hand, and the need for a supply of (cheap) labour on the other. This two-sided immigration policy was more visible in southern Europe from the 1980s until approximately 2008 than in northern European countries (Ambrosini, 2018: 15). Moreover, the United States is a well-known example of a country that closely depends on the labour of irregular migrants. As Chap. 3 has already shown, (irregular) migrants who have found employment can present themselves as more ‘deserving’ migrants (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014). Moreover, employment in sectors where there is a need for workers can cause migrants to be accepted socially, even if they are irregular (Ambrosini, 2013; Bonizzoni, 2018).

Even though irregular migrants have crossed the physical borders of states, migration and asylum regimes continue to produce distinctions between deserving and bogus, unwanted, and undeserving migrants. These distinctions, and the consequential stigmatisation of deportable (irregular) migrants, provide the rationale that legitimises juridical inequalities between categories of migrants (De Genova, 2013: 1181), even within countries. The exclusionary policies that are designed to keep migrants outside the community can be seen as ‘internal borders’. These internal border policies target forms of social and economic relations and many forms of welfare and social assistance (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007; Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006; Walsh, 2014). Examples of internal borders can be found in various policies: for instance, those that exclude irregular migrants from accessing (regular) healthcare systems or labour markets, or that prevent irregular migrants from engaging in legal contracts, for instance to rent accommodation. These policies are intended not to keep irregular migrants out, but to prevent their integration (Schweitzer, 2017). Overcoming, contesting or undermining the legal restrictions, administrative barriers and everyday risks that irregular migrants encounter because of their irregular status can be seen as an essential form of agency (Ellermann, 2010; Inda, 2010; Schweitzer, 2017; Sigona, 2012; Vasta, 2011). The various studies that have explored the agency of irregular migrants in everyday life, show, for instance, how irregular migrants make choices and develop strategies to cope with increasingly restrictive and punitive immigration regimes, despite their situation of vulnerability or marginalisation (Bloch et al., 2009). For instance, as governments prevent their access to the formal labour market more stringently, irregular immigrants can borrow documents from other immigrants, or enter some informal labour market. Within the everyday lives of irregular migrants, agency can be found in circumvention of the restrictions imposed on their irregular presence.

Many of the studies on these forms of ‘informal integration’ of irregular migrants do not necessarily frame their description in terms of agency. Instead, they speak about, for example, contestation, autonomous migration, or resistance. For these scholars, crossing borders, the boundaries that are designed to exclude, can be seen as a way to challenge those borders politically; and thus, as a form of political action or expression of political agency by irregular migrants. Moreover, some authors focus on the agency of irregular migrants following the ‘autonomy of migration’ thesis, which emphasises the agency of migrants to cross borders as a way to defy them (Mezzadra & Nielson, 2013; Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2013). Borders, both the external borders of states and the internal (administrative) ones, can in this sense be seen as a prime factor in the formation of new ‘political subjects’ because they present an opportunity to see irregular migrants, who usually are not viewed as political, as political actors. However, it is important to note that the development of increasingly restrictive immigration policies both in Europe and the United States has started to show the limits of the ability of migrants to cross borders despite their closure. States’ determination to stop these flows has grown; their policies have become more incisive; and the arrivals of unwanted migrants, or at least the most visible ones, have actually decreased. Moreover, in certain countries, these restrictive immigration policies are increasingly targeted not just on irregular entry but precisely on irregular stay. These internal bordering policies make it more challenging for irregular migrants to achieve inclusion and to use agency, even if they also provide possibilities for political contestation, as some authors argue.

6.2 Irregular Migrants and the Political Community

Irregular migrants provide an interesting case for reflection on who can be considered a member of a political community. They are formally excluded yet are physically present. In practice, it can therefore be quite difficult to exclude them entirely. As demonstrated by Chap. 3, which dealt with the various policies regarding irregular migrants in Europe, although irregular migrants enjoy forms of inclusion in different European countries, the extent of their inclusion varies among them. Moreover, irregular migrants can find forms of inclusion in their everyday lives. Therefore, it is not easy to draw a clear-cut binary division between the inclusion and exclusion of irregular migrants. There is a grey zone which comprises various forms of partial inclusion.

