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Innovation in High-Tech Mergers: Should Competition Law Bother?

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Law and Economics of the Digital Transformation (ILEC 2023)

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Abstract

The analysis of the adverse effects of a merger on competition has recently changed. While for years, competition authorities have focused primarily on the effects of a merger on prices, the impact on output, or the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in a given market, they are now examining the effects of a merger on innovation. According to the author’s analysis, which begins by explaining the peculiarities of high-tech industries, the notion of “innovation”, and the rationale for merger control, this system can only establish its effectiveness by applying the same standards of proof of the pro- and anti-competitive effects of a merger.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The term “innovation” can be used in different contexts to denote either a process or an outcome. To avoid confusion, this chapter uses the term “innovation activities” to refer to the process, while the term “innovation” is limited to outcomes.

  2. 2.

    This chapter will not address the issue of data exploitation by Big Tech companies (Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Meta (Facebook), Microsoft), nor the regulation of data protection practices, nor the interrelation between data protection and competition. For more information, see for example the following cases (non-exhaustive list): Italian Competition Authority, “Google” Case A552, (press release of 14 July 2022); “Amazon’s Marketplace”, UK Competition and Market Authority (press release of 6 July 2022); Case 50972, “Google Privacy Sandbox”, UK Competition and Market Authority (commitment decision issued and case closed on 11 February 2022); Google-Adtech and Data-related practices (Case AT.40670), opened by the Commission on 22 June 2021; Facebook leveraging (Case AT.40684), opened by the Commission on 4 June 2021; “Meta’s use of data”, UK Competition and Market Authority, investigation opened on 4 June 2021; “Proceeding against Google based on new rules for large digital players (Section 19a GWB)—Bundeskartellamt examines Google’s significance for competition across markets and its data processing terms”, Bundeskartellamt (press release of 25 May 2021); “In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., a corporation”, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), order of 28 April 2020; Google/Fitbit (Case M.9660), Commission decision of 17 December 2020; Case 1:20-cv-03010, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and 10 State Attorneys General v Google to Restore Competition in the Search and Search Advertising Markets, complaint filed on 20 October 2020; Apple—App Store practices—music streaming (Case AT.40437), initiated by the Commission on 16 June 2020; Apple—App Store practices—e-books/audiobooks (Case AT.40652), initiated by the Commission on 16 June 2020; Amazon Marketplace (Case AT.40462), initiated by the Commission on 17 July 2019; Google Android (Case AT.40099), Commission decision of 18 July 2018 (appeal by Google currently pending before the General Court of the Court of justice of the European Union (CJEU); Google Search (Shopping) (Case AT.39740), Commission decision of 27 June 2017, confirmed by the General Court of the CJEU judgment of 10 November 2021); Microsoft/LinkedIn (Case M.8124), Commission decision of 6 December 2016.

  3. 3.

    How to Tame the Tech Titans, The Economist (18 January 2018), retrievable under: www.economist.com/leaders/2018/01/18/how-to-tame-the-tech-titans (last access 07 October 2022).

  4. 4.

    Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (European Merger Regulation) [2004] OJ L 024, refers to the control of a “concentration”, which includes, inter alia, mergers, joint ventures, and share acquisitions which lead to acquiring control over the target company. The terms “mergers”, “mergers and acquisitions” and “concentrations” are used interchangeably throughout this chapter.

  5. 5.

    High-tech is an abbreviation of high technology. For the purposes of this chapter, the term “high-tech” industry refers to manufacturing industries based on their high level of technology intensity (research and development (R&D) expenditure/value added), using the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE Rev. 2) at the 3-digit level for group compilation.

  6. 6.

    European Merger Regulation, Article 2(2).

  7. 7.

    Under European competition rules, a dominant position is one in which an undertaking or group of undertakings would be able to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, its customers and, ultimately, its consumers (Definition given by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Hoffmann-La Roche Case 85/76 [1979] ECR 461 and confirmed in subsequent judgments).

  8. 8.

    Certain mergers may weaken competition by providing a means of segmenting markets or gaining significant market power, notably if they lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position (European Merger Regulation, Article 2(3)). This can result in increased concentration, reduced economic efficiency, reduced innovation, higher prices, lower quality and reduced consumer welfare (Ezrachi 2021, p. 445).

  9. 9.

    Commission “Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between Undertakings” [2008] OJ C 265/07 (Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers), para. 21.

  10. 10.

    Commission “Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings” [2004] OJ C 031 (Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers), para. 12.

  11. 11.

    The principle of legality, a corollary of the rule of law, requires that the actions of the (European) administration be carried out in accordance with the law. According to European Convention, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364/1, Article 52(1) sentence 1: “Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms.”

  12. 12.

    The concept of legal certainty—one of the general principles of European law recognised by the CJEU, Duff and Others, case C-63/93 [1996] para. 31—means that the law must be clear and precise and that its legal implications must be foreseeable.

  13. 13.

    According to the Commission, the transaction, which brings together, under a single owner, competing clinical research programmes that seek to address the same unmet medical needs is likely to diminish competition in innovation by reducing the R&D efforts of the notifying parties, see Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline Oncology Business (Case M.7275), Commission Decision of 18 March 2015, para. 104. The same reasoning applies to a transaction, prior to which the parties had significant research lines and products under development that target the same product markets. According to the Commission, the transaction would reduce competitive innovation between the parties, leading to the abandonment, postponement or redirection of competing lines of research and products under development. In addition, the transaction raised the question of the likelihood of a significant impediment to effective competition with respect to the parties’ incentive to innovate in the areas in which they operated and the risk of a significant reduction in the overall level of competition and, therefore, product innovation in the industry in question—Dow/DuPont (Case M.7932), Commission Decision of 12 October 2017, para. 1955.

  14. 14.

    See Chap. 5, Merger Efficiency: A Losing Game.

  15. 15.

    See n 6 earlier. For the purposes of this chapter, when we refer to high-tech industries, we are considering industries classified under NACE code C.26 (manufacture of computers, electronic and optical products) and C.30.3 (manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery). Although traditionally the manufacture of basic pharmaceuticals and pharmaceutical preparations is considered part of high-tech manufacturing, we purposely exclude them from our analysis.

  16. 16.

    Only concentrations that have a “Union dimension” are notifiable to the Commission under Article 4(1) of the European Merger Regulation. Article 1 of the European Merger Regulation sets out the numerical thresholds for establishing EU jurisdiction. Concentrations that do not have a Union dimension are subject to the merger laws of the Member States.

  17. 17.

    As of 20 June 2022, 272 mergers in the high-tech sector have been notified to the Commission. Of the published decisions, 58 analyse innovation in some way, of which we have selected the 26 most salient. For an overview of the decisions analysed, see the table in the Appendix.

  18. 18.

    “Killer acquisitions”, i.e. transactions that have the purpose or effect of terminating overlapping R&D projects, are currently the subject of debate, particularly with respect to the ability of merger control laws to identify and prevent such deals. See in particular the study by Cunningham et al. (2018), which focuses on the pharmaceutical sector and argues that mergers in research-intensive industries not only reduce the innovation efforts of the merged entities, but also have a negative impact on the innovation spending and efforts of rivals; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2020), Commission et al. (2019).

  19. 19.

    The low-technology industries are (i) paper printing, (ii) textiles and clothing, (iii) food, beverages and tobacco, and (iv) wood and furniture.

  20. 20.

    The medium–low-technology industries are (i) rubber and plastic products, (ii) shipbuilding, (iii) other manufacturing, (iv) non-ferrous metals, (v) non-metallic mineral products, (vi) fabricated metal products, (vii) petroleum refining, and (viii) ferrous metals.

  21. 21.

    The medium–high-technology industries are (i) scientific instruments, (ii) motor vehicles, (iii) electrical machinery, (iv) chemicals, (v) other transport equipment, and (vi) non-electrical machinery.

  22. 22.

    The high-tech industries are (i) aerospace, (ii) computers and office machinery, (iii) electronics and communications, and (iv) pharmaceuticals.

  23. 23.

    Products are considered high-tech according to calculations of R&D intensity by product group (R&D expenditure/total sales).

  24. 24.

