Keywords

We now present our results in a condensed form. We emphasise that anyone with access to the Internet and the IBM-SPSS statistical software package should be able to arrive at the same results as we did.

5.1 Results on Political Islam According to the Arab Barometer

Table 5.1 shows how strongly the Arab public already distances itself from the Islamist movements in the region. Only in Yemen is the strong trust in the Islamist movement in double figures. The selection of which Islamist movement it is in each case was made by the Arab Barometer Consortium and cannot be determined from the machine-readable data set.

Table 5.1 Trust in Islamist movements in the Arab world
Full size table

Table 5.2 shows the support rates for Islamism and political Islam in the region on a population-weighted basis. Indeed, such weighting is very important in real terms, since, for example, opinion in Egypt, with its huge population, carries much more weight for the entire Arab world than, say, that of Lebanon or the West Bank and Gaza, with their relatively small populations.

Table 5.2 Islamism and political Islam in the Arab MENA countries
Full size table

If people throughout the Arab world were allowed to vote freely in a referendum, the following rules, opinions and regulations would each receive an absolute majority:

  • Against a woman who marries a man who does not pray

  • Terrorism against the USA is a logical consequence of US interference in the region

  • Men are the better political leaders

  • The USA, UK and Israel pose the greatest threat to the stability and well-being of the region

  • Banks should not be allowed to charge interest

More than a third of the Arab population supports the following claims:

  • Turkish President Erdogan is (very) good

  • Islam requires women to wear the hijab

  • Preference for closer economic relations with Turkey

  • The country would be better off if religious leaders were in office

  • For a Sharia that uses corporal punishment

  • Religious practice is not a private matter

  • Preference for stronger economic relations with Qatar

  • A woman cannot become prime minister/president

  • In society, the rights of non-Muslims should be secondary

  • Religious leadersFootnote 1 should influence government decisions

  • Rejection of neighbours who belong to a different religion

  • Sharia should limit the role of women

  • Religious leaders are not as corrupt as non-religious leaders.

Only the following positions are genuine minority positions, supported by less than 1/3 of the total Arab population surveyed:

  • Preference for closer economic relations with Iran

  • Religious leaders should interfere in elections

  • Higher education is more important for men than for women

  • Women do not have the same right to decide to divorce.

Table 5.3 now analyses the population-weighted profiles of political Islam among migrants in the region, broken down by migration destination. Potential migrants to Western countries identify around 20–40% with destinations that the Arab Barometer describes as political Islam, but nowhere are adherents of political Islam an absolute majority of potential migrants in the West. While Table 5.3 shows the total values per migration destination, Table 5.7 shows the individual country values per migration destination.

Table 5.3 Political Islam among those willing to migrate and in the Arab population as a whole according to the Arab Barometer
Full size table

Table 5.4 shows the aggregated country results. We mark each result above 1/3 of the support rates for Islamism / political Islam. Our data are the first true estimate of political Islam in the Arab world:

Table 5.4 Political Islam in the Arab world according to the Arab Barometer (only valid percentages were evaluated)
Full size table

5.2 Political Islam and Migration Potential According to the Arab Barometer

The Gallup Institute has conducted serious surveys on global migration patterns.Footnote 2 The surveys were based on representative interviews with 259,542 people over the age of 15 in 135 countries for the period 2007–2009. The countries selected to represent 93% of the world's population in this age group.

Gallup said at the time:

The United States is the most popular destination for the 700 million adults who want to move permanently to another country. Nearly a quarter (24%) of these respondents, or more than 165 million adults worldwide, name the United States as their future residence. With another estimated 45 million saying they would like to move to Canada, North America is one of the top two most desired regions. The remaining top desired countries (where an estimated 25 million or more adults would like to go) are predominantly European countries. Forty-five million adults who would like to move name the United Kingdom or France as their desired destination, while 35 million would like to move to Spain and 25 million would like to move to Germany. Thirty million name Saudi Arabia and 25 million Australia. About 210 million adults around the world would like to move to a European Union country, which is the same as the estimated number who would like to move to North America. However, about half of the estimated 80 million adults living in the EU who would like to move permanently to another country would like to move to another country within the EU - the highest desired intra-regional migration rate in the world.

