Abstract
A cursory reading of the election of Luis Arce as president of Bolivia in October 2020 might suggest that the continuum of “left-wing” governments that had succeeded one another in that country since 2005 was hindered only for a year.
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Notes
- 1.
The “Proceso de cambio” [“Process of change”] is the name given to the three successive presidential mandates of former President Evo Morales, between January 22, 2006 and November 10, 2019. It is associated with a “diversity of experiences” of “leftist governments” in Latin America that followed the victory of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in 1998, constituting a “pink wave” that, in the 2000s, benefited more from a “sanction vote against neo-liberal experiences than from a vote of adhesion to his project” (O. Dabène, “Introduction. The Latin American Left in Action”. The Left in Latin America (1998–2012). Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2012, pp. 15–18). Olivier Dabène points out that, like the case of Hugo Chavez, the figure of Evo Morales emerged “on the ruins of a party system” and constituted a “charismatic and plebiscitary leadership” that compensated for “the absence of solidly institutionalized political parties” (Olivier, Dabène, ibid., pp. 20 and 25).
- 2.
A section devoted to understanding the antecedents comprised between 1982 and 2005, the features of the “Pacted democracy” period, fand the recurrence of unfinished presidential terms since the return to democracy in Bolivia are available online (OPALC’s website).
- 3.
S. Romero Ballivián, “Análisis de la elección presidencial de 2005 en Bolivia.” América Latina Hoy 43, 2006, pp. 49–50.
- 4.
V. Audubert, Plurinationalité et vivre bien en Bolivie: le droit au temps d'Evo Morales. Editions L'Harmattan, 2021, p. 280.
- 5.
Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Transitory Provisions, I, paragraph II.
- 6.
Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Article 168.
- 7.
Plurinational Constitutional Court, Plurinational Constitutional Award No. 003/2013 of April 25, 2013. In so doing, the TCP affirmed that the 2009 Constitution was drafted by the Constituent Assembly, without considering that the final text that was submitted to a referendum had actually been revised and modified by Congress, a constituted power. The transitional provision limiting a consecutive re-election of Evo Morales was precisely the result of negotiations in Parliament. For a history of the Constituent Assembly, see S. Schavelzon, El nacimiento del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, etnografía de una asamblea constituyente. Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Democracia, Plural editores, 2012.
- 8.
A scandal between a “telenovela” and favoritism had affected the image of the President. See: J. Lafuente and F. Molina, “Bolivia le dice no a la intención de Evo Morales de buscar otra reelección,” El País, February 24, 2016.
- 9.
Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal, Plurinational Constitutional Sentence N°0084/2017 of November 28, 2017.
- 10.
It should be noted that in 2021 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, an autonomous judicial institution whose purpose is to apply and interpret the American Convention, contradicted this constitutional sentence by stating that “Allowing indefinite presidential re-election is contrary to the principles of a representative democracy and thus to the obligations set forth in the American Convention on Human Rights and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.” See: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-28/21 of June 7, 2021 requested by the Republic of Colombia.
- 11.
A. Quispe, «‘Plataformas ciudadanas’, reflejo de la crisis política», La Razón, July 18, 2018.
- 12.
«Plataformas ciudadanas del 21F declaran “dictador” a Evo Morales», Opinión, June 2018.
- 13.
«Plataformas ciudadanas se organizan en defensa del 21F para evitar repostulación de Evo», ANF, September, 1st, 2018.
- 14.
Latinobarómetro Report 2018.
- 15.
F. Flores Castro, «Ley de organizaciones políticas en Bolivia. ¿Necesidad o instrumentalización?», Política Exterior, Accessed on December 10, 2021. https://www.politicaexterior.com/ley-organizaciones-politicas-bolivia-necesidad-instrumentalizacion/.
- 16.
E. Morales Ayma, Law of Political Organizations No. 1096, September 1, 2019.
- 17.
