Abstract
This chapter takes a step behind the legal scene by exploring the theoretical stakeholder frameworks that have contributed to different approaches to analysis and assessment of fundamental human rights. The protection of fundamental human rights is a key area of attention in relation to the Western Balkans’ accession to the European Union (EU). The terminology that is used to guide the integration often revolves around stakeholders, just as the strategy of multi-stakeholder cooperation reflects that same link with frameworks from business management theory and corporate social responsibility (CSR) doctrine. Since the frameworks come with diverging ideas for central concepts and aspirations, the philosophical contrasts that emerge should not be overlooked at a point in time where the potential and official candidate countries are in the process of taking steps towards full membership. The particular type of values project that underpins EU accession and integration reveals a bias in favor of the so-called ‘broad’ stakeholder version. However, the ‘narrow’ counterpart dismisses many of the agenda items that concern justice, solidarity, and security. Apart from providing examples that help to clarify the differences, the objective is to (re)set the stage for enhanced awareness of interdisciplinary insights, especially those that can contribute to a more nuanced and critical discourse among policymakers.
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Notes
- 1.
For a post-Brexit analysis of the impact, see Martill and Sus (2021).
- 2.
For a new form of populism in Montenegro, dominated by neither a far-right nor a far-left discourse, but controlled by leading political elites in the country’s government, see Dzankic (2017). For the anti-pluralist, authoritarian, and social inequality implications, see Centre for Civic Education (2018).
- 3.
Note that postinternational politics aims to end liberal non-democracy. See Ferguson and Mansbach (2004).
- 4.
Borrell (2021).
- 5.
Marović (2021).
- 6.
Miteva (2021).
- 7.
Wang and Rasare (2021).
- 8.
Zhexin (2018), p. 327.
- 9.
Rimmer (2020), p. 153.
- 10.
European Commission (8 November 2006), Commission proposes renewed consensus on enlargement.
- 11.
Matwijkiw and Matwijkiw (2018a), p. 110.
- 12.
For an examination of their origin (as criteria established in relation to Central and Eastern European countries), evolution (to standard accession criteria) and enforcement, see Hillion (2014), pp. 1–22.
- 13.
A country must satisfy this first criterion to have EU accession negotiations launched.
- 14.
The revised methodology includes four principles (credibility, predictability, dynamism, and a stronger political steer) and six thematic ‘policy clusters’ ((1) fundamentals, including rule of law, (2) internal market, (3) competitiveness and inclusive growth, (4) green agenda and sustainable connectivity, (5) resources, agriculture, and cohesion, and (6) external relations). See European Commission (8 November 2006), Commission proposes renewed consensus on enlargement; Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (5 February 2020a), Enhancing the Accession Process—A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans (Communication), p. 1. For rule of law, economy and functioning of democratic institutions and public administration as ‘fundamental of EU Membership,’ see Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (6 October 2020b), 2020 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, p. 4.
- 15.
The fundamentals are: Judiciary and fundamental rights; Justice, Freedom and Security; Economic criteria; Functioning of democratic institutions; Public administration reform; Public procurement; Statistics; Financial control. Note that negotiations in the area of fundamentals will be opened first and closed last. Furthermore, note that the 2020 revised methodology or approach also applies to the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, which is accompanied by the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Green Agenda for the Western Balkans. See Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (5 February 2020), Enhancing the Accession Process—A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans (Communication), p. 7; European Parliament (2020), Facts Sheet on the European Union: The Enlargement of the Union.
- 16.
A panel commissioned by Kofi Annan to help guide the UN organized the response around ‘clusters of threats,’ including poverty, disease, environmental degradation and transnational organized crime as well as inter- and intra-state conflict, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. See UN General Assembly (2 December 2004), Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, p. 2, para. 5; Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (5 February 2020), Enhancing the Accession Process—A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans (Communication), p. 1.
- 17.
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (5 February 2020), Enhancing the Accession Process—A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans (Communication), p. 4, 6.
- 18.
Ibid., p. 3, 5.
- 19.
Ibid., pp. 3–4.
- 20.
Ibid., p. 3.
- 21.
‘The EU is a strategic goal for us, but I will not condone anyone and speak out against China and Russia,’ Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić stated. See Szucs and Ozturk (2020).
- 22.
European Commission (6 May 2020a), Statement by the President Von der Leyen (following the EU-Western Balkans Zagreb Summit).
- 23.
- 24.
European Council in Action (2020), Outcome of the Zagreb EU-Western Balkans video summit of 6 May 2020 (briefing), p. 1.
- 25.
Ibid., pp. 3–4.
- 26.
Note that ‘the negotiating frameworks for Serbia and Montenegro will not be amended but the proposed changes could be accommodated within the existing frameworks with the agreement of these two countries.’ See Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (5 February 2020), Enhancing the Accession Process—A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans (Communication), p. 1.
- 27.
- 28.
For grand corruption as a phenomenon that is downplayed at the global level, see Dell (2021).
- 29.
- 30.
European Commission (30 September 2020b), Rule of Law: First Annual Report on the Rule of Law situation across the European Union.
- 31.
Ibid., pp. 2, 5, 14, 19–20, 22-23, 25, 27.
- 32.
European Commission (6 October 2020c), Montenegro 2020 Report, pp. 1, 8, 10, 13, 16. Note that this does not mention solidarity.
- 33.
European Commission (19 June 2019a), Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union: State of play and possible next steps (Communication), pp. 2–3, 9, 11, 14. Note that this mentions solidarity once (p. 2).
- 34.
Simultaneously, the UN paved the path for a modern cum broad rule of law conceptualization (‘governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. [Rule of law] requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency’), a definition that represents a significant evolution since the mentioning of human rights principles and their protection ‘by the rule of law’ in the Preamble to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See UN Security Council (2004), para. 6. Comparatively, note that important rule of law references at the international level include the Preamble to the 1992 Treaty of European Union (cf. Art. 2: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’) and the Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000). Other sources are the Preamble to the Statute of the Council of Europe (1949); the Preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights (1950); and case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
- 35.
- 36.
- 37.
Matwijkiw and Matwijkiw (2012).
- 38.
UN High-Level Meeting (26 July 2000), Global Compact.; See also UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, endorsed by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 17/4 of 16 June 2021. www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf.
- 39.
Friedman (2002), p. 27.
- 40.
Friedman (1970).
- 41.
The correlativity thesis alone says that: In order for A to have a claim-right, there must—as a logically necessary condition—exist at least one other person or party, B, who has a duty toward A. For the doctrinal complexities involving the separation thesis, the logical correlativity theses, and the interest-incompatibility thesis, see Matwijkiw (2019).
- 42.
Sangiovanni (2013), p. 238.
- 43.
‘Our national interest’ coincides with Westphalian state-centricity. This is the traditional premise.
- 44.
Friedman (2002), p. 21.
- 45.
Ibid.
- 46.
European Commission (6 May 2020a), Statement by the President Von der Leyen (following the EU-Western Balkans Zagreb Summit.
- 47.
The ICESCR makes it hold that: Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. See UN General Assembly (16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UNGAOR Supp. (No. 16), UN Doc.A/6316, 993 UNTS 3 [(ICESCR], Art. 2; European Council (1996), Social Charter Revised, arts. 13, 23, and 31.
- 48.
Matwijkiw and Matwijkiw (2014), p. 960.
- 49.
Friedman (2002), p. 3.
- 50.
Labor rights, rights to education and to a health environment, migrant worker protections are examples. See O’Connell (2012), pp. 80, 92, 97.
- 51.
Ibid., p. 97.
- 52.
Ibid., p. 86
- 53.
Ibid., pp. 80, 92.
- 54.
Matwijkiw and Matwijkiw (2014).
- 55.
Dröge (2003), p. 380.
- 56.
Henkin et al. (1999), p. 285.
- 57.
Freeman et al. (2010), p. 230.
- 58.
Bassiouni (2006), p. 544.
- 59.
- 60.
Matwijkiw and Matwijkiw (2015), p. 70.
- 61.
According to EU law, i.e., the European Council (1950), European Convention on Human Rights, Art. 8, the enjoyment of the right to privacy may be restricted by ‘the economic well-being of the country,’ thereby allowing a trade-off.
- 62.
This has the effect of dismissing the last item of the UN Global Compact’s Principle 10 (cf. ‘Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery’). For the UN 2017 admission that traditionally corruption has been viewed ‘as the price of doing business’ and not as a crime, see Fedotov (2017).
- 63.
European Commission (17 July 2019c), Strengthening the rule of law within the Union: A blueprint for action (Communication), p. 2; European Commission (19 June 2019a), Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union: State of play and possible next steps (Communication), p. 1; European Commission (30 September 2020b), Rule of Law: First Annual Report on the Rule of Law situation across the European Union, p. 2.
- 64.
Freeman (1984), p. 102.
- 65.
European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Judgment (1 July 2014), 43835/11, S.A.S. v. France. For an account of the contradictory judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), see Oriolo (2021).
- 66.
Matwijkiw and Matwijkiw (2018b), pp. 133 n9, 135 n18.
- 67.
- 68.
Matwijkiw and Matwijkiw (2019), p. 15.
- 69.
Freeman et al. (2010), pp. 226, 230.
- 70.
Sangiovanni (2013), p. 214.
- 71.
Ibid., pp. 234, 239.
- 72.
Ibid., pp. 227, 232.
- 73.
Sangiovanni (2012).
- 74.
Sangiovanni (2013), p. 215.
- 75.
Ibid., p. 229.
- 76.
Friedman (2002), p. 8.
- 77.
Ibid., p. 2.
- 78.
Matwijkiw and Matwijkiw (2014), p. 959.
- 79.
Wattad (2009), p. 273. Note that Wattad explains that the Rome Statute’s core crimes ‘are the explicit manifestations of the Nuremberg experience, i.e., the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 1945’.
- 80.
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation (15 September 2016), para. 41.
- 81.
Supra note 14.
- 82.
European Commission (2021), The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan, p. 39.
- 83.
European Commission (30 September 2020b), Rule of Law: First Annual Report on the Rule of Law situation across the European Union, p. 17.
- 84.
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions (5 February 2020), Enhancing the Accession Process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans (Communication), p. 1.
- 85.
Wilkinson (2021).
- 86.
- 87.
DK4 (2021b).
- 88.
DK4 (2021a). For the ‘limited effects’ of the infringement procedures initiated by the Commission and the European Parliament against Poland and Hungary in response to a ‘clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2’ (Art. 7 of the TEU), which are ‘values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’ (Art. 2 of the TEU), see Michelot (6 May 2019).
- 89.
DK4 (2021b).
- 90.
Ibid.
- 91.
Orford (2013).
- 92.
Matwijkiw and Matwijkiw (2014), pp. 128–129, 133–134.
- 93.
Csaky (2020).
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Acknowledgements
The two authors warmly thank Stefano Busillo from the University of Salerno Legal Observatory’s ‘EU Western Balkans Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs’ Jean Monnet Module. Stefano’s excellent editorial assistance and research input were greatly appreciated. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Matwijkiw, A., Matwijkiw, B. (2023). A Look Behind the Legal Scene: Philosophical Stakeholder Responses to Fundamental Human Rights. In: Russo, T., Oriolo, A., Dalia, G. (eds) Solidarity and Rule of Law. European Union and its Neighbours in a Globalized World, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29227-9_10
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