Abstract
This paper aims to draw some theoretical relationships between two fields of research that have remained more separated than they should have: theories of creativity and theories of cultural evolution. Particularly, it argues that the mechanisms of cultural selection postulated by cultural evolutionary theories can make a hitherto neglected contribution to explanations of human creativity. To that end, I extrapolate the arguments in favour of the creativity of natural selection and weigh its applicability in the field of culture.
People don’t invent complex tools, populations do. (Boyd et al. 2013, p. 3).
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Notes
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The other principal school is what Sterelny (2017) calls the Parisians. The Parisian school is that of cultural epidemiology, a proposal developed by Sperber (1996) and supported by other anthropologists. According to this school, cultural transmission generally implies a transformation, not a replication. I will not deal with it in this paper.
- 3.
Memetics also explains the cultural change as an evolutionary process (Dawkins 1976; Blackmore 2000; Dennett 1995, 2017). The term ‘meme’ designates pieces of culture subject to a Darwinian evolutionary process. According to this theory, culture evolves by differential replication of memes. The proposal I will try to put forward shares with memetics the strong analogy between natural and cultural selection. Likewise, Dennett (2017) argues that this theory has much in common with Californian’s theory of cultural evolution. While my suggestion is compatible with memetics, I will draw on the Californian theory, particularly Richerson and Boyd (2005), since they focus more on the human processes that explain why some cultural items are replicated and others are not. In other words, if at least some culture changes in the way this theory states, my argument holds. A more detailed analysis of the link between Memetic Theory and Californian theories is beyond the scope of this paper.
- 4.
Although this quotation illustrates the thesis that I intend to dispute, it does not mean that my proposal contradicts what Baravalle defends in this article. Instead, I will also understand biases as mechanisms that modify the frequency of cultural items. However, I intend to argue that such a mechanism can be attributed to an explanatory role different from that assumed at first sight.
- 5.
How this variation comes about is irrelevant for our purposes. I mention mutation because it is the prevailing way variation has been considered to occur. However, variation can also occur by genetic recombination. Moreover, since this discussion of the creativity of natural selection predates the incorporation of Mendelian genetics into Darwinism, to speak of mutation would be anachronistic. For this reason, we will keep the more general term ‘variation’.
- 6.
Although this way of presenting the evolutionary process is quite widespread, it is nothing more than a didactic simplification (Dawkins 1996), which does not adequately describe how the vast majority of evolutionary biologists understand the process to occur (Beatty 2019). Thus, the view of evolution as a two-step process is called into question by the interpretation of natural selection as a creative force, which still prevails within evolutionary biology (Beatty 2019). The presentation of evolution as a two-step process (first variation, then selection) is found, for example, in Mayr (2004).
- 7.
As we will see later, many notable evolutionary biologists have subscribed to this interpretation of the creative nature of the Darwinian theory.
- 8.
Someone might object that my argument incurs a sort of ‘categorial error’ since the analogised mechanisms (natural selection and cultural selection) are very different from each other. What I am going to offer is an argument by analogy. Arguments by analogy require that the analogised elements are not identical but share relevant aspects (Gensler 2003). The vast majority of the literature on cultural evolution understands that the processes of cultural evolution and biological evolution differ in important respects (e.g. in culture, inheritance is blending, and there is a lot of directed variation) but that they share relevant aspects. Centrally it is understood that there is, in both cases, a process of selection given that the conditions of variation, inheritance and differential fitness are met (Mesoudi 2011). The other starting point of the argument is that, as some evolutionary biologists have argued, the proper way to interpret how these features operate in the case of natural evolution is to indicate that natural selection sometimes initiates and directs evolutionary change and is, therefore, creative. I intend to argue that, in the same way, cultural selection sometimes initiates and directs evolutionary change (and it is, therefore, creative). Now, for this extrapolation to be well-founded, as we will see below, the significant similarities between natural selection and cultural selection must be conceived as high-level similarities.
- 9.
As it is known, naturalism has various meanings. Here I am referring to a model that considers scientific knowledge, especially the Darwinian theory of the evolution of species.
- 10.
In the realm of philosophy of technique, some authors have proposed to distinguish between the generic term ‘technique’ and the more specific ‘technology’ – reserved for scientifically based industrial techniques – (see Quintanilla 2017, p. 46). However, I will keep the latter as a generic term because it is used as such in the literature on creativity (see Simonton 1999; Kozbelt et al. 2010; Kaufman and Glăveanu 2019).
- 11.
