Keywords

1 Introduction

Reconciliation has played a more or less important role in all peacebuilding processes. Its importance depends on multiple factors in play and on interests, not only material interests but symbolic, ethical–political and social ones. The literature shows that a lasting, stable and fair peace process cannot be carried out without undertaking profound changes and without the presence of a policy that supports some kind of reconciliation.

In this regard, the European Union, as an international and strategic actor in Colombia in recent decades, has been supporting different peace processes in the country. This support has manifested itself as an attitude open to dialogue not only with the authorities, but also with many other important actors in order to go even further than agreeing, implementing and establishing a lasting peace. This has meant, in practice, understanding peace as the construction and strengthening of the rule of law, expanding the system of guarantees and openly promoting transitional justice processes, all elements that the European Union supported with the Peace Agreement of 2016; it even offered new approaches derived from the lessons learnt during the process of supporting the National Reparation and Reconciliation Commission (CNRR in Spanish) established by the 2005 Justice and Peace Law, as well as with the policies and experiences of the Peace Laboratories (2002–2012) in support of grassroots citizen movements for peace in certain areas especially affected by the armed conflict. Based on this experience, the European Union has concluded that, in order to support the Havana Agreement it was necessary to carry out significant changes in terms of the transfer of knowledge and methods in order to strengthen local-territorial initiatives and capabilities with a more bottom-up orientation, feeding partial processes and dynamics of dialogue and coexistence or promoting local reconciliation actions.

In short, without abandoning the promotion of the rule of law, transitional justice and support for other significant elements of the Havana Agreement, the European Union has favoured—via the powerful instrument of the European Fund for Peace in Colombia—a focus that stimulates local initiatives, dialogues with sensitive sectors (women, young people, ethnic groups) and the reconstruction of community relations that make possible an enhancement of peace, coexistence and reconciliation as a long process with committed actors and at different rhythms and times in accordance with the most local contexts.

This chapter aims to analyse the European Union’s track record in terms of peace and reconciliation in Colombia, taking as a starting point the invigorating debates that exist within academia regarding the nature of reconciliation and its framework of reference in a peace process. Furthermore, it looks at the history of three European Union interventions in Colombia through the Peace Laboratories, support for the CNRR and the creation and action of the European Fund for Peace. What has happened over the last two decades makes it possible to say that the European Union has considered different strategies in order to support laying down arms and the psycho-social reconstruction of the country with political and financial support in favour of a lasting, just and stable peace that allows a broad and plural reconciliation process. Finally, the text includes a series of reflections and suggestions about how to continue this work in favour of reconciliation in the South American country through European external cooperation and action.

2 Academic Debates About Reconciliation

In academic circles it is not open to question that, after an armed conflict, the arrival of peace via some kind of agreement must be sealed with a reconciliation process. Starting from this general postulate, there are multiple details on the road that can endanger not only peace but also possible reconciliation.

Reconciliation has become associated with many peace processes; in fact, over the course of the last four decades, the word reconciliation has become a talisman (López-Martínez, 2000: 53–56), something that provides the finishing touch to a long and difficult process. However, how to achieve it, what means to use and how to put it into practice is one of the hardest tasks in these processes. When talking about reconciliation we are referring to a broad spectrum of possibilities that includes different levels of amnesia or of memory, trials and purges, dialogues and settlements, etc. (Hauss, 2003; Rigby, 2001). As Cole (2007: 18–19) has pointed out, we are talking about a “spectrum”, in two ways: with broad margins, and also as something ethereal. However, in general, the scientific literature tends to agree in characterising it as a range of multidimensional phenomena (that involve knowledge of the truth, reparation of victims, etc.), on some occasions more demanding than on others, with identity changes and transformations, in which many actors intervene, including where ad hoc policies or binding and profound agreements are made for a given society (Bendaña & Villa-Vicencio, 2002; Bloomfield et al., 2003; Lederach, 1997; López-Martínez, 2005; Rigby, 2006).

Taking as a starting point classic situations, for example societies that move from a dictatorship to a democracy or from an internal armed conflict to peace, it would be useful not to idealize the term reconciliation. Firstly, because there was not always a degree of conciliation in the past that can be returned to; secondly, because to reconcile would be more linked to the capacity—with knowledge and admission of violence suffered—to be able to specify a new social contract and a non-destructive way of managing great differences; and, thirdly, because a large degree of political realism is required. However, it also brings hope to society, a more democratic vision of political relationships, a greater tolerance with regard to discrepancies and a disposition favourable to reaching agreements without bloodshed.

