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Carter v Canada: Exploring the Ebb and Flow of “Competing” Societal Values Through Sections 7 and 1 of the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms

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Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) in Canada

Part of the book series: The International Library of Bioethics ((ILB,volume 104))

Abstract

This chapter explores Carter v Canada, the case that led to the decriminalization of termination of life practice in Canada, otherwise known as “Medical Assistance in Dying” or “MAID”. The preliminary objective of this chapter is to assist those trying to better understand what the Supreme Court of Canada actually decided by providing the reader with a concise summary of the Court’s Sections 7 and 1 analysis pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The secondary objective however is to scrutinize within this summary, how the analysis identifies and balances “competing” rights and values as between persons seeking physician-assisted death (the Plaintiff in Carter) and the protection of vulnerable persons from being induced to commit suicide in times of weakness (the target of the Criminal Code provision under scrutiny). The main purpose of this chapter is not to provide a general critique of the Sections 7 and 1 analyses per se. Rather the purpose is to demonstrate how the overall Charter analysis ultimately operates to sideline “competing” societal values and obscure the critical concepts of seeking versus inducing MAID. As more information regarding the lived experiences of “vulnerable” Canadians begins to come to light, these concepts are of utmost significance to ongoing discussions around MAID reform.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) (2015) [hereinafter “Carter SCC”].

  2. 2.

    Criminal Code of Canada R.S.C. (1985), c. C-46 [hereinafter “Criminal Code”] at Sections 241(b) and 14.

  3. 3.

    The terms “physician-assisted dying” and “physician-assisted death” and are used interchangeably throughout the Carter decision and were defined by the trial court to include both the acts of: “physician-assisted suicide” or PAS (whereby the patient intentionally kills themselves with assistance of a physician or someone acting under a physician’s direction); and “voluntary euthanasia” (whereby the patient’s life is intentionally terminated by a physician or someone acting under a physician’s direction). See Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 BCSC 886 [hereinafter “Carter BCSC”] at paras 23 and 37–39; In Canada, these terms have been superseded by the term “medical assistance in dying” or “MAID” when the Criminal Code of Canada was amended in 2016 to allow these practices by physicians and nurse practitioners with the passing of Bill C-14, Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying), S.C. 2016, c. 3 [hereinafter “Bill C-14”]. Bill C-14 received Royal Assent June 17, 2016. Online: https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-14/royal-assent.

  4. 4.

    Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].

  5. 5.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 123.

  6. 6.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 126–128.

  7. 7.

    Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC 4, [2016] 1 SCR 13 [hereinafter “Carter SCC 2016”]. During this extension period, the SCC granted an exemption “for those who wish to seek assistance in ending their life” to apply to the superior court of their jurisdiction to demonstrate eligibility on basis of the “criteria” set out in “para 127” of Carter. Carter SCC 2016, Footnote 7 at para 7. Approximately 15 cases were heard by provincial courts during this period.

  8. 8.

    Bill C-14, Footnote 3. For Parliamentary debates leading to Bill C-14 see Parliament of Canada (2015).

  9. 9.

    Criminal Code, Footnote 2 at Section 241.1.

  10. 10.

    Pursuant to the Bill C-14 amendments to the Criminal Code, a person would have a “grievous and irremediable medical condition” if they met four (4) specific criteria which included the criterion that their “natural death has become reasonably foreseeable”. Following subsequent legislative amendment (discussed further below at Footnote 11 and accompanying text), the “reasonably foreseeable” natural death eligibility criterion was removed, leaving the remaining three, namely that: (a) they have a serious and incurable illness, disease or disability; (b) they are in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability; and (c) that illness, disease or disability or that state of decline causes them enduring physical or psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot be relieved under conditions that they consider acceptable. See Criminal Code, Footnote 2 at Sections 241.2(1)(c) and 241.2(2).

  11. 11.

    For brief discussion see Tiedemann (2019) at pp. 4–5; For an example of media commentary see Coyne (2020).

  12. 12.

