The Greek Asylum Regime: From Latecomer on Reception to Inspirational Model on Asylum Procedures

Abstract

From asylum processing to reception, Greece since 2015 has undergone a gradual transformation that re-enforces its role as the external border of the European Union. The European refugee “crisis” of 2015, the closure of the Western Balkan route and particularly the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016, triggered a series of emergency measures that resulted in a new asylum regime. On the one hand, the “crisis” resulted in a newly formed reception system, with non-state actors taking an unprecedented role in offering reception services. Here, Greece maintains the role of the “student”, seeking to offer similar reception as most of its European partners. On the other hand, a differentiated asylum system emerged between land and sea borders, making Greece the only country with two parallel asylum processes. The chapter explores the different elements of the asylum regime in the country in the period 2015–2019, and argues that some of the practices on the maritime border, from the hotspots to the fast track border procedure, have found their way to the New Pact on Migration and Asylum of 2020, suggesting that in this case Greece functions as an inspirational model for Europe.

1 Introduction

Since the 1990s, the European framework has sought to enhance the mobility of EU citizens while restricting the (irregular) entry of third country nationals (Kostakopoulou, 2000), including asylum-seekers. The “gatekeepers” in this endeavour are first and foremost the frontline states, specifically Greece, Italy, and Spain. Due to their geographical location, they receive the majority of irregular arrivals, and they act as buffers to the rest of the EU. Unlike other frontline states, Greece lacked, until 2011, a sufficient institutional framework to process asylum applications and host asylum applicants. The country had been severely criticized in the period 2000–2010, for failing to provide to asylum applicants a functioning asylum process and dignified conditions of stay (Cabot, 2014). Significant changes take place since 2015. Greece functions as the main entryway to the EU, with 850,000 migrants crossing its maritime border, according to UNHCR. The majority do not remain in Greece, opting to transit to other EU Member States (MS). This is evident in the rather limited number of asylum applications; only 13,197 applications were submitted in 2015 to the asylum service. Greece, in turn, was criticized for indirectly assisting transitory movements, by failing to register on EURODAC¹ migrants on arrival to the land and/or sea border.

At the start of the “crisis”, in May 2015, the European Commission announced the Agenda on Migration and Asylum (henceforth the Agenda). The Agenda incorporates the notion of the “hotspot approach”. The latter is presented as a migration management tool, to ensure that those who reach the EU external borders are registered before processing their asylum claims. The “hotspots” originally are envisaged as both sites of disproportionate pressure as well as sites where the streamlined operation of screening and registration takes place.² The hotspot approach renders newcomers’ registration in the EURODAC database systematic (Tazzioli & Garelli, 2020). Greece establishes the first registration facilities (known as hotspots) in June 2015, long before the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016. Yet, bureaucratic delays, and objections from locals on the islands, delay the project. The first registration facility, Moria in Lesvos, is only introduced in October 2015, with the rest following throughout 2015 and early 2016. The EU-Turkey Statement (henceforth the Statement) of March 2016, de facto alters the nature of the hotspots. From temporary screening sites, they transform overnight into spaces of indefinite stay, where newly arrived migrants remain until such time as they receive asylum in Greece or are returned to Turkey as per the Statement. The latter influences in unexpected ways the asylum processing in the country. Greece is the only Member State in the EU that implements two parallel asylum procedures, i.e., a regular procedure in the mainland and a fast-track border procedure on the islands,³ with significant repercussions on asylum applicants. It is the implementation of the Statement that offsets a period of unprecedented change in Greece as regards the asylum regime, from the processing of applications to reception.

To ensure implementation of the Statement, a swift transfer took place of all asylum applicants on the Greek islands that arrive prior to March 18, 2016, so that their applications are processed under the regular procedure (in contrast to those arriving post March 18, 2016). Their transfer to the mainland, in conjunction with the closure of the Western Balkan route, created an emergency, as regards reception, to which international organisations, local and non-state actors responded, resulting in synergies and partnerships. Through formal and informal practices of cooperation, Greece acquires a reception system that in 2021 passes under the full control and administration of the Greek state.