For some authors, religious factors play in favour of reconciliation (Etxeberria, 1999; Lederach, 2008; Philpott, 2007; Tutu, 1999; Villa-Vicencio, 2002). In Catholic countries, as is the case with Colombia, Catholicism is usually identified with certain degrees and rites of forgiveness, offering the Church a role and a place which, in other cases, would only be available to the political sphere (López-Martínez, 2000: 86–92; Rigby, 2004: 109). Similarly, forgiveness and reconciliation mechanisms linked to other religious and cultural mechanisms have been identified.

Another focus of the academic debate has been the contrast of reconciliation versus justice. Much retributive justice, without being open to other models and procedures (restoration, rituals, alternative penalties, etc.), can sometimes hinder progress in the field of agreements. A balance between the two is more a question of pure pragmatism than dogmatism (Bloomfield et al., 2003: 97–121), although it is true that without justice there can be no reconciliation, and reconciliation can lead the way to a certain degree of justice.

Another matter is the time or, rather, the times (especially in relation to other variables: conflict, traumas, pacts, etc.) so that the process can proceed as harmoniously as possible. The questions of how to plan a reconciliation policy, specify and arrange the order of processes, foresee challenges and problems, have a clear vision, etc., can make it easier to understand that we are dealing with a matter of great importance, one that makes it possible to learn from the errors of the past and that any profound transformation requires different and complementary understandings of time and places (Crocker, 1999; Huyse, 2005; Lederach, 1995, 2005).

So, both transitional justice by means of instruments such as truth commissions and their reports, together with other dynamics of reparation and rehabilitation of victims; as well as peacebuilding processes that involve institutional and structural changes, if they are oriented—as a priority activity—by a spirit of reconciliation (Lederach, 2008), can be granted legitimacy, offering scenarios that are favourable to the intervention of human rights policies, and policies for the non-violent transformation of conflicts (López-Martínez, 2000: 97–101). This allows more intervention by civil society and by third parties, as well as the design of a reconciliation policy that has the national character (Kriesberg, 2007; Redekop, 2008; Schapp, 2005). They even, as Walter Wink (1998) points out, thinking about Africa and Latin America, allow many societies to cure the deep wounds that violent conflicts leave in their nations, offering them not only a way out, but real solutions to rethink and rebuild.

It is clear that academia admits that reconciliation is a concept with a great political and spiritual strength, an example of moral recovery and human resilience. Following López-Martínez (2006: 187–194) it is possible to use the two metaphors of the cobweb and grammar in order to better understand processes of reconciliation, in accordance with national, regional and local differences, at different rhythms and times and with broader or more limited scopes. When he talks about a cobweb, this author is thinking of two meanings: firstly, the eye condition (often referred to in Spanish as “to have cobwebs in your eyes”) that distorts visual reality, and secondly, the spider’s web. A society gets trapped in this web, one that has, stuck to it, multiple key concepts and elements (amnesia, pain, guarantees, justice, memory, losses, forgiveness, reparation, rehabilitation, truth, violations, etc.), and which it cannot see clearly. To remedy this situation, López-Martínez considers that a society has to debate and enter into dialogue regarding how to clarify concepts, pathways and decisions regarding the importance of each one of the elements in play in order to aspire to building scenarios in which there is a grammar of reconciliation. This journey has to generate its own language, which allows the actors involved to communicate, understand each other and make progress in the path of reconciliation. Like all grammars of different languages, this grammar is a set of rules that makes it possible to convert the order of words into an act of communication. Therefore, reconciliation is a new form of social, political and spiritual communication (López-Martínez, 2006: 189–90). This author uses various examples in order to explain how different grammars of Reconciliation come together in order to grant more weight to knowledge of the truth, reparation of victims or to retributive justice, as well as to offer scenarios of grammar about past or future times.

The academic literature on the subject is very broad and each researcher emphasises some elements of the process or combines different variables depending on the specific study or on the model that has been created. Some of the models given in Table I make it possible to see that in the literature there is a consensus regarding reconciliation as a complex process involving multiple factors, involving elements that may be political, psychological, social, institutional, spiritual, etc. There are no rigid rules, and that is why it is better to speak about “grammars” in the plural. What for some societies may be important, such as knowing the truth even at the expense of justice, for others is not. What for some may involve incorporating religious sentiments, for others may have to be done increasing processes of secularization. Some, in short, prefer to carry out reconciliation only thinking of the future, bypassing a part of the past. As a result, each historical context, each unique cultural component, the actors involved, the capacity to develop broad-based processes, discourses, instruments used, existing strengths, local initiatives, etc., will vary certain unique features within these broad models cited below and which, for reasons of space, will not be developed, and so the sources drawn on are given for further reading (Table 1).