    Truchon v Canada (AG), 2019 QCCS 3792 [hereinafter “Truchon”]. The Attorney General of Canada decision not to appeal this trial court decision was and remains controversial. See for example, commentary by Sikkema (2019); For a technical review of the government’s response to Truchon, see Government of Canada, Legislative Background: Bill C-7: Government of Canada’s Legislative Response to the Superior Court of Québec Truchon Decision (2021). Online: https://justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pl/ad-am/c7/c7-eng.pdf.

  13. 13.

    Bill C-7, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying), S.C. 2021, c. 2 [hereinafter “Bill C-7”] which received Royal Assent March 17, 2021. Online: https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/bill/C-7/royal-assent.

  14. 14.

    See Criminal Code, Footnote 2 at Sections 241.2(3) and 241.2(3.1).

  15. 15.

    Independent review of these areas was mandated by Bill C-14. Bill C-14 Footnote 3 at Sections 9.1(1); See also Bill C-7, Footnote 13 at Sections 3.1(1) and 5(1).

  16. 16.

    For an example of argumentation with recourse to the Supreme Court of Canada’s direction or non-direction in Carter SCC, see Downie (2022); Compare to response: Lemmens (2022).

  17. 17.

    In 2017 it was estimated MAID “could reduce annual health care spending across Canada by between $34.7 million and $138.8 million”. Traachtenberg and Manns (2017) [hereinafter “Traachtenberg”]; With Bill C-7, the predicted net cost reduction for provincial health care spending is $86.9 million. Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer(2020) [hereinafter “OPBO-BDPB”]. Online: https://www.pbo-dpb.gc.ca/web/default/files/Documents/Reports/RP-2021-025-M/RP-2021-025-M_en.pdf.

  18. 18.

    See Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 95.

  19. 19.

    See Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 2.

  20. 20.

    See for example, discussion in United Nations (2021); See also recent discussions in Canada where persons have described that it is not their medical condition (which makes them eligible for MAID) but rather their experiences of poverty, homelesness or lack of supports to live and engage in society that is motivating them to request or proceed with MAID. For example see: Alberga (2022a); See also Favaro (2022); See also Leffler and Dimain (2022); See also LeGal (2022); See also Alberga (2022b); See also Mulligan and Bond (2022); See also Phillips ((2022); See also Kruger (2022); See also Farquhar (2022).

    Canadian Association of MAID Assessors and Providers (2022).

  21. 21.

    For example, what should or should not be said to a patient whose medical condition would appear to make them eligible for MAID. See discussion in Ho et al. (2021); Compare to guidance document by the Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers (2022) [hereinafter “CAMAP”].

  22. 22.

    See Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 74–78.

  23. 23.

    In addition to Ms. Taylor, the claim was filed by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, a physician willing to participate in PAS or euthanasia, and the daughter and son-in-law of Kay Carter who assisted Ms. Carter in receiving assisted death in Switzerland. While the trial court found that the prohibition of physician-assisted dying was an unjustified infringement of Ms. Taylor’s Sections 15 right and the Section 7 rights of both Ms. Taylor and those who would assist, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) confined its decision “to the rights of those who seek assistance in dying”. Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 69.

  24. 24.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 11.

  25. 25.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 11–12.

  26. 26.

    Criminal Code Footnote 2 at sections 14, 21, 22, 222 and 241. See Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 11.

  27. 27.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 11.

  28. 28.

    Note: Both the Sections 15 and 7 arguments succeeded at trial. Carter BCSC, Footnote 3 at paras 16–19. The trial decision however was successfully appealed to the BC Court of Appeal on the ground that the trial judge was bound to follow Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519 [hereinafter “Rodriguez”], an earlier Supreme Court of Canada decision which upheld the blanket prohibition on assisted suicide. Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) (2013) [hereinafter “Carter BCCA”]. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. Carter SCC, Footnote 1.

  29. 29.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 93.

  30. 30.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 1 and 2. Emphasis added.

  31. 31.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 13. Emphasis added.

  32. 32.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 2.

  33. 33.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 20. Emphasis added.

  34. 34.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 55.

  35. 35.

    R v. Michaud (2015)127 O.R. (3d) 81, 2015 ONCA 585 at para 79 [hereinafter “Michaud”]; See also Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 at paras 123–127 [Bedford]; For further discussion see Michaud, Footnote 35 at paras 146–154.

