Ending the ‘Perpetual Menace’ of Nuclear Weapons: The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

XXII EDOARDO AMALDI CONFERENCE Nuclear Risks and Arms Control: Problems and Progress in the Time of Pandemics and War.

ROME, 06 April 2022.

© Yuko Baba, UNITAR Hiroshima (used with permission)

Hiroshima Peace Memorial, Photo:

1 Introduction

On 16th July 1945, at 05:29 AM, the secrets of the atom were unlocked by detonating the world’s first nuclear explosive device dubbed “The Gadget”. Robert Oppenheimer, the scientific leader of the multinationally staffed and supported Manhattan Project to develop atomic weapons, lamented that, “We knew the world would not be the same. Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds”, and his colleague Leó Szilárd¹ remarked, “That night I knew the world was headed for sorrow”.¹

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a mere three weeks later, on 6th and 9th August 1945, respectively, clearly demonstrated the revolutionary and catastrophic power of nuclear weapons on human beings and the environment and ushered in a dramatic revolution in military affairs that legitimized attacking civilian targets that was later formalized as “nuclear deterrence”. However, one may recall that civilian targeting was proposed by General Giulio Douhet in his seminal treatise, “The Command of the Air” (1921)² and the related concept of the independent air force that reached its zenith in the fire bombings of cities such as Dresden, Hamburg and Tokyo – the fire bombing of Tokyo remains history’s deadliest air raid exceeding in prompt fatalities even those of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Returning to the Trinity test of 16th July 1945, nuclear scientist Leó Szilárd observed that, “Almost without exception, all the creative physicists had misgivings about the use of the bomb” and further that “Truman did not understand at all what was involved regarding nuclear weapons”.

Later Szilárd recalled that “In March 1945, I prepared a memorandum which was meant to be presented to President Roosevelt. This memorandum warned that the use of the bomb against the cities of Japan would start an atomic-arms race with Russia, and it raised the question whether avoiding such an arms race might not be more important than the short-term goal of knocking Japan out of the war?”.

Following the death of Roosevelt, Szilárd drafted a petition to President Harry Truman opposing on moral grounds the use of atomic bombs against the cities of Japan.

Several years later, Szilárd astutely observed, after the atomic bombing of Japan’s two cities, that the United States lost the argument of the immorality of using atomic bombs against the civilian population.

Once the concept of atomic fission had been scientifically demonstrated and its application utilized to destroy cities in Japan, Albert Einstein belatedly took full responsibility for the dire consequences of the letter of 2nd August 1939 that he and fellow scientist Leó Szilárd had jointly sent to US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt warning against the dangers of Nazi Germany developing atomic weapons and recommending that the United States initiate a nuclear weapon development programme–that led Roosevelt to commission the Manhattan Project.

Less than a year after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Einstein lamented that, “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe”. Later Einstein called it “the greatest mistake” and in 1947 he told Newsweek magazine that “had I known that the Germans would not succeed in developing an atomic bomb, I would have done nothing”.

2 Promoting Nuclear Disarmament

Emerging from the ashes of the Second World War, the very first resolution adopted in 1946 by the newly formed United Nations called for the “elimination of atomic weapons”.

Thus, the first seeds were planted warning about the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of the use of atomic weapons and the first call issued to prohibit nuclear weapons.

To atone for his mistake, Einstein joined with philosopher Bertrand Russell and other atomic scientists to issue the “Russell-Einstein Manifesto”, on 9th July 1955, that issued a clarion call:

“Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war? No one knows how widely lethal radio-active particles might be diffused, but the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with H-bombs might possibly put an end to the human race. Although an agreement to renounce nuclear weapons as part of a general reduction of armaments would not afford an ultimate solution, it would serve certain important purposes”.

Despite efforts by many scientists to abolish nuclear weapons, other scientists unfortunately were successful in persuading their political leaders to develop thermonuclear weapons with much greater destructive force than simple atomic weapons. Indeed, in 1958 there even was a short-lived US effort, Project A-119, to detonate a thermonuclear nuclear device on the surface of the Moon. The rationale was to produce a very large mushroom or radioactive cloud and a brilliant super flash of light clearly visible from Earth—that would be an obvious show of strength to the Soviet Union. Fortunately, the project was cancelled, the Moon was spared and the “Moon Treaty” of 1979 prohibits all types of nuclear tests on the Moon and other celestial bodies. This to highlight just one of the follies of humankind to misuse nuclear energy for destructive purposes and the ever-present risks of nuclear weapons. Today there are more than 13,000 nuclear weapons, held at 107 locations in 14 States—nine nuclear-armed States and five non-nuclear-weapon States.

Today, some seven decades after the end of the Second World War, we again are facing a situation where nuclear weapons use is being threatened and again a country—this time Ukraine—has been invaded. Mohamed ElBaradei, former IAEA Director General and 2006 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, in this regard recently commented that, “A global order that is shaky, selective, and full of holes and double standards has brought us to this point”.

This is not the first time that nuclear weapons use has been threatened; during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis the survival of the world was put at risk by two nuclear armed-States, nuclear weapons were invoked again during the 1973 Middle East war, and threats of “all options on the table” made repeatedly against some States (in particular Iran and North Korea). In this regard, we have been lucky to have escaped thus far nuclear weapons use by accident or misadventure over the past seven decades.