    Patents are considered high technology or biotechnology based on the International Patent Classification (IPC), eighth edition. The following technical fields are defined as high-tech IPC groups: (i) aviation, (ii) communication technology, (iii) computer and commercial automation equipment, (iv) lasers, (v) micro-organisms and genetic engineering, and (vi) semiconductors, according to Eurostat, Glossary: High-tech, retrievable under: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:High-tech (last access 07 October 2022); According to a study by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to classify high-tech industries, a high-tech industry is defined by the presence of four factors: (i) a high proportion of scientists, engineers, and technicians; (ii) a high proportion of R&D employment; (iii) the production of high-tech products, as specified in a Census Bureau list of advanced technology products; and (iv) the use of high-tech production methods, including the extensive use of high-tech capital goods and services in the production process, Hecker (2005, p. 58).

  25. 25.

    Serediuk and Vdovychenko (2018, p. 315).

  26. 26.

    Market uncertainty refers to ambiguity about the type and extent of customer needs that can be met by a particular technology, Mohr (2000, p. 247).

  27. 27.

    Technological uncertainty is “not knowing whether the technology—or the company providing it—can deliver on its promise to meet specific needs”, Mohr (2000, p. 247).

  28. 28.

    Competitive volatility refers to changes in the competitive landscape: which firms are one’s competitors, their product offerings, the tools they use to compete. Innovations by entrants and incumbents can render older technologies obsolete, and as a result, the mortality rate of firms in high-tech industries can be high, contributing to competitive volatility.

  29. 29.

    Von Furstenberg (1986, p. 43).

  30. 30.

    Many high-tech companies spend 10% or more of their revenues on R&D, Gilbert (2020, pp. 13–14), referring to reports of the US National Science Foundation.

  31. 31.

    Gilbert (2020, p. 16).

  32. 32.

    Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82, para. 17; Commission Recommendation on relevant product market within the electronic communications sector, para. 10.

  33. 33.

    Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82, para. 17; Commission Recommendation on relevant product market within the electronic communications sector, para. 9.

  34. 34.

    Ibid.

  35. 35.

    Commission Recommendation on relevant product market within the electronic communications sector, para. 11.

  36. 36.

    Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (Case M.877), Commission decision of 30 July 1997, para. 102.

  37. 37.

    Idem.

  38. 38.

    Lenovo/Motorola Mobility (Case M.7202), Commission decision of 29 July 2014, paras 22 and 55.

  39. 39.

    OECD/Eurostat (2018, p. 20). For other definitions of innovation, see: Dosi (1988, p. 222), for whom innovation is the search for, discovery of, experimentation with, development of, imitation of, and adoption of new products, new production processes, and new organisational structures. For O’Sullivan and Dooley (2009, p. 3), innovation is the process of making changes, large and small, radical and incremental, to products, processes, and services that result in the introduction of something new to the organisation that adds value to consumers and contributes to the organisation’s knowledge stock. For Christensen (2013, p. xiii), innovation means a change in one of the technologies, with the help of which an organisation transforms labour, capital, materials, and information into more valuable products and services. McKinley et al. (2014, p. 91), define innovation as any new product, service, or production process that deviates significantly from previous product, service, or production process architectures. Nahm (2014, p. 9), defines innovation as the process, used by firms to develop, master, and commercialise new product, service, and production process designs. It includes the process used to introduce new and improved technologies and practices to commercial markets. Tidd and Bessant (2014, p. 3), describe innovation as the process of introducing a new idea that creates widespread or long-term change. Mukhtar (2016, p. 47), views innovation as an interactive process to bring value to the market. In many cases, this process is initiated by a technological breakthrough from a research activity, which is followed by other activities such as manufacturing and marketing.

  40. 40.

    Schreiber (2021, p. 291).

  41. 41.

    OECD/Eurostat (2018, p. 68).

  42. 42.

    Schumpeter (2008, p. 83). Schumpeter also insisted that this creative destruction was a much more important competitive force than the traditional concept of price competition, contrary to the conventional view of neoclassical economics (pp. 84–85).

  43. 43.

    Swann (2009, p. 12).

  44. 44.

    OECD/Eurostat (2018, p. 20).

  45. 45.

    R&D is one of many activities that can generate innovations, or through which knowledge useful for innovation can be acquired. Other methods of acquiring potentially useful knowledge include market research, engineering activities to evaluate process efficiency and market surveys, OECD/Eurostat (2018, p. 46).

  46. 46.

    Every innovation implies the likely intention to pursue some form of value creation (or preservation) by the actors responsible for it (OECD/Eurostat 2018, pp. 47–48). Value is thus an implicit objective of innovation, but it cannot be guaranteed ex ante because the outcomes of innovation are uncertain and heterogeneous. According to Dosi (1988, p. 222), innovation involves a fundamental element of uncertainty. This is not simply the absence of all relevant information on the occurrence of known events, but more fundamentally it means that (i) there are technical–economic problems whose resolution procedures are unknown, and (ii) that it is impossible to trace precisely the consequences to action. Almost by definition, what is being sought cannot be known precisely before the very activity of research and experimentation, so that the technical (and, even more, commercial) results of innovation efforts can hardly be known ex ante. Certainly, whenever innovative activities are undertaken by profit-motivated agents, they must also involve some perception of untapped technical and economic opportunities. However, these perceptions and beliefs rarely involve detailed knowledge of possible events, states of the world, input combinations, and product characteristics.

  47. 47.

    “New or improved product or business process (or combination thereof) that differs significantly from the firm’s previous products or business processes”.

  48. 48.

    OECD/Eurostat (2018, p. 47).

  49. 49.

    OECD/Eurostat (2018, p. 47).

  50. 50.

    Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property, Guide for Innovative and Creative Minds, Patents Protection Requirements, retrievable under: https://www.ige.ch/en/intellectual-property/guide/patents/protection-requirements (last access 07 October 2022).

  51. 51.

    OECD/Eurostat (2018, p. 104).

  52. 52.

    OECD/Eurostat (2018, p. 106).

  53. 53.

    OECD/Eurostat (2018, p. 115).

  54. 54.

    OECD/Eurostat (2018, p. 117).

  55. 55.

    Whish and Bailey (2021, p. 859).

  56. 56.

    Commission Communication “Notice: Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty” [2004] OJ C 101/97, para. 13; Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, para. 8.

  57. 57.

    Whish and Bailey (2021, p. 859), Këllezi (2010, p. 16); on this point see Gencor v Commission Case T-102/96 [1999] para. 106.

  58. 58.

    Other remedies include the removal of links with competitors, commitments to grant access to key infrastructure, networks, and key technologies such as patents or interoperability obligations.

  59. 59.

    AB InBev/SAB Miller (Case M.7881), Commission decision of 19 June 2017; Këllezi (2010, p. 13), Williamson (1987, p. 116 et seqq).

  60. 60.

    Whish and Bailey (2021, p. 860); See ECJ Commission v Tetra Laval BV Case C-12/03 P [2005], para. 42.

  61. 61.

    The competition authorities intervene at two different times: ex post to sanction cartels and abuses of dominant positions (within the meaning of articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/01 (TFEU), or ex ante, beforehand, to prevent anti-competitive mergers (European merger regulation).

  62. 62.

    General Court of the CJEU, Hutchison/Telefonica, Case T-399/16 [2020] upheld the validity of the Commission’s theories of harm, but concluded that the Commission had not demonstrated a “significant impediment”. See e.g. para. 118: “The Commission is required to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate with a strong probability the existence of significant impediments following the concentration” to block a merger that does not create a dominant position.

  63. 63.

    Whish and Bailey (2021, pp. 860–861).

  64. 64.

    See ECJ, Commission v Tetra Laval BV Case C-12/03 P [2005] paras 37–51; General Court of the CJEU, Deutsche Lufthansa AG v Commission Case T-712/16 [2018] paras 32–45.

  65. 65.

    General Court of the CJEU, Bertelsmann A.G. and Sony Corporation of America v Impala, Case C-413/06 P [2008], para. 48; Court of First Instance of the CJEU, General Electric v Commission, Case T-210/01 [2005] para. 61.

  66. 66.

    General Court of the CJEU, Bertelsmann A.G. and Sony Corporation of America v Impala, Case C-413/06 P [2008] para. 52; see also General Court of the CJEU, Cisco Systems v Commission, Case T-79/12 [2013] para. 47, rejecting the assertion that the Commission would have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a merger does not give rise to competition concerns.

  67. 67.

    Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law [1997] OJ C 372/05 (Notice on the definition of the relevant market), para. 2.