  36. 36.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 79.

  37. 37.

    The separation of the individual deprivation from societal interests is repeated in various different ways throughout the Carter SCC judgment. See for example, Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 85, 89; See also Bedford, Footnote 35 at para 123.

  38. 38.

    For review of case law and academic commentary regarding the limited role, insignificance and/or redundancy of the Charter Section 1 analysis once the court has found a Section 7 violation see Haak (2022) [hereinafter “Haak”]; See also Carter (2015) at 210. See also generally Carter (2017) [hereinafter “Carter, Different Questions”]. Compare to analysis in Michaud, Footnote 35, at paras 62, 83, 144–154.

  39. 39.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 56.

  40. 40.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 57–58.

  41. 41.

    Note that the effect of the prohibition on premature death was not challenged before the court. Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 58.

  42. 42.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 57; See also Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 63 where Court discusses interpretation of the “right to life”.

  43. 43.

    “Liberty protects “the right to make fundamental personal choices free from state interference’ ”. Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 64.

  44. 44.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 64.

  45. 45.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 66.

  46. 46.

    “Security of the person encompasses “a notion of personal autonomy involving … control over one’s bodily integrity free from state interference”... ”. Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 64.

  47. 47.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 66.

  48. 48.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 68. Emphasis added.

  49. 49.

    In addition to aforementioned paragraphs 1, 2 and 68 see Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 5, 12, 30, 42, 69 and 98. See also description of plaintiffs at Footnote 23 above.

  50. 50.

    See presentation by Chief Justice Glenn Joyal, “The Charter and Canada’s New Political Culture: Are We All Ambassadors Now?”, (January 6, 2017) Canadian Constitution Foundation, 2017 Law and Freedom Conference. Online: https://theccf.ca/2207-2/ [hereinafter “Chief Justice Joyal”].

  51. 51.

    For discussion see Carter BCCA, Footnote 28 at paras 283–290; See also discussion in Bedford, Footnote 35 at paras 93–123; See also Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act (1985) [1985] 2 SCR 486 [hereinafter “Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act]; See also Chief Justice Joyal, Footnote 50.

  52. 52.

    For further discussion on history and critique, see Chief Justice Joyal, Footnote 50; See also discussion in Dufraimont (2014).

  53. 53.

    Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, Footnote 51 at page 503; See also discussion in Carter BCCA, Footnote 28 at para 283.

  54. 54.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 73. For fuller description and discussion of the principles of fundamental justice see Michaud, Footnote 35 at paras 66 et seq.

  55. 55.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 72.

  56. 56.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 81.

  57. 57.

    See Rodriguez, Footnote 28.

  58. 58.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 81. Emphasis added.

  59. 59.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 78. Emphasis added; See also Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 29, 74, 76, 78.

  60. 60.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 75.

  61. 61.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 76–78. Note that Sopinka J in Rodriguez, Footnote 28, described the “purpose” of protecting vulnerable persons who might be induced in moments of weakness to commit suicide as being “grounded in the state interest in protecting life and reflects the policy of the state that human life should not be depreciated by allowing life to be taken”. See Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 76.

  62. 62.

    For example see, the Court’s interpretation of the prohibition’s infringement on the Section 7 right to life. Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 57–63; See also analysis in Michaud drawing on Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews (1989), [1989] S.C.J. No. 6: “The broader the reach given to s. 7, the more likely it is that it will be deprived of any real content”. Michaud, Footnote 35 at para 43.

  63. 63.

    Note also that in identifying the conduct at issue as an issue of suicide or self-killing, the Court had already removed from consideration, the other Criminal Code provisions and attendant policy considerations relevant to the actions of third parties who intentionally end an individual’s life. See Footnotes 26 and 33 and associated text. See also Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 19–20.

  64. 64.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 83. Emphasis added.

  65. 65.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 84.

  66. 66.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 126.

  67. 67.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 127.

  68. 68.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 87 et seq.

  69. 69.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 85. Emphasis added. Also note that it appears that the Court may be utilizing the word “measure” to indicate the law or prohibition at issue, rather than narrower “object” of the law or prohibition (as in measures taken or “targeted by the law”). See Footnote 59 and associated text and compare to Footnote 61 and associated text.