The Elders, former internationally respected world leaders, have warned that, “As long as nuclear weapons remain in existence, it is inevitable that they will someday be used, whether by design, accident or miscalculation”. United Nations Deputy Secretary General, Jan Elliason has remarked, “There are no right hands for wrong weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction are simply wrong”.

Today, four months before the 77th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and two years after the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is important to recognize that no sentient human being who has met or seen the hibakusha (survivors), or visited the hypocentre, or looked at the photographic evidence of the destruction of the two devastated Japanese cities, can avoid being shocked and horrified by the devastation that nuclear weapons inflicted on those two unfortunate cities.

During the next decades more than 2,050 nuclear test detonations were carried out in all environments: In the atmosphere, on the surface of the Earth, underwater, underground and even in near space, and tests carried out at national test sites (Nevada, Semipalatinsk, Lop Nor, Pokhran, Chagai, Punggye Ri) and in indigenous peoples ancestral lands in Australia, Algeria and the South Pacific led to radiological contamination of vast swaths of lands and seas, as well as long lasting genetic damage to humans and the environment. As the CTBTO Executive Secretary Robert Floyd said at the Conference on Disarmament last month, “our collective efforts to further increase adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty will continue to strengthen the Treaty, and solidify the already powerful international norm against nuclear testing”.

It is surprising and deeply disappointing that leaders of the “cabal” (and I use the term advisedly) of nine (9) countries with nuclear weapons and their “allies”—more appropriately the “captive nations” of nuclear deterrence—still continue to blindly ignore the devastating effects of nuclear weapons, are not fulfilling the nuclear disarmament obligations of the NPT, and blatantly reject the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) supported by 122 States pursuant to a UN General Assembly resolution, now signed by 86 and ratified by 60 States.

On a positive note, the TPNW entered into force on 22 January 2021 and thereby establishes a jus cogens rule (fundamental principle under international law) creating an erga omnes (obligation) for all States to renounce nuclear weapons. In this context we might recall Einstein’s prophetic words that, “Our defence is not in armaments, nor in science…Our defence is in law and order”—something in short supply today at the international level.

The first meeting of States parties to the TPNW will be held in Vienna on 21st-23rd June 2022 and preceded on 20th June by the fourth international conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons—the first was in 2013 in Oslo, second in Nayarit (Mexico) in 2014 and third in Vienna in December 2014. It is encouraging that chinks are appearing in the phalanx of opposition in NATO to the TPNW, as Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Norway and reconsidering their position and likely will attend the TPNW conference in June much to the consternation of other alliance members.

This “cabal” of ‘nuclear’ States and the “captive nations” of nuclear deterrence now also are back-tracking from measures agreed to implement nuclear disarmament and risk reduction consensually agreed at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conferences.

3 Impact of COVID-19

The unfortunate coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has clearly and unambiguously shown misplaced priorities and wasteful investments on nuclear deterrence and military interventions amounting to trillions of dollars by the “axis” of nuclear-armed States and the “captive nations”. Their historic severe under-investments in health care have led to the unacceptably high levels of infections and fatalities in most of their countries. It is truly tragic and contemptible that some of these States have selfishly opposed generic variants of effective anti-corona vaccines developed with tax-payer funding, commandeered excessive quantities of corona medical supplies and instead of collaborating internationally to jointly develop an effective and affordable vaccine they engaged in tribalism, bitter competition and propaganda that amounts to “vaccine nationalism” and “vaccine tribalism” of “my country first” (über alles, with all its perverse implications!). This is not surprising because just as the advocates of nuclear weapons and deterrence lack the mental acuity to comprehend the global catastrophe of any use of nuclear weapons, they also fail to understand that defence against a pandemic cannot be contained within any one country.

It is obvious that those non-nuclear-weapon States that did not waste national resources on nuclear weapons and foreign military interventions are the ones that have been coping much better with the pandemic.

4 Collapse of Nuclear Arms Control

Unfortunately, the vision of ridding the world of nuclear weapons is receding as the nuclear arms control architecture patiently built up over the past 50 years is collapsing before our eyes.

The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) still not in force, also is under threat of resumption of explosive nuclear testing and re-opening Pandora’s Box of nuclear weapon test explosions. The supporters of the CTBT have miserably failed to make it a requirement for India—a non-proliferation pariah—when they were giving it an “exception” in 2008 to enable it to buy nuclear technology and fissile material in flagrant contravention of UN Security Council resolution 1172 of 1998 and of the so-called “guidelines” of the self-anointed Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

In the negotiations and discussions on the denuclearization of North Korea and the Korean Peninsula, again no requirement was stipulated for North Korea to accept the CTBT.

The bi-annual CTBT “facilitating entry-into-force conferences” have become a sad joke of repetitive platitudes.

Thus, the prospects of the CTBT ever entering into force recede with each passing year and the likelihood of this treaty becoming a fossil of nuclear arms control are enhanced.

The architecture and fundaments of bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms control have been eroded by the United States withdrawal in 2002 from the crucial Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty followed by the Russian Federation.

On 2 August 2019, the United States formally withdrew from the 1987 Treaty on Shorter- and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)—foreshadowed in July 2019 by the Russian Federation suspending its compliance with the treaty. Under the INF Treaty, by May 1991, 2692 ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kms had been verifiably eliminated, 1846 by the USSR and 846 by the United States under mutual verification—and nearly 5000 nuclear warheads removed from active service.

