1 Introduction

The prevalence of border crossings by members of some Southeast Asian societies is both a cultural-historical and contemporary phenomenon. Although there is a dearth of literature and related studies about Indonesians in the Philippines, various Filipino communities at the border areas, comprising villages and neighbourhoods close to the Indonesian sea border, have harmoniously settled with the Persons of Indonesian Descent (PID). The term PID refers to the people from northern Sulawesi islands in Indonesia who have settled in Mindanao. Since in terms of ethnicity, they are also commonly called Sangirs, this study will employ PID and Sangirs interchangeably. The PID have already stayed in the southern Philippines for generations and the level of integration can be assessed according to their generational stages of local residence in the region.

The Indonesian diasporic community in the southern Philippines has already existed since the 1400s, while the migration of people from Sangihe started towards the end of the fifteenth century (Racines, 2010). Moreover, Tan-Cullamar (1993) found a new wave of Sangirs migration occurred around the 1930s due to the Great Depression. Harsono (2019) further expounded on a wave of migration to the southern Philippines around the 1960s. These two recent waves of migration created what this study identifies as the Persons of Indonesian Descent in the southern Philippines. Therefore, the PID in the southern Philippines can be seen as a product of intergenerational human movement. Today some of them can be found in some areas in the southern Philippines, including General Santos City and Sarangani province, as seen on the map below (Fig. 6.1).

Fig. 6.1
A map of Mindanao island with its regions 9, 10, 11, 12, and A R M M. Region 12 is marked with two red dots.

The location of the PID in Southern Mindanao. (Adapted from Free World Maps, 2021; Suggested reference: Dy (2017))

As foreigners in the Philippines, the relationship between Sangirs and the Philippines has been an interesting study space (Talampas, 2015; Tan-Cullamar, 1993). Talampas (2015) found that the penetration of the state could not be easily found in the Indonesian community in the southern Philippines. He argued that the influence of governmentality could be seen on the Indonesian side rather than the Philippines side. Meanwhile, Tan-Cullamar (1993) claimed that the Indonesian diasporic community in the southern Philippines could be a bridge to strengthen the diplomatic relationship between the two countries. Both believe that the relationship between Sangirs and the host country, the Philippines, has been a largely positive one. However, Racines (2010) found a stigma attached to the Indonesian population on the border of the Philippines as they were perceived of having taken the land and jobs away from the local people. As shown in the previous studies, the relationship between Sangirs at the local level is rather complex, and how it is evaluated depends on the kind of perspectives adopted. For instance, on one hand, the central government in Indonesia and the Philippines may view the matter as national security threat. On the other hand, at the local level, the relationship between PID and the local community appears to be harmonious.

This study does not compare the relationship between PID and the local and central governments in the Philippines. Instead, it examines further how the PID have positioned themselves in the Philippines and how the local government in the Philippines performs local citizenship for PID, topics which have not been explored in the existing literature. The idea of local citizenship proposed in this paper covers the area that is excluded from the legal citizenship approach. It is argued that in the local context, migrants and the local government units negotiate and perform citizenship differently from the traditional citizenship approach.

This study took place in two locations in the Southern Philippines, Sarangani province and General Santos City. Sarangani province is located in the south-eastern part of Mindanao. As a coastal area, coconut farms are commonly found along with coastal resorts. Meanwhile, General Santos city is located in the southern Mindanao and have one of the main international seaports in Mindanao. These sites were chosen given the considerably high number of PID in those locations. Most PID in the Sarangani province are working in the coconut farm, while those in the General Santos City are in the fishing industries.

The informants for this research came from different generations, including the first to the fourth generation of Indonesian descendants. There are twenty (20) representatives in each research location. It included Indonesian citizens, Filipino citizens, and those with undetermined nationality. Based on the confirmation of citizenship, around 70% of the total informants hold Indonesian citizenship, and only approximately 30% are Filipino (Philippine citizens). However, when we asked them to give a proof of their Indonesian national identity cards (KTP/Kartu Tanda Penduduk), only some could produce them. Most of them still did not possess citizenship documents, including birth certificates, national ID cards or passports. Most of the informants also came from the third and fourth generations of PID, aged 30–40, comprising about 60% of the total informants. In addition, there is a significant difference between the two locations: informants in Sarangani are predominantly PID born in Indonesia and in General Santos all the informants were born in the Philippines. The diverse backgrounds of the informants reveal a more comprehensive and complex condition of PID in the southern Mindanao.

