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Considering Short and Long Term Fairness in Recurrent Auctions with an Application to Collaborative Rostering

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Operations Research Proceedings 2022 (OR 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Operations Research ((LNOR))

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Abstract

Collaborative duty rostering can increase the satisfaction of employees in healthcare. For the acceptance of a final rostering, a fair selection of included wishes is essential. As in rostering problems various constraints must be respected, it is generally not possible to accept all bids (wishes for a single free time slot) in a planning period and fairness is important. In this paper we present a weighted Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism approach where past auction results are incorporated by a fairness factor and where the underlying winner determination problem is given by a hitting set problem (HSP). We present numerical results of simulation runs over several planning periods.

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Correspondence to S. Velten .

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Heller, T., Velten, S. (2023). Considering Short and Long Term Fairness in Recurrent Auctions with an Application to Collaborative Rostering. In: Grothe, O., Nickel, S., Rebennack, S., Stein, O. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 2022. OR 2022. Lecture Notes in Operations Research. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24907-5_42

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