Membership of political communities – typically, nation–states – is often described in terms of citizenship. The notion of a political community refers to both the relations that its members have with each other (the horizontal dimension) and the relations between political institutions and the people that they govern (the vertical dimension) (Bauböck, 2017: 68). Put otherwise, it refers to both the community of citizens and that of citizens and state. Consequently, there are various debates on the meaning of the term ‘citizenship’, and how irregular migrants can be informally included in (forms of) citizenship. In everyday talk and some more traditional theories of citizenship, citizenship is often described as a binary status, something that one either has or does not have. In this case, ‘citizenship’ is often a synonym for ‘nationality’ and, simply put, refers to the country of which one has a passport. Citizenship can generally be received through ‘blood’ (ius sanguinis). In this case, someone obtains citizenship because at least one of their parents has citizenship of a certain state which is transmitted at birth; this is the case in many European states. Another way to obtain citizenship is through the place of birth (ius soli), meaning that one receives the citizenship of the state in which one is born regardless of the citizenship status of one’s parents in that country – as is the case in, for instance, the United States of America. While no European state has a pure ius soli citizenship law since Ireland abolished ius soli in 2004, many European states have some provisions for children of (regular) migrants born on the territory of the state (Vink & De Groot, 2010). Citizenship can also be acquired later in life through forms of ‘naturalisation’; for instance, through marriage (ius connubii) or after a given period of residence (ius domicili) (Stokke, 2017). With these forms of citizenship come certain rights – like the right to vote or run for political office.

One of the most influential theories regarding citizenship has been propounded by T.H. Marshall. For Marshall, citizenship is “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (Marshall, 1951/2009: 149–150). The theory describes how citizenship rights developed as civil, political and social rights in eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth-century Britain (Marshall, 1951/2009). Civil citizenship concerns those rights necessary for individual freedom: “liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice”. Political citizenship concerns the rights to participate politically, “the right to participate in an exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of such a body”. Lastly, social citizenship concerns those rights that enable a person to live “the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society” and relate to the right to a “modicum of economic welfare and security” (Rees, 1996: 5). Still today, Marshall’s definition of citizenship persists in the conception of citizenship. However, as this chapter will show, this definition is problematic in a context of (international) migration, because it does not take account of the citizenship rights of those who come from outside the nation-state. Although it propounds an interesting explanation regarding the historical development of citizenship rights, this theory has been subject to criticism on various grounds.

One criticism focuses on how Marshall’s theory seems to assume a rather linear development of rights of citizens, as it describes how citizens gain various forms of citizenship rights over time. However, this fails to show how many citizenship rights result from the political struggles of excluded or marginalised groups (Giddens, 1982). Historically, one can observe how various groups have struggled for rights; for instance, for women’s rights, the rights of children, or indigenous people (see for instance: Cockburn, 1998; Lister, 2007; Peterson et al., 1998; Roche, 1999; Yuval-Davis, 1997). Another criticism points out that Marshall’s theory does not account for inequalities within groups of citizens, because it pays little attention to differences among citizens – for instance, between rich and poor ones (Giddens, 1982; Turner, 2009), or between men and women (Siim, 2000; Turner, 2009).

Moreover, a criticism with close relevance to the theme of this book is that Marshall’s theory does not account for ethnic and racial differences in citizenship (rights), nor does it pay attention to how religious, cultural and class differences influence national citizenship. Therefore, many sociologists have argued that the Marshallian model on its own does not provide an accurate picture of citizenship in modern, multicultural, ethnically diverse societies, where migration and various forms of diaspora are an everyday reality (Ong, 2005; Turner, 2009).

In other words, Marshall’s theory assumes a closed community. Therefore, the theory only considers the development of rights of those who are full citizens. It consequently cannot account for a reality in which various people are not full citizens. Citizenship as an indicator of membership of a state does not consider persons who are in a country without holding citizenship, such as immigrants. Nor can it fully account for a reality in which immigration policies gradually grant access to (citizenship) rights to those who are not citizens – a process which interestingly often starts with social rights related to work and ends with political rights. For regular immigrants, this can be accounted for by seeing a residence permit as a form of citizenship. Yet the case of irregular migrants challenges us to deepen our understanding of citizenship. Since Marshall’s theory, many scholars have demonstrated how citizenship is not an ‘all or nothing’ concept; rather, it is composed of many different parts. This implies that those who are not formal citizens can still have forms of citizenship, and that likewise, those who are formal citizens can be excluded from aspects of citizenship.

Citizenship can, for instance, be seen as a sort of membership relation that ties the individual to the community and consists of various elements, which include: legal status, rights, participation, and identity (Bloemraad, 2000). Consequently, conflating one element of citizenship with citizenship as a whole prevents observation of how persons can be citizens by some standards, but not by others (Cohen, 2005: 223, 234). In other words, people may hold what may be called ‘partial citizenship’ (Soysal, 1994; Bauböck, 2011). An example of partial citizenship is the citizenship of children. Children have formal citizenship and would most probably identify themselves as citizens. However, at the same time, they are excluded from some aspects of citizenship until they become adults. For instance, children do not have the right to vote, they lack certain political rights. They cannot work, and consequently lack certain economic rights; a situation which could also be seen as not being allowed to participate in society in certain ways (for more insights on the citizenship of children see, for instance, Cockburn, 1998; Liebel, 2008; Roche, 1999).

