1 Introduction

At different times and in different places, immigration has been perceived and framed as a challenge or a benefit, with migrants being conceptualized as ‘social parasites’ and ‘criminals’ threatening the established way of life and stealing the jobs of ‘native’ citizens, as sources of necessary labour to counterbalance demographic decline in Europe, or as new citizens, contributing to the framing of the receiving territory as open, tolerant and modern. Political elites have reinforced the binary categorizations of insider and outsider, establishing an immigration hierarchy of those who are ‘like us’, those who are ‘wanted’ and those who are ‘unwanted’, based chiefly on the incomers’ perceived added value to a territory and its society.

Such underlying discursive frames affect the politics of immigration and have institutional, legal, and policy implications (Korkut et al., 2013), and the construction of immigrant population as ‘others’ or as ‘new citizens’ has an impact on, and is reflected in, policies of integration (Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Verkuyten, 1997). These shifting frames also show how boundaries between natives and newcomers evolve, and how citizenship at the substate level, and hence the collective identity of the in-group, is constructed in relation to an out-group. While research on immigrant integration policies and the various actors involved is, by now, an established line of research, we know little about underlying discursive frames, and how they evolve and shift over time. This aspect is the primary focus of the article: How are migrants discursively constructed in minority regions? Are they referred to as ‘migrant workers’ contributing to the economy, as ‘welfare tourists’ taking advantage of the welfare system, or as ‘new citizens’ and hence symbolically belonging to the community?

This contribution focuses on the discursive construction of migrants at the substate level in general, and in minority regions in particular. The rescaling of socioeconomic and cultural policies to the subnational level has, combined with decentralization reforms, turned immigrant integration into a competence of subnational authorities. While the nation-state is still an important redistributor of revenue, many local and regional governments are now the key actors responsible for the allocation of public services (such as health care or social assistance). Regional policies affecting, or directly addressing, migrants also shape (through a spill-over effect) their political participation, support for the government and their probability of voting, as well as their likelihood of seeking naturalization (Bennour, 2019; Filandra & Manatschal, 2019).

Substate actors, especially governments, therefore rely on immigrant integration policies in the socioeconomic, cultural and increasingly also the political realm, to turn ‘immigrants into regional citizens’ (Manatschal et al., 2020). They rely on concrete policies, such as access to the labour market, social benefits, political rights and even enfranchisement to strengthen non-citizens’ identification and political engagement with the respective regions. Underlying frames of belonging or not belonging influence those policy choices and motivate regional governments either to turn migrants into regional citizens, or to design policies that do not support the long-term settlement of migrants in that territory. Hence, underlying frames also tell us whether immigration is perceived as supporting or hindering the development of the territory, its society and its identity.

Collective identity is a particularly sensitive issue in regions with a distinct history of statehood and/or a distinct cultural and linguistic identity (known as Rokkan regions, following Hooghe et al., 2016), embedded within multinational states (Gagnon & Tully, 2001). In those territories there is a strong connection between immigration and collective identity (Barker & Zapata-Barrero, 2014), leading to a prevailing engagement of Rokkan regions with sociocultural immigrant integration policymaking, either to protect their distinctive collective identity within the state vis-à-vis migrants, or to further carve out those distinctions through pronounced and divergent regional models of integration, often characterized by assimilationist approaches (Manatschal et al., 2020).

Regional immigrant integration policies are inspired by discursive frames regarding who should become a new citizen of a region, which translates into the question of ‘who belongs to us’, and under which conditions. Who belongs to the minority region and who is part of the subnational ‘we’ is thus an important question. By focusing on the underlying frames of constructed regional citizenship, this contribution complements an emerging line of scholarship engaging with the territorial rescaling of citizenship to the ‘meso’ level, namely to regions, provinces and cantons (Arrighi & Stjepanović, 2019; Hepburn, 2011; Manatschal et al., 2020; Xhardez, 2017). Showing how processes of ‘othering’ turn immigrants either into ‘unwanted others’, ‘wanted migrants’ providing services to the regional community (without becoming an accepted part of it) or into ‘integrated citizens’ ultimately advances our understanding of immigrant integration policymaking at the substate level. Finally, processes of ‘othering’ migrants redefine the boundaries of the substate nation.

