Abstract
Theorists arguing that non-human animals (simply animals from this point forward) are self-aware often make the case on the basis that non-human species understand aspects of themselves and the world, and these forms of understanding indicate self-awareness. But the notion of understanding in this context is often taken for granted. This article aims to analyse the nature of animal understanding to clarify the kind of understanding that matters for discussions of self-awareness, namely, self-understanding. I proceed by drawing on discussions of understanding offered in contemporary epistemology, and then by discussing the relevance of the concept of self-understanding here for discussions of animal self-awareness. I argue that the kind of self-understanding relevant to discussions of animal self-awareness is specifically an animal’s understanding of its own causal influence on the world and on others.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Anderson J, Hubert-Brierre X, McGrew W (2017) Reflections in the rainforest: full-length mirrors facilitate behavioral observations of unhabituated, wild chimpanzees. Primates 58:51–61. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10329-016-0574-7
Barron A, Klein C (2016) What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 113:4900–4908. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1520084113
Baumberger C, Beisbart C, Brun G (2017) What is understanding? An overview of recent debates in epistemology and philosophy of science. In: Grimm S, Baumberger C, Ammon S (eds) Explaining understanding: new perspectives from epistemology and philosophy of science. Routledge, New York, pp 1–34
Bermudez J (1998) The paradox of self-consciousness. MIT Press, Cambridge
Bermúdez J (2007) Thinking without words. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Blaisdell A, Sawa K, Leising K, Waldmann M (2006) Causal reasoning in rats. Science 311:1020–1022. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1121872
Bures J, Bermudez-Rattoni F, Takashi Y (2002) Conditioned taste aversion: memory of a special kind. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Cabanac M, Cabanac AJ, Parent A (2009) The emergence of consciousness in phylogeny. Behav Brain Res 198:267–272. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2008.11.028
Carter AJ, Marshall HH, Heinsohn R, Cowlishaw G (2014) Personality predicts the propensity for social learning in a wild primate. PeerJ 2:e283. https://doi.org/10.7717/peerj.283
Cheney D, Seyfarth R (2008) Baboon metaphysics: the evolution of a social mind. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Couchman J (2012) Self-agency in rhesus monkeys. Biol Lett 8:39–41. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2011.0536
Couchman J (2015) Humans and monkeys distinguish between self-generated, opposing, and random actions. Anim Cogn 18:231–238. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-014-0792-6
Couchman J, Coutinho M, Beran M, Smith JD (2009) Metacognition is prior. Behav Brain Sci 32:142. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X09000594
DeGrazia D (2009) Self-awareness in animals. In: Lurz R (ed) The philosophy of animal minds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 201–217
DeGrazia D (2019) Animal self-awareness: types, distribution, and ethical significance. In: Fischer B (ed) The Routledge handbook of animal ethics. Routledge, New York, pp 71–82
Drea CM, Wallen K (1999) Low-status monkeys “play dumb” when learning in mixed social groups. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 96:12965–12969. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.96.22.12965
Eriksson N, Wu S, Do C, Kiefer A, Tung J, Mountain J, Hinds D, Francke U (2012) A genetic variant near olfactory receptor genes influences cilantro preference. Flavour 1:22. https://doi.org/10.1186/2044-7248-1-22
Gallup G (1970) Chimpanzees: self-recognition. Science 167:86–87. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.167.3914.86
Gallup G, Anderson JR (2018) The “olfactory mirror” and other recent attempts to demonstrate self-recognition in non-primate species. Behav Process 148:16–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2017.12.010
Godfrey-Smith P (2017) Other minds: the octopus and the evolution of intelligent life. William Collins, London
Gopnik A, Sobel D, Schulz L, Glymour C (2001) Causal learning mechanisms in very young children: two-, three-, and four-year-olds infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation. Dev Psychol 37:620–629
Grimm S (2016) Understanding and transparency. In: Baumberger C, Grimm S, Ammon S (eds) Explaining understanding: new perspectives from epistemology and philosophy of science. Routledge, New York, pp 212–229
Hacking I (1995) The looping effects of human kinds. In: Sperber D (ed) Causal cognition: A multidisciplinary debate. Clarendon Press, New York, pp 351–394
Haslanger S (2013) Resisting reality: social construction and social critique. Soc Theor Prac 40(1):145–152
Hoffman M, Beran M, Washburn D (2018) Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) remember agency information from past events and integrate this knowledge with spatial and temporal features in working memory. Anim Cogn 21:137–153. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-017-1147-x
Jelbert S, Miller R, Schiestl M, Boeckle M, Cheke L, Gray R, Taylor A, Clayton N (2019) New Caledonian crows infer the weight of objects from observing their movements in a breeze. Proc Royal Soc B: Biol Sci 286:20182332. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2018.2332
Kohda M, Hotta T, Takeyama T, Awata S, Tanaka H, Asai J, Jordan A (2019) If a fish can pass the mark test, what are the implications for consciousness and self-awareness testing in animals? PLoS Biol 17:e3000021. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3000021
Kummer H (1982) Social knowledge in free-ranging primates. In: Griffin D (ed) Animal mind - human mind. Springer, Berlin
Kushnir T, Gopnik A (2005) Young children infer causal strength from probabilities and interventions. Psychol Sci 16:678–683. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01595.x
Parker L, Rana S, Limebeer C (2008) Conditioned nausea in rats: assessment by conditioned disgust reactions, rather than conditioned taste avoidance. Can J Exp Psychol 62:198–209. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0012531
Reilly S, Schachtman T (2008) Conditioned taste aversion: neural and Behavioral processes. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Saxe R, Tenenbaum J, Carey S (2005) Secret agents:inferences about hidden causes by 10- and 12-month-old infants. Psychol Sci 16:995–1001. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01649.x
Saxe R, Tzelnic T, Carey S (2007) Knowing who dunnit: infants identify the causal agent in an unseen causal interaction. Dev Psychol 43(1):149–158. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.43.1.149
Swartz K, Evans S (1991) Not all chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) show self-recognition. Primates 32:483–496. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02381939
Taylor A, Miller R, Gray R (2012) New Caledonian crows reason about hidden causal agents. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 109:16389–16391. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1208724109
du Toit JT, Provenza FD, Nastis A (1991) Conditioned taste aversions: how sick must a ruminant get before it learns about toxicity in foods? Appl Anim Behav Sci 30:35–46. https://doi.org/10.1016/0168-1591(91)90083-A
Völter C, Sentís I, Call J (2016) Great apes and children infer causal relations from patterns of variation and covariation. Cognition 155:30–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.06.009
de Waal F (2019) Fish, mirrors, and a gradualist perspective on self-awareness. PLoS Biol 17:e3000112. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.3000112
Whiten A, Byrne RW (1988) Tactical deception in primates. Behav Brain Sci 11:233–244. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00049682
Zagzebski L (2001) Recovering understanding. In: Steup M (ed) Knowledge, truth, and duty: essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 235–252
Acknowledgements and Funding
I would like to thank Dr. Alecia Carter (UCL) for discussion of these issues and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I would like to thank the Templeton World Charity Foundation for funding that allowed for the time to complete this article (TWCF0502).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Woodford, P. (2023). Animal Understanding and Animal Self-Awareness. In: Viejo, J.M., Sanjuán, M. (eds) Life and Mind. Interdisciplinary Evolution Research, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30304-3_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30304-3_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-30303-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-30304-3
eBook Packages: Biomedical and Life SciencesBiomedical and Life Sciences (R0)