Another example is the historically differentiated position of women, who, despite being formal citizens, only incrementally achieved equal citizenship rights to men (see, for instance, Blacklock & Macdonald, 2000; Voet, 1998; Yuval-Davis, 1997). These examples show ways in which the formal citizens of a country can still have partial citizenship or be included in citizenship differentially (Mezzadra & Nielson, 2013). Moreover, the examples serve to illustrate that there is a difference between formal or legal citizenship and substantive citizenship. Citizenship can be seen as an indicator of the legal membership of citizens in nation-states, but also as an indicator of who is a substantive member of the community (Evans, 2008: 240). In this sense, citizenship is seen not only as a status that comes with certain rights but also as the social, material, and political practices and ties that citizens actually develop (Isin, 2008: 17). Thus, this perspective on citizenship interprets the active forms of participation within communities of citizens as a form of citizenship (Stokke, 2017). As demonstrated above, the binary distinction between citizens and those who are not citizens fails to capture the multitude of categories and forms of membership that can exist (Bickham Mendez & Naples, 2015). When formal citizenship does not guarantee (equal) rights, one wonders whether, the other way round, a lack of citizenship does not necessarily block access to some (substantive) rights (Wonders & Jones, 2019).

On adopting this perspective, one wonders whether forms of partial citizenship could hold for the situation of irregular migrants as well. Irregular migrants are not formal citizens, but this does not necessarily exclude them from being part of the community. Irregular migrants are between inclusion and exclusion in many ways: they are not formal citizens; they lack legal status but can possess other elements of citizenship, which they can acquire informally. Swerts (2014a), for instance, argues that the involvement of non-citizens in local communities constitutes an enactment of ‘informal citizenship’ that can be used to claim recognition as whole social beings (Swerts, 2014a). Hence, in other words, on distinguishing between formal and substantive citizenship, one sees how it would perhaps be short-sighted to think that just because irregular migrants lack legal status or formal citizenship, they are in no way part of the broader social community.

A variety of scholars of critical citizenship studies have conceived alternative, inclusive theories of citizenship in response to static and binary understandings of citizenship. They often argue that the different elements that constitute citizenship may be obtained in various ways that combine distinct strategies or acts, therewith it pays more attention to the agency of non-citizens (Bloemraad et al., 2008). Some scholars argue that citizenship can be transformed from below in various ways (see, for instance, Ataç et al., 2015; Lentin, 2012). The notion of ‘citizenship from below’ refers to how non-citizens can claim rights, membership, and belonging from the margins through struggles and social movements. In other words, citizenship from below describes how, in the absence of formal citizenship granted by the state from above, acting in certain ways can create citizenship from below. This has often been described in the context of social movements and protests of irregular migrants, on which the next sub-section will dwell.

One of the most influential theories regarding this citizenship perspective is Acts of Citizenship (Isin & Nielsen, 2008). ‘Acts of citizenship’ can be understood as:

those moments when, regardless of status and substance, subjects constitute themselves as citizens – or, better still, as those to whom the right to have rights is due (Isin, 2008: 18).

The central issue for research is those moments when, maybe even against all the odds, migrants defy the seeming ‘order of things’ (see also, Rancière, 1999). In this ‘order’, irregular migrants are often considered as those who are invisible, inaudible, who do not play an active role in society. Therefore, by making themselves visible instead of invisible, audible instead of inaudible, acting instead of merely existing, irregular migrants break with or defy this ‘order’. In these moments, irregular migrants, by behaving like citizens, can make themselves seen as citizens. ‘Acts of citizenship’ therefore also entail understanding and reproducing the “modes and forms of conduct that are appropriate to being an insider” (Isin, 2009: 372–372). Hence, critical citizenship studies would argue that, in an ‘order’ that distinguishes between ‘good citizens’ and ‘bad illegals’, irregular migrants can become less illegal and more citizen – and therefore people who should be entitled to rights – by acting as if they already are citizens with (political) rights. These performative ideas of citizenship depict the practice of citizenship not only as exercising rights but also as claiming rights. Irregular migrants can claim citizenship by behaving like citizens in acts of citizenship; with these acts by irregular migrants, making a claim not only creates citizenship from below, but also performatively brings a right to claim rights into being. Through claim-making, non-citizens performatively claim the right to claim rights and claim to be subjects of rights (Isin, 2017: 506).

