Abstract
This chapter explores implications of 3e Psychopathology for the task of explanation. Some general comments about explanation itself are made, before exploring implications at both a research level, and at an individual/clinical level. The section on ‘explanation for researchers’ prescribes explanatory and methodological pluralism, before assessing some different ways that attempts at explanation are targeted. The Relational Analysis of Phenomena (the RAP) is then summarized as one way to develop explanatory theory in a way congruent with 3e Psychopathology. The section on ‘explanation for clinicians’ explores the role of individually tailored explanations (i.e., ‘formulations’) in clinical practice. A rough methodological taxonomy of the ways in which approaches to formulation differ is presented. It is then explored how a 3e Psychopathology orientation would influence each factor in this taxonomy. Some 3e Psychopathology inspired clinical tools are presented.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
This last example is inspired by Krueger and Colombetti (2018).
References
Aftab, A., & Nielsen, K. (2020). 3E approach to psychopathology: Kristopher Nielsen, PhD [Interview in Psychiatric Times]. https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/view/three-approach-psychopathology-kristopher-nielsen-phd
Bechtel, W. (2009a). Explanation: Mechanism, modularity, and situated cognition. The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition, 155–170.
Bechtel, W. (2009b). Looking down, around, and up: Mechanistic explanation in psychology. Philosophical Psychology, 22(5), 543–564.
Beck, J. S. (2020). Cognitive behavior therapy: Basics and beyond. Guilford Publications.
Berenbaum, H. (2013). Classification and psychopathology research. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 122(3), 894.
Bogen, J., & Woodward, J. (1988). Saving the phenomena. The Philosophical Review, 97(3), 303–352.
Bokulich, A. (2018). Representing and explaining: The eikonic conception of scientific explanation. Philosophy of Science, 85(5), 793–805.
Borsboom, D., Cramer, A., & Kalis, A. (2018). Brain disorders? Not really… Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42, 1–54.
Brigandt, I. (2013). Explanation in biology: Reduction, pluralism, and explanatory aims. Science & Education, 22(1), 69–91.
Bringmann, L. F., Elmer, T., & Eronen, M. I. (2022). Back to basics: The importance of conceptual clarification in psychological science. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 31(4), 340–346.
Bruch, M. (2015). Beyond diagnosis: Case formulation in cognitive behavioural therapy. John Wiley & Sons.
Casey, B., Craddock, N., Cuthbert, B. N., Hyman, S. E., Lee, F. S., & Ressler, K. J. (2013). DSM-5 and RDoC: Progress in psychiatry research? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14(11), 810.
Chang, H. (2017). Is pluralism compatible with scientific realism? In The Routledge handbook of scientific realism (pp. 176–186). Routledge.
Clack, S., & Ward, T. (2020). Modeling the symptoms of psychopathology: A pluralistic approach. New Ideas in Psychology, 59, 100799.
Contractor, A. A., Roley-Roberts, M. E., Lagdon, S., & Armour, C. (2017). Heterogeneity in patterns of DSM-5 posttraumatic stress disorder and depression symptoms: Latent profile analyses. Journal of Affective Disorders, 212, 17–24.
Cuthbert, B. N. (2014). The RDoC framework: Facilitating transition from ICD/DSM to dimensional approaches that integrate neuroscience and psychopathology. World Psychiatry, 13(1), 28–35.
Cuthbert, B. N., & Insel, T. (2013). Toward the future of psychiatric diagnosis: The seven pillars of RDoC. BMC Medicine, 11(1), 126.
Cuthbert, B. N., & Kozak, M. J. (2013). Constructing constructs for psychopathology: The NIMH research domain criteria. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 122, 928–937.
Dallos, R. (2006). Integrative formulation: CAT and ANT. In Formulation in psychology and psychotherapy (pp. 199–224). Routledge.
Dallos, R., & Stedmon, J. (2013). Systemic formulation: Mapping the family dance. In Formulation in psychology and psychotherapy (pp. 87–115). Routledge.
de Haan, S. (2020b). Enactive psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.
Dickinson, D., Pratt, D. N., Giangrande, E. J., Grunnagle, M., Orel, J., Weinberger, D. R., Callicott, J. H., & Berman, K. F. (2017). Attacking heterogeneity in schizophrenia by deriving clinical subgroups from widely available symptom data. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 44(1), 101–113.
Donovan, C., & Murphy, D. (2020). De Haan on sense-making and psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 27(1), 29–30.
Eells, T. D. (2015). Psychotherapy case formulation. American Psychological Association.
Fuchs, T. (2017). Ecology of the Brain: The phenomenology and biology of the embodied mind. Oxford University Press.
Fulford, K., & Jackson, M. (1997). Spiritual experience and psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 4(1), 41–65.
Galatzer-Levy, I. R., & Bryant, R. A. (2013). 636,120 ways to have posttraumatic stress disorder. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(6), 651–662.
García Otero, E. (2022). Participatory sense-making in psychotherapy, PhD, University of the Basque Country/Universidad del País Vasco. http://hdl.handle.net/10810/56213
Gauld, C., Nielsen, K., Manon, J., Bottemanne, H., & Dumas, G. (2022). From analytic to synthetic-organizational pluralisms: A pluralistic enactive psychiatry. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 13. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2022.981787
Glennan, S., & Illari, P. (2017). The Routledge handbook of mechanisms and mechanical philosophy. Taylor & Francis.
Greenberg, L. S. (2004). Emotion–focused therapy. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy: An International Journal of Theory & Practice, 11(1), 3–16.
Haig, B. D. (2014). Investigating the psychological world; scientific method in the behavioural sciences. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Harper, D., & Spellman, D. (2006). Social constructionist formulation: Telling a different story. In Formulation in psychology and psychotherapy (pp. 115–142). Routledge.
Harris, R. (2009). ACT made simple: A quick-start guide to ACT basics and beyond. New Harbinger.
Hawkins-Elder, H., & Ward, T. (2020). The explanation of eating disorders: A critical analysis. Behaviour Change, 37(2), 93–110.
Hawkins-Elder, H., & Ward, T. (2021). From competition to co-operation: Shifting the “one best model” perspective. Theory & Psychology, 31, 821–841. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354321995900
Hershenberg, R., & Goldfried, M. R. (2015). Implications of RDoC for the research and practice of psychotherapy. Behavior Therapy, 46(2), 156–165.
Hoffman, G. A., & Zachar, P. (2017). RDoC’s metaphysical assumptions: Problems and promises. In Extraordinary science: Responding to the crisis in psychiatric research (pp. 59–86). MIT Press.
Insel, T., Cuthbert, B., Garvey, M., Heinssen, R., Pine, D. S., Quinn, K., Sanislow, C., & Wang, P. (2010). Research domain criteria (RDoC): Toward a new classification framework for research on mental disorders. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 167, 748–751.
Insel, T., & Cuthbert, B. N. (2015). Brain disorders? Precisely. Science, 348(6234), 499–500.
Jerotic, S., & Aftab, A. (2021). Scientific pluralism is the only way forward for psychiatry. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 143(6), 537–538.
Johnstone, L. (2018). Psychological formulation as an alternative to psychiatric diagnosis. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 58(1), 30–46.
Johnstone, L., Boyle, M., Cromby, J., Dillon, J., Harper, D., & Kinderman, P. (2018). The power threat meaning framework. British Psychological Society.
Johnstone, L., & Dallos, R. (2013). Introduction to formulation. In Formulation in psychology and psychotherapy (pp. 21–37). Routledge.
Jones, E. G., & Mendell, L. M. (1999). Assessing the decade of the brain. Science, 284(5415), 739–739.
Karter, J. M., & Kamens, S. R. (2019). Toward conceptual competence in psychiatric diagnosis: An ecological model for critiques of the DSM. In Critical Psychiatry (pp. 17–69). Springer.
Kendler, K. (2008). Explanatory models for psychiatric illness. American Journal of Psychiatry, 165(6), 695–702.
Kendler, K. (2012b). The dappled nature of causes of psychiatric illness: Replacing the organic–functional/hardware–software dichotomy with empirically based pluralism. Molecular Psychiatry, 17(4), 377.
Kendler, K. (2019). From many to one to many – The search for causes of psychiatric illness. JAMA Psychiatry, 76(10), 1085–1091.
Kirmayer, L. J., & Crafa, D. (2014). What kind of science for psychiatry? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 435.
Krueger, J., & Colombetti, G. (2018). Affective affordances and psychopathology. In Philosophical perspectives on affective experience and psychopathology: Vol. XXVIII–2 (pp. 221–247). Quodlibet.
Larøi, F., Luhrmann, T. M., Bell, V., Christian, W. A., Jr., Deshpande, S., Fernyhough, C., Jenkins, J., & Woods, A. (2014). Culture and hallucinations: Overview and future directions. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40(Suppl_4), S213–S220.
Leo, J., & Lacasse, J. R. (2008). The media and the chemical imbalance theory of depression. Society, 45(1), 35–45.
Lilienfeld, S. O. (2014). The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC): An analysis of methodological and conceptual challenges. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 62, 129–139.
Lilienfeld, S. O., & Treadway, M. T. (2016). Clashing diagnostic approaches: DSM-ICD versus RDoC. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 12, 435–463.
MacNeil, C. A., Hasty, M. K., Conus, P., & Berk, M. (2012). Is diagnosis enough to guide interventions in mental health? Using case formulation in clinical practice. BMC Medicine, 10(1), 1–3.
Malan, D., & Parker, L. (1995). Individual psychotherapy and the science of psychodynamics. CRC Press.
Miller, G. A. (2010). Mistreating psychology in the decades of the brain. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 5(6), 716–743.
Mitchell, S. D. (2002). Integrative pluralism. Biology and Philosophy, 17(1), 55–70.
Monroe, S. M., & Anderson, S. F. (2015). Depression: The shroud of heterogeneity. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 24(3), 227–231.