This leaves only one nuclear arms reduction treaty in force between Moscow and Washington—the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)—that was signed on 8 April 2010, entered into force on 5 February 2011. By 4 February 2018 both Russia and the United States had verifiably met the central limits of 1550 accountable deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 700 deployed launchers (land-and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers). In fact, on 1 July 2020, under New START, Russia had 485 deployed launchers carrying 1326 nuclear warheads, and the United States had 655 warheads on 1372 launchers warheads; the latest data from September 2021 shows that Russia had 1458 warheads on 527 deployed launchers, and the United States had 665 on 1389 deployed launchers.

New START set to expire on 5 February 2021, was extended on 3 February this year for five years until 2026 by the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States. New START involves mutual intrusive verification and technical weapons data exchange modalities for transparency, which is an important area of cooperation between especially in these times of heightened tensions.

For the first time in the history of Soviet/Russian-United States nuclear arms control not only have existing agreements been dismantled but both sides are modernizing nuclear arsenals unchecked and have lowered the threshold of nuclear weapon use in their declaratory and operational policies. Furthermore, in blatant disregard of important Cold War risk reduction measures such as the Agreements on Nuclear Accidents (1971), Prevention of Incidents at Sea (1972), Prevention of Nuclear War (1973), Dangerous Military Activities (1989), De-targeting and Information Sharing (1994), over past years and continuing today air and naval forces of NATO and Russia, and the United States and China, have been engaging in dangerous and provocative actions especially in areas adjacent to territorial wars and airspace. Though there are attempts at deconfliction the danger of accidents remains high, especially now in the European and Arctic theaters of operations. It is time to recall the 1958 Surprise Attack Conference and take steps to hold a similar conference as soon as possible.

Doctrines of some nuclear-armed States now posit first or early use of nuclear weapons. The United States Defence Department’s new nuclear weapons guidance, Nuclear Operations (11 June 2019) clearly posits that “using nuclear weapons could create conditions for decisive results and the restoration of strategic stability.”

For its part, Russian military doctrine envisions what some have called “escalation to de-escalate” in countering superior NATO conventional forces, that is early but limited use of nuclear weapons.

In South Asia, both India and Pakistan also contemplate use of nuclear weapons in a regional conflict. Recently, India is under pressure domestically to invoke its nuclear capabilities to defend against China in the context of their revived conflict in the Ladakh region in the high Himalayas.

It is highly disturbing that when nuclear weapon use is discussed, the vocabulary used is very often conveniently sanitized. The destruction by thermonuclear war and resulting humanitarian and environmental consequences are downplayed and substituted by antiseptic concepts of nuclear deterrence. Alfred Wohlstetter in analyzing The Delicate Balance of Terror in 1958, noted that the existence of nuclear weapons does not automatically prevent a nuclear war but increases the danger of accidental wars particularly during a crisis, although this risk can be mitigated by arms control measures.³

Worrisomely, it is the view of many erstwhile defence experts, such as William Perry, former United States defence secretary, among others, that in today’s world the dangers of inadvertent, accidental or even deliberate use of nuclear weapons is higher than it was during the height of the Cold War. Perry published his new book in July 2020 entitled, The Button, because in his words, “Our nuclear weapons policy is obsolete and dangerous. I know, because I helped to design it, and we have to change it before it is too late.” He warns that the “awesome ability to launch hundreds of thermonuclear weapons in mere minutes” creates grave dangers of blundering into Armageddon.

This year the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set the clock (which puts into context how close we are to nuclear catastrophe) at 100 s to midnight; closer to catastrophe than any year of the Cold War, one of the darkest years of the Cold War, when it was set at two minutes.

In January, UN Secretary General Guterres in his message to the NPT review conference noted that, “….the end of the Cold War also left us with a dangerous falsehood: that the threat of nuclear war was a thing of the past. Nothing could be more mistaken. These weapons are not yesterday’s problem. They remain today’s growing threat. The risk that nuclear weapons will be used is higher now than at any point since the duck-and-cover drills and fallout shelters of the Cold War … The nuclear landscape is a tinderbox. One accident or miscalculation could set it alight.

The Gorbachev-Reagan understanding of December 1987 that a “nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought” is no longer in the forefront of the minds of today’s leaders and nuclear war planners. On 3 January 2022, in the current climate of hostilities we were surprised to see a Joint Statement by the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races. Correctly the Joint Statement was labelled as from the Five Nuclear-Weapon States, and not P-5 States—though the US issued is as from the P-5 and then hastily corrected its mistake. The Joint Statement noted inter alia that France, China, the Russian Federation, the UK and the UK “consider the avoidance of war between Nuclear-Weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities. We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. As nuclear use would have far-reaching consequences, we also affirm that nuclear weapons—for as long as they continue to exist—should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war”.

While the five NWS affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, they did not affirm the full complement of the Reagan-Gorbachev commitment that: (a) they should not fight any war between themselves nuclear or conventional; and (b) for none of the NWS to seek nuclear or military superiority. The Joint Statement repeats the language from Article VI of the NPT, and it reaffirms the importance of complying with their bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements and commitments; though in reality some of their actions do not support such a reaffirmation claim. The five NWS then say that they have the “desire to work with all States to create a security environment more conducive to progress on disarmament with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all”; repeating the buzz words and undefined concepts of “creating a security environment” and “undiminished security for all” with the “ultimate” aim of a nuclear-weapon free world. Nor are their actions thus far conducive to “creating a security environment” for nuclear arms control and disarmament.

