1 The Near Future and the Post-Pandemic Scenario: The Risk of Missing the Boat

1.1 Doing Political Science in Turbulent Times

The data briefly presented at the end of the previous chapter summarize the different reactions of the European community of political scientists to the impact of the pandemic in terms of patterns of adaptation. As already shown, a significant minority believe that this crisis should be considered an opportunity to improve the social relevance of the discipline and to produce better research. Additionally, a good number of political scientists think that the near future will be crucial to focusing their research agendas more closely on what is relevant for the socio-political context.

From this point of view, the COVID-19 pandemic can be considered to have added another driver to the turbulent situation of the discipline. In fact, what characterizes the external world also applies to the academic world: we live in turbulent times such as those “in which the interaction of events and demands is experienced as highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected, and/or unpredictable” (Ansell et al., 2017, p. 8).

Overall, the pandemic has not only increased the challenges to be dealt with by the discipline, but has also shed further light on its limitations. These challenges are highly relevant and persistent, and as such they deserve our focused attention if we are to understand the future of political science.

It is important that we start this analysis from what our early and mid-career interviewees (and not the seniors) have said about this strategic topic. For example, a young researcher clearly pointed out the connection between structural challenges on the one hand, and those challenges emerging from the pandemic, as follows:

Political science is more challenged today than it used to be in the past. On the one hand, there are developments around ‘post-truth’, disinformation campaigns, anti-gender movements, and the rise of right-wing populism—to name just a few buzzwords of those worrying phenomena. This particularly concerns and challenges political science as a ‘science for democracy’. … The main risk is excessive fragmentation in too vague and irrelevant research questions of course. … In the autumn of 2020, as I think about the state of political science ten years from now, the global pandemic outbreak of COVID-19 certainly needs to be taken into account. On the one hand, this concerns COVID-19, policy responses and political consequences as a phenomenon—political science is essential to understand those. We will certainly see the continued publication of articles, special issues and books, but it will also be important to address lines of research concerning COVID-19 that have not received very much attention so far, such as at the connection between political science and public health.

Political science is therefore seen as a discipline that is not sufficiently capable of offering analytical responses to most key political and policy problems. This is expressed, perhaps even more strongly, by a mid-career scholar who pointed out how:

Political scientists need to be more inclusive of topics. And you know, when you look at the recent event in the US on Wednesday, I don’t hear a lot of political scientists because that would require us to talk about race, to talk about gender, to talk about identity politics, and political science doesn’t like all these kinds of thing. If we look at COVID, we would need specialists in health policy, (and) political science doesn’t do health, it doesn’t do housing policies, all that kind of stuff. So I think now this year with COVID, with what’s happening in the US, we can see that political science—actually, we are just shooting ourselves in the foot because we do not cover the full spectrum of politics, of political problems out there. … And then there’s this problem with data that when we have to answer funding calls that are problem oriented, then half of the discipline cannot apply, because that’s not what we do. … And then we have part of the discipline that jumped and started to do tons of studies about migration, about Brexit, and I’m pretty sure (soon) it’s going to be about COVID, so we’re going to have funding for COVID and publications about COVID and we will forget all the other problems out there. So, I think we are missing the boat once again; we are all obsessed with pandemics, but we do not really make a very clear contribution, a mark, where we can say, “this is political science’s contribution to understanding the crisis, the politics of the crisis, implications, and so on and so forth”. We are a bit lost. When you look at, for instance, the COVID advisory bodies across Europe, there is not a single political scientist there. There are economists, sociologists, and what have you, but there is not a single political scientist, or at least not in the countries where I follow politics, like Italy, Switzerland, France, the UK and Germany. I don’t see any political scientists. So, I think we are missing that boat.

This “missing the boat” image is very powerful and represents in a dynamic way the persistence of the never-ending, double-sided problem of political science. This is equally true with regard to the European arena, which we examined in the first chapter of this book when introducing the characteristics of the discipline. This is the same double-sided problem that has accompanied the reader throughout all the previous chapters, together with the difficult process of institutionalizing European political science and the various capacities of country-level political science to make a relevant impact to some degree.

One could say that there is nothing new under the sun, and that the pandemic is just one of many crises that political science has had to deal with during the course of the discipline’s historical development; and that nothing can be done to change its structural weaknesses.

However, what our younger interviewees pointed out should not be underestimated. They believe that the pandemic has come at a time when other socioeconomic and political drivers are leading towards the possible decline of democracy, towards increasing social inequality (not only between different parts of the world but also within each country), towards faster processes of innovation and also to new and unexpected social problems. All of these drivers may have a snowball effect which could render the social legitimation of political science extremely critical. Why should society and taxpayers be concerned with a discipline that looks disinterested in the most relevant and pressing social problems of our time? Why should citizens be interested in a discipline that displays little interest in society itself?

Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic can be seen as a sort of litmus test for this tendency of political science to be insufficiently engaged with its social environment. In these turbulent and critical times, there are signs of the emergence of a potential vanguard: a kind of modern “Aeneas” represented by the future heroes of European Political Science—scholars who are conscious of the adversities of history, and the consequent weaknesses of the discipline, such as fragmentation and low socio-political salience and legitimation. They know that the foundation of a new, stronger Political Science goes beyond their individual aspirations. They also know that a plurality of objectives and fields of study have to be pursued in order to defend the role of political science. Several of the interviews we organized confirm this sense of awareness also among the most recent generation of scholars.

However, the majority of political scientists still seem to resemble the other two heroes we have used to picture our ideal types: like a sort of modern Odysseus, some of them tend to focus exclusively on the collective goal of political science, while underestimating their potential impact on the public sphere; others, like Achilles, are exclusively concerned with their individual impact on society but fail to strive for the achievement of the scientific community’s mission. Moreover, the passivity and negative feelings of some interviewees occasionally seem to evoke the syndrome of Sisyphus, that is, a group of scholars going endlessly round in circles.

The lines of reasoning of the new “Aeneas type” include the arguments of the necessary recognition, for example, of the challenges and opportunities that have been generated by the COVID-19 pandemic in terms of its indicating relevant topics and research perspectives. This is clearly captured by one mid-career scholar:

I do think that the role of the State in public service delivery has come back with a vengeance—the distinctiveness of the public sector and its role in the pandemic … without the government we would have all died, I think. So, I think that is an important consequence. And then there are new issues that are related to political leadership and volunteerism, effective policy instruments, the organization of health care and care for the elderly. … Just think of (all the labour involved in) to the promotion, the organization of vaccination programs. … You know, this is paired with citizens’ trust, there’s the next series of subjects and studies following the pandemic. And then also there is room for political scientists who study inequalities; I think the COVID-19 crisis has been utterly divisive in its worsening of inequalities and segmenting citizens. And something I haven't addressed but I noted down here: I think, with this background, there could be more fertile ground on which to study micro phenomena together with meso and macro variables.