  70. 70.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 86. Emphasis added.

  71. 71.

    Note that the finding that not everyone who wishes to commit suicide is vulnerable was conceded by the Respondent AG Canada. See Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 86.

  72. 72.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 86. Court’s emphasis.

  73. 73.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 86. Emphasis added.

  74. 74.

    See Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 86. Emphasis added.

  75. 75.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 87. Court’s emphasis.

  76. 76.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 88.

  77. 77.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 88.

  78. 78.

    For a discussion of proposal to use language of rights “in tension” as opposed to “competing rights” in order to permit “a more nuanced assessment” see Hughes (2012): 171; See also discussion in Haak, Footnote 38 at footnote 4.

  79. 79.

    For preliminary discussion questioning overbreadth as a principle of fundamental justice see, Fehr (2020).

  80. 80.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 89.

  81. 81.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 89. Emphasis added.

  82. 82.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 90.

  83. 83.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 90.

  84. 84.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 90.

  85. 85.

    Charter, Footnote 4.

  86. 86.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 119.

  87. 87.

    See Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 94; See also R v Oakes (1986) [1986] 1 SCR 103 at paras 69–71.

  88. 88.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 94. Emphasis added.

  89. 89.

    For an example of one case where Section 7 infringement was justified under Section 1 see Michaud, Footnote 35; See also Footnote 38.

  90. 90.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 95. Emphasis added.

  91. 91.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 96. Emphasis added.

  92. 92.

    Compare to the trial judge’s evaluation of “pressing and substantial” at Part XII.E and in particular para 1190: “I conclude that the objective of the legislation is, by imposing criminal sanctions on persons who assist others with suicide, to protect vulnerable persons from being induced to commit suicide at a time of weakness. The underlying state interest which this purpose serves is the protection of life and maintenance of the Charter value that human life should not be taken …” Carter BCSC, Footnote 3 at Part XII.E and para 1190. Emphasis added; Compare to Footnote 61 and evaluation by Sopinka J in Rodriguez, Footnote 28.

  93. 93.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 97. Emphasis added.

  94. 94.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 98. Emphasis added.

  95. 95.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 98. Emphasis added.

  96. 96.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 2.

  97. 97.

    See Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 86.

  98. 98.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 98. Emphasis added.

  99. 99.

    Carter BCSC, Footnote 3 at para 1171. Emphasis added.

  100. 100.

    See discussion in Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 125.

  101. 101.

    For further discussion of continuity with respect to the object of the law as between Sections 7 and 1, see Haak, Footnote 38 at Section III.1; See also Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, [2009] 2 SCR. 567 at para 76.

  102. 102.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 95.

  103. 103.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 99. Emphasis added.

  104. 104.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 100.

  105. 105.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 101. Emphasis added.

  106. 106.

    Notwithstanding the author’s comment, the Sections 7 and 1 concepts are said to be analytically distinct, though “rooted in similar concerns”. See discussion in Bedford, Footnote 35 at paras 124–128; For additional discussion and critique see for example, Carter, Different Questions, Footnote 38.

  107. 107.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 102. Emphasis added.

  108. 108.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 103. Emphasis added.

  109. 109.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 103–104. Emphasis added; see also Fig. 2.2.

  110. 110.

    “The common law doctrine of stare decisis requires that cases involving materially the same facts and invoking the same legal principles be decided the same way”. Carter BCSC, Footnote 3 at para 899. The trial court in Carter determined that it was not bound by Rodriguez, Footnote 28, an earlier Supreme Court of Canada decision which upheld the blanket prohibition on assisted suicide. Carter BCSC, Footnote 2 at Part X. The trial decision was successfully appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal which determined on the basis of stare decisis that the trial judge was indeed bound to follow Rodriguez. Carter BCCA, Footnote 28. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, the decision of which is the subject of this chapter.

  111. 111.

    For example, aspects of palliative care were perceived by the Claimant (and others) as an unacceptable alternative. See for example Carter BCSC, Footnote 3 at paras 54–56 and 315(h).