This research was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic; therefore, the researchers had to hire local assistants to assist in the interviews and collect information from the local officials because of the travel ban and quarantine restrictions in the Philippines. For Sarangani province, there was one assistant, member of the PID, who helped with the interviews. Meanwhile, three assistants from the Mindanao State University did the interviews in General Santos City. This research used a semi-structured interview.

The analysis for this chapter adapts the works of Takeyuki Tsuda (2006, 2008) on the idea of local citizenship to interpret its data. His studies found that in the context of East Asian countries, the local governments subtly grant the fundamental socio-political rights and services to migrants as legitimate members of their local communities. His conclusions challenge the traditional approach to citizenship that posits that citizenship lies on the national level government and the role of local government is seen as relatively insignificant.

This chapter is organised as follows: the contextual background of PID in the Philippines and their current citizenship status as introduction. It then moves to the traditional citizenship approach, which predominantly relies on a legal method. This section focuses on the exclusion of some communities based on legal citizenship. The subsequent section discusses the alternative to include all communities through local citizenship. The integration process that has been supported by the local government in the southern Mindanao is examined in the following section. Lastly, in conclusion the final section points to the important role of local government in performing citizenship, a topic that still remains under researched.

2 Traditional Citizenship Approach

Citizenship is a complex and complicated term. Tegtmeyer Pak (2006) invokes four conceptions of citizenship: juridical citizenship which comprises the formal, legal status of nationals in a given territory; substantive citizenship refers to the civil, political, and social rights that bind states and societies together; cultural citizenship underpins the sense of social and cultural belonging in a given polity; and participatory citizenships dwells on the normative function of citizen’s role in public life and good governance. The traditional citizenship approach is primarily focused on juridical citizenship.

Turner (1997) defines citizenship as a compilation of rights and responsibilities that provide a person with legal status and identity, contending that citizenship is used by the state to control the access of individuals and groups to scarce resources in society. Moreover, he argues that citizenship is predominantly related to rights and responsibilities that are managed by the state. According to Villazor (2010, p. 590), “to be a citizen is to possess the legal status of a citizen.” It is argued that the traditional concept of citizenship concerns the legal status of individuals within the nation-state and has implications for associated rights and duties. Also, Staples (2012) contends that the idea of citizenship entails contradictory consequences, including creating a more significant gap in access and protection between citizens and noncitizens.

Bader (1995) believed that citizenship is the equivalent of feudal privilege as a status inherited from the previous generation. This means that citizenship was created to maintain the state legacy. Legal citizenship has positioned citizens as subordinate objects, while the state always takes its position as an authority. Similar to Sadiq (2017) and Naujoks (2020), legal citizenship always sees citizens as the object to be ruled, while citizens themselves are active subjects who have their own initiatives and demands in relation to the state.

Consequently, persons who cannot conform with the government rules, including undocumented migrants and displaced persons, are considered as noncitizens and are excluded from being state members (Villazor, 2010). Being noncitizens, they could not access the basic rights provided by the state. Moreover, Kapur (2007) and Acciaioli et al. (2017) assert that even if people whose ancestors were migrants have already long inhabited the host country, they might experience ‘being other’ as result of the traditional approach of citizenship.

In most Southeast Asian countries, the principle of citizenship is based on jus sanguinis, meaning “the principle that a person’s nationality is determined on the basis of the nationality of his or her parents at the time of the person’s birth” (Waldrauch, 2006, p. 121). None of the countries in Southeast Asia applied solely on the jus soli principle, “the principle that a person’s country of birth determines his or her nationality” (Waldrauch, 2006, p. 128). Unfortunately, the jus sanguinis principle has become the main cause of the emergence of statelessness, especially for undocumented migrants because they cannot possess citizenship for themselves and the same condition will be applied for their children.

Costica Dumbrava (2018) argues that jus sanguinis is problematic, since it historically tainted, inadequate and normatively unnecessary. Using the case in Europe, he demonstrates how jus sanguinis could not include children from a surrogate mother and in the case of migrants, the failure to register their children might lead to statelessness. Dumbrava’s study illustrates how jus sanguinis has widened the gap between citizens and noncitizens, deepening exclusion among communities within a state.