However, as shown in our flash survey of the effects of COVID-19 on European political scientists, many scholars were not affected by the pandemic and its consequences but simply adhered to their research agenda and interests.

Consequently, the near future and the post-pandemic scenario may be characterized by the fossilization of historical trends and a pattern of division from current events. Overall, the greater, more challenging divide is that between a minority who are interested in the social relevance of the discipline and in changing its perspective so as to be more involved in external world facts and dynamics, and those who, legitimately, are more interested in following their own research agenda and are thus completely absorbed by internal academic dynamics and research into what the discipline itself considers mainly relevant (Stoker, 2010). This, as we will see, is a divide that has always characterized the development of political science. Furthermore, we think that if this divide is not bridged, then there could be a real risk of “missing the boat”.

1.2 Lessons Learned from COVID-19, and the Need to Take the Structural Turbulence of Our Times Seriously

Turbulent times, punctuated by structural crises (such as the financial turmoil of 2008, COVID-19, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the waves of uncontrolled migration, the recurrent droughts and the other natural disasters due to global warming), have two significant effects on European political science. These are very often underestimated by political scientists themselves, with the exception of a promising minority, as shown by our survey on the impact of COVID-19.

The first of these effects takes the form of an analytical and theoretical challenge: the fact that the reiteration of crises and turbulence occurs much more often in the recent past implies an increasing need to better understand changes, unintended consequences and connections between different political and policy processes.

The second is a risk, connected to the increasing demand made of academic disciplines by society and, more generally, by the outside world: the lack of preparedness in providing advice, engagement and research focused on socially relevant problems.

1.2.1 The Theoretical Challenge

Regarding the theoretical challenge, COVID-19 has shown how an unexpected external event can be a bearer of multiple political and societal effects whose duration may be short but could also result in significant changes (Capano et al., 2022a). However, COVID-19 is only one, and probably the most relevant, of the several factors contributing to the structural turbulence that characterizes the contemporary world and that affects practical political and policy processes. Thus, if turbulent times mean a context in which unexpected and/or unpredictable events are more probable, this implies a need for a theoretical approach capable of conceptualizing the implications of these events in terms of their impact on the characteristics of political and policy dynamics. Such studies would be more effective in shedding light on whether, and how, such events can be foreseen, what sequential chains they may trigger and how to prepare political institutions and political systems to deal with them.

From this point of view, mutatis mutandis, political science is in the same situation described by David Easton in his APSA Presidential Address in 1967 when, analysing the situation of American political science and the rise of the “post-behavioural revolution”, he pointed out that “the search for an answer as to how we as political scientists have proved so disappointingly ineffectual in anticipating the world of the 1960s has contributed significantly to the birth of the post-behavioural revolution” (Easton, 1969, p. 1053). Easton noticed how, faced with developments in American politics and society, the risk of nuclear war and the ongoing Vietnam War, political science had nothing to say. This view led Easton to conclude that political science, “as an enterprise, has failed to anticipate the crises that are upon us” (p. 1057). This harsh judgement shows that what we can learn from COVID-19 and from the turbulent times we live in is something that political science has already encountered. Overall, there is the persistent issue of failing to take the complexity of the world seriously, to anticipate political and policy dynamics, or to consistently reflect on disciplinary identity.

All in all, this challenge requires political scientists to devote more attention to analysing the complexity of political phenomena and to focusing on more general research questions, while the interconnections between political, societal and policy variables clearly call for investigation. This means rediscovering political science as a discipline that focuses on how to build a more robust democracy. Substantially, the theoretical and analytical challenge from COVID-19, as an emblematic example of what it means to live in turbulent times, is to redefine the object of study in terms of the politics of turbulence. Instead of assuming that the usual sequence of stability-change-stability holds, a new approach ought to be adopted in which turbulence (unexpected events) is also perceived as characterizing so-called stable situations. Thus, the first lesson learnt from the COVID-19 crisis is the need to move beyond the immediacy of the pandemic itself: this crisis is not an opportunity to test theories or frameworks on specific causes or drivers of relevance when dealing with the pandemic, but a starting point from which to improve political scientists’ theoretical, conceptual and methodological capacity and readiness to analyse and anticipate the continuing critical moments that are going to drive much of twenty-first-century politics. It is very interesting that most of the scholars we interviewed share this view, which can be summarized by the words of one senior scholar specialized in international relations:

You know, medicine needs a vaccine, but we need also a vaccine in political science, that’s to say, to adapt ourselves to new challenges. I think that events are able to stimulate and trigger reflection. We started this discussion, this talk, with the ‘68 movement and I said that the ‘68 movement socialized me and determined my academic career. I think that the present pandemic is able to reshape our vision, for instance, to give priority to global security over national security. … You know, IR is constituted through the concept of national security.

1.2.2 Lack of Preparedness to Deal with What Is Urgent for Society

The other main lesson emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic is that political science should have something to say about the question of crisis and turbulence. This is the other side of the aforesaid challenge: if political science as a discipline is not ready to focus on the complexity of political phenomena, and if its research agenda does not significantly focus on real social and political problems, then there is a risk that it will become irrelevant with regard to the very issues that are urgent for the world at large.

From this point of view, political science can be said to have a considerable amount to say about crises and turbulent times. Crises are a relevant topic in many subfields of the discipline, and we can find classical works on this idea/event. International and foreign politics and policy scholars (Allison, 1971; George, 1991; Jervis, 1976; Lebow, 1981) have paid particular attention to the role of élites, bureaucrats and leaders in political development/democratization studies, whereas a crisis usually refers to the moments of disorder in national democratization (Almond et al., 1973; Linz & Stepan, 1978; Zimmermann, 1983). Public policy has long studied crises and policy failure (Bovens & ‘t Hart, 1996; McConnell, 2010a, 2010b; Hudson et al., 2019), while comparative politics has recently been attracted towards the question of the critical development of democracy in the most advanced countries (Diamond & Plattner, 2015; Przeworski, 2019). However, the problem is not that political science needs to have its say in regard to the role of crisis as a unique event or process, but that political science ought to show that in critical times, it can contribute towards anticipating future turbulence, managing actual crises and proposing solutions that will avoid the onset of future crises.

From this point of view, the lessons emerging from COVID-19 are that political science is always a step behind what society considers relevant. Overall, the experience of COVID-19 has shown that other disciplines have been considered more relevant in terms of the provision of advice or crisis management—not only hard sciences, but also certain other social sciences such as economics, statistics, management and psychology. What can we, as political scientists, truly offer in turbulent times if we do not foresee crises and critical junctures when society needs us to help find solutions? If political science cannot respond to these challenges, then it is going to remain in a permanent state of ill health.