The different dynamics regarding the reception of asylum seekers but also the asylum procedures, constitute part of the broader asylum regime in Greece. The notion of regime derives from the field of international relations but has been utilised in migration research since the early 1990s. The regime implies the exploration of the governance structures through a set of negotiating practices that can be formal but also informal (Rass & Wolff, 2018). In other words, public and private actors, state, and non-state actors, produce and implement various decisions as regards migration and asylum through a continuous interaction and negotiation (Cvajner et al., 2018, Finotelli and Ponzo, introduction). In the period 2015–2019, the Greek asylum regime is characterised by divergent implementation between the border areas and the mainland. Different asylum processing and different reception conditions and accommodation options exist between the border areas. This divergence is reinforced by actors involved; non-state actors are actively involved in reception, and state and EU actors in the asylum procedures. Eventually by late 2020, all aspects of the asylum regime are administered by the state and a logic of deterrence is incorporated. Aspects of said logic are visible in the legislative reforms undertaken in the context of the International Protection Act (IPA) and subsequent amendments affecting both asylum processing and reception. The aim is to make Greece a less-attractive destination for asylum seekers. In turn, elements already applied in Greece have now found their way to the EU New Pact on Migration and Asylum of 2020, indicating parts of Greece’s asylum regime are in line with the EU’s overall asylum policy aims and objectives.

The chapter discusses the development of the asylum regime with a particular focus on the reception system in the mainland and the processing of asylum claims at the maritime border. Section 16.2 offers a brief discussion of the Europeanisation of Greece’s migration governance prior to 2015, identifying the main approach of Greek migration and asylum policy until the refugee crisis. Section 16.3 focuses on the reception system that emerges from the implementation of the EU- Turkey Statement of March 2016; the core components and the synergies developed. Both sections are based on empirical research carried out in 2018 in the framework of the CEASEVAL project.⁴ Data collection identified the legal changes in the asylum system, complemented by fifteen (15) semi structured interviews with key stakeholders at national and local level as well as non-state actors (e.g., international organisations, NGOs, researchers). Here, Greece maintains the role of the “student”, developing reception services already in place by its European partners. Section four shifts the focus to asylum procedures, the legislative changes implemented both for the application of the Statement in 2016 and particularly in 2019–2020 with the hopes of re-invigorating core aspects of the deal, namely returns. The chapter concludes with a look at the elements of the New Pact that appear “modelled” on the experience of Greece, suggesting that the country functions both as a “student” when it comes to reception but also as an inspirational model for the EU as regards asylum procedures.

2 Greece’s Asylum Prior to 2015

In the 1990s Greece lacked a functioning asylum system. Greece endorses and adopts the status of a “transit country” (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula, 2008; Dimitriadi, 2018), thereby assuming that migrants would seek to settle in other EU Member States. The Greek state, based on the logic of ethnic homogeneity and the desire to maintain it, does “not trust or encourage the establishment of non-nationals in the country” (Papageorgiou, 2013, p.76). This “mistrust” according to Papageorgiou (2013), is incorporated in the governance of migration and asylum, resulting in the absence of a functioning asylum system until 2011. The Hellenic Police was responsible for asylum processing and routinely rejected asylum requests on submission (Cabot, 2014). No service provision was included, no financial assistance to asylum applicants nor accommodation options with one exception: a formal camp in the outskirts of Lavrio (port) in Attika. By reducing access and incentives, asylum applicants are “encouraged” to transit rather than settle in the country. This system is partially disrupted in 2010 as Greece undergoes a process of renewed Europeanisation⁵ of its asylum and reception system. Europeanisation is more than the adoption of institutional structures, or the transposition of European legislation (Sotiropoulos, 2007) but also the normative (a human-rights based asylum system) and policy processes, in this case refugee protection (Lavenex, 2001).

In Greece, the Europeanisation period of 2010–2014 is brought about by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece. The Court condemned Greece for failure to uphold Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as regards the degrading detention and living conditions of the applicant (M.S.S). Belgium was also condemned for enforcing a Dublin return, despite the numerous and public information of Greece’s inability to uphold the standards of the Convention (Moreno-Lax, 2011). The Court’s decision resulted in suspension of Dublin returns for Greece (AIDA, 2014), extended until mid-2019. It also kicked off the Europeanisation process of the Greek asylum system, starting with the National Action Plan on asylum of 2010 and culminating in the adoption of Law 3907/2011 creating an independent Asylum Service and a First Reception Service.