  68. 68.

    Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, para. 28; Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, para. 12.

  69. 69.

    Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, para. 89; In CJEU, France v Commission, Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 [1998] the Court of Justice held that there must be a causal link between the merger and the deterioration of the competitive structure of the market for the European Merger Regulation to apply.

  70. 70.

    European Merger Regulation, recital 29.

  71. 71.

    European Merger Regulation, Article 6(2) and Article 8(2); Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 [2008] OJ C 267/01, para. 2.

  72. 72.

    A correct definition of the relevant market is a prerequisite for any assessment of the effect of a merger on competition: CJEU, France v Commission, Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95 [1998] para. 143; subsequent judgments have regularly repeated this point, for example General Court of the CJEU, Spar Österreichische Warenhandels v Commission, Case T-405-08 [2013] para. 116; General Court of the CJEU, HeidelbergCement AG and Schwenk Zement v Commission, Case T-380/17 [2020] para. 293.

  73. 73.

    According to the Notice on the definition of the relevant market, para. 7: “A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended use.”

  74. 74.

    Notice on the definition of the relevant market, para. 2 and para. 13. Firms are subject to three main sources of competitive constraints: demand substitutability (paras 15–19), supply substitutability (paras 20–23) and potential competition (para. 24).

  75. 75.

    Notice on the definition of the relevant market, paras 14–18.

  76. 76.

    In economics, a monopsony is a market structure in which a single buyer substantially controls the market as the primary purchaser of goods and services offered by many potential sellers. Microeconomic monopsony theory assumes that a single entity has market power over all sellers as the sole buyer of a good or service. This is similar to the power of a monopolist to influence the price for its buyers in a monopoly, where many buyers have only one seller of a good or service at their disposal.

  77. 77.

    The reasoning behind this approach is that if a hypothetical monopolist cannot profitably raise its price, it is not a true monopolist. In particular, this means that a significant portion of its customers might respond to the price increase and switch to another product.

  78. 78.

    Petit (2020, p. 22).

  79. 79.

    Facebook/WhatsApp (Case M.8228), Commission decision of 17 May 2017.

  80. 80.

    It is up to the competition authority to determine whether the precedents are still applicable or whether, on the contrary, market conditions have changed since the previous decisions or are different in other countries.

  81. 81.

    For this reason, competition authorities usually send targeted requests for information and organise hearings.

  82. 82.

    It is always revealing to learn from parties whom they consider to be their direct competitors, provided, of course, that these documents are authentic and not prepared for investigation.

  83. 83.

    Such events can shed light on how customers have reacted to price increases in reality, making the SSNIP test more than a theoretical hypothesis.

  84. 84.

    While our analysis does not address digital markets, it should be noted that their multisided nature (where outcomes between different markets are linked), and the fact that services are provided for free (effectively having a price of zero), pose an additional challenge in defining the relevant market.

  85. 85.

    See Chap. 2.1 High-technology industries, notably “Characteristics of High Technology” and “High Barriers to Entry and Expansion”.

  86. 86.

    Some competition experts have begun to question the primary role traditionally played by market definition, and, in particular, the Notice on the definition of the relevant market, a tool that has not been updated since its introduction in 1997.

  87. 87.

    E.g. U.S. DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing of Intellectual Property [2017] (U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing of Intellectual Property) retrievable under https://www.justice.gov/atr/IPguidelines/download (last access 07 October 2022), para. 3.2.2: “Technology markets consist of the intellectual property that is licensed and its close substitutes—that is, the technologies or goods that are close enough substitutes to constrain significantly the exercise of market power with respect to the IP that is licensed. When rights to IP are marketed separately from the products in which they are used, the agencies may analyse the competitive effects of a licensing arrangement in a technology market.”; Commission Communication “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements” [2011] OJ C 11/1 (EU Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements), paras 116–118.

  88. 88.

    Directorate General for Competition (DG Competition) (EC) et al. (2021, p. 112).

  89. 89.

    DG Competition (EC) et al., p. 112.

  90. 90.

    See Chap. 3.4 “Innovation Markets and Innovation Spaces”; DG Competition (EC) et al. (2021, p. 112).

  91. 91.

    A distinction can be made between competition in current goods, future goods (i.e. new markets), and pure research. The Commission has identified a number of “emerging” markets, including portals (Vodafone/Vivendi/Canal Plus (Case JV.48), Commission decision of 20 July 2000); online music (Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram (Case M.2050), Commission decision of 13 October 2000, para. 15 and paras 26–32, and AOL/Time Warner (Case M.1845), Commission decision of 11 October 2000, para. 26), interactive video networks (Alcatel/Thomson Multimedia/JV (Case M.2048), Commission decision of 26 October 2000, para. 16), one-stop integrated broadband content supply via the Internet (AOL/Time Warner (Case M.1845), Commission decision of 11 October 2000, para. 35), bottled water in Norway (Orkla/Volvo (Case M.582), Commission decision of 20 September 1995, para. 39), Internet book sales in Spain (Bertelsmann/Planeta/BOL Spain (Case JV.24), Commission decision of 3 December 1999, para. 26), as well as the collection of spent catalytic converters, the equipping/pounding of these converters, and the extraction of precious metals from the catalysts (Rhône-Poulenc/Engelhard (Case M.615), Commission decision of 23 October 1995, para. 25).

  92. 92.

    AlliedSignal/Honeywell (Case M.1601), Commission decision of 1 December 1999, paras 57 and 58.

  93. 93.

    A term that the Commission explicitly takes from the U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing of Intellectual Property when discussing innovation competition in Dow/DuPont (Case M.7932), Commission decision of 12 October 2017 (para. 346), although the term (and concept) of “R&D market” was already used by the Commission in Glaxo Wellcome/Smithkill Beecham (Case M.1846), Commission decision of 8 May 2000, para. 174.

  94. 94.

    DG Competition (EC) et al. (2021, p. 112).

  95. 95.

    For example, in Bayer/Monsanto (Case M.8084), Commission decision of 14 December 2018, para. 1023, the Commission found that innovation should not be considered as a market in its own right, but as an entry activity for downstream product markets. If the innovation ultimately leads to products competing in these markets, the assessment of competition in innovation cannot be directly conflated with the relevant downstream product markets.

  96. 96.

    Lindsay and Berridge (2017, p. 167).

  97. 97.

    Nevertheless, the Commission regularly examines the loss of innovation competition in pharmaceutical mergers. See Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz (Case M.737), Commission decision of 17 July 1996, paras 101–106; Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham (Case M.1846), Commission decision of 8 May 2000, paras 70–72, 175–178, 194, 195 and 222.

  98. 98.

    Airbus/SITA (Case M.3657), Commission decision of 27 January 2005, para. 11.

  99. 99.

    Thrane & Thrane/Nera (Case M.4465), Commission decision of 21 March 2007.

  100. 100.

    Ibid., para. 45.

  101. 101.

    Seagate/HDD Business of Samsung (Case M.6214), Commission decision of 19 October 2011.

  102. 102.

    Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies (Case M.6203), Commission decision of 12 August 2013.

  103. 103.

    Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies (Case M.6203), Commission decision of 12 August 2013, para. 94; Seagate/HDD Business of Samsung (Case M.6214), Commission decision of 19 October 2011, para. 66.

  104. 104.

    Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies (Case M.6203), Commission decision of 12 August 2013, para. 96; Seagate/HDD Business of Samsung (Case M.6214), Commission decision of 19 October 2011, para. 68.

  105. 105.

    Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies (Case M.6203), Commission decision of 12 August 2013, para. 97; Seagate/HDD Business of Samsung (Case M.6214), Commission decision of 19 October 2011, para. 69.

  106. 106.

    Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies (Case M.6203), Commission decision of 12 August 2013, para. 99; Seagate/HDD Business of Samsung (Case M.6214), Commission decision of 19 October 2011, para. 71.

  107. 107.

    General Electric/Honeywell (Case M.2220), Commission decision of 3 July 2001.

  108. 108.

    Ibid., para. 79.

  109. 109.

    Ibid., para. 110.

  110. 110.

    If GE Capital were a stand-alone company, it would (at the time of the analysis) rank alone in the top 20 of the Fortune 500 (para. 107).

  111. 111.

    Ibid., para. 110.

  112. 112.

    UTC/Goodrich (Case M.6410), Commission decision of 26 July 2012.