Belatedly, one hopeful sign emerged with the initiation of direct discussions held in Vienna between the Russian Federation and the United States in June and August 2020. The NSVT (nuclear, space and verification talks) focused on three baskets of nuclear arms control issues cover: nuclear weapon doctrines; space weapons and arms control; and transparency and verification.

Following the June 2021 Putin-Biden meeting in Geneva, the two sides set up a Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD), that met in July and September last year and in January this year. After the September dialogue, two working groups were established, one on “principles and objectives for future arms control” and the other on “capabilities and actions with strategic effects”.

Both sides are divided over the inclusion of China as preferred by the US; and inclusion of France and the UK if China is included as preferred by Russia. None of the other three nuclear-armed States—China, France, and the United Kingdom—have expressed any enthusiasm in joining Russia and the US in starting multilateral talks.

The United States and Russia appear to have different priorities for the dialogue. The US wants to focus on the very complex set of nuclear arms issues that face the two countries, such as what may come after New START, how to deal with Russia’s new nuclear systems, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and space and cyber weapons. Russia wants to address strategic stability including nuclear and non-nuclear and offensive and defensive weapons, as well as missile defence. How to deal with strategic non-nuclear weapons is an important matter not on the table.

Given the risks of nuclear weapons, some States and civil society actors have been promoting the concepts of “no first use” of nuclear weapons; and “sole purpose” that is to use nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack. The USSR claimed to have a no first use policy, but the United States never gave it much credence. Among the five nuclear-weapon States, only China has a longstanding non first use policy—none of the other eight nuclear-armed States endorses it.

In 2017, Joe Biden wrote in Foreign Affairs that the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal should be deterring—and, if necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack, and as president he would “work to put that belief into practice, in consultation with the U.S. military and US allies”.

Now, late last month, as President, Joe Biden has stepped back from his campaign promise and approved a National Defence Strategy (NDS) that includes the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that reaffirms an old Obama-era policy that allows for a potential nuclear response to deter conventional and other non-nuclear threats in addition to nuclear ones.

For its part, Russia’s nuclear strategy also calls for nuclear retaliation to threats against the existence of the State.

In my view, while both no first use and sole purpose policies are good at the declaratory level, but at the operational level there is no way to verify or to assure that these policies are implemented. Expending effort on them would not lead to one less nuclear weapon or a lowered alert status; rather the nuclear-weapon States could score an easy political win by declaring support without necessarily reducing nuclear dangers. Fewer and eventually zero nuclear weapons are the best assurance for non-use.

5 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) marked its 50th anniversary in July 2020; given the perilous relations between nuclear-armed States alarm bells have been ringing warning about impending failure of the 10th NPT review conference postponed (four times thus far) now scheduled to be held from 1st to 26th August this year because of the SARS COVID-19 pandemic.

With regard to nuclear disarmament in the context of the NPT, the field is now crowded with several disorganized competing approaches: the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) NPT States favour a three-phase time bound “plan of action”, in contrast the Western States stand by a “step-by-step” approach which has been slightly modified by a cross-cutting group called the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) that calls for “building blocks”; while another such group, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) supports a “taking forward nuclear disarmament” approach; Sweden has proposed “stepping stones”; and the United States has advanced the concept of “creating the environment for nuclear disarmament” (CEND).

A sober assessment of the CEND approach suggests that this initiative is geared to transfer the focus and responsibility for the “environment” and “conditions” for nuclear disarmament from the nuclear-armed to the non-nuclear-weapon States. In fact, the dystopian CEND approach and nuclear policy as presently formulated is serving the cause of “creating conditions to never disarm”.

It would be appropriate to characterize CEND approach as being based on “dreaming of rainbows, butterflies and unicorns to appear magically and sprinkle fairy dust leading to a new fantasy world of nuclear arms control”. Faithfully implementing nuclear disarmament obligations in the framework of the NPT is the only way forward to salvation.

The Stockholm Initiative on stepping stones to nuclear disarmament started off on a good footing but has lost steam as it prioritizes nuclear risk reduction over nuclear disarmament. The NPDI no longer attracts much support as it largely has been overshadowed by the Stockholm Initiative. As for the Non-Aligned Movement’s time bound framework for nuclear disarmament, opposition by the nuclear-weapon and allied States deprives it of traction.

6 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Since the last NPT review conference, there now is an “elephant in the salon” of the NPT and this is the TPNW that opened for signature in September 2017 and entered into force in January 2021. It has become something of a lightning rod between its proponents and opponents at the NPT Preparatory Committee sessions in 2018 and 2019 and will be so at the review conference in August.