Of importance is Law No. 3907 of 2011 “on the establishment of an Asylum Service and a First Reception Service”, transposition into Greek legislation of Directive 2008/115/EC “on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third country nationals” and other provisions (see also AIDA report 2013–2020 for all the legislative changes). L. 3907 serves as an example of Europeanisation, as the governance structure of asylum in Greece aligns with EU practices. L. 3907 ends arbitrary detention in scattered locations that function also as de facto reception sites. It establishes a reception service responsible for new structures (first reception centres), new detention facilities and a streamlined process from arrival to asylum. Two stages of reception emerge, first and secondary, with L. 3907 explicitly referring to “first reception”. The latter indicates the short- term supply of basic material conditions and services offered to asylum seekers on arrival, especially those deemed most vulnerable (elderly, women with children, unaccompanied children). In principle, those applying for asylum enter a “secondary reception” framework where material conditions are offered for the duration of their asylum process, while those who opt out and/or are rejected, remain outside the scope of any assistance (and often detained). However, it is important to note that these clear distinctions are not always implemented in practice, as asylum seekers do not always access first and/or secondary reception, despite their eligibility.

The institutional and legislative changes coincide with the worst period of the Greek financial crisis (2010–2015). The fiscal limitations imposed by Greece’s creditors, impact reforms but most importantly, result in a gap between the design of the asylum procedures and reception and their implementation. The various agreements between Greece and its creditors prohibit additional hires in the public sector, limiting the staffing ability of the Asylum Service and the First Reception Service (European Commission, 2014). With staffing shortages and financial limitations, the Asylum Service becomes operational only in 2013, and the Regional Asylum Offices (RAO) open gradually over the next few years. The first RAO outside of Attika, opens its doors in July 2015 in Thessaloniki, with offices in Thrace, Epirus, Thessaly, Western Greece, Crete, Lesvos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Rhodes opening from 2015 through 2019. The First Reception Service opens the First Reception Center (FRC) in the land border of Evros (Fylakio center) in 2013. Fylakio is a screening and registration center, where asylum seekers can remain in dignified conditions up to 25 days. No FRC exists on the islands in 2015 when the refugee “crisis” unfolds. Throughout the mainland, detention, and pre-removal centers (PROKEKA) are also gradually set up. Asylum seekers whose applications are pending, rejected asylum applicants or migrants that have opted out of the asylum process are often detained for an indefinite period (AIDA, 2014, p.61), evidence of different implementation of the law (Rozakou, 2017). Despite attempts to improve the legislative and institutional framework asylum applicants encounter divergent practices across different entry points on asylum and detention but also in the mainland regarding their reception.

Reception is part of asylum management. It is applicable to asylum seekers only (hence the importance of registration) and thus, a way of distinguishing between the refugee and “unwanted” irregular migrants, with the former worthy of assistance and the latter undeserving of protection (Mantanika & Arapoglou, 2021; Holmes & Castaneda, 2016, p. 17). As prescribed in the Common European Asylum System, reception entails service provisions, and begins with identification, screening and submission of an asylum application rendering the individual under the care of the host State. It includes access to legal assistance, counselling, healthcare, shelter, food, education particularly for minors, special accommodation provisions for vulnerable groups, food, hygiene, interpretation. Despite the codification in L. 3907 of the material provisions for asylum applicants, most asylum applicants are left unassisted. In September 2014, a total of 1160 reception places are available) operated by 16 NGOs and funded through the European Social Fund (ESF), although the National Centre for Social Solidarity (NCSS) responsible for processing requests for accommodation of asylum seekers registers 4269 requests in that same year. Overall, Greece, at the start of the refugee “crisis” in 2015, lacked a reception system capable of addressing the needs of asylum applicants (accommodation and material provisions) and as a result the emphasis was placed on improving reception conditions and particularly accommodation. As the numbers of those stranded in Greece increased post March 2016, a humanitarian crisis unfolded necessitating a reception system put in place.

3 The EU-Turkey Statement 2016 and Its Impact on the Greek Reception System

Until March 2016, hundreds arrived from the islands to the Greek mainland on a weekly basis, joining thousands already waiting to register for asylum, or trying to organize the next leg of their journey. The Syriza government commits, in late 2015, to 30,000 reception places in collective accommodation schemes (i.e., camps), mostly in the mainland, to respond to the urgent need created by the refugee “crisis” as well as the transfer of the population of the hotspots before the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. Greece has a total reception capacity of 36,910 as of March 20, 2016. Around 10,000 are transferred to Northern Greece in newly set up camps in the mainland and/or near Athens (Human Rights Watch, 2016). In total, an estimated 50,000 (UNHCR, 2016) require accommodation and services provision.