Simonton’s characterisation is consistent with memetic approaches to artefacts but also more generally with any non-intentionalist views of artefactual function, such as those of Dennett (1990, 1995), Kelemen and Carey (2007), and Vermaas et al. (2013). Non-intentionalist perspectives on the artefactual function object to the idea that the designer’s intentions determine the artefact’s function. In turn, Simonton’s characterisation is inconsistent with intentionalist views of artefactual function such as those of Dipert (1993), Kroes and Meijers (2006), or Cuevas-Badallo (2008). Those who rely on the analogy between artefacts and organisms try to move away from the intentionalist perspective.
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Yet, researchers have recently argued that some creative processes are essentially collective (Glăveanu 2011). For example, Csikszentmihalyi’s (2014) Systemic Model Theory. But, this theory still claims that the background and training of creative people are essential for the emergence of creative achievements.
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The idea that these are the main aspects explained by an evolutionary theory is present in the vast majority of evolutionary theories and models – such as Mesoudi’s (2011), mentioned above. Although it is convenient for our purpose, it is a non-exhaustive characterisation which places special emphasis on explanations that resort to the action of natural or cultural selection. However, Darwin’s theory of evolution also allows us to construct other types of explanations. For example, homologies are explained by appealing to the common ancestor (Blanco et al. 2020).
- 16.
In fact, Simonton (1999) uses the term ‘adaptability’ to refer to this dimension of creative products.
- 17.
There are some ways to complexify what it means for something to work in the technological sphere. For example, Lemonnier (2013) argues that the ‘technological choices’ that different societies make are more the result of cultural values and social relations than the inherent benefits of technologies themselves. Even if this were true, it seems adequate to assert that, for some technological artefacts, it is possible to determine whether they perform a given function. Therefore, I do not consider that this type of complexity would jeopardise my analysis.
- 18.
The CNST also addresses the more general point that natural selection is a mechanism that produces evolutionary change and not one that prevents it. Thus, Gould (2002) points out that it distinguishes Darwin’s theory from earlier theories that also postulated the existence of natural selection. For example, Blyth’s theory (1835) held that natural selection is a process that eliminates extreme and maladaptive variants and thereby helps species to retain their essential traits. No one with an evolutionary perspective would argue against the idea that natural selection is a mechanism that contributes to change rather than conservation. Instead, the interesting discussion is about the role of this mechanism in evolutionary change. Thus, we will leave aside this interpretation of CNST, according to which it serves to distinguish an approach in which selection produces change from one in which it prevents change.
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According to Beatty (2016, 2019), this position was held by mutationists such as Hugo de Vries and Thomas Hunt Morgan, and by neutralists such as Jack King and Thomas Jukes and Daniel Hartl and Clifford Taubes. However, they all share the idea that the TCSN is false. For this reason, he calls these neutralists ‘neo-mutationists’.
- 21.
Beatty (2016) is offering a reformulation of Gould’s (2002) proposal. According to Gould, CNST rests on three assumptions regarding the production of variation. First, variation is abundant and takes place in all directions. Second, while large-scale variation can occur, small-scale variation serves as the material for evolutionary change. Finally, the production of such variations is ‘decoupled’ from the direction of evolution. For the sake of length, I will directly consider Beatty’s (2016) proposal, which I judge to be superior.
- 22.
However, as a reviewer remarked, this is not incompatible with asserting the importance of mutation within the evolutionary process. Indeed, selectionists recognise that mutation is ever present and in all directions (Beatty 2016).
- 23.
The following quote from Beatty (2016) on how selection in Darwin’s theory can imprint a particular direction on subsequent variations may be illustrative: ‘By selective “accumulation,” he did not just mean increasing the proportion of an advantageous trait within a species, as for example when an ancestral flying squirrel is born with a flap of skin, between its fore- and hind flanks, that is larger (say x+) than the flap possessed by other members of its species (say x), and the initially rare x + variation becomes more and more common. Rather, he was referring to the way in which selection in favour of larger flaps increases the mean flap volume from x, to x+, to x++, to x+++, etc. And the important point here is that, as evolution by natural selection proceeds in the direction of larger flap volumes, ever larger variations become available for natural selection to act upon’ (Beatty 2016, pp. 667–668). Beatty (2016) makes a detailed case for selection being responsible for the variation on which it then acts are not incompatible with the Darwinian principle that variation is random (see Beatty 2016, pp. 662–670).
- 24.
There are various processes by which natural selection preserves variation (heterozygote advantage, disruptive selection). Dobzhansky groups these processes under the label of balancing selection. Thus, balancing selection refers to a series of selective processes by which multiple alleles (different versions of a gene) are actively maintained in the gene pool population at frequencies higher than those expected from genetic drift alone.
- 25.
This is not to be confused with the definition of creative products given in the first section of the chapter. I am proposing that when a process ‘behaves’ in the way that either of these two assumptions indicates, I will consider that we have good reasons to assume that such a process is making a relevant contribution to the emergence of an original and functioning product. The reasons why I consider that processes that ‘behave’ in this way can be considered ‘creative’ will become clear later.