Rubén Ariñez, “Dunia Sandóval renuncia al TSE: dice que la entidad toma decisiones que van contra su ‘ética democrática’,” La Razón, January 30, 2019. This resignation followed that of the President of the TSE who, before the primaries, declared that the plenary chamber of the court was blocked in making decisions on “fundamental issues for the safeguarding of the institutionality.” See: “Katia Uriona renuncia al TSE,” Página Siete, October 22, 2018.
- 18.
F. Chávez, «Según la encuesta, 68% cree que habrá fraude electoral», Pagina Siete, September, 29, 2019.
- 19.
Los Tiempos, September 30, 2019.
- 20.
Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Art. 11, II.
- 21.
«Bartolinas advierten con “lucha armada” en defensa de Evo», Página Siete, October, 8 2019.
- 22.
C. Sánchez, «Evo advierte que cívicos y exmilitares planean quemar la Casa Grande del Pueblo y dar golpe de Estado», Oxigeno.bo, October, 14, 2019 (http://oxigeno.bo/pol%C3%ADtica/38959).
- 23.
OAS, «Declaración de la misión de observación electoral de la OEA en Bolivia», October, 21st, 2019. Consulted on December, 10, 2021: https://www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=C-085/19). In their final report, the OAS experts stated that “the manipulations and irregularities indicated do not allow us to be certain of the margin of victory of candidate Morales over candidate Mesa. On the contrary, based on some overwhelming evidence, it can be said that there was a series of deliberate operations aimed at altering the will expressed in the ballot box” (OAS, “Análisis de integridad electoral, elecciones generales en el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia - 20 de octubre de 2019,” December 4, 2019, https://www.oas.org/es/sap/deco/informe-bolivia-2019/0.1%20Informe%20Final%20-%20Analisis%20de%20Integridad%20Electoral%20Bolivia%202019%20(OSG).pdf).
- 24.
In its final report, the European Union’s electoral expert mission found “numerous errors and irregularities in the protocols” and stated that the counting process was “chaotic and appeared to be due to the TSE’s effort to announce the results as soon as possible. See: Unión Europea—Misión de Expertos. Bolivia 2019, Informe Final, December 20, 2019 (https://www.uetrabajandojuntos.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/EU-EEM-BOL-2019-FR-ES.pdf).
- 25.
R. Aron, «Introduction à la philosophie politique», Editions de Fallois, 1997, pp. 38–39.
- 26.
Ibid., 50–53.
- 27.
According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, between 2008 and 2018 the Gini index fell from 0.513 to 0.438. In the same period, poverty had fallen from 46.5 to 33.2% of the population and extreme poverty from 21.4% to 14.7%. In fact, between 2017 and 2018, Bolivia had experienced the largest decrease in extreme poverty in the entire region (minus 1.7 points). See: CEPAL, Panorama social de América latina 2019.
- 28.
H. Do Alto, «Bolivie: la réélection d’Evo Morales, le triomphe d’un protestataire devenu gestionnaire», in O. Compagnon et M. L. Geoffray, Amérique latine – Edition 2015-2016, IHEAL-Université Paris 3, La Documentation française, p. 36.
- 29.
MAS-IPSP, Programa de gobierno – Agenda del Pueblo para el bicentenario, 2019.
- 30.
MAS-IPSP, «Mesa es igual a Macri», October 2019.
- 31.
Cuarto intermedio N°123, Elecciones generales 2019 – Lo que los candidatos dicen, entrevista y análisis a profundidad, Agencia de Noticias Fides, Editora Presencia S.R.L, September 2019, pp. 73–74, 87–88.
- 32.
Idem.
- 33.
Ibid., p. 61.
- 34.
F. Molina, «Evo Morales, implicado en un escándalo por tráfico de influencias», El País, March 1st, 2016.
- 35.
In fact, Carlos Mesa had been mandated by Evo Morales to be the spokesperson for Bolivia’s maritime claim at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, between 2016 and 2018.
- 36.
Cuarto intermedio, ibid., p. 90.
