The Korean Peninsula remains a hotspot in terms of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Despite diplomatic efforts and increasingly severe sanctions on Pyongyang by the UN Security Council, initially imposed following DPRK's first nuclear test in 2006, as well as years of unilateral sanctions by the United States and several other countries, the DPRK managed to acquire the technological capability to produce nuclear weapons, including their delivery systems.Footnote 1 According to assessments in the report cited in footnote 1, by September 2022 the DPRK may have sufficient nuclear material—HEU and weapons-grade plutonium—to produce nearly 60 nuclear warheads. Analysts estimate that Pyongyang's existing short- and medium-range missiles are capable of reaching targets in the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Guam, an unincorporated territory of the United States. The Hwasong-14 missile has enough range to strike targets in Alaska, while the Hwasong-15, once deployed, is capable of reaching the rest of the United States.

Meanwhile, the Republic of Korea has been exploring the nuclear option in one form or another for many decades. The country has reportedly initiated nuclear-related activities, which could have military applications, at least three times in the history. Support for acquiring the country's own nuclear capability continues to grow among South Korean politicians, scientists, and military officials who fear the United States could refuse to defend its ally. In this context, Seoul's attempts to further develop its nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies, are likely to expand in the coming years.

After a round of intense diplomatic efforts in 2018–2019 that brought limited but important results (suffice it to mention the DPRK's unilateral moratorium on long-range missile launches and nuclear tests, as well as Pyongyang's announcement of the closure of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site) the international community is entering another phase of escalating tensions in the region, with a likely prolonged pause in dialogue between the main antagonists—Washington and Pyongyang, Pyongyang and Seoul. In his contribution to the XXII Edoardo Amaldi Conference, the author examines the history of the nuclear factor on the Korean Peninsula, considers possible approaches to reducing nuclear risks in the region, and proposes his views on progress toward denuclearization of the peninsula in the long term.

1 Why is The Region Being ‘Nuclearized’?

It is believed that the DPRK's interest in pursuing a military nuclear program has historically been driven by four main factors.

First, the division of Korea in 1945 and the ensuing confrontation between the North and the South that escalated into the Korean War, during which the United States stated it could use nuclear weapons. In November 1950 the U.S. President Harry Truman publicly declared his readiness to use nuclear weapons if necessary in order to win the Korean War. According to archival documents, in April 1951 he ordered 9 nuclear bombs to be transferred to the U.S. Air Force and transported to the Okinawa base.

Pyongyang's fear of a nuclear threat increased after American tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in South Korea in the late 1950s. At one point there were as many as 950 nuclear warheads for 8 types of US tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea. Their complete withdrawal was announced 1991. There have been no corresponding verification measures, although most analysts tend to believe that there are no U.S. nuclear weapons left on South Korean territory.

Secondly, confronted with the United States and its allies, the DPRK was interested in obtaining a kind of ‘insurance’ in case relations with Moscow and/or Beijing, with which it then had allied treaties, began to deteriorate. Due to the prolonged crisis in Sino-Soviet relations and other political developments in the socialist camp, as well as the USSR–US detente and US–China rapprochement that began in 1971, Pyongyang no longer had full confidence that Beijing and Moscow would unreservedly support it in the event of another military crisis.

Third, in the 1970s Pyongyang became aware of Seoul's efforts to develop its own nuclear weapons. South Korean President Park Chung-hee ordered the start of a secret plutonium weapons program in 1970, with the goal of developing a domestic nuclear explosive device by the end of the 1970s.

Fourth, some experts believe that the DPRK may feel that nuclear weapons could help achieve the declared goal of unifying the Korean Peninsula by preventing the United States from supporting the Republic of Korea in the event of renewed hostilities. The Constitution of the DPRK refers to the restoration of the country's unity as ‘the nation’s supreme objective’. At the same time, the Constitution of the Republic of Korea claims that its territory consists of the entire Korean Peninsula, and the South Korean National Security Act describes the DPRK as an ‘anti-government organization’.

The Korean War of 1950–1953 ended with an armistice with no peace treaty signed to date. Thus, the continued mutual antagonism between the two Koreas creates additional nuclear risks on the peninsula. Moreover, currently Pyongyang's top priority is to strengthen its deterrence capability against the United States.