The risk clearly emerging from the ongoing pandemic, as has been the case in other moments of crisis, is that political science does not have much to offer as things stand. To be clear on this, there is a subfield of the discipline that could provide something (namely public policy), and yet its contributions have been rather limited (due to the internal dynamics of this subfield, which are mainly oriented towards explaining policy processes rather than policy outcomes and impacts). Public policy can help design policy processes to be better prepared to manage crises or unexpected policy effects (Bali et al., 2019; Capano & Toth, 2022), but right now it appears reluctant to propose direct, clear solutions to policy problems. On the other hand, mainstream political science is focused on its explanatory mission. Political scientists search for explanations to account for how things are the way they are. It is not surprising that most of the political science literature regarding COVID-19 has focused on explaining what happened and why, by identifying different independent variables accounting for the nature of policy restrictions and the measures offering support to citizens. Thus, we have seen interesting comparative studies focusing on the role played by various factors (the political composition of governments, the type of political system, the nature of the healthcare system, the levels of systemic decentralization and trust), as drivers of the responses to the pandemic (Capano et al., 2020; Boin et al., 2020; George et al., 2020; Kettl, 2020; Van Dooren & Noordegraaf, 2020; Weible et al., 2020; Yang, 2020; Toshkov et al., 2022; Weiss & Thurbon, 2021).

Thus, we have had an outpouring of well-produced, methodologically sophisticated research that has shown political scientists’ capacity to focus partially on a “hot” issue, but at the same time, the inability of such research to make any significant contribution to solving questions regarding the nature of the crisis. Overall, while there has been interest shown by political scientists in the COVID-19 pandemic, as a topic of research (as there has also been in other social science disciplines), we have not found any significant evidence of a specific involvement of political science at any key stage of the response process. For example, if we check the list of Sage experts in the UK,Footnote 1 we find medical and hard scientists, psychologists, anthropologists, criminologists and sociologists, but no political scientists. Or, looking at the members of the Italian national scientific committee or of the similar committees established by the Italian regions, there is not one single political scientist (while other disciplines, such as law or management, are represented at regional level) (Capano et al., 2022b).

Furthermore, we have discovered that there are many topics which we have not yet investigated sufficiently as a community of scholars. For example, political scientists in the various different subfields of the discipline have not paid enough attention to the following topics: communication in times of crisis (while there is a substantial amount of research on different dimensions of political communication); the micro-dynamics of politics and policy-making in the field of health policy (while there is a substantial amount of research on the macro- and meso-politics of health policy); the politics of crisis management (which political scientists have left mostly to scholars in the fields of public administration and disaster management); the governance of uncertainty (which also has strong political dimensions and not just policy-psychological-anthropological dimensions); and the role of big data in governing political and policy processes (there has been more attention on big data as a source for sophisticated empirical research).

Without sufficient expertise on these topics, among others, political science has been caught unprepared for the pandemic. Yet, this was not unexpected. The characteristics of political science as a scientific discipline have remained the same as those pointed out by David Easton sixty years ago. Thus, by being unable to anticipate a crisis and to offer solutions within crises, political science risks being progressively marginalized.

Importantly, we are not arguing that political scientists should become futurologists. One of the mid-career scholars we interviewed clearly pointed out the pitfalls of such an idea as follows:

[W]hen they become ‘futurologists’, they usually fail and it is not good for the legitimacy or the credibility of the discipline to say: ‘this is going to happen’, and then it doesn't happen.

However, political scientists possess sufficient theoretical background, methodological expertise and empirical knowledge to do more than they have done thus far for their societies. We know that they can act as public intellectuals, as policy and political advisors, and as bearers of evidence-based policy. However, we also know that very often these functions can be constrained and limited not only by individual characteristics and by the features of an academic career and job, but also more significantly by the epistemological mission that the majority of political scientists believe in.

Thus, the lessons of COVID-19 bring us back once again to the characteristics of the discipline. We can deal with them by accepting our inherited path. However, if we believe that we are truly living in turbulent times and that this requires societies to continuously deal with uncertainty and “unexpected” problems, then we need to consider what this could mean for the future of political science.

From this point of view, the metaphor of “missing the boat” should be taken into serious consideration. Clearly, the metaphor dramatizes the problems of political science. However, the signal coming from a changing world (and the higher educational environment), together with the speed of change, deserves closer attention as regards the possible consequences they may have for the future of political science.

2 Changing the Historical Path and Making Political Science Socially Relevant

2.1 The Problem of Values, the Emphasis on Methods and the Forgotten Practical Dimension of Political Science

Our discussion of the lessons to be taken from COVID-19 leads to the never-ending, unsolved problem of the relevance of political science. This debate has been ongoing since the discipline’s foundation. The problem of relevance is not simply related to the visibility and impact of the discipline in its socioeconomic and political context but also regards its identity and mission as a discipline.

In Chap. 1, we examined the divided nature of political science and its intrinsic weakness as a discipline, while in Chap. 2 we offered some empirically based thoughts on the institutionalization of European political science. Chapter 3 gave an interpretation of the fragmentation of political science’s research mission, while also identifying a significant number of European political scientists who are socially engaged (especially in the UK and Northern Europe). In one way or another, political science, in its several European guises, maintains the original traits of the discipline. It is extremely pluralistic, divided into “tribes”, and boasts a limited degree of internal communication. These tribes are significantly influenced by their national context (the political system and the characteristics of the higher education system in which they operate). With regard to this contextual diversity, the issues of disciplinary identity and mission and of social relevance should be treated with great care: the various different national historical, institutional and cultural trajectories may significantly impact our conceptions of professional values.

That said, the basic concern remains the same everywhere, and regards the relationship between political science and the outside world. As an academic discipline, political science has its own internal logic based on the freedom of its scholars to choose what to study, and on its internal processes of reproduction. However, since its early days as an independent discipline, political science has had to ask itself the question of how it is to interact with the external world, while its objects of study are acted upon by many other actors (politicians, citizens, bureaucrats, interest groups etc.). In one way or another, political scientists have always been aware that they do not have a monopoly on their object of study. Obviously, political scientists rely on more theoretical and methodological instruments to understand and explain what politics is, and above all how it works; but very often what they do is not interesting or understandable to the other actors involved in politics. Apparently, these problematic lines of communication between science and politics are the norm, another of the never-ending problems of our times (Weiss, 1979; Cairney, 2016; Parkhurst, 2017; Capano & Malandrino, 2022). It should be considered normal for political science as an academic discipline to want to be independent of the dynamics of the real world in order to pursue its own mission and goals, as other disciplines do.

This intrinsic need of every academic discipline can be considered one of the main drivers of the evolution of political science, with its solid emphasis on its explanatory mission and the increasing stress of having to acquire methodological sophistication (as we can see not only in the increasing “quantification” of the discipline, but also in the significant attempts of the supporters of qualitative methods to make them more objective and reliable). In this process, most people have a mistaken idea of the neutrality and objectivity of social sciences, and thus of political science. It appears that the “methodification” of political science is seen as a way of guaranteeing the ideological neutrality of researchers, allowing them to perform a neutral analysis of the different dimensions of politics on the basis of their own interests as scientists (Green & Shapiro, 1994). According to this perspective, the choice of research subject depends only on the individual perception of how the project connects to the goals of the discipline, that are now refocused on finding or confirming generalizable laws of political behaviour. Hence, what truly matters is the reliability of the adopted method more than the analysed topic.