In a brief paragraph, Gallup provided an important key to evaluating other surveys, particularly for the roughly 630 million adults worldwide who intend to move to another country. Less than one-tenth of them—about 48 million adults—say they plan to make that move in the next 12 months.Footnote 3 Again, less than half of those who plan to move—about 19 million adults—take the necessary steps such as applying for a visa or residence permit and buying tickets for the trip. With a little simple arithmetic, we can say that out of 100 people who said in the Gallup poll that they wanted to emigrate, only 3.0 will actually emigrate. This radical interpretation of the data, which excludes any alarmism, goes back to Faßmann and Hintermann (1997), Faßmann and Münz (1994), who were correct in their migration forecast for Eastern Europe, which defined as the final migration potential those who really wanted to emigrate in the next year, and thus in the great EU enlargement of 2004. Gallup said at the time in the original sound bite:

Of the approximately 630 million adults worldwide who want to move to another country, less than one-tenth of them - about 48 million adults - have told Gallup they plan to move in the next 12 months. Less than half of those planning to move - about 19 million adults - have taken the necessary steps, such as applying for visas or residence permits and buying tickets.Footnote 4

Table 5.5 is the first result of the rough estimate of the total, general migration potential from the Arab world:

Table 5.5 Desire to emigrate to Western countries, in % of the total Arab population according to the Arab Barometer
Full size table

Table 5.6 provides information on the confidence of the population in the Arab countries in the country-specific Islamist movement according to the Arab Barometer Survey. It clearly shows that those who are willing to migrate to the West have less confidence in the country-specific Islamist movement than the total Arab population of the respective country. On a population-weighted basis, 13.11% of potential migrants to the West openly state that they trust the country-specific Islamist movement. Realistically, therefore, we can expect the immediate influx of a six-figure number of Islamist movement supporters in France, Canada, Germany and the USA, while the influx of Islamist movement supporters to Italy, Spain and the UK is likely to be in the five-figure range.

Table 5.6 Trust in the Islamist movement of the respective home country as a percentage of the total Arab population and as a percentage of the Arab population willing to emigrate to the West
Full size table
Table 5.7 Support for political Islam (five items according to the Arab Barometer survey) as a percentage of the total Arab population willing to emigrate to the West and as a percentage of the total Arab population
Full size table

Table 5.7 shows the support rates for Islamism and political Islam in the region on a population-weighted basis for those willing to migrate to the West and for the total population of the respective Arab country. Table 5.3 analyses the population-weighted profiles of political Islam among those willing to migrate in the region, broken down by migration destination. While Table 5.3 shows the total values per migration destination, Table 5.7 now shows the individual country values per migration destination, as announced earlier.

Here, too, it can be seen that Falco and Rotondi (2016), were correct in their assumption that the proportion of those who support radical Islamist positions is lower among those willing to emigrate (to Western countries) than in the population as a whole.

5.3 Towards a Multivariate Analysis of Political Islam and Migration

Let us now briefly describe our multivariate analysis of the variables measuring political Islam, based on the promax factor analysis using the IBM-SPSS XXIV computer programme with the Arab Barometer data. We propose to name the resulting promax factors based on the factor loadings > 0.500 (structural matrix) as follows. The number of factors results from the application of the classical eigenvalue criterion > 1.0 for multivariate statistics.

  • Distance to Turkey and Iran

  • Distance from political Islam—interference in elections

  • Against the theocracy

  • Against religious discrimination

  • Against discrimination based on gender

  • Against an Islamist interpretation of Islam.

The model explains 50.1% of the total variance (Table 5.8).

Table 5.9 then shows the results for potential migrants in Western countries. Potential migrants in Spain and Italy are least likely to sympathise with political Islam, while potential migrants in the USA and Canada hold views that are more influenced by the patterns of political Islam.

