Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

How to Promote Cooperation for the Well-Being of Individuals and Societies

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Ergonomics and Nudging for Health, Safety and Happiness (SIE 2022)

Part of the book series: Springer Series in Design and Innovation ((SSDI,volume 28))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 280 Accesses

Abstract

The most successful human societies are those that have found better ways to promote cooperative behaviour. Yet, cooperation is individually costly and, therefore, it often breaks down, leading to enormous social costs. In this article, I review the literature on the mechanisms and interventions that are known to promote cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In iterated or non-anonymous interactions, I focus on the five rules of cooperation, as well as on structural changes, involving the cost or the benefit of cooperation, or the size of the interacting group. In one-shot and anonymous interactions, I focus on the role of internalised social heuristics as well as moral preferences for doing the right thing. For each account, I summarize the available experimental evidence. I hope that this review can be helpful for social scientists working on cooperation and for leaders and policy makers who aim at promoting social cooperation or teamwork.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 169.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 219.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    This suggests that there might be intermediate cases in which the individual return of full cooperation increases too slowly with the group size, leading to a null or even a negative effect of group size on cooperation. For example, it could be interesting to study the relationship between group size and cooperation in a logarithmic public goods game.

  2. 2.

    To be precise, there is also a fifth technique: neurostimulation. Neurostimulation methods come from the idea that high-level, reflective reasoning comes primarily from a specific brain area, the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC). Therefore, deactivating this area, using transcranial magnetic stimulation or transcranial direct current stimulation, might make people more likely to follow their heuristics. However, in this article, I decided not to focus on this method because, to the best of my knowledge, there are no studies testing the effect of neurostimulation of the rDLPFC on cooperative behaviour using prisoner’s dilemmas or public goods games. There is only one study, but it uses an asymmetric public goods game (Li et al. 2018). I hope that future work can fill this gap.

  3. 3.

    For completeness, I mention that also neurostimulation tools have been criticised, as they are usually applied over the brain area of interest. This implicitly assumes that the stimulus spreads uniformly towards the target area. However, this is generally not true, but depends on the topography of the cortical surface, which, in some cases, can even reverse the polarity of the stimulus (Berker et al., 2013; Rahman et al., 2013).

  4. 4.

    I refer to Capraro, Halpern and Perc (in press) for a review article providing many examples of situations in which people’s behaviour cannot be explained using outcome-based utility functions but require language-based utility functions; moral preferences can be seen as particular language-based utility functions, where morally loaded language carries the moral utility of an action.

  5. 5.

    There is also one work exploring the effect of moral messages in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2014) found that making participants read the Golden Rule increases cooperation in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, although the effect vanishes after a few rounds.

  6. 6.

    Internalised moral identity measures the extent to which being moral is important to one’s self-concept, while symbolised moral identity measures the extent to which people care about looking moral (Aquino and Reed 2002).

  7. 7.

    The descriptive norm represents what other people actually do (Cialdini et al. 1990).

References

  • Aquino, K., Reed, A., II.: The self-importance of moral identity. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 83, 1423–1440 (2002)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barcelo, H., Capraro, V.: Group size effect on cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas. Sci. Rep. 5, 7937 (2015)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bašić, Z., Verrina, E.: Personal norms—and not only social norms—shape economic behavior. MPI Collective Goods Discussion Paper, (2020/25)

    Google Scholar 

  • Basu, K.: The traveler’s dilemma: paradoxes of rationality in game theory. Am. Econ. Rev. 84, 391–395 (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  • de Berker, A.O., Bikson, M., Bestmann, S.: Predicting the behavioral impact of transcranial direct current stimulation: Issues and limitations. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7, 613 (2013)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bertrand, J.: Book review of theorie mathematique de la richesse social and of recherches sur les principes mathematiques de la theorie des richesses. J. des Savants (1883)

    Google Scholar 

  • Bilancini, E., Boncinelli, L.: The co-evolution of cooperation and defection under local interaction and endogenous network formation. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 70, 186–195 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bilancini, E., Boncinelli, L., Wu, J.: The interplay of cultural intolerance and action-assortativity for the emergence of cooperation and homophily. Eur. Econ. Rev. 102, 1–18 (2018)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Binmore, K.: Modeling rational players: part I. Econ. Philos. 3, 179–214 (1987)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Biziou van Pol, L., Haenen, J., Novaro, A., Occhipinti-Liberman, A., Capraro, V.: Does telling white lies signal pro-social preferences? Judgm. Decis. Mak. 10, 538–548 (2015)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Böhm, R., Rockenbach, B.: The inter-group comparison – intra-group cooperation hypothesis: comparisons between groups increase efficiency in public goods provision. PLoS ONE 8, e56152 (2013)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bolton, G.E., Katok, E., Ockenfels, A.: Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation. J. Public Econ. 89, 1457–1468 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Richerson, P.J.: The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 100, 3531–3535 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Capraro, V.: The dual-process approach to human sociality: a review. Available at SSRN 3409146 (2019)