Relying on a structured comparison of the various Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties (SNRPs) in the Basque Country (Spain), Corsica (France), South Tyrol (Italy), and Scotland and Wales (UK) I show that these parties engage, through processes of ‘othering’, in the creation of a hierarchy of diversities, differentiating between markers of diversity based on the perceived proximity of immigrants to the collective identity of the in-group, as well as their constructed distance to the identity of the state in which the minority region is situated. Hence, the construction of ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ migrants and, in the long run, ‘wanted’ and ‘unwanted’ citizens, reflects the perceived potential of newcomers to strengthen the SNRPs’ vision of the territory, their nationalist mobilization and their nation-building project, which then becomes the salient criterion for the inclusion or exclusion of migrants into the construction of regional citizenship.

2 Actors and Processes of Constructing Regional Citizens through ‘Othering’

There is a continuous process of constructing, negotiating and reconstructing the collective identity that defines a territorially bound society at all levels, be it the state, the region or the city. This even occurs at the supranational level, as in the case of the European Union and its struggle for a European identity. These processes involve, first, a ‘significant other’ from which to differentiate (Triandafyllidou, 1998; Weber, 1976).

While it is widely acknowledged that immigration has an impact on collective identities, there is no evidence on how immigration changes them and in which particular direction (Esses et al., 2006; Hjerm, 1998; Wodak et al., 2009; Wright, 2011). But immigration ‘challenges, and in some cases reaffirms, notions of national identity, sovereignty, and state control’ (Bloemraad et al., 2008, 154). Minority regions are, independent of immigration, characterized by strong collective identities and nationalist mobilizations leading to conflicts between their substate identity, often referred to as ‘national identity’, and the state’s national identity, resulting in conflicts over sovereignty and state control (Edwards & Wisthaler, 2023). Immigration into those territories is thus an additional challenge because the ‘old’ diversity of these territories encounters ‘new’ diversity, and immigrant integration is evaluated against substate nationalism (Banting & Soroka, 2012, 158; Jeram et al., 2015). A set of challenges arises: on the one hand, the territories may aim to maintain and further protect their cultural, linguistic or religious distinctiveness within a larger geographical space, and hence try to forestall further diversity. On the other hand, incorporating newcomers into the substate national community may strengthen the territory’s demography by numerically boosting the population, which is coherent with the native ‘mentality of “la survivance”’ (Kymlicka, 2001, 278) .

In those territories there is therefore a strong connection between immigration and collective identity (Barker & Zapata-Barrero, 2014), which is mobilized by political parties in different ways: emphasizing the multicultural identity of the Scottish nation (Hepburn, 2011), constructing diversity as a marker of difference in the Basque Country (Jeram, 2014), aiming for the empowerment of Wales or excluding migration-related diversity from the notion of being South Tyrolean (Wisthaler, 2016). Thus, political actors construct regional identities in such a way to strike a balance between the exclusion and inclusion of others). Building on Weber (1976), and as Zolberg and Long put it, group formation therefore entails confrontation with others, and ‘collective identity formation […] usually also involve[s] self-conscious efforts by members of a group to distinguish themselves from whom they are not, and hence it is better understood as a dialectical process whose key feature is the delineation of boundaries between “us” and “not us”’ (Zolberg & Long, 1999, 8).

Triandafyllidou picks up this theme and argues that the ‘the identity of a nation is defined and/or re-defined through the influence of ‘significant others’, namely other nations or ethnic groups that are perceived to threaten the nation, its distinctiveness, authenticity and/or independence’ (Triandafyllidou, 1998, 594). While for minority regions the ‘significant other’ has traditionally been the state in which they are embedded, there might also be occasions when there is more than one ‘significant other’. Laxer, Carson and Korteweg suggest that minority nations, when confronted with immigration, ‘face the challenge of forging an identity defined simultaneously in opposition to two groups: the national majority, in relation to whom they form a minority, and migrants, for whom they constitute the majority receiving society’ (Laxer et al., 2014, 133).

This contribution elaborates on the minority regions’ relations with their ‘significant others’, specifically the others stemming from international migration. The boundaries of regional citizenship, or the questions of ‘who are we?’, becomes a question of ‘who are the others?’. This contribution shows that the boundaries of regional citizenship are defined through a process of ‘othering’ the newcomers. While immigrants are always framed as ‘others’ political actors create a hierarchy of others: those ‘like us’ which strengthen the regional citizenry and contribute to the nation-building project, and those ‘others’ who undermine and eventually dilute the minority regions’ collective identity.