  113. 113.

    Ibid., para. 312.

  114. 114.

    Ibid.

  115. 115.

    Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space and Technology (Case M.3680), Commission decision of 28 April 2005.

  116. 116.

    Ibid., para. 112.

  117. 117.

    Axalto/Gemplus (Case No M.3998), Commission decision of 19 May 2006.

  118. 118.

    Ibid., para. 50–52.

  119. 119.

    Ibid.

  120. 120.

    Ibid., para. 53.

  121. 121.

    Ibid.

  122. 122.

    Ibid., para. 54.

  123. 123.

    Seagate/Maxtor (Case M.4100), Commission decision of 27 April 2006.

  124. 124.

    Ibid., para. 39.

  125. 125.

    Lite-On/PBDS (Case M.4502), Commission decision of 16 February 2007.

  126. 126.

    Ibid., para. 34.

  127. 127.

    Ibid., para. 29.

  128. 128.

    Ibid.

  129. 129.

    Ibid., para. 35.

  130. 130.

    Acer/Packard Bell (Case M.4979), Commission decision of 27 February 2008.

  131. 131.

    Ibid., para. 40.

  132. 132.

    Ibid.

  133. 133.

    Ericsson/STM/JV (Case M.5332), Commission decision of 25 November 2008.

  134. 134.

    Ibid., para. 129.

  135. 135.

    Ibid.

  136. 136.

    Ibid.

  137. 137.

    Panasonic/Sanyo (Case M.5421), Commission decision of 29 September 2009.

  138. 138.

    Ibid., para. 88.

  139. 139.

    Toshiba/Fujitsu HDD Business (Case M.5483), Commission decision of 11 May 2009.

  140. 140.

    Ibid., para. 37.

  141. 141.

    Ibid.

  142. 142.

    Thermo Fisher/Dionex Corporation (Case M.6126), Commission decision of 13 May 2011.

  143. 143.

    Ibid., para. 81.

  144. 144.

    Harris Corporation/L3 Technologies (Case M.9234), Commission decision of 21 June 2019.

  145. 145.

    Ibid., paras 183–185 with respect to night vision devices; paras 242–245 with respect to image intensification tubes; paras 353–355 with respect to the handheld video data links and handheld tactical air-to-ground communication devices used by ground forces markets.

  146. 146.

    Agilent/Varian (Case M.5611), Commission decision of 20 January 2010.

  147. 147.

    Ibid., para. 95.

  148. 148.

    Ibid., para. 98–99.

  149. 149.

    Ibid., para. 99.

  150. 150.

    Ibid., para. 100.

  151. 151.

    Intel/McAfee (Case M.5984), Commission decision of 26 January 2011.

  152. 152.

    Ibid., para. 97.

  153. 153.

    Ibid., para. 99.

  154. 154.

    Ibid., para. 100.

  155. 155.

    Ibid., para. 101.

  156. 156.

    Ibid., para. 102.

  157. 157.

    Ibid., para. 112.

  158. 158.

    Ibid., para. 110.

  159. 159.

    Ibid., paras 110–111.

  160. 160.

    Ibid., para. 124 ff.

  161. 161.

    Ibid., para. 167.

  162. 162.

    Ibid., paras 166–167.

  163. 163.

    Ibid., para. 172.

  164. 164.

    Ibid., para. 214.

  165. 165.

    Ibid., para. 218.

  166. 166.

    Airbus/Safran/JV (Case M.7353), Commission decision of 26 November 2014.

  167. 167.

    Ibid., para. 370.

  168. 168.

    Ibid.

  169. 169.

    Ibid., para. 371.

  170. 170.

    Ibid., para. 372.

  171. 171.

    Axalto/Gemplus (Case M.3998), Commission decision of 19 May 2006.

  172. 172.

    Ibid., para. 55.

  173. 173.

    Ibid., n. 14.

  174. 174.

    Ibid.

  175. 175.

    Thermo Fisher Scientific/Life Technologies (Case M.6944), Commission decision of 26 November 2013.

  176. 176.

    Ibid., para. 247.

  177. 177.

    Ibid.

  178. 178.

    Ibid., para. 400.

  179. 179.

    General Electric/Honeywell (Case M.2220), Commission decision of 3 July 2001.

  180. 180.

    See the discussion of this case in the Commission’s analysis of the relevant market (Chap. 3.5).

  181. 181.

    General Electric/Honeywell (Case M.2220), Commission decision of 3 July 2001, para. 347.

  182. 182.

    Ibid., para. 346.

  183. 183.

    Ibid., para. 344.

  184. 184.

    Ibid.

  185. 185.

    Ibid., para. 479.

  186. 186.

    Ibid., paras 480–482.

  187. 187.

    Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82, paras 1 and 9.

  188. 188.

    Petit (2020, p. 32).

  189. 189.

    We generalise that all merging companies are successful because notification is triggered by a significant turnover, just as a takeover or the creation of a joint venture is usually based on an existing or predictable success.

  190. 190.

    Petit (2020, pp. 32 and 60).

  191. 191.

    General Electric/Honeywell (Case M.2220), Commission decision of 3 July 2001.

  192. 192.

    Ibid., paras 417 and 418.

  193. 193.

    Dassault Aviation/TSA/Thales (Case M.5426), Commission decision of 10 Mars 2009.

  194. 194.

    Ibid., para. 78.

  195. 195.

    Ibid., para. 79.

  196. 196.

    ASL/Arianespace (Case M.7724), Commission decision of 11 December 2017.

  197. 197.

    Ibid., para. 302.

  198. 198.

    Ibid., paras 303 and 306.

  199. 199.

    Ibid., paras 304 and 306.

  200. 200.

    Ibid., para. 306.

  201. 201.

    Learning by doing means that companies get better at what they do by gaining experience in that area. Over time, they can learn new ways to minimise their costs or improve their products.

  202. 202.

    One claim (somewhat controversial in the literature and empirical studies, see in particular McGuckin and Nguyen 1995) is that dynamic efficiency gains occur when the acquiring firm has an excellent management team that replaces the target firm’s inferior team, resulting in sustained performance improvement.

  203. 203.

    Some vertical mergers can bring together complementary assets so that products reach consumers faster. This includes opportunities such as improved product distribution logistics due to the combined company’s greater geographic coverage, or combining a company with a strong R&D programme with a company whose forte is marketing.

  204. 204.

    If the two merged companies devote resources to the same research, there is clear potential for cost savings and dynamic efficiency if the merged company uses these savings to fund other innovation efforts. However, although both companies were trying to achieve the same end result, they may have conducted their research in different ways. Because one method may be better than the other, it may be appropriate to keep the two programmes separate and fund both rather than risk eliminating the wrong programme. It is therefore important to verify that the two allegedly duplicated research projects are in fact duplicated, not only in terms of purpose but also in terms of method.

  205. 205.

    When the research programmes of two companies are combined, their R&D assets can accomplish more than they would have if the programmes had remained separate. For example, one programme may benefit from access to a certain piece of equipment or technology owned by the other company’s laboratory that the first company would have found too expensive to purchase on its own. Or it may be that a new research tool, useful to both programmes, is worth purchasing when neither company would have purchased it on its own. Another possibility, and probably the most common, is that the two companies have complementary R&D assets and can reduce transaction costs by merging.

  206. 206.

    In general, a licensing agreement will be sufficient to make better use of the intellectual property. In some cases, however, a merger may be the only arrangement to persuade a company to share its IP with another company. The IP owner may feel that its IP is more valuable than anyone else’s, for example, and so may insist on royalties that no other company is willing to pay. It may also feel that allowing another company to use its IP is potentially dangerous because it will allow the licensee to innovate more, which will eventually replace the licensed technology.

  207. 207.

    If both parties to the merger are profitable, they can afford to take more risks and invest more in R&D. Not only can these initial investments be spread over a broader revenue and income base, but any potential failure will be more easily absorbed by the merged company.

  208. 208.

    Smaller firms are less likely than larger firms (i) to protect their IP in the first place, and (ii) to have the resources to fund legal actions to protect their IP. Therefore, when a merger improves the ability of the merging parties to enforce their IP portfolios, their incentives to innovate may also increase.

  209. 209.