The highest factor loadings of the opinion “Violence against the United States of America is a logical consequence of (US) interference in the region”, which is a clear indicator of support for anti-American terrorism, are statistically explained by the factor “Islamist interpretation of Islam” (factor loading: 0.512) as well as by the factor “Preference for Turkey and Iran” (factor loading: 0.347).

Resilience to anti-American terrorism in the Arab world is consistent with the following statements:

  • ECONOMIC RELATIONS: NONE PREFERENCE: IRAN

  • ECONOMIC RELATIONS: NONE PREFERENCE: QATAR

  • ECONOMIC RELATIONS: NONE PREFERENCE: TURKEY

  • INTERPRETATION OF ISLAMS: BANKS SHOULD CHARGE INTEREST

  • INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM: ISLAM DOES NOT PRESCRIBE THE HIJAB

  • INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM: THE RIGHTS OF NON-MUSLIMS MUST NOT BE INFERIOR

  • NEGATIVE OPINION: PRESIDENT ERDOGAN.

5.3.1 Conclusions and Perspectives from the Arab Barometer Data

On the one hand, our analysis has shown sufficiently clearly that Falco and Rotondi (2016), were right when they said that Islamist radicalism among potential migrants from the Arab world to the West is lower than in the population as a whole. However, as this radicalism is still large enough to pose a serious security problem, we were able to show in the study for Directions in Terrorism that from 1979 to 2019, no less than 755 people died in Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe. Our quantitative analysis in this regard in Tausch (2021), based on data from Science Po, provided clear evidence of an 11-year cycle of Islamist terrorist activity in Europe, based on an econometric time series analysis. Based on our prediction using the quantitative, proven techniques of statistical spectral analysis and cross-correlations (Tausch, 2021), we will—with all the caution that is required in such predictions based on spectral analysis and cross-correlations—see another peak of Islamist terrorism in Western Europe in 2026/2027.

Our multivariate promax factor analysis, based on nineteen items from the Arab Barometer survey and explaining more than 50% of the total variance, has shown that support for Turkey under Erdogan and Iran under his regime are the most important streams of political Islam today. This factor alone explains 14.3% of the variance.

Our analyses have broadly confirmed those perspectives on “political Islam” already elaborated in full detail in Solomon (2016), Solomon and Tausch (2020a, 2020b, 2021a, 2021b). Our conclusions—for reasons of space—only briefly refer to this literature here, and we only note here that there are major differences in the degree of support for political Islam as to which population willing to migrate it is in the Arab world. The migrants who express a preference for the destination countries of Spain and Italy identify least with political Islam, while the population who would prefer to go to the USA and Canada identify most strongly with political Islam.

5.4 Results of the World Values Survey on Religiously Motivated Political Extremism (RMPE) in Europe Compared to 79 Countries in the World

In the following, we will use the World Values Survey to estimate religiously motivated political extremism (RMPE) in Europe compared to 79 countries worldwide. The two questions we will evaluate in this context based on the World Values Survey are:

Many things are desirable, but not all are necessary components of a democracy. For each of the following things, please tell me to what extent you consider it a necessary component of a democracy. Use this scale, with 1 being “not at all a necessary component of a democracy” and 10 being “a necessary component of a democracy”. Religious leaders ultimately determine the interpretation of the laws.

For each of the following, can you please tell me whether you think it is okay under no circumstances, all circumstances or anything in between? Please use the following scale. Politically motivated violence

Our findings thus provide a limited insight into the landscape of religiously motivated political extremism (RMPE) in Europe. Due to the unfortunately very small possible sample size of Muslims in the omnibus survey of the World Values Survey for Europe, our results for this population group are only in the nature of informed indications, also emphasising that even with better samples, the international comparative results are unlikely to change.

According to Table 5.10, based on the data of the World Values Survey, a certain or greater degree of religiously motivated political extremism (RMPE) is found in 9.7% of the total population in Austria and in 16.4% of Muslims in Austria. It should be noted that the results in Table 5.10, must also be compared with the ranges of variation. Austria's Muslims are ahead of the total population in Portugal, the USA, France, the UK, Lithuania, Spain and Slovakia, to name but a few countries.