Table 1 Models of Reconciliation processes
Full size table

For the case of Colombia, whose society has experienced various peace processes, at least between the end of the 1980s and the last major accord between the Government and the FARC-EP, the peace and reconciliation scenarios have changed, the debates within the heart of society with regard to the cobweb have been controversial and contested, even more so in contexts in which the violence had not completely come to an end. However, trailblazing initiatives of possible grammars of reconciliation have been developed, and the European Union has been present in some of these, supporting the initiatives or promoting scenarios that are favourable to a stabilization of peace and to ensuring agreements. Of all these experiences there have been three times and programmes that are worth examining for their practices: the Peace Laboratories, the CNRR and the current peace process.

3 The Peace Laboratories

The idea of the Peace Laboratories arose from the very interesting precedent of the Magdalena Medio Development and Peace Corporation (CDPMM in Spanish), led by the Jesuit Francisco de Roux. In the Magdalena Medio programme, alternative development models and approaches were introduced with the goal of building peace at a local and community level. So, the European Commission decided to take these experiments to different parts of Colombia with three goals: (a) to support specific agreements among parties in conflict; (b) to construct areas of peaceful coexistence by means of strengthening local institutions and support for civil actors that promote peace, and (c) to boost economic and social development based on the promotion of alternative development (Barreto Henriques, 2010).

This meant not only that local and community peace and reconciliation processes were supported, but also that the European Union, by means of these Laboratories, was putting in place a new framing for its common foreign policy, better defining the profile of the EU as an actor in the exterior, and also underscoring differences with the United States, the country that had most influence over Colombia. Both the general goals and the strategic axes of the Laboratories focussed on clear elements characteristic of mid-conflict peacebuilding (integrated rights, peace culture, social and governability processes, institution building, democratic governability, citizen participation, dignifying life, public development policies, support for young people and women, etc.), giving European cooperation in Colombia a political and ethical value, and not a military or commercial one. Something else that was very evident was the profound dichotomy with regard to, for example, policies regarding the eradication of illegal crops, with a European Union favourable to funding alternative and sustainable agriculture and against massive crop spraying with its unhealthy environmental effects, and one that stayed clear of the Plan Colombia (with its excessive military component), which has sought to support the State’s military capacities and has completely lacked in terms of building the social fabric (Castañeda, 2009; Molano Cruz, 2009; Roy, 2001).

Furthermore, the EU transformed the design of the Peace Laboratories reflecting the Union’s significant capacity to adapt to the context of the conflict, especially when the Government-FARC conversations failed during the Pastrana presidency. So, the EU did not link its Official Development Aid policy to finalizing the conflict, and to reconstruction, but rather it became involved in it by means of strategies that have been more persuasive to the most influential actors and committed to that part of civil society that wanted peace and not victory. As Castañeda (2014) and Cepeda-Ladino and Costa (2017) have pointed out, this means, in terms of praxis, a commitment to the local and regional construction of peace programmes and initiatives that act as laboratories, fields of exploration and for registering and storing experiences regarding building coexistence and peace, not only in the midst of the conflict, something that was very complicated, but also as steps forward and ingredients for future post-conflict peacebuilding processes that would come in time.

In this regard, support in peaceful and non-militaristic sectors—such as NGOs that had been working already in the 1990s, for example PRODEPAZ, Consornoc, Asopatia, the Consejo Nacional Indígena del Cauca, etc.—helped to legitimise the axes that the European Union wished to consolidate in the regions for intervention. These axes were peace and human rights, international humanitarian law, governability and citizen participation, and socioeconomic development for the improvement of vulnerable populations, seeking productive alternatives and local development. This support for the active and pacifist civil society was something that very clearly characterised the new exterior action of the European Union in Colombia.

The Peace Laboratories covered different regions: the first was set up in Magdalena Medio, the second in Norte de Santander, Oriente Antioqueño and Macizo Colombiano, and the third in Montes de María and Meta. All of them are territories where the armed conflict has been present, with illegal economies, areas of illicit crops, a fragile institutional presence, a high concentration of wealth and little social mobility (European Union, 2013). It involved helping 220 municipalities with a total of over 315,000 direct participants.

These experiments in territorial peace confirmed the importance of supporting peace initiatives against the war. Put another way, peace and civil society could overcome the adversities and negativities generated by the dynamics of the internal armed conflict. It was no less important that the EU’s central analysis regarding the Colombian conflict persisted in taking a critical position with regard to the inequalities and poverty that acted as fuel keeping the fire of the conflict alive, and taking a line of civil diplomacy and understanding of the deep roots of the injustices (Lillo González & Santamaría García, 2009). This model, critical of the unjust historical structures, encouraged subaltern sectors, those mistreated by political dynamics of exclusion, which in practice offered other achievements in a positive direction, such as boosting human capital, rebuilding the social fabric, the empowerment of social organizations, a greater citizen involvement, a shedding of fear and paralysation; in short, it promoted the development of the population’s endogenous capabilities, which had been left lethargic by the war.