    When companies’ financial resources are combined, they can undertake more research projects. As a larger entity, the combined firm may have better access to capital markets or borrow (more) money at lower interest rates, thus undertaking more research projects in general. If so, it may invest more in its research equipment, facilities and personnel. It may also be willing to fund projects with a slightly lower expected return than the individual parties would have been willing to fund. In addition, if the merger involves a large, cash-rich company and a smaller, research-oriented company with little capital, the purpose of the merger may have been to fund the work of the smaller company—especially if the larger company understands and values the potential value of the smaller company’s ideas.

  210. 210.

    There may be a very general efficiency of innovation associated with mergers that significantly increase concentration. According to Schumpeter, market power stimulates innovation. In short, this theory argues that firms with market power tend to innovate more than firms without market power, but that any market power is temporary due to the process of creative destruction through innovation.

  211. 211.

    OECD (2007, p. 9).

  212. 212.

    Niels et al. (2016, p. 350), Farrell and Shapiro (2001, p. 687).

  213. 213.

    Ibid.

  214. 214.

    Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, para. 53; Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, paras 78, 86–88.

  215. 215.

    OECD (2007, p. 9).

  216. 216.

    Ibid., p. 10.

  217. 217.

    Ibid.

  218. 218.

    General Court of the CJEU, Ryanair v Commission, Case T-342/07 [2010].

  219. 219.

    Ibid., paras 386–443.

  220. 220.

    Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, para. 79.

  221. 221.

    Ibid., para. 80.

  222. 222.

    Ibid., para. 81.

  223. 223.

    Ibid., para. 82.

  224. 224.

    Ibid., para. 84.

  225. 225.

    Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies (Case M.6203), Commission decision of 12 August 2013, para. 1015.

  226. 226.

    Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, para. 85.

  227. 227.

    Ibid., paras 86–88; General Court of the CJEU, Deutsche Börse v Commission, Case T-175/12 [2015] para. 362.

  228. 228.

    General Court of the CJEU, Ryanair v Commission, Case T-342/07 [2010] para. 411.

  229. 229.

    Ryanair/Aer Lingus (Case M.4449), Commission decision of 17 December 2016, para. 1133.

  230. 230.

    Inco/Falconbridge (Case M.4000), Commission decision of 4 July 2006, paras 529–550.

  231. 231.

    GE/Alstom (Case M.7278), Commission decision of 8 September 2015, paras 1362–1363.

  232. 232.

    Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext (Case M.6166), Commission decision of 1 December 2012, paras 1133–1342, upheld on appeal General Court of the CJEU, Deutsche Börse v Commission, Case T-175/12 [2015] para. 362; UPS/TNT Express (Case M.6570), Commission decision of 30 January 2013: the Commission’s decision was annulled on appeal to the General Court on procedural grounds in General Court of the CJEU, United Parcel Service v Commission, Case T-194/13 [2017]. The case is currently pending on appeal by the Commission, CJEU, Commission v UPS, Case C-265/17 P; Hutchison 3G UK/Telefonica UK (Case M.7612), Commission decision of 11 May 2016, paras 2337–2608.

  233. 233.

    Korsnäs/Assidomän Cartonboard (Case M.4057), Commission decision of 12 May 2006, paras 57–64; TomTom/Tele Atlas (Case M.4854), Commission decision of 14 May 2008, paras 238–250; Nynas/Shell/Harburg Refinery (Case M.6360), Commission decision of 2 September 2013, paras 443–474.

  234. 234.

    Axalto/Gemplus (Case M.3998), Commission decision of 19 May 2006.

  235. 235.

    Ibid., para. 48.

  236. 236.

    Ibid.

  237. 237.

    Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies (Case M.6203), Commission decision of 12 August 2013.

  238. 238.

    Ibid., paras 990–995.

  239. 239.

    Ibid., para. 1037.

  240. 240.

    Ibid., paras 999–1002.

  241. 241.

    Ibid., paras 1004–1007. According to the Commission, the parties’ efficiency claims were rather general in nature, and the indication that efficiencies should start to materialise in 2011 (the year of the Commission’s analysis of the transaction)—speculative. The parties tried to rely on their experience with recent acquisitions while submitting a numerical prognosis of the cost savings—to no avail. In the Commission’s view, the figures submitted were, by their nature, “extremely aggregated”, the accuracy of which was neither verifiable nor credible. The Commission stated that quantitative or other detailed evidence should have been presented to clearly explain how the efficiency calculations were made.

  242. 242.

    Ibid., paras 1008–1013. The efficiencies submitted by the parties also failed to pass the test of merger specificity, as they did not provide concrete evidence, in particular with respect to the type of complementarities that each of the merging firms brings to the table (including the reasons why the parties would not achieve the same result by mere co-operation between them). The Commission found it “extremely unlikely that many of the other elements of the efficiency claims are entirely, if not totally, merger-specific”, such as incentives to increase efficiency, improve quality and reduce inventories. They would, according to the Commission, also be present in the absence of the merger.

  243. 243.

    Ibid., paras 1014–1036. The Commission analysed both the expected fixed and variable cost reductions and was not convinced by the parties’ claims. The estimates alleged by the parties were not credible and were not related to any possible benefit to consumers resulting from the merger.

  244. 244.

    ASL/Arianespace (Case M.7724), Commission decision of 20 July 2016.

  245. 245.

    Ibid., para. 436.

  246. 246.

    Ibid., para. 437.

  247. 247.

    Ibid., para. 438.

  248. 248.

    Ibid., para. 439.

  249. 249.

    Airbus/Safran/JV (Case M.7353), Commission decision of 26 November 2014, paras 174 and 175.

  250. 250.

    ASL/Arianespace (Case M.7724), Commission decision of 20 July 2016, para. 441.

  251. 251.

    Ibid., para. 442.

  252. 252.

    Ibid., para. 443.

  253. 253.

    Ibid.

  254. 254.

    Ibid., para. 444.

  255. 255.

    Siemens Healthineers/Varian Medical Systems (Case M.9945), Commission decision of 19 February 2021.

  256. 256.

    Ibid., para. 122.

  257. 257.

    Ibid., para. 130.

  258. 258.

    Ibid., para. 131.

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Appendix—Summary Table of the Analysed European Commission Merger Cases in High-Technology Industries

Appendix—Summary Table of the Analysed European Commission Merger Cases in High-Technology Industries

Decision date

Case

Industry

Theory of harm

Efficiency

Cleared

Challenged?

01.12.1999

M.1601 Allied Signal/Honeywell

Merger between AlliedSignal Inc. and Honeywell Inc., both U.S. firms

AlliedSignal is a manufacturing company operating in the aerospace, automotive and engineered materials (i.e. polymers, speciality chemicals and electronic materials) sectors

Honeywell develops and supplies advanced technology controls and products, systems and services for homes and buildings, industrial applications and the aerospace industry

C.30.3—Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery

The Commission’s in-depth investigation raised serious doubts as to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position (CSDP) in certain avionics product markets through technical bundling and withholding of information due to the overlapping activities of undertakings. See in particular paras 101–103 and para. 114

“As long as such technical integration does not lead to foreclosure effects, improved technical interoperability may generally be considered to be in the interest of customers…” (para. 112)

Yes, both in the EU and in the U.S., subject to substantial conditions (paras 125 et seq.)