47.3% of Muslims in Austria are against political violence and against a religious role in legislation. 23.6% are against political violence but can imagine a religious role in legislation. 12.7% are secular and accordingly against a religious role in legislation, but accept political violence. Our empirical definition of RMPE fully applies to 16.4%.

Austria—total population

 

Against political violence

For political violence

Total

Against the role of religion in legislation

62.9

9.0

71.9

For the religious role in legislation

18.4

9.7

28.1

Total

81.4

18.6

100.0

  1. N = 1561; the RMPE value outlined in red has a range of variation of ± 1.4% with a probability of error of 5%

62.9% of the total population in Austria are against political violence and against a religious role in legislation. 18.4% are against political violence but can imagine a religious role in legislation. 9.0% are again secular and thus against a religious role in legislation, but accept political violence. Our empirical definition of RMPE fully applies to 9.7%.

The proportion of people who favour religious authorities in interpreting the law while accepting political violence is alarmingly high in various parts of the world, raising fears of numerous conflicts in the years to come in an increasingly unstable world system. It amounts to more than half of the adult population in Tajikistan (the international record holder), the Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea and Malaysia. In many countries, including NATO and EU member states, it is an alarming 25–50%: Iraq, Macau SAR, Lebanon, Slovakia, Hong Kong SAR, Thailand, Bangladesh, Mexico, Chile, Ukraine, Russia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Spain, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Guatemala, Nigeria and Indonesia. It is 15–25% in the following states, including core countries of the Western security architecture: UK, Taiwan ROC, France, Netherlands, Belarus, Argentina, USA, Nicaragua, Peru, Montenegro, Pakistan, Iran, Colombia, Armenia, Tunisia, Portugal, Czech Republic, Poland and Italy. Only the best-ranked countries Albania, Ethiopia, Iceland, Macedonia, Egypt, Andorra, Germany, Puerto Rico, Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Denmark, Japan, Estonia, Bulgaria, Austria, Australia, Norway, Slovenia, Kyrgyzstan, Hungary, Sweden, Azerbaijan, Finland, Zimbabwe, Serbia, Jordan, Georgia, Switzerland, New Zealand, Burma, Greece, China, Brazil and Romania, the potentially fatal combination of mixing religion and law and accepting political violence has a relatively small following of less than 15%.

Table 5.11 is our final table of the empirical comparison of RMPE in 79 countries around the world.

The following charts show the reality of religiously motivated political extremism (RMPE) in the global system across all geographical and denominational boundaries. Our maps, as well as the data from the World Values Survey, are designed to soften rigid and ideologically entrenched fronts. We refer our readers to subsequent studies on our maps:

  • Figure 5.1 Acceptance of political violence shows that it is not the Arab region, and certainly not the Arab region as a whole, that is to be identified with the acceptance of political violence; Southeast Asia as well as Iraq and Spain, on the other hand, are real problem zones. In Europe, the Nordic states, the Federal Republic of Germany and, fortunately, Hungary as well as the countries of the Balkan region are relatively little affected by the acceptance of political violence.

    Fig. 5.1
    2 maps, the first is a map of the world with many countries across the globe shaded in different dark and light shades, to indicate acceptance of political violence. A substantial number of countries close to the North pole, most of the African continent, the whole of India, a few regions in the Middle East, and a few countries in the far East have not been shaded. The second map is a close up of regions with the darker shades, with Egypt being the darkest. Most of the European continent has darker shades as well. The legend on the left has shades ranging from 0.76 to 1.12, to 3.99 and more.

    Acceptance of political violence

    Full size image

  • Electronic Appendix Figure 2: Standard Deviation—Acceptance of Political Violence uses this important statistical indicator to show the extent to which the fringes of the political system are already radicalised and reject a consensus of non-violence. This statement applies not only to Spain and Serbia, but also to France and large parts of America, the former Soviet Union and West Asia.