These alternative theories of citizenship aim to account for a situation in which irregular migrants are neither entirely excluded nor fully included – a situation where there may be a substantial difference between formal status (or the lack thereof) and informal inclusion. However, these forms of claim-making and ‘informal’ participation often do not ‘solve’ the situation of irregular migrants. Despite these alternative ways of seeing their belonging and inclusion, it is still fundamentally difficult for irregular migrants to create forms of citizenship, not least because they are generally confronted with hostile sentiments. Moreover, not every irregular migrant will find it easy to make these performative claims or engage in acts of citizenship. For irregular migrants who have a job, speak the language, or have more social capital, participation in society will be easier than it is for irregular migrants that are homeless, suffer from mental health problems or addiction, or have trouble communicating (see, Hajer, 2021). Women who work in domestic settings, especially if they do so around the clock, tend to be spread over large geographical areas, have fewer opportunities to gather, to be involved, and to take part in political activities. More generally, the ‘familiar’ intersectional axes of race, gender, and other hierarchical categories, like health and disability, apply also to the situation of irregular migrants (McNevin, 2011: 10).

Moreover, irregular migrants that group together and claim this recognition collectively, in informal groups and social movements, will find it easier to be seen and make their political demands heard. However, while acting in a collective may make it easier to ‘speak up’ politically, the collective aspect may also make it easier to see these groups of irregular migrants as a threat to public order. When their squats or encampments are cleared by the police, for instance, citizens can perceive their homemaking in those places as illegal or criminal, and not as an act of citizenship. The next section will elaborate on what political mobilisation and social movements can bring to irregular migrants.

6.3 Political Mobilisation of Irregular Migrants

Theories of ‘citizenship from below’ and ‘acts of citizenship’ are often used in combination with empirical studies on the political mobilisation and social movements of irregular migrants. Scholars have argued that this political mobilisation can be a way for irregular migrants to challenge borders and obtain forms of inclusion or citizenship despite their formal exclusion. The political opportunities for irregular migrants can mainly reside in challenging their ascribed categories.

6.3.1 Opportunities for Inclusion

Theories like ‘acts of citizenship’ are closely related to theories of politics. As stated above, when irregular migrants act as if they are citizens, they go against a particular order in society. The philosopher Jacques Rancière writes about a ‘social order of things’ in which everyone has a determined place (see also, Rancière, 1999). In this order, irregular migrants are not seen as active participants in society but are assumed to be ‘invisible’. According to this theory, the moments in which people go against this order are considered political moments. In other words, by focusing on moments of rupture with existing socio-historical patterns about ‘who’ can be citizens and ‘what practices’ are interpreted as practices of citizenship, the acts of citizenship literature establishes a way to see irregular migrants as people that belong in society, and ‘unfamiliar ways of being political’ (Ní Mhurchú, 2016; Isin & Nielsen, 2008; McNevin, 2011). Irregular migrants can be seen as non-citizens because they “have crossed state borders or remain in state territory without the sanction of the state” (McNevin, 2006: 136). This can be considered a direct challenge to both the binary categories of citizen versus non-citizen and the ways in which (physical) borders separate these categories. However, irregular migrants do not only cross and thereby challenge physical borders. Balibar, for instance, argues that non-citizens are produced by the external borders of the state and internal borders of belonging to the community (Balibar, 2010: 316). These symbolic boundaries are used to place non-citizens outside a bounded community of citizens (Benhabib, 2004). The challenging of these borders or various forms and processes of bordering can be interpreted as forms of agency of non-citizens. Challenging the boundaries, breaking with the social order, in turn, can be seen as a process of challenging the boundaries of the political – as a process of political subjectification (Oliveri, 2014).

With this and similar theoretical backgrounds, scholars have entered the field to empirically study irregular migration in general, and the instances of protest and social movements of irregular migrants in particular. From this a number of empirical case studies have emerged: for instance, on Berlin (Borri & Fontanari, 2015; Dines et al., 2015; Meret & Della Corte, 2014), Hamburg (Drangsland, 2020), Brussels (Depraetere & Oosterlynck, 2017; Swerts, 2014b, 2017), Paris (Caraus, 2018; Nicholls & Vermeulen, 2012), Vienna (Ataç, 2016), Amsterdam (Dadusc, 2019; Hajer & Bröer, 2020), Turin (Belloni et al., 2020; Bolzoni et al., 2015), Malmö (Nordling et al., 2017), and Oslo (Bendixsen, 2013). Moreover, scholars have studied migrants’ protests in combinations of cities (Chimienti, 2011; Monforte & Dufour, 2013; Oliveri, 2014). These case studies describe not only acts and practices that are commonly understood as political, like protesting, marching, and occupying buildings and urban space, but also those acts and practices that are less commonly understood as political, or “unfamiliar acts of citizenship” (Ní Mhurchú, 2016). These practices include, for instance, making music (Ní Mhurchú, 2016), storytelling (Swerts, 2015), or cooking and sharing food (Depraetere & Oosterlynck, 2017).