This contribution takes an actor-centred approach to constructing regional citizens, since the role of elites in identity construction is particularly relevant (Brady & Cynthia Kaplan, 2009; Wimmer, 2008). It is the political elites ‘who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to represent in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their groups as well as for themselves’ (Brass, 1991, 8). There is a particularly strong relationship between SNRPs and identity politics (Massetti, 2009, 26), which is salient for immigration (Barker & Zapata-Barrero, 2014). Immigration brings additional diversity which SNRPs need to reflect and include or exclude from the construction of the national identity; it also challenges the demographic equilibrium between the national majority and the national minority (Conversi, 1997). Regionalist parties do not automatically develop a restrictive and exclusionary position towards immigration, but rather use the issue to strengthen their core interests that focus on the centre–periphery dimension (Jeram, van der Zwet and Wisthaler, 2015). Hence, regionalist parties appropriate the issue and connect their positions on immigration with their identity politics and nation-building aims. As such, political parties inclusive positions towards immigrants are a form of instrumental nationalism (Wisthaler, 2016). Jeram (2012) argues that the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) presents migration-related diversity as a new marker of the Basque identity as open and tolerant, in contrast with the exclusionary Spanish identity. Similarly, Franco (2015) argues that the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) develop positions towards immigration that serve to highlight the difference between Scotland and the UK, and between Catalonia and Spain, respectively.

This article contributes to this line of scholarship by showing that migrants are not automatically excluded from SNRPs’ constructions of collective identity. Rather, migrants may be used to strengthen the in-group in some cases, becoming ‘new citizens’, ‘co-citizens’, or ‘citizens by adoption’ and thereby furthering the nation-building project.

3 SNRPs in the Basque Country, Corsica, South Tyrol, Scotland and Wales

The empirical analysis draws on material from SNRPs in the Basque Country, Corsica, South Tyrol, Scotland and Wales. They were selected to represent a variety of contextual settings, ideological foci, governmental positions of the parties, and different nation-building projects.Footnote 1 A most different case study design allows for the exploration of different hypotheses on how regional citizens are constructed, as well as additional explanatory and contextual variables regarding SNRPs’ reliance on one or other of the framings (Collier, 2011).

However, the cases also share important characteristics: these regions all accommodate a significant share of international migrants, but also have historical experiences with internal migration. Hence, in all cases, migrants contribute to the ‘dilemma’ over immigration and identity (Xhardez, 2017). Moreover, all selected SNRPs are engaged in nationalist mobilizations based on the quest for linguistic or cultural recognition of their collective identity, and the search for greater sovereignty in many policy areas including immigration and immigrant integration.

Focusing on party positions from 1992 to 2016, I rely on official party platforms, statutes and manifestos, as well as thematic documents on migration, immigration and integration together with official party press releases on these issues. These documents represent the finalized outcome of the consensus reached by the SNRPs in the particular policy areas. Additionally, parliamentary debates focusing on the introduction or reform of various immigrant integration policies have been analysed. One of the key functions of regional assemblies is that of ‘attributing meaning to the region as a democratic polity’ (Piccoli, 2014), and the analysis of parliamentary debates therefore reveals the reasoning behind a certain position, the underlying conflicts or justifications. Data have been retrieved either via the internet or from party and governmental archives, or collected during fieldwork in the minority regions indicated (Table 6.1).

Table 6.1  Data
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Given the considerable scope of the research in terms of time span, number of minority regions and number of SNRPs (and thus primary documents), qualitative content analysis proves to be the most suitable method (Mayring, 2000). The structured and comparative analysis is facilitated by the computer-aided qualitative data analysis software, Atlas.ti. Relying on this software guarantees consistency in the elaboration of large amounts of text and facilitates a systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The inclusion of a large number of quotes compensates for the subjectivity inherent in qualitative content analysis (Gerring, 2017, 20).

4 Regionalist Parties’ Framing of Immigrants: From ‘Unwanted’ Migrants to ‘New Citizens’, ‘Co-Citizens’ and ‘Citizens by Adoption’

The framing of migrants indicates which features or perceived characteristics are appreciated by SNRPs, and why. SNRPs might attribute certain characteristics to immigrants, portraying them as undermining the development of the territory, particularly the SNRPs’ territorial projects. In these cases, immigrants are constructed as not belonging to the in-group, or as ‘unwanted’ migrants. Alternatively, migrants might be constructed as ‘temporarily wanted’, because they performe certain services and fill vacant positions in the labour market, or as generally ‘wanted’ because of their contributions to cultural development and their potential to strengthening the regionalist mobilization. These migrants are portrayed as belonging to the in-group. Those migrants portrayed as already belonging to the territory and society are referred to as ‘citizens’, with additional descriptors emphasizing the temporal aspects (‘new citizens’; ‘citizens by adoption’) or spatial aspects (‘new neighbours’; ‘co-citizens’) of their inclusion. Table 6.2 provides an overview of the frames used in the five minority regions.