Various problems are reported, particularly as regards accommodation provided by the Greek State (in camps set up by the military and in the hotspots), such as accommodation in inappropriate structures (e.g., tents or containers) for a prolonged period; the use of former factories with hazardous industrial residues; inadequate sanitary conditions and the lack of infrastructure, such as hot water and heating during harsh weather conditions (Greek Ombudsman, 2017, pp. 41–45). The Greek state is unable to ensure the provision of decent living conditions for all asylum seekers (ibidem), failing to respond to its obligations deriving from European and national law. This left significant room for international organisations, NGOs, and cities to step up and function as implementing partners, seeking to offer a holistic reception system that includes accommodation, social and health services provision, and assist, where possible, with integration.

3.1 Non-state Actors in Reception

International organisations do not immediately expand their presence in Greece. UNHCR and IOM’s growth and expansion takes place towards early 2016, in parallel with the closure of the Western Balkan route (Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2019) and the implementation of the EU relocation scheme. The restrictions imposed on border crossings from end of 2015 through March 2016, combined with the transfer of thousands from the islands to the mainland, create an unprecedented demand for but also a large-scale provision of housing and services. UNHCR and IOM become implementing partners to the EU Relocation programme, with UNHCR responsible for housing those eligible and IOM for their transfer from the islands to the mainland and/or their relocation flights. The accommodation scheme is known as ESTIA⁶ (I & II). ESTIA initially provides housing and cash assistance to the beneficiaries of the relocation programme. By late 2016 the beneficiaries expand to include Dublin family reunification candidates and vulnerable applicants. It is the first attempt to offer holistic reception services to beneficiaries. To implement the ESTIA programme, UNHCR cooperates with NGOs and local authorities.⁷ By the end of June 2020, UNHCR had established 25,792 accommodation places in 14 cities and 7 islands across Greece. ESTIA provides rented housing, in parallel with access to social workers, interpreters, assistance with accessing medical services, employment, language courses and recreational activities but most importantly cash-assistance. The latter reached until 2021, 70,000 asylum seekers and refugees. In December 2020 ESTIA transitioned to the Greek State and is now part of the national reception system (UNHCR, 2020). Similarly, in 2021, cash assistance transitioned under national administration. What began as a distinct activity by international organisations, currently forms almost 50 percent of the Greek state’s capacity on reception.

In 2015, responding to the “emergency”, NGOs (national and international) redirected their services to assist refugees in Greece (Skleparis, 2015). Many NGOs function as implementing partners to international organisations, in offering various services related to reception. Alongside the formal NGOs, informal/grass-root initiatives emerge, supporting asylum seekers. Self-organised movements of radical Left and anarchist spaces already active in supporting migrants’ rights (Papataxiarchis, 2016) step in and occupy abandoned spaces in urban centres, particularly Athens, to address accommodation shortages.

The level of involvement of non-state actors in Greece is unprecedented and requires a continuous negotiation between the Greek state, the international organisations and non-state actors as well as the local level that will eventually also step in and assist with the buildup of reception.

3.2 The Local Actors

Though municipalities and regions have no legal authority over matters of migration including reception, they are an important actor that can either facilitate or hinder the setup of reception services in an area by objecting or supporting the transfer of refugees in their municipal limits. There is no redistribution mechanism of asylum applicants in Greece (Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2019). This has not prevented municipalities from participating (Sabchev, 2021a) but it has resulted in a patchwork of responses across the mainland with some cities taking a very active role and others actively opposing the presence of asylum seekers (e.g., protests, blocking hotels that would function as accommodation sites). For some cities, like Athens and Thessaloniki, reception is critical as in 2015, they are on the receiving end of significant numbers of asylum seekers arriving from the islands. The two cities opt to partner with NGOs and international organisations, drawing from best practices acquired through city networks (e.g., EUROCITIES) (Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2019).

The City of Thessaloniki forms the Refugee Assistance Collaboration Thessaloniki (REACT) programme (Sabchev, 2021b), for the reception of asylum seekers and refugees in private apartments in partnership with UNHCR (funded by the EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid). It is, thus, part of the ESTIA programme. The municipality is responsible for organising accommodation places in private apartments and covering the utility costs with different NGOs assisting. Along the lines of ESTIA, it offers a holistic approach to reception.