As the above summary suggests, in many of these studies, cities play an important role as the sites of the social movements of irregular migrants. Maestri and Hughes (2017) argue that citizenship is in itself fundamentally spatial. New and old political subjectivities are contested and resisted in spaces of encounter and struggle; spaces can generate opportunities to rethink political subjectivities. The city can make irregular migrants visible, and irregular migrants can locate and substantiate their claims and demands in cities (Borren, 2008; Chauvin & Garcés-Mascareñas, 2014). It can be argued that the ability of migrants to become political subjects depends on their capacity to make themselves and their demands visible and audible in the public space. Studies describing how irregular migrants use urban space often view the city as a prime site for political contestation. The spatial aspect of both mobilisations and citizenship struggles by irregular migrants is not merely a background to claim-making or a ‘container’ of activism (Martin & Miller, 2003). Instead, claims can be made through the city, using its urban spaces (Isin, 2002). Studies describe, for instance, the protest marches of irregular migrants as a form of collective action that politicises the presence of irregular migrants in the public space (Monforte & Dufour, 2013), turning it into a front stage for their struggle for citizenship (Swerts, 2017). Another way in which irregular migrants can use the city to create citizenship is through squatting (Belloni, 2016; Dadusc, 2019; Dadusc et al., 2019; Hajer & Bröer, 2020; Maestri, 2018; Mudu & Chattopadhyay, 2016; Raimondi, 2019). Case studies in numerous European cities describe how irregular migrants use squats both to live in and as places to make political statements or claims. Squats provide irregular migrants – who in many contexts are increasingly excluded from the housing market – with a place to live, even if the living conditions in squats are not always very comfortable, for instance, because they lack heating or electricity. Moreover, living in a squat can be seen as a performative claim to citizenship by enacting a ‘normal life’ of a local, using urban space regardless of citizenship status. Furthermore, these forms of occupying (urban) space also occur in camps. The political struggle of irregular migrants has been described in the context of migrant (tent) camps, either in cities or at border sites (Ataç, 2016; Bendixsen, 2013; Depraetere & Oosterlynck, 2017; Maestri & Hughes, 2017; Sandri, 2018).

In the first five chapters of this book, we described some instances of inclusion of irregular migrants – in labour markets and sanctuary cities for instance. However, we also described many ways in which irregular migrants are excluded. To some, therefore, the theories described in this chapter might seem overly optimistic about the possibilities of the political mobilisation of irregular migrants. It is important to nuance both sides. On the one hand, as stated above, we can observe various forms of political participation by irregular migrants, even if they sometimes assume less traditional forms. This shows that irregular migrants are not entirely excluded from the political sphere and that political participation is to some extent possible. On the other hand, as will be stated below, these openings for political participation should not be overemphasised but should be seen within a context of exclusion.

6.3.2 Challenges for Inclusion

The inclusive citizenship theories risk overemphasising the political aspects of the ‘citizenship struggle’ of irregular migrants. Consequently, it is essential to consider these theories from a broader perspective. The idea that irregular migrants can become citizens by making claims to citizenship or by acts of citizenship can be nuanced or criticised theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, one could, for instance, nuance the idea that claims and acts by irregular migrants cause a rupture of the social order. As, for instance, Swerts and Nicholls (2020) put it, the critical scholarship on the political and acts of citizenship “presumes rather than explains the disruptive qualities of undocumented activism” (Swerts & Nicholls, 2020:3, emphasis in the original). Moreover, these theories can also be nuanced on a more practical and empirical level by considering the specific constraints that irregularity imposes on political mobilisation. Making claims and mobilising politically entail a paradox for irregular migrants: they must be wary about not attracting too much attention in order to avoid arrest and possible deportation; but in order to be effective in claim-making and mobilising they need a form of visibility. Moreover, the marginalisation of irregular migrants is a major obstacle to their mobilisation. A brief review of the social movement literature can furnish better understanding of the (possibilities for) political mobilisation by irregular migrants and show the limits of such mobilisation.