Table 6.2 Frames and themes referring to ‘migrants’
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SNRPs in South Tyrol, the Basque Country and Corsica use the terms ‘migrant’ or ‘immigrant’ (Einwanderer/inmigrante-migrante/émigrant) and ‘foreigner’ (Ausländer/extranjero/étrangère) when discussing immigration flows. SNRPs in those three minority regions do not differentiate between first-generation immigrants and their descendants who were born in those regions. This differentiation is not yet salient in South Tyrol and the Basque Country where international immigration is still a fairly recent phenomenon, with a relative absence of second-generation migrants. However, in Corsica there is a substantial second and third generation. Corsican SNRPs therefore neglect the long history of immigration, as well as French nationality law, by failing to differentiate between persons who physically moved to the island and their locally born descendants. Continuing to use the term ‘foreigner’ for persons with a migration background underlines the distance between them and the in-group, and highlights their ‘not belonging’ to the territory.

The parties in South Tyrol predominantly frame immigration negatively, as a threat to the welfare system and the collective identity (Wisthaler, 2015), while SNRPs in the Basque Country, Scotland, and recently also in Wales, frame immigration as an added value to their own nation-building projects (Arrighi, 2019; Jeram, 2012). SNRPs in Corsica, on the other hand, frame internal migration from France and international migration from former French colonies as a threat to the economic and cultural development, or ‘survival of the island’ (Wisthaler, 2016), while international migration from other destinations is positively framed.

The framing of immigration spills over into to the framing of migrants themselves. A positive framing of immigration translates into the framing of migrants as becoming part of the in-group, and hence part of the regional citizenship. A negative framing of immigration predominantly translates into framing migrants as not belonging to the territory, as ‘unwanted’ migrants hindering socioeconomic development and diluting the SNRPs’ territorial claims, and who are therefore excluded from the in-group.

4.1 Migrants – Those Who Do Not Belong to ‘Us’

In South Tyrol, SNRPs construct the category of ‘unwanted’ migrants based on the perceived threats to security and the welfare system, and most importantly, the potential threat to the minority region’s identity.

Migrants are referred to as ‘social parasites’ or ‘welfare tourists’ by opposition parties die Freiheitlichen (dF), Union für Südtirol (UfS) and Bürgerunion (BU), who predominantly frame immigration as a threat to the welfare system (Wisthaler, 2015). dF has been proclaiming a connection between crime, security and migrants, irrespective of their legal status, since the beginning of the 1990s. They introduced this framing into the debates of the regional parliament in 1994 and have continued to do so until today. The framing of migrants as exploiters of the welfare system very much resembles the populist right-wing tradition of the Austrian Freedom party, which has always had a strong connection to the South Tyrolean dF. In contrast, the framing of migrants as criminals resembles the discourse of Italian right-wing parties, in particular the Lega Nord (Colombo, 2013).

Nevertheless, the most important frame determining migrants’ belonging in South Tyrol is the ascribed capacity to integrate, to ‘become like us’ (Wisthaler, 2015). Migrants who are ‘wanted’ by South Tyrolean SNRPs are those who are perceived as more capable of assimilating into the German culture and language due to their linguistic, religious or cultural proximity, thereby strengthening (numerically) the German community within the minority region vis-à-vis the Italian-speaking population, but most importantly, vis-à-vis the Italian state.

While migrants with a European background are more ‘wanted’ than those from Third Countries, there are also differences within the European group. German-speaking neighbouring countries and those of the former Habsburg Empire are preferred.

Experience has shown that there are differences between migrants from different countries in their ability and willingness to integrate. With European migrants there are less problems than with Arabic, African, or Asian migrants. This is due to the fact that persons with a European cultural background are closer to our culture than others [Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP) Grundsatzpapier , 2003]

We need to make sure that predominantly persons from other EU countries come, who are closer to our culture, language, and lifestyle [SVP Election Manifesto, 2008]

Preference [is] for workers from North and East Tyrol, and the rest of Austria, Germany, and other countries, whose populations we do not have integration problems with [Südtiroler Freiheit (SF) Election Manifesto, 2013]

Migrants from cultures considered to be closer to the Latin language and culture and thus to Italians, such as Romanians, Bulgarians and Albanians, as well as Roma and Sinti, are constructed as ‘unwanted’ migrants.

I talk about Romanians and Bulgarians. Although they are from EU countries, it is as if they were from non-EU countries and thus more difficult to integrate than those that are closer to us [Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 06.12.2011, Pius Leitner, dF]

Muslims are considered to be distant from the Catholic culture and are therefore seen as ‘difficult to integrate’.