Thanks to this support, and in these scenarios, some peace organizations started to work towards reconciliation. Often, the concept took on the shape of supporting the integration of demobilised combatants, and other times it was expressed through offering victims opportunities for employment; organizing community processes; setting in motion labour, production, distribution and selling cooperatives; generating local dialogues about the negative impact of the violences; seeking opportunities for young people and mothers who were heads of a household; building relationships with local and regional institutions; strengthening the fabric of pacifist and environmental associations; and implementing many other experiences that made the Laboratories a unique style, with multiple lessons that are proving to be useful in the present.

3.1 Reconciliation through the CNRR

The second process came through the legal and financial support by the EU of various institutions responsible for implementing transitional justice, including the National Reparation and Reconciliation Commission (CNRR in Spanish) and the High Council for Reintegration (ACR in Spanish). The philosophy consisted of supporting processes of reintegrating former combatants into civil life, as well as initiating broad-based support for the recognition of victims of the armed conflict, regardless of who had caused the human rights violations.

The EU’s support and consultancy regarding Law 975 of 2005 (which, in theory, allowed the demobilization of over 25,000 members of paramilitaries) was done within a very precise institutional framework. This resulted from the mandate of the Colombian Political Constitution of 1991, which established the obligatory right to have peace implemented (art. 22), to education (art. 67), to the maintenance of peace (art. 95) and to establish a reconciliation policy (art. 30 provisional), as well as a strengthening of the Republic of Colombia within the international system of the United Nations and of the system for the preservation of and respect for human rights considered in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international agreements, non-binding protocols, the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José 1969) and the obligations to be found in the Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002).

It was that Law 975 that allowed the creation of the CNRR, which would work on two lines: the reparation of victims and the establishment of some criteria for future reconciliation. One of these criteria consisted of making reconciliation into a public policy, something that was finally included in the final Havana Peace Agreement of 2016.

However, Law 975 was passed not only in order to begin the process of demobilization, but also in order to apply an ad hoc model of transitional justice, more formal than profound, which legitimised the process underway. In this regard, and in terms of reconciliation, the Law was rather vague from a conceptual point of view, general in content, and politically speaking offered little guidance, which allowed the CNRR to be able to work on this matter with greater freedom and meant that the EU could financially support—via the Spanish government and a basket fund—a line of social pedagogy, of dialogues with victims and of explorations in this field. Furthermore, two Decrees (4760 of 2005 and 3391 de 2006) which added details to Law 975, still left a great deal of room for action and interpretation. Article 21 of the first decree stated that one function of the CNRR would be to enable reconciliation together with state institutions, civil society and international organizations; the second piece of legislation mentioned the “Restorative Programmes for National Reconciliation”, which would be the responsibility of the High Council for Reintegration of those demobilised, which developed the emphasis on carrying out reconciliation by means of “linking victims and perpetrators to productive projects” (art. 19c).

The second decree gave better shape to the governmental conception of reconciliation. This was based on the emotional and social reconstruction of the victim population, as well as offenders, the elaboration of a historical memory of the reconciliation process and the question of productive projects. The government would be the body to decide—via the ACR—which public or private institutions would receive money in order to implement these projects. A possible, though unusual, exercise of reconciliation through coexistence at work was considered. This idea came from the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2003: 2, 12, 89 and 90, Volume IX) when it spoke of “interpersonal reconciliation”, leaving the entire weight of the process to the victim population which suffered the violence and to the perpetrators, avoiding the political and social components that may be involved in a reconciliation process, and ignoring the asymmetrical relationships of power that all violence creates between victims and offenders. Uribe’s Colombia, then, prioritized a labour-based and bipolar (work involving victims and perpetrators) approach, as against a more political understanding of reconciliation (a much more demanding process with many more social actors involved).