However, this way of thinking is based on a misinterpretation of the Weberian call for the neutrality of the researcher, since Weber himself was fully aware of the meaninglessness of this neutrality. As he explained, “There is no absolutely objective scientific analysis of (…) ‘social phenomena’ independent of special and ‘one-sided’ viewpoints according to which expressly or tacitly, consciously or unconsciously they are selected, analysed and organized for expository purposes” (Weber, 1904 (1949, p. 72)). And thus, “all knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from particular points of view” (Weber, 1904 (1949, p. 81)). Weber argues that what makes science objective is the method we adopt, but that values are important in selecting the object of study. Weber clearly suggested that the selection of the object of research should be based on the personal values of the researchers because “only a small portion of existing concrete reality is coloured by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us. It is significant because it reveals relationships which are important to use due to their connection with our values” (Weber, 1904 (1949, p. 76)). Weber called for the objectification of social science research and the explanation of important processes and facts. He clearly called for researchers to avoid any of the goals pursued in society, but argued instead that there should be analysis of whether and how those goals have been or could be reached. Weber wanted the normative dimension to be excluded from the scientific perspective. However, he expected that the research focus would be chosen according to a subjective perception of social relevance. This self-awareness is very often lacking in political scientists, due to a solid “scientist” perspective that is perceived to make the discipline more reliable and “scientific”.

There is more to be considered if one looks at the history of political science. In fact, there can be no doubt that the discipline has always been characterized by a normative afflatus deriving from its foundation. Originally, political science was deeply concerned with trying to understand how democracy works in practice and how it can survive over the course of time (Verba, 1960). Lasswell constantly argued that political science should focus on problem-solving in order to improve the quality of citizens’ lives (Lasswell, 1963). David Easton clearly indicated that political science ought to focus on immediate major problems (1969). These are clear normative indications coming from the American masters of political science, and they remind us what the discipline shares with other social sciences, that is their intrinsic relevance, based on their production of practical knowledge. Following John Dewey’s famous quote (“Any problem of scientific inquiry that does not grow out of actual (or ‘practical’) social conditions is factitious”, 1938, p. 499), Gerring and Yesnowitz (2006) argue strongly that “Art for art’s sake has some plausibility, and science for science’s sake might also be argued in a serious vein. But no serious person would adopt as her thesis social science for social science’s sake. Social science is science for society’s sake. These disciplines seek to provide answers to questions of pressing concern, or questions that we think should be of pressing concern, to the general public. We look to pursue issues that bear upon our obligations as citizens in a community—issues related, perhaps, to democracy, equality, justice, life-satisfaction, peace, prosperity, violence, or virtue, but in any case, issues that call forth a sense of duty, responsibility, and action” (p. 112).

Political science should be a science for society’s sake, should produce useful applicable knowledge (Sartori, 2004), should help citizens (Ostrom, 1998; Putnam, 2003; Trent, 2011) and should focus on how to pursue “a more decent politics and society under dangerous and difficult conditions” (Katznelson, 2007, p. 4).

Therefore, political science should focus on real things, and try to produce knowledge that may help improve politics and society. While this assumption dramatically problematizes the vast bulk of literature produced for the sake of political science theories, it does not solve the normative question, which remains that of addressing what good politics and good society actually are.

Let us adopt a clear, analytical approach to this matter. We have indicated that political science needs to improve its theoretical and analytical capacities in order to produce knowledge capable of helping society in turbulent times, when crises are recurrent and uncertainty is structurally high. This calls for a greater focus on real political and policy problems and not just studies that confirm existing general laws or discover new ones (activities that are always welcome in scientific discourse). The goal should be to offer reliable, or potentially workable, solutions to relevant social and political problems. However, this shift does not resolve the normative problem related to the evaluation of what is good for society and why this is so.

Thus, it is clear enough that we cannot impose one single, specific normative anchor. However, one goal remains predominant. For decades, political science has been a discipline focusing on the defence of liberal democracy. At the same time, political scientists have shown that advanced democracy has significant pitfalls and shortcomings, by producing research that shows, for example: the ignorance of voters regarding many important details of politics and policy; that élites manipulate people; that interest and business groups strongly influence political and policy processes; and that democratic procedures may defend a status quo characterized by social inequality. There is a significant amount of research in the field of political science showing that democracy does not work as expected, and this represents a profound, sometimes radical, criticism of liberal democracy. These findings are often methodologically reliable and convincing from the substantive point of view, but their constant repetition, without any proposed solution being put forward (how to correct the system, or if necessary to change it), may contribute to undermining the democratic system itself, or may further a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Is political science useful when it is not based on a clear normative statement declaring why the topic of research has been chosen, and what the implications of the research findings are (in terms of policy prescriptions)?

A similar example may be taken from the upsurge in political science literature that has been recently devoted to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Many articles have emphasized how, during the first wave of the pandemic, some Asian countries were more effective in responding to the health crisis, and how authoritarian regimes reacted faster, than consolidated democratic systems. This emphasis echoes a similar focus on the part of the mass media. Such observations could result in the delegitimizing of the existing arrangements and operations of advanced democracies, without there being any clear normative assumptions offered as to whether a democratic system is better than an authoritarian one, or whether the relationship between the individual and society in Asia is better than that witnessed in the Western world. Ultimately, these studies do not offer a coherent solution as to how to better prepare for the next pandemic.

2.2 What Kind of Knowledge Is Required to Make Political Science More Relevant?

What we have tried to do in the previous section is to show that political science should not only focus on more socially relevant topics, but also have normative foundations. What this means is that we should be concerned about the outcome of the political process. Outcomes such as better democracy, greater social equality, more sustainable forms of development and a more peaceful world are examples of our dependent variable. To choose such variables would continue to imply analysing what political scientists actually study (political actors and institutions, political regimes, policies, international relations); but by assuming a normative stance, the scholars in question would prioritize questions that are of relevance to society. This would mean as analysing, for example: whether and in what way strong party systems are drivers of better democratic quality and policy performance; whether and how institutional political arrangements convey more democratic processes and whether and in what ways policies drive greater social equality.

As Gerring and Yesnovitz (2006, p. 130) have pointed out, “This sort of endeavour directly addresses what lay citizens and policymakers wish to know, for it addresses the consequential question: what shall we do? What sort of institutions, and what sort of policies, shall we adopt? Which will advance justice and human welfare, and which will not?”