  • Electronic Appendix Figure 3: The Depth of the Problem of Country Residents Endorsing political violence now organises the data underlying Fig. 5.2 in a more graphically appealing form. The red-coloured zones of the global scale for acceptance of political violence are thought-provoking; however, the analysis should also take into account that in most countries of the Arab world for which data are available, performance on this indicator is even better than in the core countries of Western democracies.

    Fig. 5.2
    2 maps, the first is a map of the world with many countries across the globe shaded in different dark and light shades, to indicate whether religious authorities should interpret laws. Countries close to the north pole, most of the African continent, India, a few regions in the Middle East, and a few countries in the far East have not been shaded. The map below is a close up of regions with the darker shades, including Egypt and many European countries. The legend on the left has shades ranging from 10.35 to 19.96, to 96.83 or more.

    Religious authorities should interpret the laws

    Full size image

  • Figure 5.2 The map “Religious authorities should interpret the laws” shows that the approval of this sentence, which runs counter to everything a modern secular state stands for in the sense of Hans Kelsen's “pure doctrine of law” (Hans Kelsen, 1881–1973; cf. Kelsen, 2005, posthumously) and in the sense of the Enlightenment, is geographically very similar to the maps of political and social values described by Ronald F. Inglehart in his extensive work as “survival values versus self-development values” and “traditional values versus secular-rational values”.Footnote 5

  • The combination of the two RMPE measures (Electronic Appendix Figure 4: % in favour of political violence + interpretation of laws by religious authorities; Electronic Appendix Figure 5: Depth of the problem of residents of a country who endorse political violence + interpretation of laws by religious authorities; and Electronic Appendix Figure 6: Radicalisation of the “anti-Kelsen camp” (% of population who affirm interpretation of laws by religious authorities endorse political violence)) yields an interesting difference in perspective from Inglehart and Welzel's map mentioned earlier. The real problem cases of RMPE (RMPE > 25%) are: Tajikistan, Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, Malaysia, Iraq, Macau SAR, Lebanon, Slovakia, Hong Kong SAR, Thailand, Bangladesh, Mexico, Chile, Ukraine, Russia, Bolivia, Ecuador, Spain, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Guatemala, Nigeria and Indonesia. It is also worth noting that among the less developed countries outside the traditional Western democracies and the European Union with less than 15% RMPE are the following countries whose good performance allows for optimistic prospects: Albania, Ethiopia, Macedonia, Egypt, Puerto Rico, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Zimbabwe, Serbia, Jordan, Georgia, Myanmar, China and Brazil.

Following these remarks, we now present our successive charts:

5.4.1 The Multivariate Results of the World Values Survey on Religiously Motivated Political Extremism (RMPE)

Our multivariate analysis of the factors influencing religiously motivated political extremism is based on the promax factor analysis statistical model using the World Values Survey open data. Complete data were available for 74 states in the world. The dimensions considered were:

  • Opinions on income inequality

  • Indicators of trust

  • Opinions on gender equality

  • What is important in life

  • Values in child education

  • Religiosity

  • Statements on the market economy, private ownership of the means of production and competition

  • Xenophobia and racism

  • What is allowed and what is forbidden?

  • Life satisfaction and happiness

  • Background variables such as gender, age

  • Dissatisfaction with the political system

  • What constitutes a democracy (redistribution of income by the state, separation of state and religion).

For reasons of comprehensibility of our investigation, we name the variables used in the model after the original English text:

  1. 1.

    We need greater income inequality

  2. 2.

    one cannot be careful enough (lack of trust)

  3. 3.

    No confidence: Judiciary/courts

  4. 4.

    not important in life: Family

  5. 5.

    University is equally important for boys and girls

  6. 6.

    No trust: The police

  7. 7.

    Important characteristics of the child: Obedience

  8. 8.

    Important qualities in children: Sense of responsibility

  9. 9.

    Gender: female

  10. 10.

    Men are not better leaders than women

  11. 11.

    not important in life: Religion

  12. 12.

    Harmful competition

  13. 13.

    Never attend church services

  14. 14.

    not important in life: Politics

  15. 15.