In other words, the aim of the CNRR, particularly through its Reconciliation Department, was to work on a more political understanding of the concept of reconciliation, although the CNRR was always more involved in the reparation of victims than in a genuine socio-political debate about the second “R”. However, despite this approach, the CNRR, through the Reconciliation Department, disseminated, through the territories and among the social and political actors, its strategic definition, aiming to “build a climate of peaceful coexistence based on the creation of new relationships of trust between citizens and the State’s institutions, and among citizens, as well as extending democracy through participation in institutions and in civil society” (CNRR). Emphasising elements such as trust, democracy and coexistence situated the question within the parameters of reconciliation that were accepted in academia (Hamber & Kelly, 2004; Lederach, 2001; López-Martínez, 2006). To some extent, the definition was strategic, in that it aimed to be very broad and general, given that if it was not debated in depth then it could amount to nothing. Being critical, it should be observed that the CNRR’s second “R” was given less importance, considered to be controversial and even uncomfortable for the commissioners (with some exceptions). In this regard, in practice the Reconciliation Department had greater autonomy given the lack of political direction, such that it designed a plan with various axes in order to prepare the ground and choose the appropriate seeds, before trying to pick the fruit. This process was followed very closely by the EU authorities in Colombia.

The idea of the CNRR’s Reconciliation Area was not to emphasise or to work on interpersonal processes of reconciliation and forgiveness, but rather to focus on opening up a social debate with challenge-questions (Why is it positive for a society to reconcile? Who must create a favourable atmosphere for this? What actors must be at the centre of it? What is the aim of it? Where should it begin?), in order to give the concept a level of social and political development in the face of a society divided and convulsed by the violent conflict. The violence had destroyed not only people, but also the social and political fabric of many communities: to dismantle this violence meant not only to re-establish a lost order, but also to strip that violence of its political meaning.

The EU and the AECID (Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation) supported the CNRR’s Reconciliation Department—through UNDP Colombia—because this department worked not only within the framework of transitional justice (Bloomfield et al., 2003), but also with a much broader vision of the non-violent transformation of conflicts, and of peacebuilding. The idea was that the journey towards reconciliation would be begin with justice and reparation, and also when the truth was known, even in a wartime situation, that is, without having totally extinguished the internal armed conflict. The matter was not to situate reconciliation at the end of the process but rather within the very process of transitional justice (together with the truth, justice, reparation, etc.). Another important element was to consider reconciliation as a way of resolving conflicts and not only as a last stage after pacification and reconstruction (Lederach, 2005). That reconciliation be present at all times enables a reduction in the logics of war and of victory in favour of those involving change and dialogue between adversaries, and predisposes reconciliation to be an instrument for doing politics, giving it a very powerful symbolic reading. Furthermore, from the peacebuilding viewpoint, it enables an understanding of transformations beyond the narrow margin of transitional justice, taking peace in the direction of institutional, structural and social changes.

Based on these positions, the CNRR’s Reconciliation Department was authorized to carry out a series of workshops, dialogues and pilot projects which would allow it to extract some learnings. It cannot be described as a social consultation of the country, since the scope of these actions was limited, both in terms of its budget and in its logistics, but it can be said that a significant sample of activities was implemented, which will be listed here:

  1. a.

    Workshops with the victim population. These were held at all the regional offices of the CNRR, with a maximum presence of 30 victims per event. These were done with them directly and never with their representatives or intermediaries. They lasted between two and a half and three full days. The methodology was highly participative, with the protagonists talking about their understanding of and feelings about reconciliation. Both photos and videos were taken, and artistic, therapeutic and testimonial activities were undertaken, all of which were registered in reports that were delivered to the CNRR, UNDP Colombia and the AECID.

  2. b.

    Territorial dialogues carried out at each of the regional offices of the CNRR. Expressly invited were all the authorities present in each Colombian department (ACR, Acción Social, Justice and Peace units, Defensorías, National Police Force, Procuraduría, etc.), as well as different levels of government: Gobernaciones, Alcaldías, Personerías; and sectors of civil society (universities, religious confessions, NGOs, specific populations) and some international organizations in the Colombian departments (MAPP-OEA, United Nations, etc.). The dialogues lasted a full day. The methodology consisted of a conference, a debate, the formation of focus groups, a sharing of viewpoints and conclusions. All this material (photos, videos, report) were also delivered to the CNRR, UNDP Colombia and the AECID.

  3. c.

    A pilot project with non-extradited paramilitary leaders who had benefitted from the Justice and Peace Bill in the prison of La Picota (Bogota). Almost fifty people from the prison population participated in various workshops in which a wide range of topics were discussed (justice and peace, the meaning of the war, how to carry out reparation of victims, what kind of future should be constructed for Colombia, how to understand reconciliation, etc.). In this case, a unique situation, the project was not completed because of a lack of collaboration by the INPEC (National Penitentiary and Prison Institute) and because of political fears that the project would not be understood by public opinion.

  4. d.

    Implementation of other methodological resources. Another series of types of dissemination and discussion of reconciliation with other groups. Workshops with journalist, dialogues with academics, qualitative interviews, national and international seminars, mini-courses, consultancy with respect to the TV series Nunca más, etc. The essential question was to ask these actors what could be done for reconciliation and what a public policy on this matter should consist of.