One way or another, to be socially relevant means to offer solutions to society clearly based on methodologically rigorous analysis. To focus on solutions means not only making certain normative decisions as to what is good and what is bad (for the researchers in their contextualized world), but also partly questioning the scientific mission of political science. To query the philosophical basis of the profession does not mean that political science should forget about offering explanations and retreat into the realm of political theory. To question its explanatory mandate means that when reflecting on what to study, and why, political scientists should be aware that addressing simply the workings of politics could radically reduce the weight of the discipline in the eyes of policy-makers and the general public. The consequence of a good explanation is very often a question about “what should be done” to make the actual state of things (political institutions, performance, policy outcomes, party dynamics etc.) better for the perceived interests of society. Thus, robust explanations may not often be useful or socially relevant. For example, cultural explanations of the difference in the institutional performances of different countries or diverse areas of the same country, such as those proposed by Wildavsky (1975) on budgeting, or by Putnam (1993) on the democratic performance of Italian regions, are highly fascinating and convincing from a pure scientific perspective. However, can they offer a response to the question “what should be done?” The answer may be that in order to change cultures and civic attitudes, several complex measures would need to be implemented. The vast body of literature on public policy failure is another example. Important studies have been produced regarding how policy failure is the result of variables such as interests (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Coleman, 1990; Niskanen, 1971; Gans-Morse et al., 2014), lock-in effects and path dependence (Pierson, 1993, 2000; Torfing, 2009), ideological decisions (Feldman, 2018; Hoppe, 2018; Taylor, 2021), cognitive biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 2015) and clientelism and corruption (Dahlström et al., 2013; Brancati, 2014; Manor, 2013). However, the explanations such studies offer, which very often are highly convincing in virtue of a sophisticated research design, do not offer an answer to the question of what can be done to achieve the desired levels of policy performance.

Obviously, we know that there are political science subfields that can generate usable knowledge for improving public policy (Cairney, 2015, 2016), as well as the institutional arrangements of political systems (Sartori, 1994). However, such cases tend to be the exception rather than the rule. This of course lessens the social relevance of the discipline.

So, what can be done, besides adopting a more normative-driven position on research topics? There are no simple answers to this question, but what Stoker (2013) has proposed looks promising, and is likely to be within the capacity of political scientists. Stoker asks researchers to adopt a solution-seeking approach when carrying out political science research, which means addressing the question of a design perspective in politics. This perspective, inspired by Herbert Simon, is based on the following three steps:

  1. 1.

    A reliable state of the art on the chosen topic of research, thanks to which it is possible to assess what seems to work and how;

  2. 2.

    A “normative” assessment of the state of the art, and of the configuration of research pursuits;

  3. 3.

    Proceeding on the basis of a rule of thumb, by assuming that the chosen theoretical line is valid and ignoring any alternative lines.

This perspective could be adopted in many of political science’s subfields, also by capitalizing on the methodological tools offered by behavioural political science.

Overall, what is suggested here is not that the explanatory mission of political science be abandoned, but rather a reconsideration of that mission as the necessary basis for a more solution-oriented research approach.

3 Engagement as a Problem of Recognizability: Towards a New Politics of Political Science Relevance

Political science needs to be less timid in its normative selection of research topics, and more active in seeking solutions for relevant problems. In fact, while these changes, if pursued, would increase the objective relevance of political science, they cannot guarantee public acknowledgement of the discipline’s relevance. It is a well-known fact that the existence of a large amount of empirical evidence regarding different policies does not mean that policy-makers are guaranteed to take that evidence into serious consideration. Clearly, one fundamental prerequisite for bringing evidence-based knowledge to the table is the capability and opportunities that scholars have to dialogue with policy-makers and to gain social relevance. However, this alone would not in itself be enough. Political science needs to be more proactive in, and more engaged with, the real world.

In several countries, there is structural pressure on all social sciences to be more engaged with society, as shown by the rise of the so-called third mission (after teaching and research) in the higher education system, and through the specific policy instruments (assessment of research and targeted funding) that governments have introduced to encourage social scientists to be more engaged with socially relevant problems and with the impact that their work has (Benneworth, 2007; Pinheiro et al., 2012; Papadimitroum & Boboc, 2021). The advent of the third mission/public engagement era has offered political scientists the opportunity to reflect on who they really are, what they can do and to what extent their discipline is relevant for society. A flourishing literature on this topic has revamped the discussion characterizing all major historical developments in political science (see, e.g., Lasswell, 1971, Lindblom, 1997, and Shapiro, 2005).

Political science is not completely unfit to meet this challenge, since it has accumulated a substantial quantity of knowledge which may be considered a sound basis for the development of a strategy of public engagement, and of contributing more effectively to designated socially relevant goals. Again, there are recurrent themes that have been analysed and discussed in the recent literature (Flinders, 2013; Flinders & John, 2013; Stoker et al., 2015; Flinders, 2018; Flinders & Pal, 2020).

So to sum up, the major challenges facing political science at present are: the problem of relevance; the form of its engagement; and the public’s perception of the discipline’s capacity to handle external challenges.

Matthew Flinders has argued that political science is not irrelevant, but that political scientists have not been sufficiently capable of promoting and communicating the social value and benefit of the discipline in an accessible manner. We believe that this claim is partly true, in the sense that political scientists’ poor communicative capacities are evident, and it is arguable whether political science produces only socially relevant knowledge, as mentioned in the previous section. The crucial point, namely that political science has failed to convey its mission to the public, however, needs to be examined more closely. In fact, the problem of communication not only regards political scientists’ incapacity or lack of desire to be effectively engaged, but should also be considered one aspect of the absence of public recognition of what political science actually is. This point is of crucial importance: due to the complex process of institutionalization, and to the sizable numbers of academically oriented political scientists, there are few countries where political science is socially recognizable in a clear way. Not only do ordinary citizens struggle to recognize what political science is, but very often the media also have a limited understanding of the specificity of the discipline. This creates a vicious cycle that can structurally hinder political science’s public visibility, and can consequently diminish the chance of scholars being recognized as political scientists when conveying their knowledge to the public.

There is still disagreement over whether political scientists should be directly involved in defending certain political values (such as democracy), or whether they should only offer reliable, objective knowledge in public arenas (Flinders & Pal, 2020). In this regard, we believe that a division among political scientists on this question is unsustainable, as we have argued in the previous section: a professional ethic should be normatively based on what is relevant for the discipline. By standing “on the shoulders of giants”, we think that what matters for the engagement of political science is its capacity to develop imagination (according to Merton) or creativity (according to Lasswell) with regard to its reasoning in fundamental terms about present and future social and political problems.

As far as the third point is concerned, that of how to improve the discipline’s capacity to gain a more relevant social role (in terms of its recognizability and impact), there have been many proposed solutions, going back to Harold Lasswell and David Easton half a century ago, and much more recently by Matthew Flinders.

What is needed is a new politics of political science that is to be pursued by the political science community, both nationally and internationally, and by individual political scientists. This new politics should be based on selected pillars regarding both the internal dynamics and the external dimension of the discipline. These pillars concern what political scientists can themselves do, although we are perfectly aware that there are certain aspects of the profession that are beyond their control (such as the rules and practices of recruitment and career development within the university system).