  112. 112.

    See Carter BCSC, Footnote 3 at Part IX.

  113. 113.

    Carter BCSC, Footnote 3 at Part VIII.

  114. 114.

    Carter BCSC, Footnote 3 at Part IX.

  115. 115.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 102–107.

  116. 116.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 105.

  117. 117.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 106. Emphasis added. When applying the informed consent standard “to patients who seek assistance in dying”, the trial court further cautioned that “physicians should ensure that patients are properly informed of their diagnosis and prognosis and the range of available options for medical care, including palliative care interventions aimed at reducing pain and avoiding the loss of personal dignity”. See Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 106.

  118. 118.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 120.

  119. 119.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 122. Emphasis added.

  120. 120.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 106.

  121. 121.

    Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at paras 126 and 127. Emphasis added.

  122. 122.

    The second eligibility requirement set out by the SCC being: “grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her condition”. Carter SCC, Footnote 1 at para 127.

  123. 123.

    Informed consent involves a physician providing necessary information to a patient in order for them to make an informed decision about medical treatment. This information should include inter alia information about the nature of the proposed treatment, the anticipated outcomes, risks and alternatives. For further discussion of the informed consent doctrine see Osborne (2020) at Chapter 3.C.

  124. 124.

    Evidence of increased vulnerability due to ableist perceptions and/or conflation of eligibility and process can perhaps be observed in recent media reports, for example: Peters (2021), Favaro et al. (2018), Bartlett (2017), Brewster (2022).

  125. 125.

    Bill C-14, Footnote 3.

  126. 126.

    Bill C-14, Footnote 3 at Section 3; See also Criminal Code, Footnote 2 at Sections 241.2(1)(e) and 241.2(1)(d).

  127. 127.

    Evidence of this can be found in current debates concerning access to MAID as part of provincial healthcare whereby an argument is being advanced that the informed consent requires doctors to introduce the MAID option to a patient who “appears to be eligible”; For example: “There is no provision in the law that prohibits healthcare professionals from initiating a discussion about MAiD …. Only physicians and nurse practitioners … involved in care planning and consent processes have a professional obligation to initiate a discussion about MAiD if a patient might be eligible for MAiD. The discussion should include all treatment options, including palliative care and the option of MAiD. The appropriate timing of initiating a discussion about MAiD is determined by the clinical context. Healthcare professionals must not discuss MAiD with a patient with the aim of inducing, persuading, or convincing the patient to request MAiD.” CAMAP, Footnote 21. Emphasis added.

  128. 128.

    Bill C-14, Footnote 3.

  129. 129.

    Bill C-14, Footnote 3 at Preamble. Emphasis added. It might be noted that when the Criminal Code is later amended in March 2021 by Bill C-7, Footnote 13, inter alia to remove the MAID eligibility criteria that death be “reasonably foreseeable”, there is no mention that the law is contemplating persons who are seeking MAID. On the other hand, the Explanatory note to Bill C-7 does describe the MAID law and potential amendments in relation to persons who “seek” MAID. See Explanatory Note to Bill C-7: An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (medical assistance in dying) tabled October 21, 2020. Online: https://justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pl/charter-charte/c7.html.

  130. 130.

    For an interesting discussion in this regard see, Sigalet (2022).

  131. 131.

    The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 December 2006, 2515 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 May 2008). Online: https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities.

References

Cases

Legislation and Conventions

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  • Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.). 1982. c. 11.

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Acknowledgements

Many thanks are owed to the editors, Dr. Jaro Kotalik and David Shannon, to Ashley Benard-Legris, and to Dr. Gerard Kennedy and Dr. M. Michelle Gallant for their helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks are also owed to my research assistant Kali Faingold B.A. (J.D. candidate 2024).

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Correspondence to Mary J. Shariff .

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Shariff, M.J. (2023). Carter v Canada: Exploring the Ebb and Flow of “Competing” Societal Values Through Sections 7 and 1 of the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. In: Kotalik, J., Shannon, D.W. (eds) Medical Assistance in Dying (MAID) in Canada . The International Library of Bioethics, vol 104. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30002-8_2

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