No

03.07.2001

M.2220 General Electric/Honeywell

Proposed acquisition by General Electric Co. of Honeywell Inc

Markets for aero-engines, avionics and other aircraft components and systems

C.28.11—Manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft vehicle and cycle engines;

C.26.51—Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation;

C.20.16—Manufacture of plastics in primary forms

CSDP

The Commission’s in-depth investigation showed that GE alone already held a DP in the markets for jet engines for large commercial aircraft and large regional aircraft, a position that would have been further strengthened after the merger. The investigation also showed that Honeywell was the leading supplier of avionics and non-avionics products, as well as corporate jet engines and engine starters

The Commission asserted that GE had not presented any efficiency resulting from the merger

No, in the EU, since remedies proposed by GE were insufficient to resolve the competition concerns

Yes, in the U.S

Yes, T-210/01, General Electric Company vs Commission, Judgment of the Court of First Instance, 14.12.2005

The Court of First Instance upheld the prohibition of the acquisition of Honeywell by GE

28.04.2005

M.3680 Alcatel/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space & Technology

Creation of two JVs resulting from Alcatel merging its space activities with those of Alenia Spazio and Telespazio, and engineering company Finmeccanica

Alcatel is a French industrial company that produces telecommunication equipment, satellites, and space subsystems and provides space-related services

Finmeccanica is an Italian state controlled diversified engineering company that produces satellites and subsystems and provides satellite-based services such as space mission management

C.30.3—Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery

The Commission’s investigation did not find that the JV of Alcatel Space/Alenia Spazio JV could foreclose competing satellite prime contractors and integrators or have a negative effect on satellite users. Indeed, both companies face credible competitors for satellite systems and related equipment

However, the market investigation showed that the combination of the merging parties’ activities would lead to an almost uncontested market position for tracking and telemetry control systems and radar altimeters, which are key parts used on satellites

No

Yes, with conditions and obligations

No

19.05.2006

M.3998 Axalto/Gemplus

Axalto, a Dutch company, acquired Gemplus, based in Luxembourg

Both companies produce and sell smart cards used for cell phones, payments and identification, as well as related products and services

The parties also provide products and services related to the administration of already issued SIM cards. SIM card administration is performed through Over-the-Air (OTA) platforms, which allow mobile operators to control a SIM card without a physical connection

C.26.2—Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment

SIEC

Based on its market investigation, the Commission concluded that, despite the strong positions of the two companies, the transaction would not lead directly to higher prices or a reduced pace of innovation

However, the Commission also found that the merged entity would have had both the ability and the incentive to undermine the position of its competitors, given that the transaction would combine two important IP portfolios. In addition, the Commission had identified serious risks of compatibility of OTA platforms with competing card manufacturers

The merging parties have claimed expected efficiencies that have been confirmed by their customers (para. 48)

Yes, the parties have undertaken (i) to license the patent portfolio of the combined entity and (ii) to provide third parties with the necessary interoperability information to ensure the compatibility of their cell phone SIM cards with the technology of the combined entity

No

27.04.2006

M.4100 Seagate/Maxtor

Merger between Seagate and Maxtor

Seagate, based in the United States, designs, manufactures and markets hard drives worldwide for a variety of uses. It also produces thin-film recording media and read/write heads that are used in its hard drives

Maxtor, also based in the United States, is a global supplier of hard disk drives for a variety of uses, including desktop computers, servers and consumer electronics applications, and is also active in the production of recording media for its own hard disk drives

C.26.2—Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment

SIEC

The Commission took into account, inter alia, the following factors: (i) the practice of regular supply of HDDs to customers, who can easily switch suppliers; (ii) competition with eight other HDD manufacturers, who face relatively low barriers to entry in neighbouring HDD markets; (iii) the possibility of expanding existing capacities in the various HDD markets without significant costs and delays; (iv) the high rate of innovation in the market, short product life cycles and a continuous decline in prices

The merger will not lead to a significant reduction of the component markets if the merging parties increase their in-house production of components

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes

No

28.04.2007

M.4465 Thrane & Thrane/Nera

Acquisition of Nera Satcom AS by Thrane & Thrane A/S

Thrane & Thrane, the Norway-based acquirer, is active in the development, production and sale of equipment for terrestrial, maritime and aeronautical satellite communications, based on Inmarsat satellite systems. It also produces and sells radio communication equipment. It is also one of the designated distributors of airtime for Inmarsat’s next generation satellites in the terrestrial communications sector

Nera, the Dutch target company, is active in the development, production and sale of terminals and earth stations for mobile terrestrial and maritime satellite communications

C.26.51—Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation

SIEC

The Commission concluded that the merged entity would not be able to increase its prices profitably, as the terminals produced by the parties are subject to competition from terminals produced by other manufacturers

The market investigation showed that there are a number of competitors capable of developing and supplying maritime terminals

The market investigation also revealed that the competitive landscape is likely to change in the foreseeable future due to technological developments in the market for terminals addressing more complex communication needs, namely the introduction of terminals capable of providing broadband services

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes in the EU, Norway and Spain in October 2006

Initially following a request for information from the UK Office of Fair Trading, the merger was notified in the UK in October 2006. The OFT subsequently referred the case to the Commission, which acquired jurisdiction to assess the merger in December 2006

No

16.02.2007

M.4502 Lite-On/PBDS

Proposed entry of Lite-On into Philips & BenQ Digital Storage Corporation (PBDS). Under the proposed transaction, Lite-On would replace BenQ as a shareholder, while Philips NV would retain its shares

Lite-On, a Taiwanese technology company, is active in computers, communication products, consumer electronics and optical data storage disk drives for personal computers

PBDS of Taiwan is active in the development, design, marketing and sales of optical data storage disk drives for personal computers. With the proposed acquisition, Lite-On would replace BenQ as the controlling shareholder of PBDS, while Philips would remain the other controlling shareholder

C.26.2—Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment

SIEC

The Commission’s examination showed that the horizontal overlap between the activities of Lite-On and PBDS in the supply of ODD PCs would not give rise to competition concerns and that the combined entity would continue to face several strong, effective competitors

The Commission also analysed the effects on the branded aftermarket (i.e. retail sales as opposed to sales to original equipment manufacturers) in which Philips is active. The Commission concluded that there would be no risk of substantial strengthening of the new entities’ position in any of these markets and that customers would continue to have alternative and competing sources of supply

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes

No

27.02.2008

M.4979 Acer/Packard Bell

Acer to acquire Packard Bell

Acer, based in Taiwan, is a global supplier of PCs and related products, including notebook and desktop PCs, servers and storage, LCD monitors and high-definition TVs

Packard Bell, headquartered in the Netherlands, is a European supplier of desktop computers, notebooks and digital entertainment solutions

J.62.0—Computer programming, consultancy and related activities;

C.33.20—Installation of industrial machinery and equipment;

C.26.4—Manufacture of consumer electronics;

C.26.51—Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation

SIEC

The Commission’s examination showed that the proposed merger would lead to horizontal overlaps for desktops and notebooks, both for professionals and consumers, at the EEA and national level. However, the market would remain competitive post-merger in all segments of the PC sector with well-established alternative suppliers such as Hewlett-Packard, Dell, Fujitsu-Siemens, Toshiba, Sony and Lenovo

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes

No

21.01.2009

M.5332 Ericsson/STM/JV

Creation of a JV between Ericsson Mobile Platforms (EMP), and ST-NXP, the wireless semiconductor business of STMicroelectronics

Ericsson (Sweden) is active in the field of telecommunication products, ranging from networks and multimedia solutions to business services and other communication products such as cell phones. It is the ultimate parent company of EMP

STMicroelectronics (Netherlands) is active in the supply of semiconductors, ranging from individual components to complex integrated systems and complete electronic platform solutions. It is the ultimate parent company of ST-NXP, a company active in semiconductors for mobile telecommunications

C.26.3—Manufacture of communication equipment;

C.26.4—Manufacture of consumer electronics

SIEC

The Commission’s market investigation found that the creation of the joint venture would not raise horizontal competition concerns in the markets for wireless platforms and wireless semiconductors

The parties were also active in vertically related markets. The joint venture would result in the creation of an integrated platform provider by combining ST-NXP’s semiconductor activities with EMP’s platform design activities. However, the Commission’s investigation did not reveal any competition concerns in this respect either

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes

No

28.09.2009

M.5421 Panasonic/Sanyo

Acquisition of Sanyo by Panasonic, subject to conditions

Panasonic Corporation, based in Japan, is primarily engaged worldwide in the development, manufacture and sale of a wide range of audio-visual and communication products, home appliances, electronic components and devices, including batteries and industrial products

Sanyo Electric Co. Ltd., based in Japan, is primarily engaged in the development, manufacture and sale of consumer products, commercial equipment, electronic components including batteries and industrial logistics and maintenance equipment worldwide

C.27.2—Manufacture of batteries and accumulators;

C.26.4—Manufacture of consumer electronics;

C.26.11—Manufacture of electronic components

SIEC

The Commission’s investigation identified competition concerns in a number of battery markets where the merged entity would have a significant market share

The Commission also investigated a number of consumer electronics markets, such as camcorders and flat-screen TVs, where both Panasonic and Sanyo are active. The Commission’s investigation revealed that in many cases the eventual increase in market share was limited and that the merging parties were generally not considered each other’s closest competitor. In addition, the merged entity would continue to face competitive pressure from a number of players in each of the relevant markets