    Important qualities in children: Determination and perseverance

  16. 16.

    Justified: Someone who accepts a bribe

  17. 17.

    Rejecting neighbours: People of a different race

  18. 18.

    Justified: Political violence

  19. 19.

    Justified: Homosexuality

  20. 20.

    How important is God in your life?

  21. 21.

    Rejecting neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers

  22. 22.

    Important qualities in children: Imagination

  23. 23.

    Feeling of unhappiness

  24. 24.

    Important characteristics of the child: religious faith

  25. 25.

    Satisfaction with one's own life

  26. 26.

    not important in life: Work

  27. 27.

    Rejecting neighbours: Homosexual

  28. 28.

    Important qualities in children: Tolerance and respect for other people

  29. 29.

    Private vs. state ownership of companies

  30. 30.

    Age

  31. 31.

    Dissatisfaction with the political system

  32. 32.

    Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws

  33. 33.

    Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidise the poor.

Our factor analytic model, which extracts 12 factors, explains more than 58% of the variance of the variables. Again, it should be noted that the number of factors extracted results from the simple and rigorous application of the mathematical-statistical criterion of eigenvalue > 1.0, which is still the standard of multivariate factor analysis today.

  1. 1.

    Secularism

  2. 2.

    Feminism

  3. 3.

    Political marginalisation

  4. 4.

    Racism and xenophobia

  5. 5.

    Corruption and lawlessness

  6. 6.

    Happiness

  7. 7.

    Rejection of the Calvinist work ethic

  8. 8.

    Rejection of the neoliberal market economy

  9. 9.

    Unpolitical young generation

  10. 10.

    Education: Responsibility versus obedience

  11. 11.

    Education: Imagination versus tolerance

  12. 12.

    Redistributive state.

Two extracted factors play a prominent role in explaining RMPE: secularism (dampens RMPE) and corruption and lawlessness (promotes RMPE).

The factor loadings of >  ± 0.100 on the secularism factor with the variables of the model are

Not important in life: Religion 0.858

Never attends church services 0.764

Justified: Homosexuality 0.568

Men are not better business people than women 0.293

University is equally important for a boy and a girl 0.275

not important in life: Work 0.196

Important child traits: Imagination 0.185

Important child traits: Determination Perseverance 0.176

Important characteristics of children: Tolerance and respect for others 0.174

not important in life: Family 0.130

Important characteristics of the child: Sense of responsibility 0.124

Rejected neighbours: people of a different race − 0.106

No confidence: The police − 0.107

Private vs. state ownership of companies − 0.128

We need more income inequality − 0.140

Gender: female − 0.140

Important child traits: Obedience − 0.211

one cannot be careful enough (lack of confidence) − 0.325

Neighbours reject: Homosexuals − 0.364

Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws − 0.488

Important characteristics of the child: religious belief − 0.659

How important is God in your life − 0.828.

The factor loadings of >  ± 0.100 on the factor corruption and lawlessness on the variables of the model are

It is justifiable for someone to accept a bribe 0.816

Justified: Political Violence 0.816

Justified: Homosexuality 0:308

Harmful competition 0.207

Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws 0.204

not important in life: Family 0.109

Satisfaction with the political system 0.100

University is equally important for a boy and a girl − 0.128

Neighbours reject: Homosexuals − 0.151

Age − 0.231.

The key variable of the RMPE, Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws, is explained by the factors of the model as follows (factor loadings of >  ± 0.100)

Redistributive state 0.401

Unpolitical young generation 0.369

Rejection of the neoliberal market economy 0.276

Corruption and lawlessness 0.204

Racism and xenophobia 0.145

Rejection of the Calvinist work ethic − 0.208

Feminism − 0.393

Secularism − 0.488.

The second key variable of the RMPE, Justifiable: political violence, is explained by the factors of the model as follows (factor loadings of >  ± 0.100)

Corruption and lawlessness 0.816.

The correlations of the components of secularism (> ± 0.100) were

Feminism 0.425

Rejection of the Calvinist work ethic 0.302

Happiness 0.103

Racism and xenophobia − 0.255

Rejection of the neoliberal market economy − 0.256

Unpolitical young generation − 0.412.