For the City of Athens, 2015 marks a turning point in how migration is integrated in the administration of the City (OECD, 2018). The position of Vice Mayor for Migrants, Refugees and Municipal Decentralisation is created, indicating that migration is fast becoming a priority despite the absence of a legal framework. There are no accommodation places available in Athens, in 2015. Migrants transferring from the islands end up sleeping rough in public parks and squares (Squire et al., 2017), necessitating the City’s engagement with reception. The City of Athens, in consultation with the Ministry for Migration, offers space for the setup of the first reception center for asylum seekers (Elaionas), established under the auspices of the Ministry of Migration Policy. The lease with the Ministry is renewed annually per agreement by the municipal council, until 2021.⁸ The city also joins the ESTIA programme, cooperating with UNHCR for the distribution of accommodation spaces in different areas of Athens.

All the aforementioned examples focus on the mainland. However, both NGOs and International Organisations are also active on the islands, and in some cases (e.g., Lesvos) municipalities seek early on to cooperate with non-state actors in establishing reception processes, standards, and services. Kara Tepe on the island of Lesvos is one such example. The camp is created and managed by the Municipality of Mytilene and UNHCR in collaboration with the NGOs that offer for services provision. The camp offers temporary housing for asylum seekers waiting their registration process. Overall, there are fewer examples of partnerships between local and non-state actors on the islands that are unwilling to support further hosting of refugees. This is partly due to the presence of the hotspots but also the EU-Turkey Statement that stranded a large population of asylum seekers and refugees on the islands, thereby transforming them into a buffer zone (Tazzioli, 2018). This resulted in a divergence between mainland and the islands, where different reception practices are applied, largely due to different levels of mobilisation but mainly due to the different legal framework on the islands.

4 Beyond Reception: The Greek Asylum System After the Statement

Asylum drastically changes following the agreement on the EU-Turkey deal of 2016. In the words of a senior manager in the Asylum Service, ‘Let’s be clear, [Greece] right now is not a best practice, it is a unique practice” (interview with Asylum Service staff, June 2018 Athens, in Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2019), referring to the application of border procedure on the islands and regular procedure in the mainland. The following section tries to identify the major changes that have taken place in Greek legislation and practice. It is important to note that this is not a detailed and exhaustive account of the changes and their impact, but rather a zooming in on specific elements that the recent proposal on the New Migration and Asylum Pact appears to replicate.

4.1 Reforming Asylum to Fast-Track Returns

A key component of the Statement is that all new irregular migrants crossing to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 can be returned to Turkey, following an individual examination of their asylum application on the basis of (in)admissibility.⁹ The aim is to speed-up returns of Syrians. To implement the Statement, Greece reforms in 2016 its asylum and border procedures through Law 4375/2016, (adopted in April 2016). L.4375 provides for shorter deadlines and fewer safeguards to the asylum procedure and simultaneously establishes complex processing for different types of applicants. Fast-track border procedure initially applies only to the Syrian nationals. Gradually the procedure is extended to nationalities with a rate of international protection under 25 percent (AIDA, 2017). In contrast to the Syrians, the asylum applications of the latter are examined on merit. All other asylum claims are examined on the basis of merit through the regular procedure.

The law also regulates the organisation and operation of the Asylum service and Appeals Authority. The latter consistently rejected inadmissibility decisions, deeming Turkey not a “safe third country”. The reform alters the composition of the Appeal Committees, now made up of judges (previously lawyers and trained staff), in an effort to enforce the provisions of the Statement. L. 4375 further undertakes administrative changes, renaming the First Reception Service into Reception and Identification Service (RIS), responsible for overseeing the RICs (hotspots) and establishes the legal framework for the operation of the RICs.

The law transposes the recast Asylum Procedures Directive, establishes the Reception and Identification Centers (RICs) of the five islands of Eastern Aegean (known as the hotspots) and clarifies the application of a fast-track border procedure on the maritime border (Petracou et al., 2018). Fast-track procedure is based on the examination of the admissibility of the asylum claim, rather than the merit. In the L. 4375 it is an exceptional procedure, applicable only to the five islands of Samos, Kos, Leros, Chios, Lesvos for those arriving after 20 March 2016 and subject to the EU-Turkey Statement, and in particular vis-à-vis Syrians. Since April 2016, asylum seekers on the islands are subject to a “restriction of freedom of movement” decision issued by the Head of the RIC (FRA update 2019) which is revoked once registration completes. A deportation order is then issued, which is also suspended but a geographical restriction is automatically imposed on the island and/or in the RIC until the completion of the asylum (Greek Council for Refugees, 2018) or the return procedure.