We have a limited capacity for integration. This also requires the willingness to integrate from those that come to us. And this willingness is not there among many Muslims [Debate in the South Tyrolean Parliament, 01.12.1999, Pius Leitner, dF]

The construction of migrants’ ‘otherness’ within South Tyrolean society resembles the discourse at the national level. As Clough Marinaro and Walston point out, the ‘othering’ of migrants ‘serves to perpetuate the myth of a clear split between a unified national culture and identity, and ‘them’, the foreigners’ (Clough & Walston, 2010, 6). In South Tyrol, this split is between the German minority population and the Italian state population. Migrants closer to the Italian language and culture hence further underline that division, and undermine the nationalist mobilization of German SNRPs.

In Corsica, cultural proximity to the French language and culture, and relationship to the nationalist mobilization, are decisive factors for the framing of migrants. However, in Corsica, internal migrants from mainland France are the ‘unwanted’ ones. Since the early 1990s, Corsican SNRPs have directly engaged with anti-internal-immigrant discourse. The nationalist camp, consisting of SNRPs and the militant Front de libération nationale corse (National Liberation Front of Corsica, FLNC), coined the term I Francesi Fora, demanding the exit of those French citizens who had migrated to Corsica from mainland France, and whose citizenship gave them political rights and the right to access jobs in public administration. Internal migrants are accused of depriving ‘real Corsicans’ of their island.

Each year, 4,000 newcomers come [from France] and flood the property market and labour market. They register in large numbers in the electoral lists and thus gradually deprive the Corsicans of the ability to control their own future [Corsica Naziune Indipendente (CNI) Party Conference, 2008]

For a short while, the slogan was adapted to migrants from the Maghreb (Arabi Fora), emphasizing their proximity to the French state and to the history of colonialism (Terrazzoni, 2010, 155).

Internal migrants have also been an issue in the Basque Country (Conversi, 1997, 187–221), in South Tyrol (Lantschner, 2008) in the 1950s and 1960s, and in both Scotland and Wales, where previous internal immigration from England and Ireland significantly changed the population and caused substantial internal tensions (Hussain & Miller, 2006). But in contrast to Corsican SNRPs, internal migrants are no longer constructed as the ‘significant other’ by Basque, Scottish, Welsh or South Tyrolean SNRPs. Instead, the construction of the ‘significant other’ has shifted from the population to the state and national government. Thus, the ‘significant other’ is the government and its alleged failure to respond to the minority regions’ particularities (Wisthaler, 2016).

4.2 Citizens: Migrants Who Belong to ‘Us’

In contrast to SNRPs in South Tyrol and Corsica, regionalist parties in the Basque Country, Wales and Scotland do not particularly engage with specific national, ethnic or religious groups, nor do they refer to a ‘cultural proximity’ between the newcomers and the receiving society. Hence, migrants are overarchingly framed as ‘wanted’ due to their contributions to the economy. They are seen as an added value to the development of the society and territory in general, and a support for the regionalist quest for territorial empowerment in particular. References to regional citizenship are salient in this regard, and become a powerful tool to promote nation building and separation from the central state (Xhardez, 2017).

In South Tyrol, seasonal workers in the tourism and agricultural sectors, and women who take care of the elderly, are perceived as a particular asset to the local labour market and were the first to be called ‘co-citizens’.

The idea that in our country there are more than 2,000 foreign co-citizens that take care of our elderly, and that we need them, should be recognized more in any heated debate and should remind us of human basic values [SVP, Election Manifesto, 2008]

The term ‘co-citizens’ was introduced in South Tyrol by the SVP in their 2008 election manifesto and gained prominence in the official discourse after 2013, when the new president, Arno Kompatscher, used it in a programmatic way while opening the legislative term.

Now it’s time to create the basis for the best possible integration of the new co-citizens [Debate at the South Tyrolean Parliament, 09.01.2014, Opening speech of the legislative term, Arno Kompatscher, SVP, President]

Although referring to migrants as ‘co-citizens’ shows a willingness to accept them as part of the ‘collective we’, the parties continue to highlight the necessity of integration policies, giving migrants a ‘duty to integrate’, focusing on language learning and access to the labour market. Failure to learn one of the official languages (German or Italian) results in limited access to welfare services (Alber & Wisthaler, 2020, 241). In other words, SNRPs in South Tyrol do not frame migrants a priori as ‘co-citizens’ but establish economic and linguistic conditions for becoming part of the regional citizenry (Medda-Windischer & Kössler, 2016). So rather than engaging in nation building through the construction of a regional citizenship that is open to migrants, they strengthen the collective identity of the territory by excluding ‘unwanted’ migrants or by pushing them to assimilate into the prevailing identity of the German minority.