    Google Scholar 

  • Capraro, V., Barcelo, H.: Group size effect on cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas II: curvilinear effect. PLoS ONE 10, e0131419 (2015)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Capraro, V., Barcelo, H.: Punishing defectors and rewarding cooperators: do people discriminate between genders? J. Econ. Sci. Assoc. 7(1), 19–32 (2021a). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40881-021-00099-4

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Capraro, V., Barcelo, H.: Telling people to “rely on their reasoning” increases intentions to wear a face covering to slow down COVID-19 transmission. Appl. Cogn. Psychol. 35, 693–699 (2021b)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Capraro, V., Cococcioni, G.: Rethinking spontaneous giving: extreme time pressure and ego-depletion favor self-regarding reactions. Sci. Rep. 6, 27219 (2016)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Capraro, V., Giardini, F., Vilone, D., Paolucci, M.: Partner selection supported by opaque reputation promotes cooperative behavior. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 11, 589–600 (2016)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Capraro, V., Halpern, J. Y., Perc, M.: From outcome-based to language-based preferences. J. Econ. Literature (in press)

    Google Scholar 

  • Capraro, V., Jagfeld, G., Klein, R., Mul, M., de Pol, I.V.: Increasing altruistic and cooperative behaviour with simple moral nudges. Sci. Rep. 9, 11880 (2019)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Capraro, V., Jordan, J.J., Rand, D.G.: Heuristics guide the implementation of social preferences in one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments. Sci. Rep. 4, 6790 (2014)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Capraro, V., Perc, M.: Mathematical foundations of moral preferences. J. R. Soc. Interface 18, 20200880 (2021)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Capraro, V., Rand, D.G.: Do the right thing: experimental evidence that preferences for moral behavior, rather than equity and efficiency per se, drive human prosociality. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 13, 99–111 (2018)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carroll, J.W.: Iterated N-player prisoner’s dilemma games. Philos. Stud.: Int. J. Philos. Anal. Tradit. 53, 411–415 (1988)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Catola, M., D’Alessandro, S., Guarnieri, P., Pizziol, V.: Personal norms in the online public good game. Econ. Lett. 207, 110024 (2021)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Caviola, L., Capraro, V.: Liking but devaluing animals: emotional and deliberative paths to speciesism. Soc. Psychol. Pers. Sci. 11, 1080–1088 (2020)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chierchia, G., Parianen Lesemann, F.H., Snower, D., Singer, T.: Cooperation across multiple game theoretical paradigms is increased by fear more than anger in selfish individuals. Sci. Rep. 11, 9351 (2021)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cialdini, R.B., Reno, R.R., Kallgren, C.A.: A focus theory of normative conduct: recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 58, 1015–1026 (1990)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dal Bó, P., Fréchette, G.R.: The evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: experimental evidence. Am. Econ. Rev. 101, 411–429 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dal Bó, E., Dal Bó, P.: Do the right thing: the effects of moral suasion on cooperation. J. Public Econ. 117, 28–38 (2014)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duffy, J., Ochs, J.: Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction. Games Econom. Behav. 66, 785–812 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dunbar, R.I., Marriott, A., Duncan, N.D.: Human conversational behavior. Hum. Nat. 8, 231–246 (1997)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Engel, C., Zhurakhovska, L.: When is the risk of cooperation worth taking? The prisoner’s dilemma as a game of multiple motives. Appl. Econ. Lett. 23, 1157–1161 (2016)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Erev, I., Bornstein, G., Galili, R.: Constructive intergroup competition as a solution to the free rider problem: a field experiment. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 29, 463–478 (1993)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J.S.B.T., Stanovich, K.E.: Dual-process theories of higher cognition: advancing the debate. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 8, 223–241 (2013)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehl, K., van der Post, D.J., Semman, D.: Co-evolution of behaviour and social network structure promotes human cooperation. Ecol. Lett. 14, 546–551 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U.: The nature of human altruism. Nature 425, 785–791 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., Gächter, S.: Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. Am. Econ. Rev. 90, 980–994 (2000)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, E., Gächter, S.: Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415, 137–140 (2002)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., Fehr, E.: Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Econ. Lett. 71, 397–404 (2001)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg, D., Rand, D.G., Dreber, A.: Slow to anger and fast to forgive: cooperation in an uncertain world. Am. Econ. Rev. 102, 720–749 (2012)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gracia-Lázaro, C., et al.: Heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 109, 12922–12926 (2012)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grujić, J., Eke, B., Cabrales, A., Cuesta, J.A., Sánchez, A.: Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner’s dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior. Sci. Rep. 2, 638 (2012b)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grujić, J., Fosco, C., Araujo, L., Cuesta, J.A., Sánchez, A.: Social experiments in the mesoscale: humans playing a spatial prisoner’s dilemma. PLoS ONE 5, e13749 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grujić, J., Röhl, T., Semmann, D., Milinski, M., Traulsen, A.: Consistent strategy updating in spatial and non-spatial behavioral experiments does not promote cooperation in social networks. PLoS ONE 7, e47718 (2012a)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gunnthorsdottir, A., Houser, D., McCabe, K.: Disposition, history and contributions in public goods experiments. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 62, 304–315 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gunnthorsdottir, A., Rapoport, A.: Embedding social dilemmas in intergroup competition reduces free-riding. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 101, 184–199 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hamburger, H.: N-person prisoner’s dilemma. J. Math. Sociol. 3, 27–48 (1973)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hamilton, W.D.: The genetical evolution of social behaviour. J. Theor. Biol. 7, 17–52 (1964)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heckathorn, D.D.: The dynamics and dilemmas of collective action. Am. Soc. Rev. 61, 250–277 (1996)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Herrmann, B., Thoni, C., Gachter, S.: Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319, 1362–1367 (2008)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Inzlicht, M., Schmeichel, B.J., Macrae, C.N.: Why self-control seems (but may not be) limited. Trends Cogn. Sci. 18, 127–133 (2014)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Isaac, R.M., Walker, J.M., Williams, A.W.: Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods: experimental evidence utilizing large groups. J. Public Econ. 54(1), 1–36 (1994)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D.: Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  • Kimbrough, E.O., Vostroknutov, A.: Norms make preferences social. J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. 14, 608–638 (2016)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kocher, M.G., Cherry, T., Kroll, S., Netzer, R.J., Sutter, M.: Conditional cooperation on three continents. Econ. Lett. 101, 175–178 (2008)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kvarven, A., et al.: The intuitive cooperation hypothesis revisited: a meta-analytic examination of effect-size and between-study heterogeneity. J. Econ. Sci. Assoc. 6, 26–42 (2019)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levine, E., Barasch, A., Rand, D.G., Berman, J.Z., Small, D.A.: Signaling emotion and reason in cooperation. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 5, 702–719 (2018)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Li, J., Liu, X., Yin, X., Wang, G., Niu, X., Zhu, C.: Transcranial direct current stimulation altered voluntary cooperative norms compliance under equal decision-making power. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 12, 265 (2018)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Libet, B.: Mind Time: The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  • Madsen, E.A., et al.: Kinship and altruism: a cross-cultural experimental study. Br. J. Psychol. 98, 339–359 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mieth, L., Buchner, A., Bell, R.: Moral labels increase cooperation and costly punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with punishment option. Sci. Rep. 11, 10221 (2021)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milinski, M., Semmann, D., Krambeck, H.J.: Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ Nature 415, 424–426 (2002)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Motro, D., Kugler, T., Connolly, T.: Back to the basics: how feelings of anger affect cooperation. Int. J. Conf. Manag. 27, 523–546 (2016)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murnighan, J.K., Roth, A.E.: Expecting continued play in prisoner’s dilemma games: a test of several models. J. Conflict Resolut. 27, 279–300 (1983)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nowak, M.A.: Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314, 1560–1563 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nowak, M.A., Sigmund, K.: Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature 393, 573–577 (1998)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, E., Walker, J., Gardner, R.: Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 86, 404–417 (1992)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., Nowak, M.A.: A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks. Nature 441, 502–505 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Perc, M., Jordan, J.J., Rand, D.G., Wang, Z., Boccaletti, S., Szolnoki, A.: Statistical physics of human cooperation. Phys. Rep. 687, 1–51 (2017)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pereda, M., Capraro, V., Sánchez, A.: Group size effects and critical mass in public goods games. Sci. Rep. 9, 5503 (2019)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peysakhovich, A., Nowak, M.A., Rand, D.G.: Humans display a “cooperative phenotype” that is domain general and temporally stable. Nat. Commun. 5, 4939 (2014)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pfeiffer, T., Tran, L., Krumme, C., Rand, D.G.: The value of reputation. J. R. Soc. Interface 9, 2791–2797 (2012)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Polman, E., Kim, S.H.: Effects of anger, disgust, and sadness on sharing with others. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 39, 1683–1692 (2013)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Puurtinen, M., Mappes, T.: Between-group competition and human cooperation. Proc. Royal Soc. B: Biol. Sci. 276, 355–360 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rahman, A., Reato, D., Arlotti, M., Gasca, F., Datta, A., Parra, L.C., et al.: Cellular effects of acute direct stimulation: somatic and synaptic terminal effects. J. Physiol. 591, 2563–2578 (2013)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rand, D.G., Arbesman, S., Christakis, N.A.: Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 108, 19193–19198 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rand, D.G., Dreber, A., Ellingsen, T., Fudenberg, D., Nowak, M.A.: Positive interactions promote public cooperation. Science 325, 1272–1275 (2009)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rand, D.G., Nowak, M.A., Fowler, J.H., Christakis, N.A.: Static network structure can stabilize human cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 111, 17093–17098 (2014a)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rand, D.G.: Cooperation, fast and slow: Meta-analytic evidence for a theory of social heuristics and self-interested deliberation. Psychol. Sci. 27, 1192–1206 (2016)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rand, D.G.: Intuition, deliberation, and cooperation: Further meta-analytic evidence from 91 experiments on pure cooperation (2019). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3390018