On the islands, the screening takes place in conditions of detention and with limited legal assistance provided; interviews, particularly of Syrians under the accelerated border procedure, often take place at the moment of disembarkation, with interpreters frequently speaking different dialects (Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2019), and with little information offered to the applicants. The asylum interview is conducted by either Asylum Service or EASO staff. The role of EU agencies is not clarified in the Greek legislative framework (AIDA, 2017) and remains murky to this day. Particularly EASO has been criticized for the quality of its recommendations, with the EU Ombudsman highlighting that “[…] when conducting admissibility interviews EASO fails to comply with the provisions on “the right to be heard” in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 41), as well as EASO’s own guidelines” (European Ombudsman, 2017). The fast-track asylum procedures in the period 2016–2019, have a time limit of 2 weeks (AIDA, 2017) that is impossible to meet. In fact, the entire asylum process lasts for years in most cases, with the exception of the Syrians whose claims are routinely prioritized, in an effort to implement the Statement.

The design of the Statement envisages swift processing and swift returns that will function both as a deterrent in reducing the number of irregular migrants but also ensure that the hotspots have space for new migrants. In practice, this does not happen. By the end of January 2020, only about 2000 people are returned to Turkey in line with the Statement. Pakistanis make up the largest group of returnees, many volunteering for return. Absence of returns impacts reception. While the capacity of the hotspots remains the same, the population increases and there are no transfers to the mainland (until 2019). Conditions deteriorate rapidly, and migration is a key campaign issue in the national elections of 2019 that results in the victory of the center-right party of New Democracy. Priority is given to legislative changes to support further the implementation of the Statement and reduce not only the number of arriving migrants but also the overall number of asylum seekers in Greece.

4.2 The International Protection Act

On 1 January 2020, Greece’s International Protection Act (IPA) enters into force (voted in 2019, Law 4636/2019). It is Greece’s fifth legislative asylum reform since the implementation of the Statement (GCR & Oxfam, 2020). The IPA seeks to regularise aspects of the Statement deemed exceptional measures in the previous legislation, and to accelerate the implementation of the Statement and develop further a restrictive asylum system.

Fast-track border procedure is not new (see above discussion on the L 4375/2016) but it is established initially as an emergency process that the IPA now normalizes. The law foresees that the fast-track border procedure “can be applied for as long as third country nationals who have applied for international protection at the border or at airport/port transit zones or while remaining in Reception and Identification Centres, are regularly accommodated in a spot close to the borders or transit zones” (Article 90 (3) IPA; AIDA, 2021). (In)admissibility is determined based on Turkey being a “safe third country”¹⁰ or a “first country of asylum” for the applicant. Those inadmissible are also returnable. The fast-track border procedure is now disentangled from the Statement and can be applied to any location meeting the above requirements (for criticism of the IPA see ECRE, 2019; UNHCR, 2019; Greek Ombudsman, 2019). The new law, among others, severely restricts asylum safeguards, increases detention, limits the right to family unity and marks a return to the period of 2012–2014, when Greece prioritised deterrence and detention of migrants including asylum seekers.

Further amendments were added in May 2020. The registration and examination of all new asylum applicants in 2020 becomes a priority. As a result, those who arrive prior to 2020 and whose interviews are scheduled for 2019 and 2020, have their appointments postponed, in some cases for 2022 and 2023. The Covid-19 pandemic further exacerbates the situation, with some applicants receiving dates as late as 2025. Until such time, they will remain in detention in one of the new RIC and PROKEKA¹¹ centres being built on the islands and land border. Nationality differentiation appears to be the norm. In some cases, AIDA reports (2020) that asylum seekers with specific profiles (for example from Eritrea, or vulnerable groups from Afghanistan) are granted refugee status without an asylum interview. Others are rejected following a quick and brief interview on disembarkation. These diverse practices, often random and dependent on which regional office processes the asylum application, produce an unprecedented level of diversity in decisions.