From the internal point of view, two key points need to be emphasized here. The first is that political science should be taught more effectively at bachelor’s and master’s degree levels. It is at university that the discipline is exposed to a substantial number of people. It is important that the students concerned, who are both citizens and also prospective workers, can understand all of the potentialities of the discipline in terms not only of how policy works, but also of how it could work based on our existing knowledge. Secondly, at PhD level there is a need not only to improve the communication skills of graduates but also to make them aware that political science is a discipline that focuses on solving collective problems, and not only on explaining how politics works. This also implies cultivating their creativity and their capacity to think in unorthodox ways. PhD programmes should not replicate the existing format of the discipline but should prepare for its future (as specified below).

Regarding the relationship with the outside world, we would agree with two key points made by Flinders (2018). The first point is that political scientists should stop victimizing themselves, as there is nothing they can do to make their research socially visible and potentially relevant. Professional associations have the crucial responsibility for promoting common activities among their members so as to increase their knowledge of public engagement, and they should also be capable of interacting, at the national level, with potential funders and with key stakeholders in politics and policy, in order to divulge political science-produced knowledge. Secondly, political scientists, helped by their professional associations, need to develop a concrete strategy enabling them to embed themselves in external governmental and nongovernmental bodies offering positions for social scientists (such as national assessment agencies and governmental advisory bodies). In other words, this highly political element probably represents the main task of professional associations. Political scientists can only achieve this through the professional associations’ coordinating operations. The latter’s responsibility in this regard is undeniable, and should be as important as their other main undertakings (the organization of conferences, scientific meetings and summer schools; the management of certain publications; and the distribution of academic news of importance to their members).

Taking on these various tasks is a highly ambitious project. However, without a strong commitment to developing a political line, the discipline will continue to suffer from the same old problems, namely those of its relevance, engagement and, above all, recognizability, and it is all the more important that they do so now, in these turbulent times.

4 Engaged Eclecticism and Critical Thinking: Two Cornerstones of Political Science’s Future?

4.1 The New Aeneas-Type Political Scientist: Is it Time to Act?

Having explored the question of how the recent advent of turbulent times has pointed once again to political science’s persistent weaknesses and its key, it is now time to look ahead and propose a way of ensuring that European political scientists play a more relevant social role as a community, and thus avoid “missing the boat”. Improvement means developing and consolidating by capitalizing on the positive aspect of the discipline’s fragmentation (i.e. its theoretical methodological pluralism), while mitigating the negative aspect (the lack of communication among the different subfields and outlooks). At the same time, there is a need to both work in and for society, and to endeavour to consolidate the discipline in the academic world in both institutional and scientific terms.

It is time that political scientists paid more attention to the patterns of what we have called the new “Aeneas-like” type of political scientist. This would entail a strong commitment to a developmental goal for the discipline, thus avoiding political science’s subjection to the Sisyphus syndrome. At the same time, political scientists need to consider the dangers of perceiving old methodological approaches as new disciplinary heroes, including too personal an approach—the model of Achilles—or even an exclusive focus on the collective mission of the community—the model of Odysseus.

The time has come to abandon endless introspection, to stop bewailing never-ending fatigue, and to abandon the fatalism that is a feature of so many political scientists. The worlds of academia and of society as a whole are complex and need proactive intervention. Obviously, political science is characterized by differing levels of institutionalization, depending on national and institutional legacies, but this does not mean that nothing can be done to change its future direction or to improve its current situation. Goals can be met, but first we need to realize that indulgence in a Sisyphean approach characterized by repetitive introspection is bound to replicate those same conditions that make political science much weaker than other academic disciplines when applied to the real world. This pattern of behaviour always lays the blame on other things (other disciplines, contextual factors, the ignorance and lack of interest of society and students) for the perceived limited relevance of political science not only as an academic discipline, but also as a resource for social well-being and improvement. In the real world, too often we see that this is the model conveyed to new generations.

Those modelling research in the spirit of Odysseus and Achilles remain important examples for the academic development and public visibility of the discipline. However, if such individual behaviour is not included in a comprehensive, collective strategy, then it risks leaving no legacy or even the wrong one. It is widely acknowledged that in academic organizations, what has been built up by an enterprising individual can be quickly undone after he or she leaves the position or stops behaving in that way. Institution builders are important, but their capacity to impact reality cannot last in the medium-to-long term if they are not part of a collective trend. There are several Odysseus-type political scientists who focus on mentoring, on teaching and training excellent PhD students, and on making the reproduction of political science more robust. However, they may suddenly lose their touch (and immediately be impacted by the Sisyphus syndrome) when academic consolidation, disciplinary visibility and personal recognition fail.

Regarding the Achilles-type of scholar, it is undoubtedly important to see that certain political scientists are capable of emerging as highly reputed scholars leading their field, and eventually establishing themselves as public intellectuals impacting public debate. However, very often these are personal success stories that do not really improve the public’s perception of political science, for the following reasons: very often this individual success does not institutionalize specific results at the disciplinary level and does not ensure due attention to the reproduction of the discipline (very often Achilles-type scholars are not very effective or interested in mentoring or in the institutional impact of their work); and very often the public does not pay due attention to the disciplinary affiliation of a person, but to what he or she says, without grasping the differences between the various academic disciplines.

University departments around Europe have seen a few political scientists acting in the Odysseus or Achilles role, and their genuine impact on furthering the visibility of political science is clearly important. However, their contributions do not seem sufficient to guarantee the discipline’s capacity to deal with the persistently turbulent times in which we live. To be clear, we are not claiming that these patterns of behaviour are not of consequence. It is important to have institutional builders as well as scholars who pursue greater scientific recognition and eventually significant public visibility. However, such behaviour lacks overall perspective. They tend to be focused on individual needs, whereas an interest in, and understanding of, the future of the discipline is lacking.

For this reason, we suggest that the pattern of behaviour that is pivotal to the transformation of European political scientists is that of the Aeneas type, that is, a pattern of behaviour capable of considering the collective good of the discipline. The Aeneas model does not imply theoretical or methodological neutrality—quite the opposite! The Aeneas type has his or her own research agenda, has made specific theoretical and methodological choices and thus has individual professional interests to pursue. However, he or she has a clear idea of what the discipline’s collective interest is and feels an obligation to pursue the common good that is greater, and more important, than mere personal professional interests. Aeneas types are capable of prioritizing what is important for the discipline at any specific moment: he or she is ready to serve the institutional development of political science in his or her department or university when necessary, while understanding when and how to try to be more socially engaged. Aeneas types will fight to prove that their chosen theoretical approach is fruitful, but will also openly recognize its limitations and weaknesses, and acknowledge that other approaches can be just as (or more) promising. They will work to create connections and communication among the different schools of thought in their subfields or among the different branches of the discipline. Overall, the Aeneas-type pattern of behaviour is characterized by a strong commitment and devotion to the collective wealth of the discipline, and is even capable of eclecticism in action and continuous critical thinking.

