A number of justifications of the special military operation launched by Russia on February 24 2022 are officially put forward. Political scientists would put it prosaically: the essence of the military operation is to using force to return Ukraine to the sphere of influence of Russia, in which it has been for about three and a half centuries—from the Pereyaslavskaya Rada (1654) to the Belovezhskaya Pushcha (1991). There is no doubt, that a great tragedy is unfolding: Russia has lost thousands of soldiers and officers killed and wounded, and Ukraine—even more, a lot of civilians are dying, destruction of economy and environment is expanding.

Moreover, the threat of nuclear weapons employment entered the picture from the very beginning. The president of the Russian Federation clearly meant it in his speech on February 24, and gave an order to bring the deterrence forces into a special mode of combat duty just a couple of days after the launch of the offensive operation. This was a warning to the West not to interfere in the Russian military actions in Ukraine, although the United States and NATO have repeatedly stated that they would not get directly involved in hostilities.

As stated by Putin, it was a response to economic sanctions and aggressive statements by some Western leaders addressing Russia. Russian Military Doctrine supposes the possibility of using nuclear weapons only in two cases: firstly, in response to an attack on Russia and its allies using nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and secondly, in response to aggression with conventional weapons, which threatens the very existence of the Russian state itself. The Doctrine does not mention aggressive rhetoric or economic sanctions.

Of course, the doctrine is not a dogma, and the president has a broad leeway in authorizing the use of nuclear weapons. He is limited only by military-technical capabilities, which are determined by the fact that neither the United States nor Russia can strike the other side first and prevent its destructive response. For good reason, the five leading nuclear powers in January 2022 adopted a declaration, which again declared that there could be no winners in a nuclear war, and it should never be waged.

No question, there is a long distance from increasing the combat readiness of strategic forces to their launch. However, if the other side responds in the same way, then the strategic resonance of steps to gear up for war may quickly overcoming this distance with all of the consequences. With all the acuteness of the current confrontation in and around Ukraine, nuclear weapons should remain “outside the brackets” of the problem.

Still there are many scenarios of inadvertent escalation in the course of hostilities in Ukraine. Such are the consequences of Russia’s strikes at communications and storages of arms delivered to Ukraine, which may expand to NATO territories. Another trigger may be Ukraine’s strikes at the Russian Navy and territory (foremost at the targets on the disputable Crimea peninsula). It is also the introduction of NATO no-flight-zone in the Ukrainian airspace. In conditions of multi-front active combat actions, all kinds of military accidents are probable between Russian and NATO, which might be a spark in the powder keg.

Hence, even before reaching agreement on ceasefire in Ukraine, Russia and NATO should observe some unspoken rules of conduct and establish reliable channels of communication between military commands to prevent horizontal and vertical escalation of the armed conflict. This is a must, despite the desire of Ukraine to fight Russia back, or the wish of the West to punish Moscow, or the determination of Russia to assert its geopolitical aspirations. If escalation is prevented—the peaceful settlement will follow eventually. If not—everything else, including the fate of miserable Ukraine, Russia and the West will be catastrophic.

There can be only one way out—the political resolution of the conflict. The main task now is to immediately agree on a ceasefire and begin massive humanitarian assistance to the civilian population of Ukraine.

Further peaceful settlement will be a long and difficult process and will require international mediation. Its main elements are: Ukraine legally accepts the status of a neutral non-nuclear state, and this is recognized in the UN and the OSCE; it commits not to join military blocs and not to permit the deployment of foreign armed forces and nuclear weapons on its territory. In response, the international community recognizes and guarantees the territorial integrity within negotiated borders, sovereignty of Ukraine and respect of its statehood. Thereafter, follows the restoration of the destroyed, compensation to the victims, investigation of war crimes, the lifting of anti-Russian sanctions, and the resumption of relations between Russia and the West, including arms control process and regimes.

It seems that recently Moscow no longer raises the question of a change of government and full control of the Ukrainian territory, but demands recognition of the status of Crimea, the DPR and the LPR, as well as guarantees of the neutral status of Ukraine. Kiev is also shifting its position: it has “cooled down” to the idea of joining NATO and is ready to discuss the future of the above territories. Up to now, negotiations at various levels have been fruitless. As the experience of such conflicts shows, even a ceasefire agreement is difficult to achieve if the parties still have hope of winning or at least gaining advantages on the battlefield to strengthen their position in subsequent negotiations. A full peaceful settlement can take years.

However, eventually the restored European security should be an indivisible whole for all OSCE countries, of course, including Russia and especially neutral states: Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. The NATO and CSTO alliances should not prepare to fight each other, but rather reduce and limit their armed forces and military activities by treaties, exclude the use of force against each other, prohibit medium-range missiles, and continue the process of reducing nuclear arms and strengthening strategic stability. They should cooperate in the fight against international terrorism, armed extremism, and other common threats in Europe and beyond.