In contrast, SNRPs in Corsica, the Basque Country, Scotland and Wales rely on framings of citizenship that include migrants in order to emphasize their forward-looking and modern conceptions of the minority nation. Corsican SNRPs introduced the possibility of migrants becoming ‘citizens by adoption’ (Femu a Corsica (FeC) Election Manifesto, 2010) through birth, ancestry or residence.

The existence of the Corsican people as a historical and cultural community includes the Corsicans by origin and Corsicans by adoption [FeC Election Manifesto, 2010]

The discursive construction of ‘Corsicans by adoption’ opened a pathway for inclusion into the ‘collective we’, conditional on migrants’ willingness to learn the Corsican language and support regionalist parties’ claims, as well as long-term residence on the island.

At the beginning of the 1990s, Corsican SNRPs developed the concept of a ‘community of destiny’ with the aim of integrating those who live on the island and who share the wish to ‘maintain the cultural and linguistic heritage of the historical Corsican people’ (U Ribombu, 1998–2004). This construction of a larger community of Corsicans serves to strengthen the position of Corsica vis-à-vis the French state, and hence the quest for independence. An important element of the community of destiny is the Corsican language, which is declared to be the most visible element of Corsica’s cultural identity. SNRPs portray the Corsican language as accessible to everyone who wants to learn it, and as a tool for strengthening social cohesion and integration. Hence, through language learning and support for the ‘Corsican issue’, migrants can gain access to the community of destiny:

The Corsican language, as one of the most visible elements of the Corsican cultural identity, is a medium of communication and existence and also a factor strengthening social cohesion. Knowledge of the Corsican language is necessary for the integration of everybody who lives on the island (…) independent of his/her origins [Report to the Corsican Parliament, 10.05.2013, Proposal for a co-official status of the Corsican Language]

Since the beginning of the 2000s, the community of destiny has been complemented by proposals for a conceptual Corsican citizenship. In contrast with the community of destiny, where ancestry and birth are emphasized, the most important element of the Corsican citizenship is permanent residence on the island for a certain period of time.

A Corsican citizenship, based on 10 years of residence, as a prerequisite to be able to purchase property [U Ribombu, 2010–2014]

While the community of destiny was constructed as a symbolic membership, Corsican citizenship is connected to voting rights (FeC Election Manifesto, 2010), the right to employment in public administration (U Ribombu, 1998–2004) and the right to acquire land and real estate (U Ribombu, 2010–2014). The development from the community of destiny to Corsican citizenship shows the shift from an exclusive framing of immigration towards accepting migrants as part of the in-group:

This community of destiny, a central concept of Corsican nationalism, is composed of Corsicans by origin and Corsicans by adoption, who have intermingled with our people for centuries [Conf CNI 2008; U Ribombu, 1998–2004]

FeC has been the main driver behind the Corsican citizenship, going beyond the community of destiny by making it available to both internal and international migrants.

To everyone, French, foreign, from the EU or not, who permanently resides on our island for a significant amount of time (as is already applied in many European regions) [FeC Election Manifesto, 2010]

Basque SNRPs also propose the establishment of a ‘Basque citizenship’, focusing on the local level. Framing migrants as ‘new neighbours’ underlines the Basque approach to immigrant integration at the local city level. Consequently, proposals for Basque citizenship rely solely on residence as the criterion for inclusion; residence is currently open to both legal and undocumented migrants who register in a municipality, and allows them access to welfare services (Ruiz-Vieytez & J., 2016).

The requirement for access to the new citizenship is residence. The new concept of citizenship must be separated from nationality in the classical sense as well as from any other element related to identity. It must be based solely on residence [Plan Vasco de Inmigración, 2003-2005; II Plan Vasco de Inmigración , 2007-2009]

In contrast with Corsican citizenship and the South Tyrolean ‘duty to integrate’, the concept of Basque citizenship as promoted by all SNRPs does not focus on language as a marker of the in-group’s identity. Rather, it constructs Basqueness as an open, tolerant and fluid concept, based on diverse cultures and identities. As Jeram shows, ‘diversity’ is constructed as a new marker of the Basque collective identity (Jeram, 2012).