Thus, to have more Aeneas-type younger political scientists, we need to convey the importance of a common view of what the discipline and the common good to be served are. These political scientists should be taught how to improve their critical thinking capacities and to consider eclecticism as the best approach to political science. Preserving the systemic nature of a soft, semi-fragmented discipline is crucial not only in order to ensure openness and permeability among the discipline’s subfields, but also to expand external boundaries. The brief discussion of the post-COVID-19 scenario set out here clearly shows that an adequate level of self-consciousness is necessary if we are to avoid a historical phase of predominance of the STEM disciplines over SSH.

4.2 Eclecticism and Critical Thinking: The Way Forward to Ensure a Solid, Promising Future for Europe’s Political Scientists

In this chapter we have been discussing the future of the discipline, and in the previous section we proposed a few “political” guidelines to try and make the discipline more relevant; and we concluded that the pattern of behaviour best suited to ensuring the efficacy of political science, both as an academic discipline and as a constant contributor to societal development, is that of our Aeneas ideal-type. Notably, these suggestions imply a significant reconsideration of who we are, what we do and above all, how we reproduce the discipline. They refer to the way in which we teach political science and how we are to train the new generation of political scientists.

We believe that the way to teach political science to the next generations of political scientists (whether they work in academia or outside of that world) should be based on two methods, which also constitute training goals: critical thinking and eclecticism.

Critical thinking is a mantra of our times, and is often used in a general fashion, albeit rhetorically. The goal of teaching critical thinking in political science has been mainly dealt with at bachelor’s and master’s degree levels (Olsen & Statham, 2005; Collins et al., 2012; Berdahl et al., 2021). This is probably a consequence of the biased belief that PhD students have already been educated to think critically, such that this aspect of their education is underestimated and substantially forgotten. Generally speaking, when PhD students are trained (for those on a genuinely structured PhD programme) they are required to learn methods and theories, very often by focusing on the specific methods and theories pertaining to their research ideas and the theoretical tradition of the PhD programme. We should not forget those PhD students who are not truly trained as such, because they are part of a specifically funded research programme (as is very common now in Europe). So, critical thinking is not really part of the contemporary training schedule of political science PhD students.

More critical thinking needs to be embedded in the training of the political scientist of the future. In proposing this, we consider critical thinking in context, that is, as part of the process of construction of political scientists. Thus, if critical thinking can be defined as the “intentional application of rational, higher order thinking skills such as analysis, synthesis, problem recognition and problem solving, inference, and evaluation” (Angelo, 1995, pp. 6–7), we believe that its application at the highest levels, such as the definitive training of future political scientists, should be characterized as follows:

  1. 1.

    Through the provision of dedicated courses (separate from those already provided at master’s degree level) on specific aspects of the discipline—including policy evaluation, political behaviour, social movements, security studies, methods for social data scientists and data journalism, just to name a few relevant subjects—that continue to be neglected in several European higher education systems.

  2. 2.

    By making attendance of courses in the classics of the discipline compulsory. We know that we live in a time of specialization, but it cannot be denied that critical thinking may only be nurtured through a profound knowledge of the classics. Is it really possible to become a critically skilled political scientist without knowing the works of Lasswell, Easton, Sartori, Downs, Arrow, Wildavsky, Lindblom, Rokkan, Duverger, Almond and the other masters of the discipline? “On the shoulders of giants” is a motto that should inspire the first terms of any PhD programme. Thanks to this common training, it is possible to make future generations of political scientists aware that we belong to a lengthy tradition that has allowed the discipline to acquire intellectual and theoretical autonomy. A critical reading of the classics will increase the students’ awareness that doing political science is not a neutral activity free of values and self-referential. It will show them that political science is about doing science for society.

  3. 3.

    By developing specific training activities that show students how to make the discipline relevant for society, that is, how to divulge research findings in a way that is understandable to those outside of academia.

  4. 4.

    By developing specific training courses on how to teach political science in a more appealing way. Too often, younger scholars start teaching without any kind of preparation for this, and thus they tend to replicate the ways they themselves were taught. This is not fruitful. Training political scientists means developing not only capable researchers and professionals, but also teachers capable of conveying their knowledge in the most appropriate and effective way for the type of audience.

  5. 5.

    By consolidating specialized tracks for those who are more interested in becoming a professional political scientist (in the political-administrative system, in the media or in the private sector) than in becoming a researcher. This is another aspect that, according to our data, is significantly underestimated in several European countries. Our data and interviews show that the post-pandemic scenario for political scientists cannot be seen as one of adaptation. A set of new “portfolios” of skills and prospective professional competencies—from data journalism to international cooperation, and from strategic communication to policy advising—is strongly required throughout Europe, particularly in those countries where institutionalization has been limited.

Eclecticism can be a negative word when applied to social (political) scientists, as it tends to refer to their never-ending divisions into tribes, paradigms and schools of thought. However, we firmly believe that the complex world of political science, and its training of future generations, must be considered in a different, positive, constructive way.

Teaching eclecticism to students of political science has two main aims. The first is to teach them that every single theory is simply a specific perspective with which to order, analyse and explain a political phenomenon; it is not an unyielding truth. It is simply a way of observing. This means that if the focus of political science is on understanding and proposing a solution for the most demanding societal and political problems, then what matters is to find a highly reliable explanation and/or a convincing or potentially highly effective solution. On this point, Hirschman’s point should never be forgotten: the paradigm-focused social sciences focus their analytical attention exclusively on certain forces (drivers, mechanisms, independent variables) whilst ignoring others, thus running a high risk of committing “a particularly high degree of error” (Hischmann, 1970, p. 343). Thus, to be aware of this means that future political scientists, although they are bound to specialize in a specific research topic, should be capable of managing the basics of the most relevant theories. This would allow them, for example, to better understand whether and how an explanation can be given for a specific phenomenon by adopting one perspective or another, or better, by designing a specific theoretical framework blending a number of different theories. The same analytical eclecticism could be very useful when the focus of research is on finding a tailored solution for highly relevant social problems. Let it be clear here that we are not suggesting that all future political scientists should adopt what has been defined as “analytic eclecticism” (Sil & Katzenstein, 2010), but rather that they should be capable of doing so when this proves necessary or useful.

Furthermore, a direct consequence of this training in eclecticism will be to broaden the minds of young scholars by not only enabling them to know how many ways there are of ordering a given political reality, but also by empowering them to decide their research agenda in a more open-minded, and thus potentially creative and innovative, way.