Whilst the social movements of irregular migrants have been amply described by critical citizenship studies with a theoretical focus on political acts and claim-making practices among irregular migrants, and by scholars who study (irregular) migration, scholars of social movement theory tend to be reluctant to incorporate accounts of these types of mobilisations by irregular migrants. Yet the combination of the two topics can be valuable, because critical citizenship studies focus mostly on the subjects of actions that they consider political, while studies on social movements shed light on the practices of political action. Steinhilper (2018) argues that the reluctance to account for mobilisations by irregular migrants is precisely because the dominant theories on social movements – like ‘resource mobilisation theory’ (see, for instance, McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Klandermans, 1984; Edwards & Kane, 2007; Jenkins, 1983) and ‘political opportunity structures’ (see, for instance, Tilly, 2008; Giugni, 2011; Kriesi, 1989; Della Porta, 2013) – render (irregular) migrants unlikely political subjects or even unlikely contentious actors. (Irregular) migrants face legal obstacles, scarce resources, and closed-off political and discursive opportunities (Steinhilper, 2018: 574–575).

Irregular migrants are often not in an ideal position to mobilise politically, not just when they are in marginal conditions. Whether or not to mobilise depends on how one perceives the possibility of (future) change as much as it does on how one perceives political opportunities for protest. How marginalised subjects mobilise relates to their approach to political processes and resource mobilisation. Resource mobilisation theory accounts for the practical aspects of social movements by explaining that, in order to mobilise politically, members of social movements need elementary resources, like a printer to make flyers, a space to hold meetings, an ‘address-book of useful contacts’ (Giddens, 2009: 1015). Irregular migrants often lack these resources; nevertheless, social movements of irregular migrants still happen.

It is consequently important to note that the mobilisation of irregular migrants does not occur in a political vacuum. The likelihood of successful political mobilisation is greater if irregular migrants receive support from local citizens who have these resources or know how to obtain them. Mobilisations of irregular migrants often collaborate with local citizens or are part of already existing social movements. Support from local citizens often provides a vital link between irregular migrants and the society in which they live (e.g., Nicholls & Uitermark, 2015). Local citizens can be a valuable resource for irregular migrants and help them mobilise further resources. As explained in Chap. 5, supporters of irregular migrants can furnish many necessities that irregular migrants are not able to obtain by themselves. These may include help with political mobilisation. Local citizen supporters can play a crucial role in identifying political opportunities. Theories of political opportunity structures primarily concern how (potential) activists perceive political opportunities (Koopmans & Olzak, 2004) instead of defining an ‘objective’ notion of what constitutes a political opportunity. Therefore, to identify political opportunities, one must know a society’s ‘rules’, dynamics, agents, and rhythms (Crossley, 2002: 14). In other words, to identify and act upon political opportunities, one needs adequate knowledge of how a society functions.

A different stream of social movement studies focuses not on (perceived) political opportunities but on discursive opportunity structures. These studies examine how (potential) activists and opportunities are linked by framing. This entails that (potential) activists have to make issues resonate with existing cultural repertoires in order to be successful (Bröer & Duyvendak, 2009: 338). In other words, the frames of a social movement have to resonate with its target audience (Snow, 2013), and follow certain ‘framing rules’, i.e., “rules according to which we ascribe definitions or meanings to situations” (Hochschild, 1979, p. 566; Bröer & Duyvendak, 2009, pp. 337–338). Besides the problems that irregular migrants may have mobilising, they may also have problems framing their claims effectively. Again, supporters play a major role in sharing the cultural and symbolic resources that are needed to translate claims into powerful frames that resonate with the norms of the national political field (Nicholls, 2013b: 93).

In other words, the political mobilisation and acts of citizenship of irregular migrants must take framing rules and the norms of the political field into account. Moreover, especially because constructed citizenship relies upon the recognition of already-established citizens, the claims and acts of non-citizens may stretch existing notions of citizenship but they must never be too far ‘out of the box’. Or, as Bloemraad puts it, they have to navigate a situation of ‘structured mobilisation’ (Bloemraad, 2018: 17). Practices of political action or instances of claim-making, in general, can never be only about breaking with the social order and be recognised as legitimate political action at the same time. If actions, of irregular migrants and citizens alike, are too far ‘out of the box’, either they are not recognised as a political action or those performing these acts are not considered valid political actors. They may, for instance, be considered as troublemakers instead of people trying to make a political claim. If claims only break the social order, this leads to the claims being considered noise instead of (political) voice. Moreover, in light of hostility towards immigrants and a narrowing understanding of citizenship, it is fairly easy to disqualify irregular migrants from being legitimate political actors in general, and it can be even more difficult for irregular migrants to become and remain legitimate political subjects. Additionally, the risks of mobilisation, and its potential failure, are much greater for irregular migrants than they may be for citizens, because irregular migrants risk being deported; and, as we have seen in Chap. 4, the risk of being deported can be higher for those who are considered undeserving due, for instance, to undesired, trouble-making, or criminal behaviour.

Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that, despite the attention paid to these social movements in academia, the majority of irregular migrants do not mobilise politically. Precisely due to their irregularity, it is often unlikely that irregular migrants will mobilise. Sometimes, even irregular migrants living in squats that are part of social movements are not actively and consciously involved in a political struggle for citizenship (Hajer, 2021: 110). It is also important to look at the social movements of irregular migrants from a practical perspective, and to recognise that irregularity influences not just the chances of successful political participation, but also whether political mobilisation is even a priority. We can observe that, in order for irregular migrants to mobilise, they need the ‘right degree of marginality’, meaning that they have to be marginal enough to have reason to want to change their situation, not too afraid that political mobilisation will jeopardise the life that they have constructed informally (e.g., afraid of losing their job in the informal economy), and not so marginal that they are preoccupied with survival (e.g., looking for food and shelter) (Hajer, 2021: 114). In other words, a particular equilibrium among living conditions, availability of support, and political aspirations is needed for irregular migrants to mobilise, which explains why their mobilisation is still a rare occurrence.

Furthermore, it is important to critically evaluate the value of these forms of ‘informal citizenship’ or ‘citizenship from below’ for the everyday lives and living conditions of irregular migrants. The focus on how citizenship can be created from below, even without legal status, shows ways in which irregular migrants can use the agency that they have to become more included in the societies in which they reside. Therefore, these theories represent a way to overcome the binary interpretations of either insiders or outsiders. However, the role of the formal recognition of irregular migrants, in the form of a legal status, should not be underestimated. The absence of a legal status, or the absence of tangible rights tied to a legal status, can play a significant role in the everyday lives of irregular migrants (Sigona, 2012). A legal status can be an essential factor in the everyday lives of irregular migrants because it does not just give access to rights but guarantees certain rights. The lack of legal status can influence every aspect of everyday life because of the fundamental risks and uncertainty that it causes. As already recalled, without a legal status, migrants are at constant risk of deportation, which, even if the actual probability of deportation may be low, influences day-to-day life due to the state of ‘deportability’ (De Genova, 2002). For some, living with this fear causes severe psychological problems (Bloch, 2014). As shown in Chap. 3, the lack of legal status of irregular migrants can exclude them from many aspects of life necessary to sustain themselves in the long run. Therefore, it is important to recognise the importance of formal recognition, regularisation, and legal status for irregular migrants (see for instance: Das, 2006; Sigona, 2012). For example, irregular migrants may manage to sustain an irregular life when they are young and able to work (informally); however, when they become elderly and unable to work, this lack of guaranteed rights to, for example, housing and health care, can become a real problem as they are no longer able to arrange for them informally. One could even go so far as to state that many of these struggles are perhaps not so much about full political inclusion as they are about reaching an acceptable level of civil inclusion. Irregular migrants can be observed mobilising politically in social movements in order to normalise their living conditions (Hajer, 2021). While it is appealing to see these migrant social movements as opportunities for political agency and as possibilities for alternative forms of (political) inclusion, it is essential to keep the practical aspects of these social movements in mind, and not to romanticise migrants’ struggles.

6.3.3 Consequences of Inclusion

So far, we have seen that it is difficult for irregular migrants to mobilise politically. It is also important to evaluate the effects of social movements of irregular migrants. The success of such social movements should be nuanced even if they are ‘successful’, because the success of a particular movement may have negative consequences for other groups of (irregular) migrants. It may do so, for instance, when the granting of rights to one group is accompanied with limiting the rights of another group. An example of this is provided by a regularisation measure for children without legal status in the Netherlands. This ‘success’ was only obtained for children with a (failed) asylum request, and therefore not for children with requests based on, for instance, family-reunification or medical grounds. Moreover, the regularisation measure was the result of a political compromise that made it more difficult for children to regularise in the future, because the policy was traded, amongst other things, for the abolishment of the discretionary space in which the minister of justice can decide in ‘poignant situations’ (Alting von Geusau, 2020; Kamerstukken, 2018–2019).