The emerging inclusion and exclusion agenda among migrants may lead to differentiated and unfair treatment in the host country. The undocumented migrants become the most vulnerable group to be discriminated against by the host country. Some of them have experienced living in an unauthorized status, having no social welfare protections and generally not having health care or disability insurance, and lack job security (Debrah, 2002; ILO, 2002; Koser, 2007; Dauvergne, 2008; Kaye, 2010). The example of the exclusion of migrants in Southeast Asia can be seen from the study of Allerton (2014), who discovered some children of migrant workers in Sabah could not access education because of their legal status.

In addition, Allerton’s study (2017) found that most Malaysians see plantation migrant workers in Sabah as opportunists and label them as criminals. A similar situation also can be seen in Japan, where Filipino migrants were also labelled as dangerous aliens (Herbert, 1996; Shipper, 2008). Herbert (1996, p. 245) outlines the “illegality stigma” that migrants suffer from, made worse by Japanese police’s “labelling” practices after arrest, lack of legal counsel, and the “pre-definition” of foreign suspects as “violators of the law”. Migrants are often seen as the object of public anger and demonised by political elites, which only exacerbates their exclusion and isolation from the local community. However, recognising the high mobility of people in the region, Anderson Villa and A. Mani (2013) argue that ASEAN countries must consider alternative approaches and not just overly depend on a security/legal approach.

The Philippines is one of the countries in Southeast Asia that also employs jus sanguinis as the only basic principle of citizenship. It means that if a person has failed to achieve citizenship in the Philippines, all his/her descendants will remain stateless for the rest of their lives. The Philippines government recognised five groups that are vulnerable or at risk of being stateless, including the unregistered children, foundlings, children of Filipino descent in migration situations (e.g. the Middle East and Sabah), PID residing in southern Mindanao, and the Sama-Bajau population (UNHCR, 2017). Persons of Indonesian descent have become at risk of being a largely stateless community because they arrived in the Philippines before independence, they failed to gain Philippine’s citizenship and failed to register their children’s birth, rendering them undocumented migrants.

3 The Idea of Local Citizenship

The exclusion and stigmatisation of migrants based on traditional legal citizenship has triggered more scholars to rethink alternative citizenship approaches that can be more inclusive for all community members. One of the options to complement the lack of the traditional approach of citizenship is the idea of local citizenship. This study defines local citizenship as part of denizenship (Rosbrook-Thompson, 2014), where the membership is determined by residency (Villazor, 2010,) and the status is based on relationships, custom and memory (Chipato, 2021).

Using the words of Sassen (2006), local citizenship can be seen an assemblage of citizenship at the subnational level. Gargiulo (2017) argues that the concept can be applied through the bestowal of individual rights and statuses of membership at the municipality level, which are formally recognised as an effect of the authority that local governments exercise on behalf of the state. As a result of this assemblage, the local citizen as legal and social subject emerges, and it includes both national and non-national citizens.

Takeyuki Tsuda (2006) studied local citizenship for skilled migrants in Japan. Tsuda (2006, p. 7) defined local citizenship as “the granting, by local governments and organisations, of basic socio-political rights and services to immigrants as legitimate members of these local communities.” His study found that the local government and local NGOs (Non-Government Organisations) in Japan initiated program to include migrants as part of the community members and offered some supporting services for their establishment in Japan. Katherine Tegtmeyer Pak (2006) further discussed the importance of local incorporation programs in the context of Japanese society. Local incorporation serves to “articulate and promote a vision of citizenship that includes many persons who do not possess juridical citizenship” (p. 20).

The role of local government in Japan in regard to immigration has also been discussed by Stephen Robert Nagy (2010). Nagy’s studies have further clarified that in order to address an absence of national/state-level immigration policies, local governments have started employing their own localized incorporation and social integration policies for migrants. Nagy also pointed out the major role played by local governments in terms of service provision as the immediate interface between foreign residents and the national government through the local government policies.

Similar studies on the formalisation of local citizenship have also been undertaken in other continental contexts. Villazor (2010) situated his study in San Francisco, highlighting its reputation as the safe haven city for migrants. His study found that the San Francisco local government issued a sanctuary law that initiated membership of the community based on residency. As a result, all residents in the city, including undocumented migrants, are effectively considered citizens. Not only were they entitled to access to their rights, duties and obligations, but they were also granted to participate in the local elections to vote. Indeed, as Rosbrook-Thompson (2014) argued, local citizenship can unite the citizen and noncitizens and create strong solidarity ties that are greater than legal citizenship status.