The correlation components of corruption and lawlessness (> ± 0.100) were

Rejection of the neoliberal market economy 0.139

Education: Imagination versus tolerance 0.131

Education: responsibility versus obedience − 0.165.

Readers interested in social science are recommended to read the following factor-analytical tables, which also document the factor scores at the country level (Electronic Appendix Table 8 through to Electronic Appendix Table 11).

Table 5.8 Parametric index: overcoming Political Islam
Full size table
Table 5.9 Parametric index: overcoming political Islam for those wanting to emigrate in the Arab world to the West
Full size table
Table 5.10 RMPE in Austria according to the World Values Survey
Full size table
Table 5.11 RMPE at international level according to the World Values Survey
Full size table

5.4.2 The Extent and Global Drivers of Acceptance of Political Violence and Religiously Motivated Political Extremism (RMPE)—Multivariate Analysis of World Values Survey Data at the Global Level

In the above multivariate analysis of the World Values Survey interview data at the level of globally interviewed individuals, it was found first and foremost that the RMPE cannot be separated from the climate of lawlessness that many observers consider rampant, especially in the Western industrialised countries, and secondly that the drivers of the key RMPE variables (democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws), are the demand for a redistributive state, the apolitical young generation, the rejection of the neoliberal market economy, corruption and lawlessness, and racism and xenophobia, and that the best blockages against this are rooted in feminism and secularism. This explanation confirms an old empirical finding of the author that in multicultural and multiethnic societies, market mechanisms rather than state governance principles prove to be most effective (Tausch & Prager, 1993); a finding that was specified in Tausch et al. (2014) to the effect that there is a positive affinity between Islam and capitalism (Tausch, 2021).

As sufficiently justified in the methodology of comparative social research, the analysis of international survey data can now also be linked to aggregate data from economics, political science and sociology (cf. Tausch, 2021; Tausch et al., 2014). In the following, we present such an attempt, based on the freely accessible EXCEL data from international standard sources specially prepared for this publication:

Table 5.12 presents a regression-analytical model of the drivers and barriers to the acceptance of political violence based on the World Values Survey data at the international level. The model could be built for 65 countries with complete data. It explains 27.9% of the variance in the acceptance of political violence in adjusted terms and fulfils well the usual criteria of widely used statistical significance tests (listed below the table for statistically interested readers).

Table 5.12 Regression-analytical model of the drivers of acceptance of political violence—multivariate analysis of World Values Survey data at the global level
Full size table

When explaining the statements on the acceptance of political violence, which may seem paradoxical to some readers, we have to accept, as stated above, that it is not the Arab region as a whole that can be identified with the acceptance of political violence; Southeast Asia as well as Iraq and Spain, on the other hand, are real problem zones. In Europe, the Nordic states, the Federal Republic of Germany and, fortunately, Hungary as well as some countries in the Balkan region are relatively little affected by the social acceptance of political violence. We had also pointed out that the fringes of the political system in many states of the world are already strongly radicalised and reject a consensus of non-violence. This observation applies not only to Spain and Serbia, but also to France and large parts of both Americas, the former Soviet Union and West Asia. In most states of the Arab world for which data are available, the situation is even better than in many core countries of Western democracies.

The sad fact for Western society is that especially in Catholic countries, where the decline of traditional values is particularly rapid, there is a renewed acceptance not only of corruption but also of political violence. This problem also arises in countries with a confessional orientation towards Eastern religions. The rejection of free-market competition (competition is harmful) is also clearly associated with a higher acceptance of political violence, according to the World Values Survey.

Following Olson (1982), as well as Tausch and Heshmati (2013), Tausch et al. (2014), we identify regional distributional coalitions expressed in satisfaction with subnational, i.e. local, labour market policies as further drivers of the acceptance of political violence. At first glance, this may seem completely counterintuitive, even absurd. Yet the 20 countries with the highest satisfaction with local labour markets are Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Kuwait, Oman, Laos, Qatar, the Philippines, Singapore, Paraguay, Tajikistan, Chile, Panama, Turkmenistan, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Cambodia, Djibouti, Uzbekistan and Norway. Among them are some countries with high political acceptance of violence.