The opponents of the TPNW have raised a number of concerns and shortcomings and critics claim that the TPNW does not:

• (a) define a nuclear weapon: this is correct it does not—but neither does the NPT—the Treaty of Tlateloloco has a definition (article 5) that has been utilized by the four other NWFZ treaties;

• (b) constitute an “effective measure” for nuclear disarmament under NPT article VI—in fact, the TPNW is an “effective measure” as called for in NPT Article VI on nuclear disarmament, in parallel with the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the bilateral USSR/Russia-US treaties such as 2010 New START, 1987 Intermediate-Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) even though these were concluded for national security not NPT reasons; and the five nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties operational in Latin America and the Caribbean, South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa and Central Asia; the NPT is not a self-implementing treaty, it requires enabling actions, for example, safeguards agreements by NNWS with the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA to verify non-proliferation commitments under Articles II and III of the NPT; NWFZ treaties are required to implement Article VII, while nuclear cooperation agreements are needed to implement Article IV of the NPT on peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

• (c) include the latest IAEA safeguards (Additional Protocol)—to be precise, Article 3 of the TPNW stipulates that each NNWS party “shall, at a minimum, maintain its [IAEA] safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future”; while it is indeed unfortunate that the IAEA’s Board of Governors has been unable to agree to make the 1997 Model Additional Protocol (AP)(INFCIRC/540) an essential component of the IAEA NPT comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153) for NPT NNWS, and the IAEA General Conference in its annual safeguards resolution has said that “it is the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol”; the TPNW requires adhering NNWS to maintain, as a minimum, their existing safeguards agreements and provides for further strengthened safeguards, thus for the 80% of NPT NNWS with APs in force the TPNW secures the current de facto standard of non-proliferation verification, which is higher than the one stipulated by the NPT; and

• (d) include verification of nuclear disarmament—this is correct, but neither the NPT nor NWFZ treaties include the technical details of verification, this is left to the “Agency’s [IAEA] safeguards system”, in reality, the IAEA collaboratively with its Member States during 1970–1971 drew up (INFCIRC/153) comprehensive safeguards after the entry into force in 1970 of the NPT and the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) during 1993–1997; TPNW/IAEA States, at the first meeting of States Parties to be convened within one year of the entry into force of the TPNW (now 21–23 June 2022) should invite the IAEA to set up a technical working group to develop verification approaches and to this end sponsor a resolution at the 2022 IAEA General Conference; and unlike the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) that has acquired customary international law status and has no provisions for verification, the TPNW does in fact stipulate an approach to verification.

Other criticisms, for example, include that:

• (a) the TPNW is inconsistent as it allows for States with nuclear weapons to adhere to it and it also allows States to join that had nuclear weapons but have disarmed—it is instructive to recall that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) allows both declared chemical weapon possessor States as well as those that have previously destroyed their CW stocks to adhere to the CWC; hence the TPNW follows similar logic, States with nuclear weapons can adhere to the TPNW and then proceed to verifiably destroy them under auspices of a competent international authority to be designated by States parties;

• (b) the TPNW “demonstrates that there is no legal norm on non-possession of nuclear weapons”—one of the purposes of the TPNW is to establish a legal norm against the possession of nuclear weapons, much along the lines of the BTWC and CWC outlawing biological and chemical weapons respectively;

• (c) the TPNW will establish a “competitor regime to the NPT” and may entice “defections from the NPT”—the Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first to “prohibit” nuclear weapons in its zone of application and the subsequent four NWFZ treaties renounce nuclear weapons, but none are regarded as competitors or alternatives to the NPT, rather they are considered as complementary; and it is spectacularly illogical to suggest that a TPNW State party could “defect” from the NPT to “shirk” its non-proliferation obligations because as already noted above the TPNW itself requires each State party to “at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future” (article 3); and

• (d) the TPNW would “delegitimize extended deterrence alliance relationships” and thus incentivize alliance NNWS to develop indigenous nuclear weapon programmes—such a claim calls into question the integrity and commitment of alliance NNWS to the NPT and suggests that their non-proliferation credentials may be suspect as their fealty to the NPT is only because of reliance on extended nuclear deterrence thus a case of “having one’s cake and eating it too”, i.e. to benefit from nuclear weapons, including in cases where such weapons are stationed on their territory, without actual possession, and also to preach non-proliferation to other NNWS and result in effectively undermining trust in the NPT.

7 Attacks on Nuclear Facilities

Armed attacks on nuclear facilities are not new—on 30th September 1980, Operation Scorch Sword, was a surprise airstrike carried out by Iran Air Force on an almost-complete nuclear reactor (Osirak) near Baghdad; eight months later on 7th June 1981, the Osirak reactor was destroyed by Israel (Operation Opera). In retaliation for Iran’s raid on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor, Iraq attacked the Bushehr nuclear power plant seven times during the war, leaving the plant in ruins.⁴

On 6th September 2007, Israel bombed a site et al. Kibar (Dair al Zour) (Operation Outside the Box / Operation Orchard) in Syria that later the IAEA concluded was “very likely” a nuclear reactor (though not operational). In Iran over the past few years, acts of sabotage involving use of explosives and cyber attacks have been carried out at uranium enrichment facilities in Iran, for which Iran blames Israel—the last such sabotage, a year ago, at the TESA Karaj centrifuge assembly plant completely destroyed one IAEA surveillance camera and damaged another one.

Now in Ukraine, the Chornobyl and Zaporizhye nuclear power stations are in the midst of military hostilities. The reactors at Chornobyl are decommissioned but spent nuclear fuel is in wet and dry storage and there are many tonnes of highly radioactive corium in the destroyed Unit 4. At Zaporizhye there are six operational nuclear power reactors—it is the largest nuclear power station in Europe.