- 26.
Although the presentation of evolution by natural selection as a two-step process is quite widespread, its literal interpretation opposes CNST. This presentation is a way of expounding the theory to simplify it, which leads to confusion (Dawkins 1996; Beatty 2019). To maintain an orthodox Darwinian position on the creativity of natural selection, it would be desirable to avoid the two-step presentation.
- 27.
In the following section, I will consider cases of the creation of cultural items, which are both original – not of the type that already existed – and functional – I will leave aside those that did not work. One might object that not every original and functional cultural product is a good case of a creative product, an attribute that should be reserved for exceptional achievements. However, theories of creativity recognise that there are different degrees of creativity: little-c, mini-c, Pro-C, Big-C (Kaufman and Beghetto 2009). Thus, all creative cultural products (and also those I chose as examples for my analysis) would fall into one of these categories.
- 28.
A certain degree of abstraction is necessary to perform this analysis. In more concrete terms, first, a change in the environment generates a problem; second, the action of biases leads to the replication of one of the possible solutions available. In evolutionary terms, all these components can be understood as part of a selective process. This is the same type of abstraction that is present in the analysis according to which Darwin’s first scenario satisfies the first criterion. In this scenario, an environmental condition poses a problem (absence of prey). This leads to some wolves being better equipped to survive and reproduce, so that the traits that help them solve the problem spread through the population more rapidly. All these elements would be part of the process of natural selection.
- 29.
While this schematic modelling attempts to capture the typical occasion when criterion (1) would be satisfied, strictly speaking, cultural variant A may not exist. While, in most cases, the new technology would replace an old one, in other cases, it would simply be an artefact that did not exist before.
- 30.
It is beyond the scope of this research to carry out an in-depth analysis of all the empirical aspects related to the example to determine which of the evolutionary mechanisms proposed by the Californian approach to cultural evolution could have been operating in the production of this cultural change. That would require gathering historical information about the change in the frequency of these cultural items (i.e. the self-spinning machine and the old spinning machines) in the years following the introduction of the invention. However, I can make a more relaxed analysis based on the fact that it is an item created in response to a conflict and then expanded.
- 31.
According to Larson et al. (2013), the term exaptation has not become widely used in the biological sciences. They hold that exaptation lacks a formal definition that distinguishes it from adaptation. However, exaptation has been adopted with considerable success in studies of the history of technology. Frequently, technological innovations involve the use of a process or artefact in a new context.
- 32.
Since this is not a random introduction, but a directed one (co-optation has been carried out for the artefact to perform its new function), it could be considered a sub-type of guided variation. This question is irrelevant for the present analysis since I am interested in distinguishing processes involving cultural exaptation from those involving guided variation without exaptation (such as the invention of self-acting machines). It is also true that these delimitations will not always be precise and that many inventions should be considered a mixture of both. However, I believe that this fact does not preclude the possibility of making the distinction.
- 33.
In this paragraph, we are talking about discs as pans.
- 34.
The notion of ‘generation’ in theories of cultural evolution depends on the context of analysis. That has to do with the fact that some cultural variants are more stable than others. Thus, for cultural variants that tend to remain stable over an individual’s lifetime, the cultural generation may coincide with the biological generation; whereas, for cultural variants that tend to change more frequently, the generations will tend to be much shorter.
- 35.
For example, if in one generation there are size options (i.e. ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’, and ‘5’), and the biases lead to the selection of artefacts of size ‘5’, in the next generation, the available size options will be ‘4’, ‘5’, ‘6’, ‘7’, and ‘8’.
- 36.
For example, the programmers of a new version of certain software (e.g. version 7) may add a component that renders a segment of code from the previous version (e.g. version 6) useless. They put that segment in square brackets and ‘comment it out’. Eventually, if in the future, the developer of version 8 needs the segment in question again (present in version 6, absent in version 7), he merely has to remove the brackets that rendered it useless (this could happen if, for example, the programmer of 8 decided to remove that element of version 7 that rendered the segment useless). However, the same process of recovering the old segment could be done by obtaining the code of version 6 by another route. For its part, this programmer practice implies a conscious decision to leave behind a design that may be useful in the future.
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Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to Silvia Carolina Scotto, Laura Danón, Andres Alejandro Ilcic, and Nicolás Sánchez for their helpful comments and suggestions. Funding: This research was funded by the research project CONSOLIDAR 33620280100389CB (SECyT UNC, Argentina), by the research project PIP 11220200103107CO (CONICET, Argentina), and by the research project PICT 2020 N° 1653 (ANPCyT, Argentina).
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León, M. (2023). Is Cultural Selection Creative?. In: Viejo, J.M., Sanjuán, M. (eds) Life and Mind. Interdisciplinary Evolution Research, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30304-3_7
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