However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no country in Southeast Asia that has formalised local citizenship for migrants. Consequently, local citizenship can be seen from the performative action between local government and migrants (Chipato, 2021) and the act of belongingness (Rosbrook-Thompson, 2014). Our study found that the local government units in the southern Philippines were performing local citizenship for PID, which will be explored further in the next section.

4 PID’s Legal Citizenship Status

As mentioned previously, some PID are at the risk of being stateless because they do not have legal documents. This section draws on the history of granting citizenship for PID. It is argued that the legal status of citizenship only serves as a survival tool to gain access to rights (Kapur, 2007), and this phenomenon is aptly illustrated by PID. Many Sangirs have come to live permanently on the Philippines’ side of the border with Indonesia. Both countries, Indonesia and the Philippines, have acknowledged the existence of PID after the independence of their nations.

Recognising the long-term connection and the cross-border tradition among Sangirs, in 1961, both sides signed the Repatriation and Border Crossing Agreement. Pristiwanto (2016, p. 43) argues this agreement has categorized many of the Indonesian descendants in the southern Philippines into the following: Indonesian people living on the Philippine side, Filipinos living on the Indonesian side, Filipino people who go back and forth across the border without permission and legal documents, and Indonesian people who go back and forth the border without permission and legal documents. To further improve this measure, high-level negotiations between the two countries continued, which finally led to the signing of the Agreement on the Abolition of Visa Requirements on Certain Cases in 1963.

Manigbas (2016) contends that in the wake of this agreement, around 1000 Indonesians were repatriated using the Indonesian navy ship Halmahera in 1965. They were sent to some areas in Northern Sulawesi islands and Northern Maluku. However, there was no detail on the number and destination location of the PID. One of the informants said that his parents was among the repatriates and they were brought to Northern Maluku. They lived there for around 3 years and then returned to the Philippines thereafter. Thus, we can still find PID in many areas in the southern Philippines until now.

In May 2011, the Philippines became the first country in Southeast Asia which ratified the 1954 UN Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. As a follow-up program, the Philippines government started to map and register all the stateless groups in the Philippines, including the Persons of Indonesian Descent (PID) through the Registration and Confirmation of Nationality program. At the same time, there was a meeting of the Joint Commission for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) held in Manila, where both countries agreed to address the problems of Indonesian descent in the Southern Philippines. The Refugees and Stateless Persons Unit of the Philippine Department of Justice (RSPPU-DoJ) took on the leading role in this project, involving the Bureau of Immigration (BI), Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), the Indonesian Consulate in Davao (KJRI Davao) and United Nation High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR). They assigned a local NGO in General Santos City, PASALI, to help them communicate this project with all PID.

Finally, after working continuously for around 4 years (2012–2016), the data of PID have been completed and both governments worked together to confirm the PID’s citizenship. The Bureau of Immigration conducted a final check of PID in Mindanao. The PAO provided free legal assistance, including juridical corrections of entries on the birth certificate. Afterwards, the Indonesian Consulate registered those PID who opted for Indonesian citizenship. Furthermore, Tanggol (2017) claims that out of 8,745 PID 2,399 were granted Indonesian citizenship. Then, in November 2017, the Indonesian Consulate in Davao and the Republic of the Philippines, together with the UNHCR, distributed hundreds of birth certificates to the stateless people of Indonesian descendants in several provinces of Mindanao (Basa, 2018). The data illustrate that only a few of the PID can now be considered Indonesian citizens, and those persons with undetermined nationality were made denizens or noncitizens in the southern Philippines (Fig. 6.2).

Fig. 6.2
An outline map of southern Philippines represents the number of registered Indonesian citizens in each city. Sarangani, 3155. Davao Delsur, 2777. General Santos city, 859, South Cotabato, 688, Davao Oriental, 679, Davao city, 280. Sultan Kudarat, 175. North Cotabato, 175.

