Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of marginalization in general, and protest in particular, on foreign fighter (FF) mobilization in Tunisia between 2011 and 2014. The Arab Uprisings and the subsequent democratic transition period were marked by a high number of protests, and at the same time, Tunisia was one of the main suppliers of FF for the civil war in Syria. Drawing on a unique data set, and focusing on the fighters’ origin, Sterman and Rosenberg (2018) conclude a positive association between protest and the mobilization of FF. In order to review their results, this paper utilized a negative binomial regression to assess FF mobilization on the delegation level in Tunisia. This paper cannot reinforce Sterman and Rosenberg’s claims because protest events, as well as marginalization indicators, failed to show the expected effects on FF mobilization. Instead, Ansar al-Sharia’s activities, and the migration rate of a delegation, proved to be potent predictors. Hence, this paper questions the role marginalization, and protest in particular, play in the mobilization on theoretical and empirical grounds. This paper advocates for a greater emphasis on opportunity structures and frames than on local marginalization and the analytical distinction between FF and transnational or national terrorism.
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Notes
- 1.
Following Malet, a foreign fighter (FF) is, in this paper, broadly defined as “[a] non-citizen of a state experiencing civil conflict who arrives from an external state to join an insurgency” (Malet, 2015, p. 459).
- 2.
In the following, the author will refer to the so-called Islamic State by using the Arabic acronym, Daesh. For further information. See Dearden (2014).
- 3.
Radicalization is broadly defined here as “the process by which an individual acquires the motivation to use violence” (Hegghammer, 2013, p. 2); Mobilizing to fight as an FF can thus clearly be interpreted as a sign of being radicalized. Still, the term foreign fighter mobilization, rather than radicalization, is used predominantly in this paper, as it is focused on this topic specifically and does not aim to make broader claims on the radicalization process as such.
- 4.
These files were leaked by a supposed Daesh defector and acquired by several news outlets. They were filled out by individuals that crossed into territory held by Daesh and contained, among other things, information on the individual’s place of origin. For more information, see Dodwell et al. (2016).
- 5.
See, for example, Dawson (2021) for a non-systematic, yet thorough, review of the empirical literature on (Western) foreign fighters.
- 6.
Delegation refers to an administrative unit in Tunisia subordinate to a governorate.
- 7.
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project provides comprehensive conflict data worldwide, encompassing wars as well as demonstrations. For more information see: https://acleddata.com/#/dashboard_last checked: 06/05/2021.
- 8.
For the exact definition of socioeconomic and other protests, see Vatthauer and Weipert-Fenner (2017, p. 9).
- 9.
For more information, see the ACLED codebook https://acleddata.com/resources/general-guides/_last checked: 03/13/2020.
- 10.
ONAS is responsible for sewerage system in Tunisia, as well as the protection of the water environment and fight against water pollution: http://www.onas.nat.tn/Fr/index.php?code=3_last checked:01/05/2020.
- 11.
Aaron Y. Zelin’s Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia Full Activities Database, last updated August 26, 2016; It is important to note that Zelin does not claim exhaustiveness regarding AST activity.
- 12.
Pearson’s r is approximately 0.586.
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Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Constantin Ruhe for his technical feedback, the participants of the PRIF-Colloquium, and the two anonymous reviewers for their critical and valuable input, as well as Aaron Zelin for generously sharing his data. A special gratitude is reserved for Clara Süß for her strong encouragement and invaluable feedback.
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Strunk, J. (2023). Correlates for Foreign Fighters in Tunisia. In: Beck, D., Renner-Mugono, J. (eds) Radicalization and Variations of Violence. Contributions to International Relations. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-27011-6_4
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