  • Rand, D.G., Nowak, M.A.: Human cooperation. Trends Cogn. Sci. 17, 413–425 (2013)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rand, D.G., et al.: Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation. Nat. Commun. 5, 3677 (2014b)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rapoport, A., Chammah, A.M.: Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation (Vol. 165). University of Michigan press, Ann Arbor (1965)

    Google Scholar 

  • Richerson, P., et al.: Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: a sketch of the evidence. Behav. Brain Sci. 39, 1–68 (2016)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rockenbach, B., Milinski, M.: The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment. Nature 444, 718–723 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A.E., Murnighan, J.K.: Equilibrium behavior and repeated play of the prisoner’s dilemma. J. Math. Psychol. 17, 189–198 (1978)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Seinen, I., Schram, A.: Social status and group norms: indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment. Eur. Econ. Rev. 50, 581–602 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sommerfeld, R.D., Krambeck, H.J., Semmann, D., Milinski, M.: Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 104, 17435–17440 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., Haynes, J.D.: Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the human brain. Nat. Neurosci. 11, 543–545 (2008)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suri, S., Watts, D.J.: Cooperation and contagion in web-based, networked public goods experiments. PLoS ONE 6, e16836 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tan, J.H., Bolle, F.: Team competition and the public goods game. Econ. Lett. 96, 133–139 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., Moll, H.: Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition. Behav. Brain Sci. 28, 675–691 (2005)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Traulsen, A., Nowak, M.A.: Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 103, 10952–10955 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Traulsen, A., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R.D., Krambeck, H.J., Milinski, M.: Human strategy updating in evolutionary games. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 107, 2962–2966 (2010)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wang, J., Suri, S., Watts, D.J.: Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner updating. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 109, 14363–14368 (2012)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yamagishi, T.: The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 51, 110–116 (1986)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yang, W., et al.: Nonlinear effects of group size on collective action and resource outcomes. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 110, 10916–10921 (2013)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yao, X., Darwen, P.J.: An experimental study of N-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma games. Informatica 18, 435–450 (1994)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Middlesex University, London, NW44BT, UK

    Valerio Capraro

Authors
  1. Valerio Capraro
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Valerio Capraro .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Azienda USL Toscana Nord Ovest, Lucca, Italy

    Tommaso Bellandi

  2. Organizzazione Sviluppo e Qualità, Policlinico Umberto I, Rome, Italy

    Sara Albolino

  3. IMT School for Advanced Studies, Lucca, Italy

    Ennio Bilancini

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Capraro, V. (2023). How to Promote Cooperation for the Well-Being of Individuals and Societies. In: Bellandi, T., Albolino, S., Bilancini, E. (eds) Ergonomics and Nudging for Health, Safety and Happiness. SIE 2022. Springer Series in Design and Innovation , vol 28. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28390-1_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28390-1_2

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-28389-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-28390-1

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation