The Genealogy of the External Dimension of the Spanish Immigration Regime: When a Bricolage National Policy Becomes a Driver of Europeanisation

Abstract

This chapter will examine the genealogy of practices, logics and organisational strategies strongly linked to multilevel policy framework that fostered the development of the Spanish migration regime’s external dimension. The analysis focuses on the changing relations between Spain and the EU associated with the policymaking on externalisation of immigration policy in order to better understand influences, policy diffusion and circulation between these two political actors.

The evolution of the Spanish regime is segmented into three different periods, characterised by specific internal dynamics and by specific interactions with the EU. First, a focus on the period of “top-down Europeanisation” (1985–1999) where the EU asserted a dominant influence that impacted Spanish immigration policy, pushed by the conditionality of the Spanish accession to the EU, and later to the Schengen Area. Second, the chapter analyses how Spain progressed from a passive receiver of European norms and standards to become an active player in European policy-making, fostering changes and new developments in the EU immigration regime, initiating a more horizontal Europeanisation beginning in the 2000s. Third, through the development of the external dimension of Spanish immigration policy, Spain became a model and inspiration for migration policies implemented at the EU level in the 2010s, marking a bottom-up Europeanisation. In each of these phases, Spain utilised Europeanisation in a functional way to pursuit its own interests, signalling how the external dimension of its immigration regime influenced the development and the implementation of that of the EU.

1 Introduction

Immigration policy is a privileged prism of analysis used to understand the dynamic of policy and norm diffusion and circulation, as well as regime-formation in Europe. In particular, the Spanish immigration policy regime, and more specifically its external dimension, constitute a relevant case to understand how a national policy may influence the development and the implementation of an immigration regime at the EU level.

Until the 1980s, labour was a major Spanish export but by the 2000s, had become a major import, indicating Spain’s gradual transformation into a country of immigration. The timing of this change indicates an increase of migration issue’s importance in Spanish politics, much later than in “traditional” migrant destinations in Europe. However, the transformation of immigration as a main political issue in Spain was swift and particularly intense (Gabrielli, 2011a). In Span, the issue of immigration assumes a special dimension because of the country’s geographical location on Europe’s external border as well as that of its enclave territories, Ceuta and Melilla, the only two terrestrial borders between the EU and Africa. European accession, the entry into the Schengen Area, the progressive securitisation of immigration at internal level, and the more recent evolution of immigration flows have decisively pushed Spain to take on a gatekeeping role within the EU. In the span of 30 years, the country has emerged as a central actor in the European externalisation of migration control toward third countries in Africa.

This chapter will assess the genealogy of practices, logics, and organizational strategies that fostered the development of the Spanish immigration regime, and in particular, the external dimension of its migration policy.¹ The progression and development of the external dimension of the Spanish immigration regime is evident in the prism of multilevel relations between the Spanish government and the EU. The main research question investigated concerns which types of influence and model circulation exist between the national and the supranational/intergovernmental level.

The study of the different phases of the construction of the Spanish immigration regime, from its exogenous inputs to a more endogenous development (Gabrielli, 2011a), points out that Europeanisation² of immigration policy is not always a top-down and unidirectional process from the EU to Member States. In this respect, beyond all changes attributable to the EU that take place on the national scene (Börzel & Risse, 2000; Radaelli, 2003), interactions concerning the external dimension of immigration policies may work in an opposite way: a bottom-up influence from Member States to the EU.

In the analysis, the concept of regime is applied following Finotelli and Ponzo (see Chap. 1) and Cvajner et al. (2018, p. 17), as a tool to explore the constancy of a “cluster of migration policy action” as a result of complex and dynamic negotiation between different actors with their own specific logics and interests. This idea is crucial in understanding how Spanish actors modulate and exert control and influence on Europeanisation in a functional way as to pursue its own interests during each specific period.

Since the late 1990s, several scholars broke the silence on the Europeanisation of immigration policies from different angles: Baldwin-Edwards (1997) on the emerging European immigration regime and the implications for Southern EU countries; Huntoon (1998) on the implications of EU immigration policy for Spain; Guiraudon (2000) on the interplay between Member States and the EU; Geddes (2001) on relations between the EU and state sovereignty concerning the issue of international migration. However, a more recent analysis on this topic is needed, especially in the wake of research published by Wihtol de Wenden (2019), motivated by a lack of knowledge on the more complex configurations of Europeanisation embedded in immigration policies, and particularly in their external dimension.

To examine the genealogy of the Spanish migration regime’s external dimension, the three phases are differentiated, each of which is characterized by its own specific dynamics concerning both the Spanish approach to immigration and border control, and the role of Spain in European policymaking on this issue.

First, the chapter focuses on the “top-down Europeanisation” of migration policy, where Spain can be considered a passive receiver of European norms and standards, pushed by the conditionality of Spanish accession to the EU and later to the Schengen Area. In this first period, 1985 to 1999, European conditionality in immigration and border control impacted the national regime of immigration policy. In this context, Spain swayed between its European obligations and national apathy, which was related to the very low relevance of the issue within its national political scene.

Second, beginning in the 2000s, Spain became an active player – jointly with other Southern EU countries such as Italy – in fostering changes and new developments for the EU regime, mainly through a strong emphasis on border control towards irregular crossings. Spain’s increasingly important role in European policymaking on immigration fostered a more bottom-up Europeanisation approach.

Third, through the development of the external dimension of its immigration policy in the mid 2000s, Spain emerged as a model and inspiration for the external dimension of migration policies implemented at the EU level in the 2010s. Paradoxically, during this phase of strong influence, Spain effortlessly obtained political rents from previous initiatives, operating within a previously designed external dimension of its migration policies. In this third period, Spain swayed between a political marginality under the Partido Popular (PP) regime (amid fallout due to the 2008 global financial crisis) to a more symbolic, progressive stance under a coalition government of leftist political parties. However, the hegemony of the repressive focus of immigration at the EU level was not questioned despite the shift of power between political parties in Spain.

Methodologically, this study at hand is based on a long-term qualitative policy analysis developed during the two last decades through an extended document analysis based on administrative documents, grey literature, media, as well as through qualitative interviews with stakeholders, to understand and interpret policies as well as practices. The research within this chapter considers both elements, taking into account the very strong contradictions between formal policy and legal framework on one hand, and more informal practices deriving from their implementation³ on the other.

2 Top-Down Europeanisation: Spain’s European Obligations and National Apathy

The existence of substantial interdependencies between Madrid and the EU has been clear since the very beginning of immigration policy in Spain, when the first immigration law was approved in 1985 (LOEX – Ley Orgánica 7/1985). The birth of a legal framework for migration in Spain was not the result of an endogenous political need or social demand to regulate the phenomenon – immigration was very marginal at that time, and the issue had a very negligeable relevance on the national political scene (Dios Pintado, 2005)⁴ – but was framed as a precondition for Spain to join the EU (Gabrielli, 2011a). Moreover, the idea of Spain as a transit country for migrants led some EU countries to have outweighed concerns about the facilitated entry of immigrants.

Spanish immigration policies developed according to a restrictive model of immigration policy, strongly inspired by the concerns of key EU member countries at this time. A strong dichotomy characterised Spanish immigration policy in this first phase, similar to other Southern EU countries, wavering between a more “European-inspired” legal framework, repressive of immigration, and permissive national practices that overcame the lack of a formal channel of recruitment for foreign labour – coupled with cyclical regularisation processes (Arango, 2000; Peixoto et al., 2012).

Once the LOEX was approved in 1985, European pressures were temporarily mitigated due to the low intensity of migratory flows into the country during the second half of the 1980s. European interest in Spanish immigration control was revived when Spain signed the Schengen Agreement in June 1991. At that time, European pressure targeted the issues of visa policy and border control, given that the Spanish border was now a key external border in the Schengen Area. Spain’s entry into the Schengen Area implied additional responsibilities, mainly reflected in the introduction of the entry visa requirement for Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian nationals since 1991.⁵

Spain’s admittance to the EU and to the Schengen Area in 1996 initiated a physical integration of Spain into the European regime of immigration control. As noted by Guild and Bigo (2003), Southern European countries, i.e. Italy, Greece and Spain, found themselves in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis their European partners (mainly France and Germany) who were the most interested in the issue. On one hand, they wanted to avoid criticism for their laissez faire policies, and on the other hand, they were ready “to take symbolic measures”, while they were “not prepared to launch very costly and probably not very effective programmes to control their coasts” (ibidem, p. 13). In this context, with significant European funding during the 1990s, the Spanish government began to build and fortify border fences in its territories Ceuta and Melilla, as well as install the Integrated System of Exterior Surveillance (SIVE) along the Mediterranean corridor, starting from the Strait of Gibraltar (Gabrielli, 2011a).

At the same time, Spain began developing the external dimension of its migration policies, concluding with a readmission agreement with Morocco in 1992, allowing readmissions of citizens from signatory countries but also from third country citizens. After signing, Morocco declared that it would not implement the agreement, and readmissions were to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis until 2018, when the agreement was finally “re-activated” according to declarations of the Spanish government (Ferrer-Gallardo & Gabrielli, 2018; Gabrielli, 2015; Serón & Gabrielli, 2021).

In summary, between 1985 and 1999, the effect of the Europeanisation of the Spanish migration regime and its external dimension occurred in a rather “passive” way in Spain, in the sense that the government limited itself to seeking a balance between its European obligations and its own interests.

3 The Transition: Spain’s Ascent to an Active Role in the Development of the External Dimension of the European Immigration Regime

An important change took place in political debates in 2000, reflected in legislation that affected both Spanish immigration policy as well as the Europeanisation in the external dimension. At that time, the visibility of immigration in the political debate was the most evident and the development of the external dimension of Spanish immigration policy gained considerable momentum. Europeanisation became a less vertical process and the Spanish government was no longer a passive receiver of the political guidelines in Europe. Progressively, it became a central player in shaping immigration policy – or at least some of its dimensions – in Europe. This shift, following a key change concerning migration on the internal political level, was facilitated through a strong focus on irregular crossing and border control and externalisation of migration control.

In 1999, after approximately 15 years of political and legislative inactivity, the Spanish Parliament initiated the first real debate on immigration. After a broad consultation process with social actors, a new consensual and pragmatic legal framework was developed.⁶ Shortly before the scheduled approval in the Parliament, the centre-right government decided to oppose the law, justifying the sudden change of opinion with the fact that EU will not support such a progressive policy. The new migration law (4/2000) was finally approved in January 2000, thanks to the support of all the opposition parties needed for a majority. However, this pushed immigration to the forefront of the political arena. The reform of the law was one of Aznar’s priorities in the campaign of March 2000, breaking an existing and tacit pact between different political forces to not use immigration as an electoral tool, and instead, using a securitisation narrative, which was already common at the EU level. The absolute majority of the PP formed as a result from the March 2000 election strengthened the securitising trend.

After 15 years of inactivity, the approval of a more restrictive legal framework around immigration (Law 8/2000), the second in the same year, framed immigration as a threat to security. Deeply affected by the election defeat, an unexpected “community of discourse” between the PP and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) resulted in a restrictive approach on immigration, targeting border control, visa policies, immigrant detentions and deportations. This determined a “depolitisation” of the issue, limiting the debate to marginal elements of the policy and reduced the migration issue to a security threat (Cuttitta, 2018; Ritaine, 2003). The consolidation of immigration as a security issue fostered a growing role of the Ministry of the Interior (Zapata-Barrero2003), not just in internal matters, but also in the field of external dimension (Casas-Cortes et al., 2016), driving a stronger emphasis of police cooperation with third countries.

Concerning relations at the EU level, the Spanish alignment with the hegemonic securitisation of immigration at the EU level foster a less top-down process of Europeanisation (Guiraudon, 2010). This can be considered the prelude to the gradual transformation of Spain into a central player in the immigration policymaking in Europe. Driven by the need for a political and, above all, financial support for its initiatives to strengthen border control apparatus and developing cooperation with third countries, Spain became increasingly involved in the development of immigration policy in Europe. Immigration control at borders and its externalisation became pivotal elements through which the Spanish government pushed its priorities into the European agenda.

This became more evident during the Spanish presidency of the EU in the first half of 2002. In a global context framed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and a significant pivot to securitisation in international policy, Spanish Prime Minister J.M. Aznar had a favourable environment to push his immigration agenda through to the European Union.

On June 21 and 22, the issue of immigration was at the forefront of the Seville Council, especially in regards to relations with third countries, formally planting a seed to further develop the external dimension. At the Seville summit, Spain proposed to link cooperation on immigration by third countries (at this time, mainly readmission) with development aid. In other words, introducing a clause allowing the sanctioning of third countries through suspending aid when their cooperation is not considered satisfactory by EU countries. Although the most radical component of Spain’s proposals, the possibility of establishing a negative conditionality through sanctioning third countries had been rejected. The Spanish Presidency had played a fundamental role in fostering the development of the external dimension and giving a different connotation of the EU security-driven focus, increasing the relevance of irregular crossings at the borders in the community agenda⁷ (Pinyol Jiménez, 2007; Terrón, 2004). Furthermore, a particularly close community of interests existed in Italy at this time (Ritaine, 2003) considering the centre-right Berlusconi government supported Aznar in applying pressure to European institutions on the basis of ideology but mainly for pursuing the common interests of both Spain and Italy, as gatekeepers at the Southern European border. Progress was particularly significant in certain repressive aspects of immigration policy which had the approval of the Spanish government: support in maritime border control through the launch of Operation Ulysses coordinated by Spain and sharing the financial burden of border control.

As a result of this influence and execution of its agenda, Spain was regarded as a more relevant player in the EU immigration policymaking on border control and externalisation.

4 Bottom-Up Europeanisation: Spain’s Key Role in the Construction of the External Dimension of Immigration Policy

Despite the growing control apparatus implemented at the increasingly militarised borders,⁸ the control of immigration by Spanish public authorities was questioned due to a growing media visibilisation of borders crossings. In the summer of 2005, an attempt to jump over the fences surrounding the enclave of Ceuta resulted in five deaths and become a watershed of the country’s recent migration history. In 2006, 32,000 people came into Spain via the Canary Islands, which was widely covered in the European media. These highly visible and symbolic events are seen as catalysts that gave a decisive boost to the development of the external dimension of Spanish immigration policy, by means of an intense diplomatic action in Africa to enhance relations with third countries and facilitate the externalisation of immigration control.

The strong focus of the Spanish government on these flows of migration, despite the limited numbers of the arrivals from sub-Saharan Africa compared to the total number of foreigners entering in Spain in the same years (Gabrielli, 2015), is related to increased media exposure and therefore to their symbolic relevance (Gabrielli, 2021), but also on the European political scene. The over-visibility of specific entry points at Spanish borders allowed the government to put in place a visible action towards immigration and immigrants, while not overlooking the labour needs of the Spanish economy which was in dire need of foreign workers. This allowed the government to increase its legitimacy vis-à-vis EU institutions when campaigning for more monetary support.

Initially, the impulse to externalise control targeted Morocco but soon afterward, the externalisation of the control of migratory flows spread to other countries. The displacement of migratory paths towards the Canary Islands, migrants departing from the West-African coast pushed the government to act, resulting in the presentation of the “Africa Plan”,⁹ an attempt to re-fuel diplomatic activity with Sub-Saharan countries. Now, the external dimension of Spanish immigration policy developed very quickly, alongside directives regarding the “Africa Plan” in 2005 but was further developed as a case-by-case bricolage, depending on migration routes in third countries and their demands in order to collaborate with Spain with forced returns, controlled maritime avenues, bilateral patrols, liaison officers and information-sharing.

Spain negotiated bilateral agreements and more informal cooperation with Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia and Cape Verde – covering all crossing points into Spain – as well as with several countries along the main land migration routes and origin countries in West Africa (see Table 5.1). Spain developed a variable geometry in its cooperation with these countries in order to deploy a buffer of mobility and to increase the scope of deportations: using both formal and informal agreements on readmission and redocumentation,¹⁰ but also through stipulations of broader agreements, including control of migration departures and “transit migrations”, as well as operational cooperation in exchange of information exchange, liaison officers and joint patrol operations (Andersson, 2014; Casas-Cortes et al., 2016; Gabrielli, 2008, 2011a).

Table 5.1 Migration agreements (Readmission or broader issues) between Spain and Sub-Saharan African countries (2000–2010)

A central element of the Spanish external dimension was the “good will” of African counterparts, especially concerning readmissions, but since the mid 2000s, considerably widening the scope of cooperation in the exchange of information, presence of liaison officers, participation to bilateral patrols, and the control of “transit migrations” (Gabrielli, 2011a, b). These “second generation” agreements have been implemented through strong conditionalities, established Spanish control of migration, as well as other elements of the bilateral relation. The involvement of African countries, thus, becomes a discriminating element when it comes to facilitating trade, boosting foreign investment and allocating development aid – all of which are considered the tools used to foster a cooperation that would otherwise be very unfavourable to participating African countries. In some cases, the creation of formal recruitment channels for seasonal workers were also used, as in the case of Senegal and Morocco. In Senegal, the implementation was temporary and quantitatively negligible, while in the case of Morocco the recruitment of woman seasonal workers for red-fruit collection had been more longstanding (Arab, 2018).

In the case of cooperation with Morocco, negotiations were more complex due to historical relations between the two countries and the balance of power (Carrera et al. 2016; El Qadim, 2015; Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008; Gazzotti, Jiménez Álvarez and Espiñeira, this volume). The instruments used were broader, on issues such as the trade agreement, or on the case of Western Sahara, including Spanish support at the EU level. In the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, the main tools of negotiation and implementation of bilateral agreements are generally linked to development aid (Gabrielli, 2011a, 2016; Kabbanji, 2013).

5 Spain: A Model for the External Dimension of Immigration Policies in Europe?

Through the development of the external dimension of the Spanish immigration policy, Spain emerged as an influence and model to other European Member States, or at least a paradigm of an effective externalisation action for its effort with Sub-Saharan Africa. In this regard, Spain is considered a strong inspiration for the development of EU action (Gabrielli, 2017b; Serón & Gabrielli, 2019). In general terms, Spain is not a pioneer – as Italy was the first Member State to implement this externalisation strategy. However, several reasons may explain why the Spanish immigration policy regime, and in particular its external dimension, became so inspiring for EU institutions when developing the recent wave of externalisation.

First, Spain is the main European actor to have signed agreements with Sub-Saharan African countries on the externalisation of control in the same manner as Italy which established agreements with Mediterranean countries such as Albania, Tunisia and Libya (Paoletti, 2012). In this case, there is no direct route from Sub-Saharan Africa: France has historically been a major actor in concluding bilateral agreements with Sub-Saharan African countries, which are mainly former colonies. However, the French efforts since the mid 2000s mainly addressed readmission and was linked to co-development and development aid (Panizzon, 2011).

Second, Spanish action in externalisation matters is inspiring for the EU because of a de facto introduction of a “migration conditionality” in relation to third countries, which links cooperation in migration issues with development aid, as well as with other aspects of relations such as foreign direct investment (FDI), visa quotas, etc. “Migration conditionality” was clearly emphasised in negotiation and implementation of the external dimension on behalf of the “goodwill” of third African countries. In exchange for their cooperation, the countries that accepted externalisation were able to obtain different compensations. Regarding migration control, Spain supported by the EU, provided material and financial assistance through the provision of control equipment and police and border guard training, but also in entry quotas for seasonal workers, FDI and more.

Third, despite growing analytical evidence underlying the real effect of these policies,¹¹ there was and still is a diffuse perception by policymakers that Spanish outsourcing was finally an effective model to reduce immigration. Since the peak of migrant arrivals in 2006, pirogues crossings to the Canary Islands are almost non-existent (at least until 2019 and 2020) and informal crossings – in Ceuta and Melilla and the Strait of Gibraltar – seemed to remain relatively low in the following years.

In April 2016, Spain’s Interior Minister Jorge Fernández Díaz, explained that the EU was copying the “Spanish model” in terms of its migration policy. At the December 2016 European Council, Spain’s Prime Minister Rajoy underlined the continuity of the “Spanish model” for migration policy, as promoted by Rodríguez Zapatero, which was of particular interest at that time for the EU due to the eagerness to negotiate migration agreements with countries such as Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. The director of Frontex himself pointed to Spain as an inspiring example and leader in this regard, praising the effectiveness in “closing” the Canary Islands route after arrivals arose in 2006.¹²

Whether or not Spain is an ideal “model”, it is clear that the Spanish externalisation of migration control was a great source of inspiration for the recent wave of externalisation promoted in the EU after the Arab Spring and after the “refugee crisis” in mid 2010. This period was marked by a relevant relaunch of supranational initiatives at the EU level.¹³ Since the “Arab Spring”, EU policy towards third countries has been revitalised, maintaining the target of specific sectoral lines, but executing them with new instruments and under the guise of a new geographical focus.¹⁴ For example, through the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) in 2011, but above all, through the Valletta summit of November 2015 which established the EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa (Gazzotti, Jiménez Álvarez and Espiñeira, this volume)– and the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016.¹⁵

In the Spanish case, the EU has decided to respond to perceived migration and refugee “crises” in a reactive and short-term manner through an increasingly intense and geographically widespread externalisation of mobility and border control. The objectives of cooperation that the EU and its members have sought to implement over the last decade are closely reminiscent of Spanish action: cooperation in re-documentation and readmissions, externalisation of mobility and border control. These instruments, when used in the negotiation seem very similar, with the obvious differences of geopolitical weight in negotiating on behalf of the EU as a whole with the different third countries.

The GAMM of 2011 reminds to content within migration agreements signed by Spain and several Sub-Saharan African countries, both in terms of the areas of cooperation (readmission, cooperation in controlling flows and strengthening border control) and the negotiation instruments (development aid and visa quotas).

Moreover, migration conditionality has become a recognisable element of the external dimension of migration policies in Europe (Gabrielli, 2011b, 2016). The negotiation with Tunisia and Libya, or with Mali, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Niger and Senegal in the framework of “migration partnerships” is representative of this trend (Gabrielli, 2016; Serón & Gabrielli, 2019). This is also the case in the EUTF for Africa, where the cooperation with Ethiopia facilitated a loan of USD 500 million to the Ethiopian government. In this regard, Francisco Carreras, the head of cooperation efforts at the EU Delegation in Ethiopia, clearly confirmed that “migration issues are at the heart of our support to countries”.¹⁶

The EU seems to have gone further in several dimensions, first by recognising the possible use of negative conditionality (EU Commission, 2016). This is the possibility of openly sanctioning a third country’s “failure” to cooperate with the EU on migration, whereas, until now, only positive conditionality, i.e. incentives were recognised. Second, concerning the “migration-development nexus” and its translation into the EUTF for Africa, the mantra seems to be further reinforcing the process of “capacity building” within third countries in terms of border control and mobility (Gabrielli, 2016; Serón & Gabrielli, 2019).¹⁷

At times, development aid alone is not enough to encourage cooperation from third countries (Gabrielli, 2011a, 2016; Kabbanji, 2013), leading to the mobilisation of other instruments. The externalisation of migration control, both at the bilateral and multilateral levels, becomes increasingly embedded in a broader framework of political dialogue or intrinsically linked to other external relations issues: special visa regimes, visa quotas, diplomatic support, investment pledges, trade agreements, investment, financial aid packages and security (Jurje & Lavenex, 2014; Kunz, Lavenex, & Panizzon, 2011; Lavenex & Kunz, 2008). In the EU-Turkey Statement¹⁸ of 2016, several clauses closely resembled Spanish externalisation – in particular, the evident issue linkage between externalized tasks of buffering mobilities and accepting deportations on one side, and monetary support, visa issuance and an improved political and commercial relation from the other. The novelty is that, in this case, all policies are clearly visible, as they are explicitly mentioned in the agreement.

As in the case of Spain’s externalisation, outsourcing creates an increasingly strong European dependency on neighbouring countries, which have since become key players in mobility control systems (Greenhill, 2016; Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016). When a third country situated along major migratory routes wants to pressure Europe or its Member States to gain advantages in other policy areas, it can utilize and deploy the issue as very effective leverage. This was the case in the arrival of more than 10,000 migrants to Ceuta over the course of 1 day in May 2021¹⁹ as well as by the Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan’s opening of the Turkish border with Greece on February 28, 2020 when he declared that “hundreds of thousands have crossed, and soon we will reach millions”,²⁰ and lastly, by human crossings at the Poland-Belarus border in November/December 2021.

The exercise of “bricolage” in developing the external dimension of immigration policy and tailor-made agreements depending on soft-law instruments (memorandum of understanding and the exchange of official communication) appear to be an effective model within the EU due to the specific evolution of migration routes and avenues of negotiation. Spain’s contribution has become central to the definition of Europe’s external dimension, towards Africa and beyond. In terms of Europeanisation processes within immigration policies, Spain’s role changed from that of a “norms-taker” to that of “norms-maker”. This evolution deserves to be taken into account when analysing the circulation of policy models and tools, as well as in consideration of the forms that the Europeanisation process can take.

6 Conclusions: Reaping the Benefits?

The analysis of the external dimension of the Spanish migration regime since its inception in 1985 has resulted in a new perspective necessary to grasp the different dynamics of Europeanisation in the outsourcing of migration control towards third countries.

As the research has shown, this process has taken different forms at different times, both in Europe and in Spain. Until the early 2000s when the issue of migration suddenly appeared on the national political scene, Europeanisation acted as a top-down mechanism, mainly producing the transfer of a very restrictive legal immigration framework from the EU to Spain. Spain’s entry into the Schengen Area brought about a change in visa policy, but did not alter the already-existing ambivalence between the restrictive legal framework and the policy actually implemented by public authorities. There are, therefore, two contradictory forces shaping Spanish immigration policy: on one hand, Spain’s role as a Member State within the EU and guardian of the external border of the Schengen Area, and on the other, the national dependency and demand for foreign labour.

The Spanish government’s autonomy of action in the area of migration is thus emerging. This is a constant element in the different phases of the research analysis, as Spanish actors modulate Europeanisation in a functional way in pursuit of their interests.

In 2000, the migration issue was suddenly transformed into a major political debate and became a key segment of the national security agenda in government rhetoric, whereas previously it had been considered a labour market issue. The Spanish government’s adherence to the securing of migration issues drove an empirical change in the Europeanisation dynamic. This process is thus beginning to change its axis, pivoting from top-down to a bottom-up since the political transfer is bi-directional due to the emergence of Spain as an increasingly important actor in European policymaking on immigration. Due to its geographical location and its own internal political dynamic, Spain, together with Italy, has applied political pressure on other European Member States to support its tasks of controlling the common European border in the face of migratory flows.

With the development of the external dimension of Spain’s immigration policy, the country has become a leading inspiration for the further development of the issue at the EU level. Paradoxically, the Spanish regime was developed in an improvised way, through a bricolage process following a main driving force: a reactive and crisis/emergency-based logic. More specifically, Spanish inspiration has come at three levels: the tailor-made nature of the agreement depending of the conjuncture and characteristics of third countries, as well as informality and flexibility; the objectives of migration cooperation (re-documentation and readmissions, externalisation of border and mobility control, operational cooperation in terms of information exchange, liaison officers and joint patrol operations); and the negotiation instruments (issue linkages between externalisation and other field of relation, special development aid, and through a growing migration conditionality).

Just after Spain joined the EU, it was the recipient of the standards produced by Europe, and 20 years later, it became a pillar with a central role in defining European guidelines on the control of migratory flows. This is a particularly significant and rapid change, given that Spain is now at the heart of the definition of European immigration and border policy, especially concerning Euro-African relations.

Ironically, during the 2010s, while the external dimension of the Spanish immigration regime was establishing its influence at EU level, Spanish action occurred in the background. While the main crossing routes of migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean were mainly addressed to Italy and Greece – despite some conjunctural “crisis” in Ceuta and Melilla in mid-May 2021 – Spain took a more discrete position in EU policymaking and reduced its bilateral efforts towards third countries. In particular, budgets dedicated to the bilateral external dimension were cut, especially in the field of development, cooperation (Serón & Aimé, 2020) and foreign affairs, while those in the field of security and police cooperation through the Interior Ministry were maintained (Serón & Gabrielli, 2021). In this period, immigration slipped off the political agenda and Spain swayed between a political marginality under the PP government of Mariano Rajoy in 2011–2016 (Montilla Martos et al., 2017) to a more symbolical, visual and progressive stance under left coalition governments (with punctual support to Search and Rescue NGO activity in the Central Mediterranean, as is the case in the welcoming of the Aquarius boat in the summer of 2018). The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic has seemed to further reduce the relevance of the issue, at least during the onset.

Moreover, the multilateral efforts of the EU in the externalisation of migration control, as well the growing engagement of other EU Member States, present Spain with an opportunity to recollect as much political, diplomatic and economic benefits as possible, despite its minimal effort. Spanish political know-how in these fields allows the country to reap the benefits of past efforts, and receive important funding through leading and managing several projects of the EUTF for Africa, the GAR-SI Sahel endowment of over 41.6 million euros and the government-controlled Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas (FIIAPP) foundation together with the Guardia Civil.

Nevertheless, this situation changed suddenly in 2020, when around 23,000 people arrived to the Canary Islands over the course of the year, and again in May 2021, when high diplomatic tensions with Morocco on the Western Sahara issue arose and led to more than 10,000 people crossing the fences that separate the Spanish enclave of Ceuta with Morocco. These new episodes, framed once again as “migration crises”, have pushed the Spanish government to give a new impetus to external action and to resume a more active role at the EU level regarding policymaking on immigration. It will undoubtedly be interesting to analyse in the future what the consequences will be for the external dimension of immigration policy.