This matter of attacks on nuclear facilities has been taken up by the IAEA Board of Governors and at the review conference of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM), both last month, and most assuredly will feature at the upcoming NPT review conference. Although Article 2.4 (c) of the CPPNM affirms that “nothing in this Convention shall be construed as a lawful authorization to use or threaten to use force against nuclear material or nuclear facilities States failed to strengthen the Convention used for peaceful purposes”, the States Parties failed to strengthen this provision.

Attacks against nuclear facilities have been prohibited under several resolutions of the IAEA General Conference as well as by NPT States Parties in their 1995/2000/2010 review conference agreed documents.

In late February, the IAEA Director General stressed that the Agency’s General Conference—the annual gathering of all the organization’s Member States—had adopted a decision in 2009 on the “Prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction” that affirmed that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”.⁵

8 Nuclear-Powered Submarines and IAEA Safeguards

A looming challenge for Agency safeguards is that of safeguarding the naval nuclear cycle in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) in force. Presently, nuclear reactors for naval propulsion are either under development or envisaged for nuclear-powered submarines in at least three CSA States—Australia, Brazil and South Korea—and also could be considered in the future by additional States such as Argentina, Canada, Iran and Japan among others. Paragraph 14 of INFCIRC/153/Rev2 type safeguards agreements allows for the “Non-Application of Safeguards to Nuclear Material to be used in Non-Peaceful Activities”, generally interpreted to refer to nuclear-powered ships and submarines, military space vehicles, and nuclear reactors and radio-thermal generators (RTGs) for military bases or isolated radar stations, etc. However, there is no definition or concept of “non-peaceful or non-proscribed nuclear military activities” as this has never been tested at the IAEA Board of Governors or at NPT Review Conferences.

The IAEA Board of Governors has had fractious discussions on this matter in late November 2021 and early March 2022, involving Australia, China and Russia. The Board missed an opportunity to set up a consultation process with its member States and experts to define what is needed to safeguard naval nuclear fuel; and whether the “loophole” should be closed in the Agency’s comprehensive safeguards agreements that allows for “non-application of safeguards” on “non-proscribed” military activities such as nuclear-powered submarines. Despite the objections of States involved in the contemplated sharing of naval nuclear propulsion technology, it is now clear that this matter will be controversial at the Tenth NPT Review Conference in August 2022 in discussions in Main Committee II on IAEA safeguards.

9 Eleventh NPT Review Conference in Vienna

It is sometimes not well understood that NPT review conferences are not UN conferences—rather, they are conferences of the States parties to the NPT, paid for by them separately from UN membership dues and are governed by their own rules of procedure (RoP). Thus, while the President-designate and States parties need to take into account the advice of the UN secretariat which is always given in good faith, they are not bound in any way to accept it and are fully empowered to make their own decisions under the RoP for NPT review conferences taking into account international political developments.

Contrary to popular belief in some circles, the UN formally has nothing to do with the NPT as it was written and adopted in 1968—this is not a criticism of the UN which does valuable work internationally but merely a factual observation. The only international organization to which the Treaty accords a formal role is the IAEA—the role of implementing safeguards or verification of the non-proliferation obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) parties (article III). The inalienable right of States parties (article IV) to utilize nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes by NNWS, especially developing countries, in practice has come to be implemented through the technical cooperation programme of the IAEA.

The IAEA is an autonomous international organization subject to its own governance structure, and like most international organizations the Agency has a relationship agreement with the UN on a common system for personnel management and related administrative functions.

The UN capably and professionally has been providing services to review conferences and PrepCom sessions, such as, secretary-general of the conference, meeting rooms, interpretation, summary records, and secretarial services including officers to support the president and the chairs. While the UN provides the official secretary to main committee I (nuclear disarmament), credentials and drafting committees, and prepares the elements of their draft reports; the IAEA covers main committees II and III (non-proliferation and peaceful uses) and prepares their draft reports—though the UN also covers items such as regional issues, universality, and the review process, but it is not the secretariat for the NPT, nor is one needed.

In 1995, the NPTREC was moved to New York on the claim that all UN Member States have representation there and thus would enable the maximum number of States parties to participate in the conference’s main objective—to decide on the Treaty’s extension. A review of the record of participation by States parties shows that in various years up to 30 or more States do not take part or only show up for one or two sessions in order to be registered in the list of participants. Therefore, the argument of participation is not a sufficient reason to keep the review conference in New York.

Starting in 2007, the first session of the PrepCom was moved to Vienna (from New York) in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the IAEA and its contributions to the implementation of the NPT. The UN has successfully organized PrepCom sessions in Vienna in 2007, 2012 and 2017—thus there is no compelling reason why it would be unable or find it difficult to organize the review conference in Vienna with the assistance of the conference services offices of the UN Office in Vienna (UNOV) and of the IAEA at the Vienna International Centre and its adjoining Austria Center Vienna.

The accountability for compliance with the NPT’s non-proliferation obligations is not done in the NPT review process but it is done in Vienna by the IAEA and the assessment is released in the annual Safeguards Implementation Report—the latest report was issued by the IAEA in April 2021 and the next one likely will be issued later this month or in early May this year. The IAEA’s annual reports on nuclear safety, nuclear security, technical cooperation programme, and nuclear technology are reviewed in Vienna at the Board of Governors meetings in March and April each year and also in the General Conference in September.