The map of registration and confirmation of nationality of PID. (Source: UNHCR, 2016)

5 Local Citizenship Among PID

Despite the noncitizenship status of some PID, the relationship among PID, local community and local government units (LGUs) in the southern Philippines is relatively harmonious. The relationship can be seen from the access and rights afforded to the PID from the LGUs in the Sarangani province and General Santos City. Our study found that the LGUs in both those research sites are responsible to provide a database for the National Government in the Philippines, in order to effectively facilitate access to some basic rights and assistances. In both areas, we found that Indonesian citizens and persons with undetermined nationality gained some basic rights because of the LGU’s role in providing local database using residence as basis for access.

One of the basic rights that can be attained is education access. The chart below shows that almost all of the children of PID with Indonesian citizenship also benefited from educational assistance. In General Santos City, all the PID obtained their primary education until high school level. Meanwhile, in Sarangani province, only one person in the study claimed not to be able to access educational facilities. Some respondents claimed that the Philippine government provided free public elementary and high school education, as long as they can obtain a recommendation letter and/or residence certificate from their respective LGUs. In the Philippines, access to primary education is free for all residents, and the PID are not deprived of such privileges (Fig. 6.3).

Fig. 6.3
A bar graph represents how many people in Sarangani and General Santos could obtain primary education. In Sarangani, 15 said Yes, and 1 person said No. In General Santos, 13 had access, and no one claimed No.

Access to primary education for PID

Aside from access to education, the PID are also able to readily access health care services. The Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (2014), known as Philhealth, is a health insurance scheme controlled and managed by the government for Filipinos and foreigners who live in the Philippines as long as they comply with some requirements. In those two areas, more than 70% of the informants who hold Indonesian citizenship benefited from essential health care access from Philhealth. The ownership of a Philhealth card assures the PID assistance for their health problems or when they needed health care provision. One informant in Sarangani province did not have to pay for her caesarean childbirth delivery. These health facilities are indeed advantageous for PID because they can access health care even at the barangay level (the smallest administrative district formation in the Philippines) and in advanced-tertiary medical care facilities when needed (Fig. 6.4).

Fig. 6.4
A bar graph represents how many people in Sarangani and General Santos could access health facilities. In Sarangani, 15 claimed Yes, and 1 person claimed No. In General Santos, 10 claimed Yes, and 3 claimed No.

Health access for PID

However, the provision of health access did not run as smoothly as education access did. For instance, a father who lived in Sarangani province acquired his Philhealth card, but his son was unable to get it. The reason was that the district government required the use of primary documents for validation purposes. He insisted that he and his father have similar documents written with their citizenship as Indonesians, but the local government could not give him a satisfactory answer. Sadly, their unfortunate ordeal continued until the end of 2020. Hence, it can be argued that the main hindrance in providing fundamental rights and quality health care are the inconsistencies in data management and policy implementation by the LGUs.

A similar case can also be observed from the access to the social welfare programs, including the 4Ps. The Presidential Communications Operations Office (2016) explained that the “Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program” or 4Ps is “a human development measure of the national government that provides conditional cash grants to the poorest of the poor, to improve the health, nutrition, and the education of children 0–18 years old.” There are two elements of the program, namely health and education grants. The health grant provides 6,000 pesos annually for every household, and the payments are rolled out every month. Meanwhile, the educational assistance of 3,000 pesos is delivered for ten months for every child, and each family is allowed to have a maximum of three children supported by the program.

However, only a small portion of PID in both areas were able to access these programs, that is, less than 25% of the total informants in each site. On their website, the 4Ps program is linked with the Commission of Higher Education (CHED) to ensure deserving students benefit from this grant and connect with Philhealth as national health insurance. Some of the recipients may dispute such claims since education, health and 4Ps program have to be connected using similar data. Inconsistent data do not only lead to confusion among PID but also misunderstanding among themselves.

Another form of welfare access can also be seen in the COVID-19 pandemic response in early 2020. At that time, most PID received assistance from the Philippine government. Every household received a package of staple foods, including 4 kilos of rice, some cans of sardines and corned beef, and chicken loaves that can be accessed every week during the first two months. The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) also prepared financial assistance of 6,000 pesos for each person who lost their job. The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) allocated 5,000 pesos for each family affected by COVID-19. Perez (2020) explained that the financial assistance from DSWD was called the Social Amelioration Program (SAP) and was based on the Joint Memorandum Circular No. 1 Series of 2020.