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes, subject to conditions

No

10.03.2009

M.5426 Dassault Aviation/Thales

Acquisition of Thales by Dassault Aviation and TSA

Dassault Aviation, a public limited company under French law, is active in the space sector and in the civil aviation (business aircraft) and military (combat aircraft, flight simulators) sectors

TSA, a holding company wholly owned by the French State, has no operational activities. It holds a 26.56% stake in Thales, also a French company, which is active in satellites and associated subsystems, aeronautical equipment for civil and military aircraft, air defence systems, military communication systems and maritime security equipment and systems

C.30.3—Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery

SIEC

The Commission’s investigation ruled out any risk of distortion of competition that might result from a combination or vertical integration of the parties’ activities, as there would remain credible alternative suppliers on the markets after the transaction

The Commission also considered that the French Ministry of Defence would have a say in the selection process of component manufacturers for these products, so the transaction would not restrict the access of Thales’s competitors to products manufactured by Dassault Aviation. In addition, the selection processes for military equipment manufacturers are part of long-term programmes that will not be affected by the proposed transaction

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes

No

11.05.2009

M.5483 Toshiba/Fujitsu HDD Business

Toshiba acquires Fujitsu’s HDD business

Toshiba Corporation, of Japan, manufactures and markets a wide range of high-tech electronic and electrical products, including hard disk drives, including various types of mobile hard disk drives and various electronic products that use these hard disk drives

The HDD Business of Fujitsu Limited, also of Japan, includes Fujitsu’s global assets and subsidiaries in the production, design, sales, research and development of hard disk drives, including 2.5-inch mobile hard disk drives and 2.5- and 3.5-inch enterprise hard disk drives, excluding Fujitsu’s development and production of hard disk drive media, heads and components

C.26.2—Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment

SIEC

The Commission considered that although the transaction would make the merged entity the largest producer of mobile HDDs in terms of market share, the HDD market is competitive and the transaction would therefore not give rise to competition concerns in these markets

Post-transaction, Toshiba will continue to face significant competitors in a market where technological advances are relatively rapid, resulting in short product life cycles

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes

No

20.01.2010

M.5611 Agilent/Varian

Acquisition of Varian by Agilent

Agilent Technologies Inc. and Varian Inc are both U.S.-based and active in the design, development, manufacture and sale of bioanalytical measurement products, including analytical and life science instruments, as well as related services, consumables and software

C.26.51—Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation

SIEC

The Commission identified competition concerns in each of the markets for instruments used to detect and quantify molecular and atomic components in a given sample. The proposed transaction would bring together close competitors in some of the identified markets, resulting in the combined entity holding significant market shares

The proposed transaction would also result in the elimination of a significant competitive force in one identified market (triple quad GC–MS instruments). Varian already had significant market shares in this market and, although a recent entrant, Agilent has also rapidly gained significant influence and competes closely with Varian in this market

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes, subject to conditions

No

26.01.2011

M.5984 Intel/McAfee

Acquisition of McAfee by Intel

Intel is the leading U.S. manufacturer of CPUs, the core chip in a computer, and chipsets, which are used in industries such as computing and communications, and are among the most important components of computers. Intel also develops digital computing technology platforms, which combine various types of hardware and software

McAfee is a U.S.-based security technology company that designs and develops security products and services to protect Internet-connected devices from malicious content

J.62—Computer programming, consultancy and related activities;

C.26.1—Manufacture of electronic components and boards

The Commission was concerned that competing computer security products could be foreclosed from the market, given Intel’s strong presence in the worldwide markets for computer chips and chipsets. In particular, the Commission was concerned that the merged entity would be very likely to embed its own security solutions in its chips and chipsets, thereby creating interoperability problems with regard to competitors’ CPUs, which would need access to them in order to develop new solutions

The Commission analysed the efficiencies of the merger in terms of complementing the commitments. Both were likely to eliminate the competition concerns identified, as they were designed to maintain interoperability between the merged entity’s products and those of their competitors, thereby ensuring equal competition between the parties and their competitors

Yes, subject to conditions

No

27.06.2011

M.6126 Thermo Fisher/Dionex Corporation

Acquisition of Dionex by Thermo Fisher

U.S.-based Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. produces analytical instruments, scientific equipment, consumables, software and services for research, analysis, discovery and diagnosis

Dionex Corporation is a U.S.-based manufacturer of liquid chromatography instruments (particularly ion chromatography), sample preparation systems, consumables and software for chemical analysis

C.26.51—Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation

SIEC

The Commission’s review showed that the combination of Thermo Fisher’s and Dionex’s activities will not lead to competition concerns in any of the relevant markets

The Commission’s investigation also showed that the combined entity will not have the ability or incentive to restrict the interoperability of its Nano-LC instruments or mass spectrometry instruments with those of its competitors

The Commission therefore concluded that the transaction would not raise competition concerns

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes

No

23.11.2011

M.6203 Western Digital Ireland/Viviti Technologies

Western Digital acquires Hitachi’s hard drive business

Western Digital (WD), a U.S.-based company, designs, develops, produces and sells hard drives, SSDs, external hard disk drives (XHDDs) and media players. WD also produces key hard drive components, such as read/write heads and media

Hitachi Global Storage Technologies (HGST), renamed Viviti Technologies, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Hitachi, Ltd. of Singapore. It develops and manufactures hard disk drives and SSDs, under the XHDD brand, and also produces key hard disk drive components such as heads and media

C.26.2—Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment

SIEC

The Commission’s extensive review found that there are distinct global markets for hard disk drives based on their form factor and their end use. The Commission also identified a separate market for XHDDs, which is downstream of HDDs

In the markets for 3.5 ″ desktop HDDs and consumer electronics HDDs, the merged entity will only face competition from the recently merged Seagate/Samsung. This is a problem because, for security of supply reasons, most customers in these markets buy their HDDs from several suppliers

The parties alleged a series of expected efficiencies. The Commission rejected all of them in full, as the parties failed to prove that the claimed efficiencies were verifiable, specific to the merger or that the merger will benefit customers

Yes, subject to conditions

No

10.05.2012

M.6214 Seagate Technology/The HDD Business of Samsung Electronics

Seagate Technology acquires Samsung’s hard drive business

Seagate Technology (USA) is a worldwide manufacturer of branded hard drives, SSDs and external drives. Its businesses are vertically integrated upstream in the manufacture of key components, such as heads and media

Samsung Electronics’s HDD business (Korea) produces branded hard drives and external drives. Samsung’s HDD business is not vertically integrated upstream in the manufacture of components. Samsung’s SSD business will not be transferred to Seagate

C.26.2—Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment

SIEC

The main impact of the transaction is in the markets for 3.5 ″ desktop HDDs and 2.5 ″ mobile HDDs, where the investigation revealed that Samsung is not a particularly strong competitor. There would remain three strong suppliers in the 3.5 ″ desktop market (the merged entity, WD and Hitachi Global Storage Technologies), and four strong suppliers in the 2.5 ″ mobile drive markets (the three plus Toshiba). With at least 3 suppliers, customers will retain sufficient options to switch suppliers. The Commission also found that the elimination of Samsung is not likely to lead to a risk of coordination between the remaining HDD suppliers

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes

No

09.03.2012

M.6381 Google/Motorola Mobility

Google to acquire Motorola Mobility

Google is a provider of Internet search and online advertising services. It also provides a number of additional online services and software products. Google’s revenues are primarily derived from online advertising and, to some extent, from mobile online advertising. Google also develops and makes available an open source mobile operating system called Android

Motorola Mobility is a provider of mobile devices (smartphones and tablets), set-top boxes, end-to-end video solutions and cable broadband access solutions

C.26.30—Manufacture of communication equipment;

J.61—Telecommunications;

J.61.20—Wireless telecommunications activities

SIEC

The Commission’s investigation showed that Android contributes to the diffusion of Google’s other services and, given Google’s basic business model of distributing its online and mobile services and software to the widest possible audience, it is therefore unlikely that Google would restrict the use of Android only to Motorola

The Commission also concluded that the proposed transaction would not significantly change the current market situation with regard to access to SEPs held by Motorola

Finally, the Commission found that Google would not be able to use Motorola’s SEP to obtain preferential treatment for its services, including search and advertising

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes

No

26.07.2012

M.6410 UTC/Goodrich

United Technologies to acquire Goodrich aerospace equipment company

United Technologies Corporation (UTC) is a U.S.-based company active in the production of a wide range of high-technology products and support services for the building systems and aerospace industries worldwide