The numerous changes in the administrative aspects of asylum processing make navigating the asylum system impossible without legal assistance. The law allows for the rejection of an application without interview, if there is no available interpreter in the language spoken by the applicant. It “foresees an extended list of cases in which an application for international protection can be rejected as ‘manifestly unfounded’ without any in-merits examination and without assessing the risk of refoulement” (AIDA 2020). In addition, the IPA introduces the notion of “fictitious service” (πλασματική επίδοση, AIDA 2020) of first instance decisions. An appeal against a first instance decision should be submitted in a written form (in Greek) and it should mention the “specific grounds” of the appeal. Otherwise, the appeal is rejected as inadmissible without further examination. In practice, only those with access to lawyers can launch an appeal. Though legal assistance is free, it is extremely rare that applicants have access to it.

Throughout the appeal, applicants remain in administrative detention¹² until their asylum is fully processed. A link is now established between rejection and return. If the appeal is rejected, the Independent Appeals Board issues a return decision at the same time as the rejection; thus, administratively the two are now processed by the same authority. In principle, this facilitates the process of returns. If rejected on appeal, the individual has the right to request cancellation before a court, but the request does not have a suspensive effect, i.e., it is possible to deport the individual while the examination is pending.

Overall, the impact of the Statement on the asylum procedure should not be underestimated. The Statement began a process whereby asylum increasingly changed, differentiated based onentry points and nationality. It is a process that has slowly come to be normalized and, despite the severe impact the Greek model has had on asylum seekers rights, it is partially adopted in the New Pact on Asylum and Migration.

5 The New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Greece an Inspirational Model for Europe?

A few days after the catastrophic fire in Moria in September 2020, the New Pact on Migration and Asylum¹³ was announced. The Vice President of the Commission, Margaritis Schinas, described the Pact as a house with three floors. The first floor is the external dimension; the second floor are the front-line states that apply border procedures seeking to identify those who can be returned to the first floor. And the third floor is the internal dimension, of solidarity between Member States. The Pact establishes a pre-entry phase, where several elements from the Greek practice since 2015 are incorporated.

5.1 Screening

The pre-entry phase includes a screening procedure, upon which the remaining process hinges on. Screening is proposed for all third-country nationals who reach the external borders and/or after disembarkation or Search and Rescue. Here the screening adopts the hotspot approach. It includes a health and vulnerability screening, identity check, registration, security check.¹⁴ EU agencies, from Frontex, Europol and EASO alongside national authorities in the hotspots undertake the screening and registration of the individual that has the right to apply for asylum but only after the process concludes. Screening should be completed within 5 days. Though the proposal incorporates as standard practice the hotspot approach, the experience of Greece suggests this is unattainable, particularly in times of large-scale arrivals where the screening sometimes takes weeks if not months. On the other hand, systematic registration in the EURODAC is achieved through the hotspots, and this is part of the aim of the pre-entry phase proposed in the New Pact.

5.2 Border Procedure

Once screening is completed, an accelerated border procedure is triggered and made mandatory for most cases. This is already the current practice in Greece since the IPA came into force. The accelerated border procedure becomes obligatory in the Pact for all applicants arriving irregularly through the external border and/or in a Search and Rescue. Thus, it is normalised, instead of an exceptional measure. According to the EU Commission, the aim of the screening, is to “accelerate the process of determining the status of a person and what type of procedure should apply”. It will also render difficult to abscond after entrance in the territory; this is also the justification utilized by Greece for the restriction of movement imposed on individuals. Yet, the border procedure has already been found controversial; as noted by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA 2019) “almost three years of experience [of processing asylum claims in facilities at borders] in Greece shows, [that] this approach creates fundamental rights challenges that appear almost insurmountable”.

The border proposal in the New Pact incorporates the options for the refusal of entry (Art. 14(1) screening proposal) as well as expulsion. In principle a bias is established from the moment screening takes place, based on one’s nationality. Individuals arriving from a country with recognition rates below 20 percent, as well as those coming from a “safe country of origin” or “safe third country” (Cassarino & Marin, 2020) will be referred to the accelerated or/and border procedure, instead of the regular procedure. The aforementioned proposal is not unlike what takes place (or is designed to take place) in the Greek borders (in Greece currently the threshold is 25 percent, see discussion above on the IPA).

In the Pact, during the screening procedure and accelerated border procedure, asylum applicants are considered as not having entered the country (Article 4, draft Screening Regulation, Article 40, new draft Asylum Procedure Regulation). A version of this already applies in Greece, through the Statement. The geographical restriction of movement on the Greek islands that prevents asylum applicants from reaching the mainland, limit as much as possible entry to the country, with the islands functioning as buffer zones. Countries that designate transit zones for pre-screening, will likely do so before border areas or at the actual border, which raises the potential for many “Moria” style camps to emerge where asylum applicants wait for their pre-screening to complete and/or for their deportation to take place.