All interviewed PID in Sarangani province and General Santos City received assistance from the Philippine government and also from the Indonesian government at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. One of the informants in Sarangani province said that he was glad that he got assistance from the Philippine government, especially after obtaining legal status as an Indonesian citizen. As most PID work in the informal sector, such as farm labour and fishing, they are not spared from the pandemic crisis. Some of them lost their jobs or could not get regular jobs as before. Therefore, assistance from the local government has been meaningful for PID. This chapter confirm with Tsuda’s (2006) study that local citizenship exists where local governments recognized migrants as legitimate members of the community, albeit partially through provision of social rights. This research found that the LGUs offered those rights to PID and positioned them as part of the local community.

6 Integration of PID

The relationship between migrants (including undocumented or documented migrants) and the host country has been focused on by various migration scholars, among them Olson (2007), Horvatich (2003), and Allerton (2017) in the Southeast Asia context. Horvatich (2003) found that Sama Dilaut people in the southern Philippines have never been integrated into the Filipino community because of the view of other local islanders that they do not practise Islam. Meanwhile, Olson (2007) and Allerton (2017) study the exclusion of undocumented migrants and their children in the national politics of Sabah, Malaysia. Moreover, they argue that the problem of migrants is not only about legal identification but also related to regional belonging.

This study follows Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas’s (2016) definition of integration, which is a process of settlement, interaction with the host society, and social change that follows immigration. According to them, there are three aspects of integration: legal and political dimensions (e.g., legal residence, citizenship, and voting rights); the socio-economic dimension (e.g., immigrants’ access to health care, education, housing, and the labour market); and cultural-religious aspects. The involvement of the migrants in their communities along those three dimensions can be interpreted as full integration in the host country.

The first two elements of PID’ integration can be seen through the legal and local citizenship mentioned above. The legal and political dimension of PID is represented through their legal status in the southern Philippines. Some of them were granted legal citizenship from Indonesia and the Philippines government, while some are still considered stateless. In the local context, particularly before the confirmation of the nationality program in 2016, that differentiation never existed. Almost none in the local community treated their neighbours based on their nationality. In many cases, PID were actively participating in voting during the local elections. The LGUs assist the election commission to register voters regardless of their legal status. It was only after 2016 that local and regional officials started to be more aware about this issue after series of coordination from the national government, in this case the Bureau of Immigration.

In terms of the socio-economic dimension of integration, as can be seen from the local citizenship section above, the PID experience some basic rights accorded to them by the Philippine government, including education, health and welfare access. The LGUs considers them as part of the community members. This demonstrates the support from the local government in the southern Philippines in the integration process for PID. Consequently, the PID also develop strong attachment with local community in their residency.

A final dimension of integration can be seen from the cultural and religious aspect. Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016) argue that this aspect is the most problematic for migrants. However, our findings revealed otherwise, as this can be considered the easiest part for PID, as they shared similar culture with their local communities in southern Philippines. The similarity of their culture can be traced back from their language. The northern Sulawesi islanders use Sangirese as their local language, while southern Filipinos use Bisaya language with similar words and patterns. Lobel (2013) reiterated that North Sulawesi, and the southern Philippines have the same language roots, which he called Greater Central Philippine languages. Several words have similarities, such as Aku (Sulawesi) and ako (Bisaya), Anak (Sulawesi) and anak (Bisaya), engkau (Sulawesi), and ikaw (Bisaya). The similarities in the language made it easier for PID to adjust to their locale.

Besides, PID livelihoods are strongly connected with coconuts, as is the case for local people in southern Mindanao. The Sarangani province has its Lubi-lubi Festival every year. The Philippine Department of Tourism (2018) published on their website that the local government holds this festival to introduce and promote the utilization of coconut for accessories and home decors and local liquor known as bahalina. This festival is also known as a dancing festival, where the dancers have to wear costumes from coconut materials. The North Sulawesi islanders have migrated to follow coconut harvest season, and their primary income previously was from copra production, as part of their traditional temporary migration. Another highlight of cultural similarity is their alcohol drinking habits. The northern Sulawesi islanders used to drink tuak or palm wine that is similar to bahalina.