2 Potential Steps to Reduce Tension and Achieve Denuclearization

A rapid denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not a realistic possibility. Nevertheless, diplomatic developments and a number of summits in 2018–2019 demonstrated that progress towards denuclearization is possible. The key principle in working out a long-term agreement should be that of ‘steps in the field of security on the one side in exchange for steps in the field of security on the other.’ Economic projects and cooperation (and in this regard, the easing and lifting of sanctions) could make an important contribution to the creation of a sustainable peace and security system in the region, but they cannot be the foundation for it in the long term.

The parties should adopt a step-by-step and reciprocal approach. The step-by-step strategy is especially important in the early phase of dialogue as an element of confidence building. A long-term solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula should be based on the principle of taking into account the security interests of all parties. At the same time, the expectations of all parties involved in the short and long term must be moderate and realistic. The primary goal here should be to prevent escalation in the region.

It is necessary to create conditions for the development of joint measures that provide proportionate benefits to all participants in the process in exchange for movement toward denuclearization. The lack of a ‘proportionate response’ from the United States and South Korea following unilateral steps by Pyongyang was one of the major bottlenecks in the dialogue process that took place in 2018–2019.

In the same vein, Washington and Seoul should recognize that the sanctions imposed on Pyongyang frequently not only do not contribute to solving the current crises in the region, but also complicate the achievement of this goal, drive the situation into an even greater deadlock and have a negative impact on the DPRK population, rather than the country's nuclear and missile capabilities. This is also valid for the UN Security Council sanctions, which, in accordance with their proclaimed objectives, were aimed primarily at abandoning by the DPRK its nuclear missile program. Visiting the DPRK (which the author had the opportunity to do several times before the COVID-19 pandemic), one can easily find examples of the negative impact of the sanctions on various areas of life of ordinary North Koreans. These include an acute shortage of medications, medical equipment, and other essentials for the proper functioning of the healthcare system. An annual UN report on food security released in July 2022 found that the percentage of undernourished people in DPRK reached 41.6% in 2019–2021.Footnote 2

A blatant example of Washington and Seoul failing or unwilling to make their way through the hurdle of sanctions was South Korea's inability to supply the DPRK with 200,000 doses of the antiviral Tamiflu in January 2019, at the height of diplomatic efforts in the region following South Korea's pledge at the highest level.

Although the 2018–2019 nuclear diplomacy did not achieve its goals, it did produce tangible results, helping to temporarily ease tensions and security concerns in the region. Pyongyang's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, which as of June 2022 continues to be in place, limits its ability to improve its nuclear warheads. The complete dismantling of all Yongbyon nuclear facilities (which the DPRK and the US discussed at the Hanoi summit in February 2019) would greatly reduce North Korea's capacity to produce weapons-usable nuclear materials (up to 80% according to some estimates) and effectively freeze the DPRK's thermonuclear program.

When it comes to the dialogue format needed to work out further steps to reduce tensions and make progress on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, one can draw on the experience of the negotiations to resolve the Iran's nuclear program crisis, which resulted in the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. The multinational approach, which included both bilateral and multilateral formats and was applied during the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, seems to be the most promising and sustainable. Distrustful of the U.S., Pyongyang has been closely following the negotiation process over the Iranian nuclear program for years, and appears to be trying to understand (among other things) the added value of multilateralism. The Panmunjom Declaration, adopted following the April 2018 meeting of South Korea and DPRK leaders, stresses the importance of international support and cooperation to address the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

In any future talks on the Korean Peninsula, the same basic principles that guided the negotiation of the JCPOA should apply: mutual respect, reciprocity, as well as recognition of state sovereignty and security interests of all parties involved.

The complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the development of a comprehensive peace and security system in Northeast Asia, however difficult and distant this goal may seem, should remain the long-term goal of the negotiation process. In this context, it would be useful to recall lessons from the Six-Party Talks, including the working group that was established to examine possible peace and security mechanisms in Northeast Asia. Each of the countries involved in the process should aim at reducing tensions, working out interim agreements in the short and medium term, and reaching complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the long term. In this regard, many analysts point out that Japan has been part of the problem rather than part of the solution in recent years, putting forward unrealistic conditions for starting a dialogue, as well as regularly bringing up issues that have nothing to do with denuclearization and only complicate the pursuit of a sustainable dialogue in the region.