Among the countries with a high level of dissatisfaction with the local labour market, such as Greece, Italy, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Spain, Bulgaria, Ireland, Moldova, Hungary, Montenegro, Portugal, Macedonia, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, the UK, Egypt, Cyprus and the Czech Republic, there are again some states with a low acceptance of political violence.

In future, international social science can discover important causal mechanisms here that can be of great significance for a future of world society without political violence and which are all compatible with the neoliberal explanatory patterns mentioned at the beginning.

Electronic Appendix Figure 7 is the map of the unstandardised residuals of our regression equation from Table 5.12. The relatively high propensity for political violence in the USA, Russia and Spain still forms a statistical outlier.

To further analyse which mechanisms lead to the acceptance of political violence in world society and which mechanisms block it, we also calculated the partial correlations of the acceptance of political violence with the 300 variables of our country aggregate data set,Footnote 7 holding constant the level of human development and its square. This idea goes back to Nobel Laureate in Economics Simon Kuznets (1955, 1976), for whom development processes such as social inequality have a curvilinear shape. Inequality increases in the course of industrialisation and only decreases again at a relatively high level of development. This idea has found wide application in the social and economic sciences. On this basis, it has become common today to associate crisis phenomena of a more general nature, and not just inequality, with “Kuznets curves”.

The result of the partial correlations is that, also irrespective of the level of development, the population in countries with a certain level of satisfaction is more inclined to political violence, especially also when a higher inequality rate is added (Table 5.13).

Table 5.13 Partial correlation of factors influencing acceptance of political violence—multivariate analysis of World Values Survey data at the global level (constant: HDI 2018 & (HDI 2018)2)
Full size table

In any case, international comparative social science still has to invest a lot of analytical capacity to really fathom the mechanisms of acceptance of political violence.

In Table 5.13, we present our model of the drivers of acceptance of religiously motivated political extremism (RMPE) based on a multivariate multiple regression analysis of World Values Survey data at the global level with national aggregate data.

The regression model explains 50.3% of the variance of the RMPE for 63 states with complete data with good joint significance values of the whole equation.

The main drivers of acceptance of religiously motivated political extremism (RMPE) that are significant at the 5% level are, in this order

  • Workers’ remittances as % of GDP

  • Global migration sending countries 2017

  • Gallup Satisfaction Survey: Local Labour Market

  • Gallup Satisfaction Survey: Quality of Education.

The main obstacles to a high acceptance of religiously motivated political extremism (RMPE) are

.

  • Proportion of Muslims in the total population

  • Gallup satisfaction poll: Freedom of choice

  • Proportion of Orthodox Christians in the total population

  • Gallup Satisfaction Survey: Overall Life Satisfaction Index.

Electronic Appendix Table 11 shows the predicted RMPE, the actual RMPE values and the residuals based on the regression-analytical model of the drivers of religiously motivated political extremism in the multivariate analysis of the World Values Survey data at the global level in Table 5.14. The 15 states whose structural conditions suggest that RMPE may increase rapidly in the near future are Kyrgyzstan, Germany, Nicaragua, Croatia, Albania, Hungary, Norway, Italy, Egypt, Estonia, Switzerland, Portugal, New Zealand, Poland and Bangladesh.

Table 5.14 Regression-analytical model of the drivers of acceptance of religiously motivated political extremism—multivariate analysis of World Values Survey data at the global level
Full size table

The 15 countries whose structural conditions suggest that weighty forces are at work that could flatten the RMPE are South Korea, Spain, Malaysia, Nigeria, Vietnam, Slovakia, Chile, the Netherlands, Tunisia, Tajikistan, Lebanon, Ukraine, France, the UK and the Philippines. Electronic Appendix Figure 8 illustrates the data in Electronic Appendix Table 12 in an analytical map.