In addition, the most distinguishing feature of cultural integration for PID can be observed in the Tulude Festival. Every year, PID celebrate Tulude as part of their tradition. Makainas (2018) described Tulude as an acronym for tulung (help), lukade (protect), and dendingang (involvement). In general, Tulude involves an apotropaic ritual to ask for support and protection from God from any threats and danger and to pray for blessings of their activities. This ritual was performed annually during the last day of December, but after 1995 the ceremony was moved to the 31st of January, upon the confirmation of Sangihe and Talaud districts. The Consulate General of Indonesia in Davao City also supported the annual ritual performance of Tulude, which still runs until today. In the 2019 celebration, the festival was attended by the Indonesian Consul General and his staff members, together with the local Municipal Mayor, LGU officials, staff and community members.

Furthermore, the LGUs also often permitted the PID to celebrate their culture and tradition in the Philippines. Usually, the PID celebrate Indonesian Independence Day at the Indonesian Consulate General Office in Davao City. However, due to restrictions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Philippine local government only allowed the PID to celebrate the Indonesian Independence Day in their respective localities, where they held the annual flag-raising ceremony.

With regard to their religious practices, the PID are well incorporated within the local community. Since 1958, there was an exchange program between the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (PGI) and the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP). The PGI sent a priest to the southern Philippines to teach PID to read and translate Bible in the Sangir language. Most of the PID are Christian, and they share the church with the local community. One of the priests in General Santos City said that he has a mixed congregation of Filipinos and Indonesians. When the church holds religious event, he usually asks permission from the LGUs, and the municipality always supports all their activities. Therefore, in terms of religious practices, the PID do not have any complicated problem.

7 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to revisit the contention that the traditional approach of citizenship is the only solution to include the undocumented migrants, particularly those who have already resided in the host country for some generations. The granting of legal citizenship for PID could be seen as an achievement from the national government perspective, while at the local level, it is only treated as a survival tool to help PID gain accessible basic rights in the Philippines. The traditional approach of citizenship always leaves space for the exclusion of some groups of migrants.

This study has endeavoured to unpack the idea of local citizenship as an alternative solution allowing excluded migrants to be more integrated into the host country. The provision of some basic rights and the support from the local government units in the Philippines based on local residency offers an oasis for PID, some of whom are in the state of having undetermined nationality and being treated as aliens (i.e., Indonesian citizens). Local residency and shared cultural connections have become the basis for local citizenship to be practiced in the southern Philippines.

Tsuda’s (2006) conclusions on the critical roles of local governments in the integration of migrants are obviously relevant in analysing these communities, albeit in this context lacking support from NGOs, civil society groups, and activist associations. More apparently, the LGUs provided a population database that can support PID’s access to the fundamental rights to education, health and welfare at the individual level. At the organizational level, LGUs demonstrated provision of equal access for PID as member of the community. In this context, the Philippine local government has demonstrated a relatively advance practice of local citizenship in creating an inclusive environment for migrants in their respective jurisdiction.

This chapter points to more productive insights in understanding integration between migrants and the host country. The findings of this study reveal the vital role of LGUs in the integration process including legal, social-economic and cultural dimensions. The study also illustrates that the cultural dimension has become one of the main assets for accelerating the integration process of PID with the local communities, including LGUs. This can be seen through the similarities in culture, language, and religion, which Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016) argue as the most complex dimension for migrants to be fully integrated. These results also establish why local citizenship can possibly provide solution for the inclusion of PID within the community in southern Philippines since they have strong cultural ties and attachment.

The analysis of the integration and local citizenship should not be plainly reduced to simplistic exclusion and inclusion considerations. Rather, our study shows how to assist more scholars in challenging exclusive reliance on the traditional concept of citizenship, which largely rely on the legal status of migrants. Hence, citizenship should not always be seen from the ‘top’ but can also be studied from ‘below’. The performance of citizenship at the local level is an insightful space in the relationship between migrants and the local community. This act also offers a haven for migrants that moved beyond their complex relationship with the national level government and their immigration laws.

On a final note, the researchers are fully aware that this study could not solely and entirely represent the general situation of PID in the Philippines as the number of informants is relatively small. The limited locale of study for this research might not significantly present a total picture of local citizenship and integration of all PID. Future studies on the integration of diasporic communities at the state level through national policies remain necessary, as this study presents a complementary perspective rather than a replacement for other approaches. It is also valuable to explore the relationship between state and migrants and other stakeholders at the different levels of public policy analysis covering issues related to social protection, social welfare, and human rights.