The second aspect of eclecticism regards the different roles that political scientists can play in academic institutions. Usually, this is something that is learned through individual training (the relationship between the supervisor and the supervisee) or on the job (according to the practices of the institution in question). However, we should endeavour to offer our PhD students different possible roles. We should explain to them that Sisyphean defeatism is always just around the corner, and how they may avoid disciplinary solipsism. Similarly, we should discourage them from taking Achilles as a model, even if every young scholar aspires to becoming highly reputed and publicly recognized. We should teach them that institutional roles in academic and research organizations are part of the job, and thus that some institutional experience is useful and is part of the academic profession: while there is a risk of losing some students attracted by the Odyssean path, this does not mean that institutional service should be avoided, but only considered in the proper dose. We should teach them that there is a community of political scientists to serve, together with the future of the discipline, and thus the Aeneas-type path may constitute added value in terms of their personal performance as political scientists.

We should therefore also prepare future political scientists to be professionally eclectic and versatile with regard to the nature of their job. They should be capable of operating as researchers and teachers, but also as advisors and public intellectuals involved in daily debate and engaging with the media.

5 Conclusion: A European Political Science for the Future

5.1 Eclectic but Committed: Critical but Engaged

While we are living in turbulent times, Europe appears to be one of the critical areas of the world where potential economic failure, cultural decline and political uncertainty may feasibly arise. In the last 15 years, Europe has had to deal with the effects of a major financial crisis, a pandemic and now a war. The future looks gloomy, and the social and political achievements of the last century are clearly at risk. The backlash to this chain of events is before our very eyes: increasing levels of populism in many countries, serious difficulties in identifying core values, struggles to guide future generations, deadlocked decision-making and increasing inequality. What we are witnessing is the decline of a system that up until now has proven capable of ensuring democracy, wealth and rights to Europe’s citizens. This is a dramatic challenge that the people of Europe are now facing, and European political science cannot remain unaffected by it.

We should be ambitious and courageous enough to overcome our historical limitations and weaknesses. We should work together to help deal with the extraordinary socioeconomic and political challenges that the continent is facing. Thus, we need to question our legacies and try to establish a unified research agenda together with a shared approach to training future generations of political scientists.

As we have been suggesting in this chapter, this agenda should be characterized by a greater focus on socially relevant problems rather than on theoretical problems, and on a solution-seeking rather than an explanatory approach. We need to capitalize on our intellectual pluralism so as to establish an integrated research agenda capable of offering multifaceted analysis and solutions for the same societal challenges. For example, many political scientists have designed and implemented sophisticated research agendas regarding the rise of populism and its drivers and consequences. Why do these agendas not shift towards research designs focused on finding feasible ways of slowing down or changing this phenomenon? Is it challenging? Yes it is. Is it risky? Yes it is. However, as we have tried to show in this book, political science necessarily needs a practical side as well. We may like or dislike it, but without it the practice of political science loses all relevance.

This could be done by encouraging eclecticism and critical thinking not only as praxes for those already working as political scientists, but also, and above all, as part of the training of the new generations of scholars. By increasing eclecticism, we raise the effectiveness of our commitment to problem-solving; reinforcing critical thinking helps political scientists be socially engaged in a highly innovative and creative way.

5.2 High, but Realistic, Expectations

In the previous section we mentioned two practices that in our opinion would significantly redefine the role of the political scientist and the potential relevance of the discipline. What we would like to examine, in order to complete our modest normative argument, is the degree of change we can expect from these responses which we hope will save European political science from impending oblivion.

This last matter looks a particularly difficult one. In our attempt to consider the multidimensional nature of the process of professionalization, we have to take randomness and permanent uncertainty into consideration. Our data clearly show that the different dimensions we have analysed—institutionalization, internationalization, visibility, social impact and applicability—display extremely irregular trends across European countries and across the different segments of political science communities (above all, generational cohorts and sub-disciplinary groups). From this point of view, what we have labelled the internal borders of political science look even more critical than its external ones. After all, the existing cultural and dimensional subordination to other academic disciplines has not prevented the community of political scientists from playing certain important roles in several European countries to date. On the contrary, a total atomization of this body of scholars would probably determine its marginalization, in a changing context dominated by a galaxy of new futurologists, including all kinds of data scientists and STEM experts.

Control over fragmentation cannot be exercised without a strong commitment towards a common definition of political science’s disciplinary mission, together with a strong sense of solidarity among political scientists across Europe. By this we do not mean simply financial or economic solidarity: the reduction of cultural divides and the creation of space for a new solid discipline will depend above all on the mutual recognition of the characteristics and needs of other nations’ political science communities. Mobility rates will need to go back to pre-pandemic levels; and the divisions between North and South, West and East, must be bridged. The aforementioned possible strategies aimed at raising levels of critical thinking and eclecticism should be pursued all around Europe, from the major metropolitan universities to the more peripheral ones. From the largest European departments of political science to the single one-scholar units contained within generic social science faculties. The process of cultural modernization aimed not only at the smooth adaptation of traditional (and local) styles of academic life, but also at the transformation of crises into opportunities, should be shared among generations and sub-disciplinary groups. In the end, we can argue that it is time for European political scientists to overcome their national and local legacies and idiosyncrasies, to reason as a continental community, and to act accordingly.

Finally, after checking the state of the borders of political science and after analysing the individual characteristics of political scientists, in this volume we have considered the evolution of their attitudes and values. The picture we have obtained is a rather mixed one. While on the one hand we have found plenty of enthusiasm and curiosity about the prospective reconsolidation of the discipline, on the other hand several indicators reveal the persistence of opportunistic behaviour, scarce attention paid to the discipline’s collective mission, significant free riding and limited awareness of and interest in civic engagement and social impact as goals to be achieved. In particular, the post-pandemic scenario is not fully appreciated as an opportunity, since many scholars choose a modest degree of adaptation and believe there is little to learn and little need to invest in such an opportunity.

We would argue that a new optimistic, enthusiastic approach to the daily lives of political scientists and to the applicability of their knowledge represents the ultimate test for the coming years. We cannot expect the next generation of scholars to adopt a positive approach if we do not share the aforementioned optimism and vision. Such optimism must of course be measured, as we are fully aware of the limited room for revolutionary change. This will necessarily be a very limited, short-term vision, since the resources available for such investment remain scarce. However, it is going to be important to set a good example by combining realistic, yet high expectations. After all, this is the very reason why we have chosen the figure of Aeneas as the most appropriate mythical hero to propose to the new generations of scholars. The modern Aeneas acts differently from Odysseus—who focuses on the virtue of Metis that is, pure cleverness and cunning—by pursuing the general interest without leaving any tangible legacies or learning processes. Aeneas may also be distinguished from those, like Achilles, who exhibit Hubris in their pursuit of individual glory while paying no attention to the collective mission. Conversely, Aeneas’ virtue is Piety. What this ultimately means is the subordination of any legitimate individual effort to a sense of duty and to the “design of the Gods”. For modern political scientists, the “Gods” are the classical scholars with their too often forgotten commitment to social change and democracy; and their purpose is to pay homage to democratic society and to strive to make it increasingly aware and mature. Even when this means travelling a considerable amount, facing difficult tasks and sacrificing part of one’s own life to the collective mission.