Goodrich Corporation is a U.S.-based company engaged in the production and sale of systems and services to the aerospace, defence and security industries worldwide

C.30.3—Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery

SIEC

The Commission examined the competitive effects of the proposed acquisition in various affected markets and concluded that the transaction would not raise competition concerns in any of them

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes, subject to conditions

No

26.11.2013

M.6944 Thermo Fisher Scientific/Life Technologies

Acquisition of Life Technologies by Thermo Fisher

Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. is a U.S. company active in the production and supply of analytical instruments and laboratory consumables (e.g. reagents) in virtually all areas of experimental science, including life sciences, chemistry and physics. Thermo Fisher also operates a strong multi-brand scientific distribution business, Fisher Scientific

Life Technologies Corp. is a U.S.-based manufacturer of analytical instruments and laboratory consumables for the life sciences, where it is the global market leader

C.26.51—Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation

SIEC

The investigation showed that the transaction, as initially notified, would have significantly reduced competition in the production and supply of (i) cell culture media and sera, (ii) gene deletion products and (iii) polymer-based magnetic beads

These concerns were based on the large combined market shares of the merged entity and the presence of significant barriers to entry, namely (i) the considerable time and investment required to establish the necessary track record and reliability as a supplier, (ii) the limited availability of the required equipment (blood), but also (iii) the presence of IP rights, technical know-how and established commercial relationships

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes, subject to conditions

No

26.11.2014

M.7353 Airbus/Safran/JV

Aerospace and defence JV between Airbus and Safran

Airbus Group N.V. of the Netherlands is active in the aerospace and defence industry. Its activities include the design, manufacture and worldwide sale of civil space launchers, launch vehicle subsystems and equipment, satellites, satellite subsystems and equipment. Airbus is also active in strategic and tactical missiles

Safran S.A. of France is active in aerospace propulsion, aircraft equipment, defence and security. Its activities include the production of liquid and solid propellant engine propulsion systems for launch vehicles and electric propulsion systems for satellites. Safran is also active in strategic and tactical missile propulsion

C.30.30—Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery;

C.25.40—Manufacture of weapons and ammunition

Significant impact on competition

The Commission examined the competitive effects of the proposed transaction and concluded that, as initially notified, it would have significantly reduced competition in the supply of satellites and spacecraft

Indeed, the JV would have an incentive to exclude or limit access of Airbus’s competitors to a number of important components

The transaction could also have led to exchanges of confidential information concerning satellites and their components between the joint venture and Airbus, to the detriment of competitors

The parties did not present a defence based on expected efficiency per se. Instead, they have indicated that the reason behind the creation of the JV was to generate efficiencies and rationalise costs in the new Ariane 6 programme, which both the European Space Agency (ESA) (para. 175) and the Commission’s investigation have confirmed (para. 174)

Yes, subject to conditions

No

20.07.2016

M.7724 ASL/Arianespace

Acquisition of Arianespace by ASL

Arianespace is a French company that provides satellite launch services to private and institutional satellite operators

Airbus Safran Launchers (ASL) is a 50/50 JV between Airbus and Safran that manufactures the Ariane launcher

C.30.30—Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery

Potential flows of sensitive information

The Commission was concerned that the transaction could lead to sensitive information flows between Airbus and Arianespace, to the detriment of competing satellite manufacturers and launch service providers. These potential information flows could lead to less competitive bidding and less innovation in the satellite and launch service markets

The parties alleged a series of efficiencies, all of which were rejected in full by the Commission (paras 436 to 444)

Yes, subject to conditions

No

29.05.2019

M.8858 Boeing/Safran/JV (auxiliary power units)

Creation of a joint venture by Boeing and Safran for the production of auxiliary power units

The joint venture will manufacture APUs which provide electrical power to the aircraft when the engines are shut down

The Boeing Company, a U.S.-based company, designs, manufactures and sells commercial aircraft and defence, space and security systems

The French company Safran S.A. designs, manufactures and sells aerospace systems and aerospace and defence equipment

C.30.30—Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery;

C.33.16—Repair and maintenance of aircraft and spacecraft

No particular theory of harm

The Commission concluded that the proposed acquisition would not raise any competition concerns

The overlaps between Safran and the JV are limited: Safran manufactures APUs for military aircraft and helicopters, while the joint venture will manufacture APUs mainly for large commercial aircraft

Secondly, the Commission found that despite Boeing’s strong position in the manufacture of large commercial aircraft, the transaction is unlikely to lead to the foreclosure of competing APU suppliers from the market for commercial aircraft APUs. In fact, the transaction will lead to the creation of an entrant in this market

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes

No

21.06.2019

M.9234 Harris Corporation/L3 Technologies

Harris Corporation to acquire L3 Technologies

Harris Corporation, based in the United States, is a global aerospace and defence technology company that provides products, systems and services for defence, civilian government and commercial applications

L3 Technologies, based in the United States, is an international aerospace and defence systems company that provides intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications and electronics systems for military, homeland security and commercial aviation customers

C.26.3—Manufacture of communication equipment;

C.26.7—Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment;

C.27.9—Manufacture of other electrical equipment;

C.25.4—Manufacture of weapons and ammunition

SIEC

With respect to night vision devices, the Commission found that Harris Corporation and L3 Technologies compete directly in the markets for image intensified night vision devices and image intensified tubes. The proposed transaction, as originally notified, would have significantly reduced competition in these markets, leading to higher prices and reduced choice for ministries of Defence, commercial customers and others

As regards portable video data links, the Commission concluded that the proposed merger would not give rise to any competition concerns, as the merged entity would continue to face a number of credible competitors

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes, subject to conditions

No

19.02.2021

M.9945 S Healthineers/Varian Medical Systems

Acquisition of Varian by Siemens Healthineers

Siemens A.G., headquartered in Germany, is a globally active technology group focused on various fields, including medical technology and digital healthcare services. Its subsidiary Siemens Healthineers provides healthcare solutions and services worldwide, including medical imaging solutions

Varian, headquartered in the United States, is a global provider of medical devices and software solutions for the treatment of cancer and other conditions with radiation therapy and other advanced treatments

C.26.60—Manufacture of irradiation, electromedical and electrotherapeutic equipment

SIEC

The Commission was concerned that the transaction, as originally notified, would lead to the foreclosure of competitors in the markets for (i) the provision of medical imaging solutions, as well as (ii) the provision of radiotherapy solutions. This could occur through the degradation of interoperability (i) between Siemens Healthineers’s imaging solutions and third-party radiation therapy solutions, as well as (ii) between Varian’s radiation therapy solutions and third-party medical imaging solutions. The foreclosure of competitors resulting from the acquisition would therefore likely have led to a reduction in product choice and a loss of innovation to the detriment of customers and patients

The parties claimed efficiencies for customers in terms of lower prices and the availability of new innovative products in a faster and more efficient way (para. 122), which had been confirmed by their customers (para. 130). The Commission approved the transaction without conducting a systematic analysis of the efficiencies (para. 131)

Yes, subject to conditions

No

20.05.2021

M.10059 SK Hynix/Intel’s Hand and SSD Business

Acquisition of Intel’s NAND and SSDs business by SK Hynix

Intel Corporation’s (U.S.) NAND and SSDs business is active in the manufacture and sale of products using the NAND flash memory

SK Hynix Inc. of the Republic of Korea designs and manufactures memory storage devices such as DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory), NAND flash memory and NAND-based SSDs, as well as CMOS (Complementary Metal Oxide–Semiconductor)

C.26.2—Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment

SIEC

The Commission concluded that the proposed acquisition would not give rise to any competition concerns, given the limited horizontal overlaps and the limited effects resulting from the vertical relationships between the companies

In addition, the Commission found no concerns regarding the companies’ activities in neighbouring markets, as the companies would not have the ability and/or incentive to engage in exclusionary practices, and even if they did, there would be no appreciable effect on the markets

Efficiency gains were not claimed

Yes

No

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Telychko, A. (2023). Innovation in High-Tech Mergers: Should Competition Law Bother?. In: Mathis, K., Tor, A. (eds) Law and Economics of the Digital Transformation. ILEC 2023. Economic Analysis of Law in European Legal Scholarship, vol 15. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25059-0_10

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