Finally, the Asylum Procedure Regulation proposes that a rejected application should be accompanied with a return decision. It is an administrative model already applicable in Greece¹⁵ since the IPA. As in Greece, in the original proposal of the New Pact, there is no suspensive effect of appeal established. Instead, the individual’s appeal can be processed following her/his return.

5.3 Force Majeure

One of the least discussed elements of the proposal of the New Pact is the introduction of the right to derogate from the rules due to force majeure. It was proposed by Greece, in a non-paper circulated during the negotiations (ΑΜΝΑ, 2020).¹⁶ In February 2020, thousands of migrants moved towards the Greek-Turkish land border of Evros. In response, Greece closed its border, and suspended access to asylum in its territory, in violation of international law. Greece announced it was invoking article 78 (3) to justify the suspension of asylum, even though this would require a proposal to be submitted by the EU Commission and agreed on by the EU Council. The Greek proposal to the New Pact was to establish a mechanism that allows for derogation from the rules in case of crisis.

In the New Pact force majeure triggers several derogations from the Asylum Procedures Regulations but also as regards registration of applications for international protection. The problem with the force majeure is that it allows for derogation from the rules in an emergency that is left undefined. If triggered at times of an increase in asylum seeking flows, it will likely impact the asylum applicants that will remain stranded in multiple “Moria-type” centers along the external borders. Yet elements of the force majeure have already been tested in Greece following the events in Evros in March 2020.

The aforementioned elements suggest that, to an extent, Greece serves as an inspirational model, particularly as regards the strengthening of the links between asylum and return.

6 Conclusion

The impact of the EU-Turkey Statement on asylum seekers has been well documented, yet the impact on the Greek asylum regime has been less explored. The chapter has highlighted the attempted responses to unfolding emergencies, contributing to the argument raised by Finotelli and Ponzo that a rather than Europeanisation a “hybridisation of strategies, logics of action, and practices” (see Chap. 1 in the volume) is witnessed since 2015. In Greece this kicks off as a response to the divergence between mainland and border areas in asylum processing; a product of the EU-Turkey Statement.

The legislation aims to facilitate the implementation of the Statement on the maritime border. In the period 2015–2019 this produces delays and inconsistencies particularly between border areas and mainland (exempt from the Statement). The limited capacity of the Asylum Service (and Appeals) poses an additional challenge, since it is unable to meet the increasingly high level of applications launched throughout the period in question. Overall, the asylum legislation post- 2016 seeks to implement a more restrictive and deterrence-based approach. This logic of deterrence, initially a response to the refugee “crisis”, is now formalised and normalised in the IPA and its amendments.

Although reception emerges in the same context as asylum processing, the former is driven by a logic of humanitarian emergency (Dimitriadi & Malamidis, 2020). It is oriented towards services-provision and accommodation, in an effort to address the needs created from the swift transfers of all the population in March 2016 from the islands to the mainland, the relocation mechanism and the border closures. Unlike asylum, the state and its institutions have little role in the development of the reception system that develops mainly by non-state actors, including cities, international organisations and NGOs. In 2021 the reception system becomes fully part of the national reception system. As numbers of arrival are at an all-time low, little progress has been made to move away from the “crisis” model into a sustainable secondary reception system that results in integration. Overall, despite the positive steps undertaken between 2015–2019, reception today falls short of what is on offer in other EU Member States and is gradually taking backward steps. This is in line with the overall logic of deterrence, increasingly applicable to all elements of the asylum regime since 2020. The aim is to render Greece an undesirable destination for asylum applicants, by reducing available spaces of accommodation, closing many of the camps that offer shelter to applicants, and limiting who is entitled to cash assistance (only those residing in the few remaining state-run accommodation sites).

Despite the shortcomings of Greece on reception, there are aspects of the asylum regime that render Greece a “pioneer” and inspirational model for the EU, as evident in the initial proposal of the New Pact. Accelerated border procedures, pre-screening, and derogations from the rules in case of “emergencies”, to name a few, suggest that the deterrence logic applied in the country is very much in line with the EU and its Member States, and a potential-albeit problematic- model for the way forward.