An inclusive concept of citizenship which allows the full participation of immigrants in the political community but which simultaneously allows them to maintain their identities [Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) Election Manifesto, 2009]

PNV has always been conscious of the plural character of the Basque society. […] The open, tolerant, and integrative nationalism which characterizes PNV aims for the future to support an economic, social, and cultural project for all citizens, whether they have nationalist sentiments or not, because this project does not have the slightest exclusive dimension [PNV Election Manifesto, 1998]

We find a similarly inclusive framing of the in-group in Scotland. The Labour/Liberal Democrat coalition government officially introduced the term ‘New Scots’ in 2003 in the title of their strategy to attract highly skilled workers (New Scots: Attracting Fresh Talent to Meet the Challenge of Growth, 2003). The notion of ‘New Scots’ was also adopted by the SNP in its 2005 general election manifesto, announcing that the party aimed to ‘pursue an immigration policy that welcomes new Scots’ (SNP Election Manifesto, 2005a, b).

In the Scottish discourse, which is characterized by the wish to expand immigration flows and attract more newcomers, the most ‘wanted’ and appreciated migrants are overseas students who have studied in Scotland and are willing to remain in the minority nation after the completion of their degrees. They are the main target group of the ‘New Scots: Attracting Fresh Talent to Meet the Challenge of Growth’ (2003) campaign, which later expanded to workers (especially highly skilled workers) who were needed in certain sectors of the labour market. The term ‘New Scots’ is applied to students and highly skilled workers even before they enter Scotland, and thus does not refer to integration requirements but rather proposes a very immediate and inclusive notion of Scottishness.Footnote 2

We will introduce measures to encourage doctors who come from other countries to study here, to stay on and work in the Scottish NHS [National Health Service] when they graduate [SNP Election Manifesto, 2005a, b]

Since 2014, the notion of ‘New Scots’ has been expanded to refugees and asylum seekers through the ‘New Scots: Integrating Refugees into Scotland’s Community Strategy’ (2014).Footnote 3

But in reaching out to new migrants, we should not forget those who are already here. There are many asylum seekers in Scotland who could make an enormous and long term contribution to Scottish society if only they were given the chance. The way in which some asylum seekers are treated by the UK immigration authorities is not only, on occasion, morally wrong. It also deprives Scotland of much needed talent and risks sending the wrong message about our country to the very people we are encouraging to come here to live and work [SNP Press Release, 26.11.2005a, b]

Who shall be citizens? – All people resident in Scotland and all those who were born in Scotland [MacCormick, SNP, 1999]

A similar discourse emerged in Wales, where Plaid Cymru (PC) started framing migrants as ‘new citizens’ in 2007, highlighting their added value and potential for strengthening the party’s quest for nationalist mobilization.

Plaid Cymru believes we should celebrate and support the cultural riches of the diverse and vibrant communities that make up modern Wales, and welcome the input of new citizens, without in any way forgetting what makes us a unique nation [PC Election Manifesto, 2007]

Since 2016, the Welsh Government, supported by PC, has focused on a strategy to expand this approach to include asylum seekers. This resulted in Wales labelling itself ‘the first nation of sanctuary’ in 2019, with an action plan to support refugees and asylum seekers in their long-term settlement in Wales, including access to health care, education, employment, and English and Welsh language learning (Welsh Government, Nation of Sanctuary – Refugee and Asylum Seeker Plan, January 2019). As Edwards and Wisthaler (2023) argue, the Welsh Government attempts first to ‘develop a specific Welsh approach to sanctuary that sets it apart from the UK Government’, and second, to foster its construction of a regional citizenry through immigrant integration policies.

While Muslims are classed as ‘unwanted’ migrants in South Tyrol, they are ‘wanted’ in Scotland and Wales. The Welsh and Scottish governments, and in particular the SNP, present Muslims as a vital part of the Welsh/Scottish community whose particularities need to be protected and promoted:

Rhodri, and other Ministers, have done their best to ensure that we consider the Muslim communities as a part of the Welsh community [Debate in the Welsh National Assembly, 06.11.2001, Paul Murphy, Labour Party, Secretary of the State]

There is no doubt the Scottish Muslim community sits at the heart and in the mainstream of modern Scotland (…) Next year I hope to be Scotland’s First Minister and I want to make clear that I will work to ensure that nothing threatens the place of Scottish Muslims, or any ethnic community, at the heart of our society [SNP Press Release, 20.08.2006, Alex Salmond;]

The added value of Muslims is not only celebrated in discourse, but is also embraced in practice. Candidates with a Muslim background regularly appear on the SNP’s election lists, and there have been two SNP members with a Muslim background sitting in the Scottish Parliament: Bashir Ahmad (2007–2009) and Humza Yousaf (2011–ongoing), and one in the House of Commons: Tasmina Ahmed-Sheikh (2015–2017). Furthermore, the pro-independence ‘Scots Asians for Independence’ group, launched by Ahmad at the party’s general conference in 1995, became an important part of the SNP. In Wales, PC includes black and ethnic minority candidates in its election lists and has supporter groups called ‘Muslims for Plaid’ and ‘English for Plaid’, the latter counterbalancing, to some extent, the accusations of Plaid having anti-English sentiments.