- 37.
L. Mealla, «Ni Morales ni Mesa llegan a dos tercios», La Razon, October 21, 2019.
- 38.
See the data collected and their analysis on OPALC’s website.
- 39.
«Enfrentamientos en Santa Cruz dejan 2 muertos y 6 heridos de bala», Los Tiempos, October 31, 2019; «Jornada violenta en Cochabamba deja un muerto y 90 heridos», Opinión, November 6, 2019.
- 40.
OEA, «Comunicado del Grupo de auditores proceso electoral en Bolivia», November 10, 2019.
- 41.
M. Campos Vélez, «La COB se abre a la renuncia del presidente Evo Morales», El Deber, November 10, 2019.
- 42.
Article 245 of the 2009 Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia states that ‘the organisation of the armed forces’ is “essentially obedient, does not deliberate and is subject to military laws and regulations. As an institutional body, it does not carry out political action”. The Bolivian army is therefore not supposed to intervene in the politics. However, in an interview conducted after the events (L. Nuñez, ‘Williams Kaliman, Excomandante de las Fuerzas Armadas: “No ha habido un golpe de Estado en Bolivia”’, El Mundo, December 5, 2019), the former commander-in-chief of the armed forces declared he acted in this way because of ‘the escalation of the conflict, which could reach a point of no return’. He would therefore have followed Article 20 of the Armed Forces Organization Act, which gives the military high command the responsibility to ‘analyse situations of internal and external conflict, in order to suggest appropriate solutions to the appropriate person’. It should be noted that although Article 19 of said law indicates that the military high command is composed of the commander-in-chief, the chief of staff and the commanders of the three branches (army, air force and navy), the president and the minister of defense are also part of it. See: Organic Law of the Armed Forces of the Nation, Law 1405 of 30 December 1992.
- 43.
«Golpe de estado en Bolivia. Mensaje de Evo Morales», La Jornada, November 11, 2019.
- 44.
Amnesty International, «Para sanar la pandemia de la impunidad», 2020, p. 4 and 7.
- 45.
«El Ejército de Bolivia se une a la Policía para contener el vandalismo», El Mundo, November 12, 2019.
- 46.
According to the Bolivian Bishops’ Conference, at a dialogue meeting held on the morning of 12 November, attended by the ambassadors of Brazil, the European Union and Spain, civic committees and opposition parties, Senator Adriana Salvatierra, who the day before had given up the presidency of the Senate, agreed to sit in the Assembly in order to acknowledge Jeanine Añez as the President of the Senate and therefore President of Bolivia. She repeated, however, that she would have to consult Evo Morales on the matter. This meeting was the result of a request for mediation made on 7 November by the Minister of Communications, Manuel Canelas. On 11 November, the discussions had focused on the MAS’ demand that Evo Morales be guaranteed to leave for Mexico before any discussions could take place. See: Conferencia Episcopal de Bolivia, Memoria del proceso de facilitación de dialogo 2019–2020.
- 47.
The Second Vice President has the power to “replace the President or Vice-President when they are absent for any reason”. Plurinational State of Bolivia, National Legislative Assembly, Chamber of Senators, General Regulations, R. No. 008/2012–2013, Art. 41, a. Such regulations do not specify whether such a replacement requires a vote of the Senate members.
- 48.
This communiqué referred to the jurisprudence contained in a Constitutional Declaration issued in 2001. This had provided that in the event of a vacancy caused by the Head of State and not by a proclamation, “the Vice-President shall ipso facto assume the Presidency of the Republic until the end of the constitutional period” (See: Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal of Bolivia, Constitutional Declaration No. 0003/01, 31 July 2001). In its 2019 communiqué, the PCC established that while this declaration was based on a now repealed constitution, the similarity of the articles of the latter with those of the 2009 text relating to succession—apart from the fact that the President of the Supreme Court of Justice is no longer provided for as a possible replacement—was relevant (See: ‘El Tribunal Constitucional respalda la sucesión presidencial’, Correo del Sur, November 12, 2019). The cited article referred to cases of “impediment” or “definitive absence” (Art. 169.I) and not to a resignation presented to Parliament (Art. 169.II). It should be stressed that a communiqué is not binding. However, in 2021, the TCP declared that it could not find any record of a sentence or declaration or under which the magistrates had pronounced on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the presidential succession (See: ‘Comunicado’ o aval: compara la respuesta del TCP con el documento de 2019’, Pagina Siete, August 4, 2021).