However, the most telling example is provided by the Dreamers movement in the United States. This was a group consisting of young irregular migrants who had come to the United States at a very young age and who started to mobilise politically in the hope of changing their undocumented status. The Dreamers movement can be seen as an example of a successful social movement that mobilised effectively and with high levels of professionalisation. It did so by efficiently appealing to notions of deservingness, and by conveying an image of the stereotypical Dreamer as ‘the best and the brightest’ of normal American youths (Nicholls, 2013a), often college students. As Fiorito (2020) writes, the Dreamers movement was “extremely successful in using emotion work to transform stigmatised and marginalised youths into confident agents with empowered subjectivities and a strong sense of personal and political agency.” (Fiorito, 2020: 166). Moreover, the Dreamers movement was successful in achieving its political goals. The movement was most active during the Obama presidency, a period with more favourable circumstances for the mobilisation of irregular migrants than under the Bush or Trump presidencies. This can be seen as an important contributing factor to the success of the movement. In 2012 the ‘deferred action for childhood arrivals’ (DACA) came into effect. DACA was a policy installed by the Obama presidency, and was not the desired Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) act, which failed to pass the senate numerous times. However, DACA still granted temporary protection against detention and deportation to undocumented persons who entered the country illegally when they were minors and gave them a (temporary) social security numbers and a work permit, for a renewable period of 2 years (Gonzales et al., 2014; Fiorito, 2020). This provided the so-called dreamers with a liminal legal status that allowed them to gain lawful employment and build a ‘more mainstream adult life’ (Fiorito, 2020: 134). Yet this relative success of the Dreamers movement simultaneously caused rifts within the larger immigrant rights movement. The members of the Dreamers movement successfully framed themselves as deserving migrants; however, this did not necessarily apply to their parents as well. By promoting the image of Dreamers as deserving migrants, they were criticised for simultaneously reinforcing the negative image of those irregular migrants who were not the best and the brightest all-American college students, making them seem undeserving in comparison (Nicholls et al., 2021). Moreover, the success of the Dreamers meant an increased risk for other irregular migrants, because DACA led to an increase in the detention and deportation rates of these ‘other’ irregular migrants, who were considered less deserving (Fiorito, 2020). In the case of the Dreamers, the stabilisation of their own legal status indirectly led to increased risk and uncertainty for their, also irregular, family members. The guilt associated with this caused some Dreamers to refuse to apply for DACA, and many more to ‘struggle with their success’ or to suffer from forms of ‘survivor guilt’ (Fiorito, 2020: 134, Fiorito, 2021). In other words, in the USA, the success of one group of irregular migrants can lead to an increased risk for other irregular migrants. Instead, in Europe, social movements of irregular migrants have not reached this level of success.

6.4 Agency, Inclusion, and Political Participation (Conclusion)

Irregular migrants, by definition, find themselves in a conflicting situation, because the state in which they reside does not recognise them as residents. Moreover, irregular migrants find themselves in a position in which states aim to contain their mobility and often prevent their integration. As also demonstrated in the previous chapters, irregular migrants experience various forms of exclusion in various areas of their lives. Therefore, it is easy to see irregular migrants as victims of these forms of exclusion, the smugglers that brought them to their destination country, or the war and persecution that triggered their mobility. However, this perspective does not account for the various ways in which irregular migrants are active participants in their migration journey and in society.

Policies regarding irregular migrants are generally restrictive but never all-encompassing. Moreover, a policy or a state can never fully influence or control social life. Therefore, the agency of irregular migrants can be found in both individual and collective acts of non-compliance. Perhaps their irregular border crossing in itself is the best example of irregular migrants expressing their agency through transgressing exclusionary border policies. Moreover, within the everyday lives of irregular migrants, they can use their agency to find ways around the restrictions imposed on their irregular presence, and they can create forms of inclusion through social interaction with citizens and participation in society.

Furthermore, this chapter has shown how the informal inclusion of irregular migrants is not limited to social interaction. One can also observe how in various European countries, as well as in the United States, irregular migrants mobilise politically. This social and political participation of irregular migrants can be seen as an alternative form of citizenship ‘from below’. Moreover, their mobilisation shows that irregular migrants are not banned from political participation. Mobilisations evidence that citizenship is not a binary of inclusion or exclusion. Instead, irregular migrants can participate in the political process and exercise the right to claim rights, and through their participation appear more as citizens. The political participation of irregular migrants shows their partial inclusion in society, just as their informal work shows their inclusion in the labour market (and therewith society).

The political mobilisation of irregular migrants has been amply described by critical citizenship and migration scholars alike. However, within these studies, there is a tendency to emphasise the political openings for irregular migrants, see possibilities for their inclusion, and describe the instances in which the protest of irregular migrants ‘goes right’. Herein lies the risk of romanticising the struggles of irregular migrants and describing the potential for change in an overly optimistic way. This chapter has shown that it is precisely the irregular status of irregular migrants that makes it difficult for them to mobilise politically. Furthermore, if they manage to mobilise or make claims to citizenship, there remains the question of the extent to which they are able to effectively change their everyday lives without obtaining a change in their legal status. Moreover, even when mobilisation is effective in achieving goals for one group, it may be to the detriment of another group of irregular migrants.