The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) is the logical venue to discuss any issues related to nuclear weapon testing, even though the CTBT has yet to enter into force.

The reality is that of the present 173 member States of the IAEA, 165 are NNWS party to the NPT. Though some in the EU are propagating the claim that peaceful uses of nuclear energy are not well known or appreciated; the fact is that currently, at the IAEA there are 848 active technical cooperation projects underway covering development priorities in areas such as human health and nutrition, food and agriculture, water and the environment, nuclear safety, nuclear security, nuclear power generation, nuclear waste disposition, nuclear sciences, industrial applications, nuclear knowledge development and management, and legislative assistance (nuclear law); as well as to develop solutions for future energy needs, and standards for radiation safety and nuclear security worldwide. Presently, the Agency is assisting developing Member States with real time reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction (real time RT-PCR) methodology for detection of COVID-19 infections in people—previously, RT-PCR technology was utilized by the IAEA to diagnose diseases such as Ebola, Zika, MERS-Cov, SARS-Cov1 and other major zoonotic and animal diseases.

Given its direct relationship to the NPT, it is now time for NPT States parties to relocate the review conference to Vienna to be closer to the Agency without whose verification and technical cooperation programme the NPT would be reduced to a hollow shell. The Eleventh NPT Review Conference likely will be held in 2026 and the Twelfth NPT Review Conference in 2030. Now it is imperative for NPT States Parties to regularize NPT review conferences in Vienna where they logically belong, starting in 2026.

10 Possible Recommendations: NPT 2022

The following is a non-exhaustive list of possible recommendations.

• 1. Reaffirm relevant viable elements of the 1995/2000/2010 NPT agreed outcomes in an updated “concrete actions” to 2026—to be reviewed and updated at the 2026 review conference.

• 2. Recommit to and undertake to secure ratification of the CTBT by the remaining two nuclear-weapon and three non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT by 2025, as well as to redouble regional and global efforts to achieve entry-into-force of the CTBT by 2026.

• 3. Note the fact of the entry-into-force in January 2021 of the TPNW; the nuclear-weapon States and their allies undertake to attend the first conference of TPNW States parties as observers and to table their views on achieving nuclear disarmament as envisaged pursuant to Article VI of the NPT; and all NPT States parties undertake to facilitate and resume civility in dialogue on this matter.

• 4. Affirm the continuation of the consultation process involving the five NPT nuclear-weapon States (aka “P-5” process) to focus on implementation of specific measures to reduce risks of deliberate, inadvertent or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as agreed in the 2000/2010 NPT outcomes and supplement with additional steps such as: data exchanges on nuclear weapon holdings; “managed” technical briefings on new advanced systems deployed or being tested; clarification on doctrines; and understandings on not using cyber capabilities to target or interfere with nuclear weapon command and control systems and associated early warning networks, among other such measures as proposed at recent review conferences.

• 5. Development and deployment of “non-nuclear strategic weapon” systems can be highly destabilizing and even provocative; the five NPT nuclear-weapon States undertake to avoid destabilizing actions and engage in transparency exchanges amongst themselves.

• 6. At the review conference, and preparatory committee sessions, the five NPT nuclear-weapon States undertake to provide informative technical briefings in Main Committee 1 and cluster 1, respectively, jointly and separately, on the items noted in §4-§5 above.

• 7. By 2026, all non-nuclear-weapon States undertake to conclude and bring into force Additional Protocols to their (NPT) comprehensive safeguards agreements, especially those categorized by the IAEA as having “significant nuclear activities”; and for all remaining States with small quantities protocols (SQPs) based on the old standard text to amend or rescind them as called for in 2005 by the IAEA Board of Governors and the Director General.

• 8. Call on all parties to the JCPOA to implement the agreement in full and on Iran to further extend its cooperation with the IAEA on safeguards implementation.

• 9. Reaffirm full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East taking into consideration developments at the UN Secretary General’s conference on the Middle East zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and call on Israel to accede to the NPT as a NNWS.

• 10. Call on India and Pakistan to implement UN Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) and call on the DPRK to freeze its nuclear-weapon and missile programmes; to sign and ratify the CTBT and cease further development of nuclear weapon programmes.

• 11. Reaffirm the NPT 2000/2010 understandings that nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes must be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States, as defined in the context of the NPT, only under IAEA comprehensive safeguards as a condition of supply.

• 12. Support multinational approaches to the sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, and in this regard to encourage States to utilize the low enriched uranium resources of the IAEA LEU Bank at Oskemen (Kazakhstan) and the IAEA LEU Reserve at Angarsk (Russian Federation) for their nuclear fuel requirements.

• 13. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy much pre-date the NPT, however, the Treaty has facilitated international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the IAEA and this is well understood and recognized—currently 140 States benefit from 848 IAEA technical cooperation projects across the broad spectrum of peaceful applications of nuclear technology—accordingly, all States parties undertake to facilitate peaceful uses under applicable IAEA safety, security and safeguards measures, without discrimination in accordance with the Treaty.