A great many results came from all these processes, but certain elements can be taken away. For example, the victims were quite generous and were disposed to contribute to reconciliation; they felt that the violence had lasted too long and that the best contribution would be to know the truth, obtain reparation and to live quietly within a framework of reconciliation. In the workshops, much emphasis was laid on helping to articulate a “governance of victims” that would empower them and strengthen them in terms of their interests as citizens who had suffered violations of their rights. On the other hand, those who worked for the authorities were less willing to offer their opinions. They liked the idea of starting to talk about reconciliation, but they were more in favour of not taking initiatives in the territories. For them it was better to wait for instructions handed down from the government in Bogota. Some NGOs, universities and international organizations on the ground had already implemented specific campaigns regarding local reconciliation, within the framework of transitional justice, and looked with greater optimism at the potential use of a social pedagogy of reconciliation as a first step in the non-violent transformation of conflicts at a local level. The experience in La Picota was unsuccessful, and that was the opinion of the people who participated in it, who opted for more individual ways of resolving their personal situation. The courses with the media, etc., were carried out in a pleasant atmosphere, but also one of little commitment, since it was impossible to operate with a concept of reconciliation with a synchronic time, given that the majority had a linear view in which the actors saw it as the end of a very long process, and as something for after transitional justice, at a time (still with strong guerrilla activity, especially by the FARC-EP) which did not lend itself to seeing progress.

Perhaps the most interesting lessons gathered for the later peace process were: one, to learn from the Peace Laboratories that peace, coexistence and reconciliation were possible at local and community levels, and hence at a different pace at which it was experienced at the national level; and two, based on the work of the CNRR it was possible to think, debate, build and design reconciliation—together with people, authorities and the politicians responsible for it—as a public policy to accompany any peace process.

4 The EU’s Commitment to the 2016 Peace Agreement: The European Fund for Peace

The European Fund for Peace is the EU’s most important development cooperation instrument in relation to the Colombian Peace Agreement, funding a number of projects in this area. Its goal is to support peace, understood not only as the end of violence, but also as a long process of genuine support for and empowerment of the civil population in a given territory.

Its model of intervention is designed in accordance with a territorial viewpoint and with the active participation of local actors. This means respecting the special features of each region, its capabilities, priorities, and the needs of the institutional and social actors. In order to better deal with this reality, the Fund is based on six strategic pillars that structure its common identity and strategic timescale, independently of the particular focus of each intervention.

In terms of this analysis, the first pillar refers to “Reconciliation and conflict reduction”. For the EU, consolidating peace involves generating guarantees for reconciliation in its dimension of coexistence, tolerance and non-stigmatization among the different sectors of the population which have come into confrontation or which have become divided with the conflict. Reconciliation as an opportunity to bring together positions that are differing, intransigent, unbridgeable, given the challenge involved in building peace in a territory by means of changing dynamics created through historical exclusions accentuated by the pain and suffering caused by the war.

The fund understands reconciliation in very pragmatic and functional terms, avoiding giving the concept a supreme, absolute and grandiloquent value; it does not go into conceptual or academic aspects, either, but rather seeks to help in the transformation of the subjects and actors involved in the processes in order, thus, to break up asymmetrical power relationships and facilitate the actors’ undertakings in the territory. So, the areas for action are related to the generation of capabilities for developing peaceful coexistence in the territory; the reduction of socio-territorial conflictivities often linked to the problems of different groups (peasants, indigenous people, displaced people, women heads of households, etc.); the implementation of a great deal of pedagogy and social communication in order to understand and explain the processes and their scope; running citizen campaigns that provide dialogue regarding what it means, in this territory, to build peace and resolve conflicts without violence; support for creating community pacts and agreements in terms of coexistence and peacefully living together; the construction of mechanisms for the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflictivities, generating a new culture of peace; strengthening the socio-community fabric in order to allow the creation of mutual trust and respect—especially in order to better understand the difficult incorporation into civil life of those who have voluntarily laid down arms—and the empowerment of victims who wish to stop being that, in order to be recognized as free citizens (European Fund for Peace, 2016).

As is explained in the quarterly reports which monitor the Fund’s strategic pillars, in terms of Reconciliation and Conflict Reduction, it is possible to see the extent to which this pillar is understood as the discovery, learning and development of capabilities and skills for living together more and better, in communities, and throughout the territory. The projects not only involve many people from the areas where intervention has taken place, but they do so oriented towards peace and reconciliation values. To learn, teach oneself, educate, dialogue, agree, link and commit are all verbs that acquire an important pragmatic dimension for the EU’s action. To make this a reality, community radio stations have been funded; dialogue spaces have been set up; victims’ association have been promoted; educational and informative workshops run; assemblies have been used as spaces for dialogue, deliberation and decision-making; groups have been trained in new communication technologies, etc. (European Fund for Peace, 2022).

The pragmatic idea of reconciliation is a connecting thread that runs through and across projects on sustainable economic development; on basic public infrastructure and goods; on access to the construction of a microbusiness fabric; on the production of family food security; on strengthening institutions linked to technical processes of planning, intervention and assistance; on organizational empowerment; on citizen participation; on political incidence and community networks; and on citizen platforms.

For the EU, talking about reconciliation in the territories involves understanding up to what point the conflict in its many forms has punished certain places, for example, El Caguán: during the negotiations between the Pastrana government and the FARC-EP this was a demilitarized area, and after the failure of these negotiations this territory was punished in a way that was especially harmful for the civil population; or El Chocó, a department, forgotten and abandoned by the public authorities, whose extreme poverty figures are around 40%; or the Montes de María, an area chosen for a socio-territorial “cleansing” in order to extinguish the possible social foundations of the guerrilla war (with over 50 massacres in 10 years). These are only some of a great many examples. However, it is also possible to see how the peace processes in the territories and the attempts at coexistence and reconciliation have gradually woven a lasting fabric of social regeneration, linked to communities and to pacifist associations. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s annual peace prizes are evidence of this vitality: Mogotes (1999), los Nasa (2000), the Magdalena Medio Programme (2001), the Alto Ariari (2002), the Montes de María (2003), Cochaguán and the Guardia Indígena (2004), Quibdó Diocese (2005), las Madres de la Candelaria (2006), Puerto Leguízamo (2007), las Voces del Secuestro (2008), Comunidad de la Unión Peneya (2009), Merquemos Juntos and San Carlos (2010–2011), Forjando Futuros Foundation and the Tierra y Vida Association (2012), the Campesinos de Buenos Aires Association (2013), Ruta Pacífica de Mujeres and Centros de Reconciliación (2014), etc.

Another important milestone has been to link a part of reconciliation to knowledge of the truth. In this regard, the EU’s support for the Commission for the Clarification of the Truth, Coexistence and Non-Repetition, which formed a part of the 2016 Final Peace Agreement, as a temporary and extra-judicial state body, one of whose goals is to promote coexistence in the territories in order to transform relations and explore the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Its work between 2018 and 2022 has been considerable, with 28 territorial centres, known as “Houses of Truth”, collecting over 27,000 testimonies, with 14,000 interviews, both in Colombia and in 27 countries, delivering over 1,800 reports with analysis and reflections that will enable a great national dialogue in favour of non-repetition. Although the Commission is not the owner of the truth, it has contributed to making truth into an incentive for making progress in peace and reconciliation with a solid basis in terms of the recognition of victims; of the harm that has been caused, where, by whom, when, with what aims, in which territories, to which populations; in order to contribute to bringing an end to a decades-old conflict.

The Truth Commission’s Final Report reveals the importance of many sectors that were silenced and subjugated by the war, in its ten thematic strands (including the Historical narrative; Human rights violations and International Humanitarian Law; Women, indigenous people and the LGBTQ + population; Children and adolescents; Exile; Impacts and resistences; Testimonies and the territory) set out in eleven chapters (the last is on findings, conclusions and recommendations) (Colombia’s Truth Commission, 2022). With this plural and multi-dimensional perspective, a holistic view is offered of the truth as a powerful instrument for building peace, coexistence and non-repetition. Although putting the controversial term “reconciliation” on the front page was avoided, it can be understood that its transformative message is nonetheless involved. The motto chosen for its presentation campaign: “If there is truth there is a future”, implies that the crucial area of knowledge of the truth brings a liberation from prejudices and stereotypes, clearing the path to the coexistence which is both seed and fruit of reconciliation. In this last case, the Report indicates conclusive elements that demand major changes in the structures that have exacerbated suffering and which will have to be taken into consideration in order to achieve a “greater peace” and its reconciliatory correlate. These are structuring elements such as drug trafficking; serious socio-economic exclusions; the neoliberal economic model; the State’s security model; racial, ethnic, cultural and gender discrimination; and a lack of protection of regions and territories. This demands a profound, lasting and exacting peacebuilding that will make it possible to change identities, cultures, styles, and behaviours, which in turn will give rise to another Colombia.

It is perhaps an exaggeration to say that “peace is not made in the Capitol, it is made in the territories” (Sergio Fajardo, Governor of Antioquia), and perhaps it is more reasonable to point out, as María Patricia Giraldo, the Mayor of San Carlos (Antioquia) says: “peace is built in the territories. With opportunities for people, with the satisfaction of basic needs (health, housing, education, drinking water, etc.) and, most importantly, with hearts that are open to reconciliation” (Sierra Restrepo & Botero de la Torre, 2015: 133 and 137). It is possible and indeed necessary to build it in every place that influences and affects society as a whole. The goal is clear; it is the means that are up for debate.

In this regard, by supporting the Laboratories, the CNRR and the Final Peace Agreement (2016) the EU has built up a network of relationships and strengths that make it possible to talk about a new orientation for intervention. A liberal understanding of peace has been put into second place, instead prioritizing a local, community peace that is close to the people. The final scope of this new strategy is still to be seen, but its results are already tangible and positive.

5 Conclusions and Recommendations

Reconciliation in Colombia, as in other examples around the world, must be a historical task, and sooner or later it must be tackled as a problem and as a solution. In the case of Colombia, it is even a constitutional duty, which must be accompanied, if possible, by a public policy that has come out of a political consensus and broad agreements on the matter.

In fact, if we take reconciliation as the most similar thing to a new Social and Political Pact, that is, something that goes even further than the last peace agreement and which would be reinforced by the new presidency of the republic in the hands of Gustavo Petro, it is clear that it can bring a great deal of motivation and benefit to society as a whole. In this regard, it seems that the grammar in Colombia is already being defined through a clarification of the truth and reparation of victims, but also with a presidency that is committed to transformations of the old historical injustices and contributing new solutions (dialogue whose nature is intergenerational, interclass, spans the rural–urban world, genders, majorities-minorities, etc.), and to all that can lead to inclusion and overcoming traumas and historical eliminations.

It seems that the EU has understood that all this requires a great deal of time and support (a significant turn in terms of policy, which now has 20 years of experience), a more synchronic than diachronic time, a support that involves commitments and continuities. The ‘what’ is clear: supporting Colombia on the way to peace and in achieving that its conflicts are resolved politically and creatively, and not destructively and violently. The ‘how’ has involved a change from a liberal conception of peace, carried out from the top and by major actors, to another that is more local, regional, closer to people and linked to both civil society and the strengthening of democratic and participative institutions.

The EU has demonstrated with its policies that it is seeking a peace and a reconciliation for Colombia that involves many acts (gestures and dialogues that are institutional, political, social, etc.) and for (individual, group) wills to converge; more than a goal, it is like a road to be travelled, stage by stage, and each one at its own pace. What is more, it is not just one road, but many. It is not so much a goal as a way of travelling together with others. It is responding to the question, how do we wish to produce something that we all want, but do not know how to achieve it?

In this long process there are actors, without excessive protagonism, who can help to bring forward times and responsibilities (the new president is one of them); but it is, above all, a group task for society as a whole. This is a task that permits the “normalization of Colombia”: detecting problems, discussing solutions, learning to live in diversity, reducing negative passions and neutralizing dynamics of hate and exclusion.

The EU has invested in peace and reconciliation on the basis of strengthening the rule of law, human rights, the systems of guarantees and the culture of peace, in some cases directly in favour of transitional justice and in others with a support for local institutions and pacifist civil society. This has brought credibility to processes and given them considerable support.

The EU has understood that where there are obstacles, there are opportunities. It is learning from the processes it has experienced and from what others have done. Some lessons from failure and some epistemology from mistakes have been useful. History is a great laboratory where we can all learn from everyone. One of the opportunities is to understand and deal adequately with victims. Helping them is creating a social and cultural movement based on their reality. The governance of victims may mean just that, allowing them to deprivatise their pain and make it collective, dignifying them, decriminalising politics and taking the path of the citizens’ victimhood.

The EU has understood, with its policy in Colombia, that it is better to work synchronically; for example, in terms of transitional justice, reconciliation is created when processes of truth, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition are supported, and it is not necessary to wait until linear and diachronic processes have passed. Time conceived dynamically, in terms of levels and scales, becoming familiar with local realities and occasional, isolated agreements. It might be said that the EU would adopt a progressive understanding of reconciliation (López-Martínez, 2000) in which society can help to close and heal wounds, to build or rebuild policies based on sustainable values and to think and design ways of overcoming and solving old forms of historical exclusion, as well as how to implement reconstruction plans.

With its policies, the EU has been able to harmonize both its reasoning and its hopes, which have been made a reality in the territories thanks to the work of civil society. All this has come together to create something greater and more powerful than simple specific experiences. It has stimulated the idea that peace is stronger than war and that it can indeed overcome it. This makes it possible to offer an optimistic hypothesis: if we continue to work well in this process, how will Colombia be in 25 years?