- 49.
«Presidenta cambia Alto Mando militar», Correo del sur, November 14, 2019.
- 50.
The emblem of Bolivia’s indigenous peoples, the wiphala, is considered as a “symbol” of the State in the 2009 Constitution (Art. 6II).
- 51.
J. Añez, Supreme Decree nº 4078 of 14 November 2019.
- 52.
OAS, «CIDH presenta sus observaciones preliminares tras su visita a Bolivia, y urge una investigación internacional para las graves violaciones de derechos humanos ocurridas en el marco del proceso electoral desde octubre de 2019», December 10, 2019.
- 53.
J. Añez, Law No. 1266, November 24, 2019.
- 54.
J. Añez, Law No. 1270 of 20 January 2020.
- 55.
J. R. Alanoca Paco, «En bochonorsa sesión legisladores aprueban las renuncias de Evo Morales y Álvaro García Linera», El Deber, January 21, 2020.
- 56.
See OPALC’s website.
- 57.
«Trump respalda a Añez y denuncia que hay una violencia en curso en contra de Bolivia», Urgente, December 17, 2019.
- 58.
F. Molina, «Bolivia: un nuevo bloque de poder», Nueva Sociedad, January 2020.
- 59.
In a survey carried out by CiesMori, 65% of those questioned did not approve of the president's candidacy, two points more than those who disapproved of Evo Morales’ candidacy for the Senate. See: P. Ortiz, ‘La huella del 21-F marcó el camino para el cambio de la política boliviana’, El Deber, February 21, 2020.
- 60.
J. Añez, Decree No. 4146, March 16, 2020.
- 61.
A complementary decree stipulated that those inciting non-compliance with the quarantine rules in force, disseminating misinformation or creating “uncertainty in the population” would be liable to criminal prosecution for “crimes against public health” (Art. 7). J. Añez, Decree No. 4199, March 21, 2020.
- 62.
In May 2020, the Minister of Health was arrested for purchasing overpriced respirators. “Arrestan y echan al ministro de Salud boliviano por presuntos sobreprecios en respiradores”, Telam, May 25, 2020.
- 63.
During her term of office, the President made eighteen cabinet shuffles. See: ‘18 cambios de ministros en 11 meses’, Opinión, September 29, 2020.
- 64.
«Bolivia decreta estado de “calamidad pública” por coronavirus», El Clarín, July 27, 2020.
- 65.
«La presidenta Áñez contagiada, récord de casos y hospitales en emergencia en Bolivia», Telam, July 9, 2020.
- 66.
«Bolivia flexibiliza la cuarentena para evitar una situación de “coronahambre”», Telam, August 28, 2020.
- 67.
«Evo insta a movilizados a considerar el Acta de entendimiento que ratifica elecciones para el 18 de octubre», ANF, August 10, 2020.
- 68.
«Añez le declara guerra frontal al feminicidio y el infanticidio», Página Siete, January 13, 2020.
- 69.
«Gobierno presenta el programa “Bolivia mujer” con una inversión de $us 100 millones», Los Tiempos, March 9, 2020.
- 70.
See OPALC’s website for further development.
- 71.
«Choquehuanca: “Insistir en reelección a pesar de que hubo un referéndum ha sido un error”», Opinión, October 13, 2020.
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Urioste, S. (2023). The 2019 Elections in Bolivia. In: Dabène, O. (eds) Latin America’s Pendular Politics. Studies of the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26761-1_11
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