Morris, S. E., & Cuthbert, B. N. (2012). Research Domain Criteria: Cognitive systems, neural circuits, and dimensions of behavior. Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience, 14(1), 29.
NiaNia, W., Bush, A., & Epston, D. (2016). Collaborative and indigenous mental health therapy: Tātaihono–stories of Māori healing and psychiatry. Taylor & Francis.
Nielsen, K. (2020b). What is mental disorder? Developing an embodied, embedded, and enactive psychopathology. PhD thesis, Victoria University of Wellington. http://hdl.handle.net/10063/8957
Nielsen, K. (2022b). Same diagnosis, different problem: The challenge of heterogeneity in mental disorder. MIND Foundation. https://mind-foundation.org/same-diagnosis-different-problem-the-challenge-of-heterogeneity-in-mental-disorder/
Nielsen, K., & Ward, T. (2018). Towards a new conceptual framework for psychopathology: Embodiment, enactivism and embedment. Theory & Psychology, 8(6), 800–822. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354318808394
Nielsen, K., & Ward, T. (2020b). Phenomena complexes as targets of explanation in psychopathology: The Relational Analysis of Phenomena (RAP) approach. Theory & Psychology, 30(2), 164–185.
NIMH. (2022). Developmental and environmental aspects. https://www.nimh.nih.gov/research/research-funded-by-nimh/rdoc/developmental-and-environmental-aspects
Papaspirou, P., & Moussas, X. (2013). A brief tour into the history of gravity: From Emocritus to Einstein. American Journal of Space Science, 1(1), 33–45.
Potochnik, A. (2016). Scientific explanation: Putting communication first. Philosophy of Science, 83(5), 721–732.
Potochnik, A. (2017). Idealization and the aims of science. University of Chicago Press.
Radomsky, A. S., Alcolado, G. M., Abramowitz, J. S., Alonso, P., Belloch, A., Bouvard, M., Clark, D. A., Coles, M. E., Doron, G., & Fernández-Álvarez, H. (2014). Part 1 – You can run but you can’t hide: Intrusive thoughts on six continents. Journal of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders, 3(3), 269–279.
Seli, P., Risko, E. F., Purdon, C., & Smilek, D. (2017). Intrusive thoughts: Linking spontaneous mind wandering and OCD symptomatology. Psychological Research, 81(2), 392–398.
Sullivan, J. A. (2017). Coordinated pluralism as a means to facilitate integrative taxonomies of cognition. Philosophical Explorations, 20(2), 129–145.
Thagard, P. (2017). Natural philosophy: From social brains to knowledge, reality, morality, and beauty (draft 3).
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. Harvard University Press. https://books.google.co.nz/books?id=OVGna4ZEpWwC
Vanderbeeken, R., & Weber, E. (2002). Dispositional explanations of behavior. Behavior and Philosophy, 30, 43–59.
Veit, W. (2020). Model pluralism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 50(2), 91–114.
Wakefield, J. C. (2014b). Wittgenstein’s nightmare: Why the RDoC grid needs a conceptual dimension. World Psychiatry, 13(1), 38–40.
Ward, T., & Clack, S. (2019a). From symptom to clinical phenomena. New Ideas in Psychology, 54, 40–49.
Ward, T., & Clack, S. (2019b). From symptoms of psychopathology to the explanation of clinical phenomena. New Ideas in Psychology, 54, 40–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2019.01.004
Ward, T., Clack, S., & Haig, B. D. (2016). The abductive theory of method: Scientific inquiry and clinical practice. Behaviour Change, 33(4), 212–231.
Ward, T., Vertue, F. M., & Haig, B. D. (1999). Abductive method and clinical assessment in practice. Behaviour Change, 16(1), 49–63.
Wegerhoff, D. (2022). Understanding gangs: Developing an epistemically pluralist framework for gang research.
Wegerhoff, D., Ward, T., & Dixon, L. (2020). A pluralistic approach to the definition, classification, and explanation of gangs. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 58, 101546.
Wegerhoff, D., Ward, T., & Dixon, L. (2022). Epistemic pluralism and the justification of conceptual strategies in science. Theory & Psychology, 32(3), 443–466.
Wilshire, C. E., Ward, T., & Clack, S. (2021). Symptom descriptions in psychopathology: How well are they working for us? Clinical Psychological Science, 9(3), 323–339.
Zachar, P., & Kendler, K. S. (2007). Psychiatric disorders: A conceptual taxonomy. American Journal of Psychiatry, 164(4), 557–565.
Zachar, P., & Kendler, K. S. (2017). The philosophy of nosology. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 13, 49–71.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Nielsen, K. (2023). The Task of Explanation (and the Beginnings of Treatment). In: Embodied, Embedded, and Enactive Psychopathology. Palgrave Studies in the Theory and History of Psychology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29164-7_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-29164-7_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-29163-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-29164-7
eBook Packages: Behavioral Science and PsychologyBehavioral Science and Psychology (R0)