• 14. The review process for the Treaty as strengthened in 1995 and improved in 2000 works well when States parties cooperate in good faith to strengthen the authority and integrity of the Treaty; accordingly States parties undertake to carry out the review process as provided for in the 1995/2000 documents and commit to cooperate in assisting the President in preparing a concise review conference final document, covering all three pillars, regional issues, universality and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution, for adoption as a whole by consensus, in recognition of the NPT being the cornerstone for nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

• 15. Relocate NPT Review Conferences to Vienna starting from the Eleventh NPT Review Conference, likely to be convened in 2026.

11 Epilogue

General Lee Butler, former commander of the US Strategic Air Command, insightfully observed that nuclear proliferation cannot be contained in a world where a handful of self-appointed nations both arrogate to themselves the privilege of owning nuclear weapons and extol the ultimate security assurances, they assert such weapons convey.

At an event that I attended in Ottawa (Canada), on 11 March 1999, addressing the Canadian Network Against Nuclear Weapons, as noted in the header (to this article), General Butler cited WWII General Omar Bradley, who had said on Armistice Day 11 November 1948 that, “We live in an age of nuclear giants and ethical infants, in a world that has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. We have solved the mystery of the atom and forgotten the lessons of the Sermon on the Mount. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about dying than we know about living. If we continue to develop our technology without wisdom or prudence, our servant may prove to be our executioner”.

The reason for recalling this admonition is a disturbing new tendency starting around 2013 for some States, especially some of the NWS, to push back on implementing agreed commitments on nuclear disarmament of 1995/2000/2010 while insisting on full implementation of NNWS commitments on safeguards, export controls, nuclear safety and security, among others. They posit that for nuclear disarmament it is important to take into account the international security situation, revived great power competition and regional instabilities, and to focus instead on nuclear risk reduction, motivations to hold nuclear weapons and on international arms control institutions. Furthermore, it is even argued that the NPT review process may no longer be fit for purpose as regards nuclear disarmament unless it takes account of the considerations noted above.

The NPT cannot resolve every problem related to the international security environment and strategic stability—that is not and never has been the purpose or objective of the Treaty or of its review process. The NPT review process included in the Treaty at the insistence of NNWS was and remains to ensure accountability for the implementation of its provisions and obligations. As discussed above, the 1995 NPTREC in deciding on indefinite extension instituted a strengthened review process that was further elaborated in 2000 to ensure “permanence with accountability”. The NPT is not the forum to discuss and review international relations or disputes, the appropriate venues for these are the UN Security Council and the General Assembly.

Other negotiations in other forums will be needed to address advanced emerging technologies, cyber and space weapons, and other related political-military and technological developments. The NPT is not the appropriate forum to negotiate on these matters, but it is the forum to negotiate on measures to further strengthen the authority and integrity of the Treaty across its three pillars and to review their implementation along with Treaty provisions.

The NPT is the only multilateral nuclear arms control treaty on the books that commits the NWS to nuclear disarmament and the NNWS to non-proliferation—it is the only multilateral forum in which the NWS are prepared to discuss their nuclear weapon policies with the NNWS, albeit within limits. If the foundations of multilateralism are attacked and weakened, the NPT will not escape its effects.

A key element for success at the next review conference will rest on clear acknowledgement of the continuing validity of the relevant elements of 1995/2000/2010 outcomes that along with the Treaty itself can be considered the “triptych” of the acquis communautaire of the NPT community. The Berlin Declaration on The NPT at Fifty got it right when it stated that: “We underline that past NPT commitments remain valid and form the basis for making further progress in fully implementing the treaty and achieving a world free of nuclear weapons”. Characterizing reaffirmation of existing past commitments as “conventional wisdom that is at least a generation out of date” wins no friends, not to mention is disingenuous.

Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic will have significant impact on how we think about “national security” and should lead to rethinking about the role of nuclear weapons in international security and to resurrecting concepts such as “our common future”, “human security”, “cooperative security”, “common security”, “collective security” (not the NATO version) and the like that were advanced in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s during times of perceptions and realities of existential threats to achieve a more secure world.

An international order anchored in legal norms and treaties offers the best hopes for survival. In this regard the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could establish a “right to nuclear peace” and stop nuclear weapons becoming a “perpetual menace”. Sometimes the most penetrating wisdom comes out of the “mouths of babes”, in this case a child at the United Nations kindergarten in New York who aptly observed: “Why a country that makes atomic bombs would ban fireworks?”.

We need to heed the call of Pope Francis when, during his visit to Japan in November 2019, he clearly voiced his demand that world powers renounce their nuclear arsenals. He declared that both the use and possession of atomic bombs an “immoral” crime and a dangerous waste. I end by recalling Pope Francis’ lament at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial, “How can we propose peace if we constantly invoke the threat of nuclear war as a legitimate recourse for the resolution of conflicts? May the abyss of pain endured here remind us of boundaries that must never be crossed!”.

Notes

• 1. Tariq Rauf, is a Director of Atomic Reporters; former member of the Eminent Persons Group for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament established by the Foreign Minister of Japan; former Head of Nuclear Verification and Security Policy at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, former Alternate Head of the IAEA Delegation to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) Review Conferences; Senior Advisor on nuclear disarmament to the Chairs (nuclear disarmament) at the 2015 NPT Review Conference and 2014 NPT PrepCom; long time Expert with Canada’s NPT delegation until 2000. Personal views are expressed here.