In both Wales and Scotland, residence or birth are the only criteria for being a regional citizen:

Who shall be citizens? – All people resident in Scotland and all those who were born in Scotland [MacCormick, SNP, 1999]

In addition, PC regards the Welsh language as inherent to the Welsh nation and their uniqueness, and calls upon migrants to learn the minority language to further strengthen their ties with the territory.

Wales has a language of its own, that we are rightly proud of. The Welsh Language is spoken throughout Wales, and you will find television and radio programmes, publications and signs in both Welsh and English. We would certainly encourage you to learn Welsh, as well as English [Government of Wales – Understanding Wales 2012]

5 Conclusion

The empirical analysis shows that migration contributes to and challenges collective identity-building in minority regions, but does not supersede or replace the traditional ‘significant other’ against whom the collective identity is constructed. Instead, migration complements and strengthens pre-existing cleavages and boundaries between groups (Wisthaler, 2015). In the case of South Tyrol, the Italian state together with its language and culture is still perceived as the main threat to the German and Ladin minorities, while migration is considered to be an additional ‘other’ threat (Carlà, 2018). In Corsica, the Basque Country, Wales and Scotland the collective identity is constructed as inclusive and open to new forms of belonging, whereas the French, Spanish and British states are still constructed as the main pole against which to differentiate. ‘Othering’ becomes a strategy of SNRPs to strengthen their quests for territorial empowerment.

This strategy of ‘othering’ extends to SNRPs’ construction of migrants as either strengthening or weakening the in-group, with several important implications. First, these discursive constructions impact immigration and integration policymaking, influencing the material rights and benefits available to migrants and persons with a migration background. Second, the framing of immigration, and thus immigrants, also contributes to SNRPs’ nation-building projects by (1) reinforcing the sociocultural uniqueness of the minority community, (2) asserting their autonomy through divergent policymaking and (3) establishing a national identity and notion of citizenship in contradistinction to the state majority.

For example, regionalist political parties in South Tyrol employ negative discursive frames, referring to migrants as ‘parasites’ and ‘welfare tourists’, contributing to the notion of the minority nation as exclusive, with strict limits on membership. This results in a hierarchy of migrants largely based on their country of origin and perceived linguistic, cultural and religious proximity to the South Tyrolean German minority, or distance from the majority Italian culture. It is also paired with expectations of assimilation into the host community, reaffirming their cultural distinctiveness.

Some SNRPs take a more civic approach to inclusion, with residence serving as the main criterion for membership of the in-group, without reference to any social or cultural markers. This positive framing contributes to the nation-building project by (numerically) boosting the minority population and its relative political and economic power, or by attracting specific ‘wanted’ migrants based on what they can contribute to society in terms of filling gaps in the labour market and bringing skills into the region. In addition to the intrinsic value of this approach, it also raises the region’s influence vis-à-vis the state. It can also have a more symbolic value: Developing immigration and integration policies that contrast with those at the national level assert the region’s right to self-determination.

Scholars show that inclusive regional integration policies, especially language policies and access to social benefits, have a positive impact on immigrant’s intentions to naturalize in Switzerland (Bennour, 2019), and positively affect their political engagement and sense of belonging in the US (Filandra & Manatschal, 2019). We can therefore expect that a sense of belonging to the minority regions will increase migrants’ support for SNRPs and their quests for territorial empowerment. Consequently, some SNRPs are actively engaged in supporting citizens-to-be in their long-term settlement by facilitating their access to the welfare system and the labour market. This positive discursive construction of immigration and immigrants therefore, once again, supports SNRPs by fostering a sense of belonging among New Scots, new citizens of Wales, adopted Corsicans and new Basque neighbours, whereas migrants constructed as ‘unwanted’, ‘difficult to integrate’ and ‘distant to our culture’ are unlikely to contribute to the nation-building project, as in South Tyrol.

Characteristics of SNRPs, such as party politics and party ideology, can account for their behaviour, but there is also evidence supporting a cleavage hypothesis, where it is the distance (spatial or ideological) between the state and the sub-nation that carries explanatory power. In this hypothesis, conflicting and fragile societal relations exert an influence on SNRPs’ positions on immigration and integration, as well as on their framing of the minority nation’s identity. This may account for SNRPs assimilating migration-generated diversity into their own particular framing of the collective identity, and instrumentalizing their framing of migration to support their claims for autonomy and distinctiveness within the state.