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Part of the book series: Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences ((WHPS,volume 18))

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Abstract

 In this chapter, Marjorie Glicksman argues that the validity of philosophical positions is relative to philosophical methodology.

Marjorie Glicksman: First published in 1937 in The Philosophical Review, 46(6), 649–656.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers, 5.77 ff.

  2. 2.

    Cf. The Quest for Certainty (New York, 1929), Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, 1920), etc. Professor Lewis’s theory of alternative logics (“Alternative Systems of Logic,” Monist, 1932 (Vol. 42), pp. 481 ff.) seems to involve a similar relativism. Cf. also Mind and the World Order (New York, 1929), p. 23. Even a metaphysician as “absolutist” in scope and speculative daring as Professor Whitehead holds “that the true method of philosophical construction is to frame a scheme of ideas, the best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme” (Process and Reality, New York, 1929, p. x). It is the psychological attitude back of the phrase ‘the best that one can’ to which I refer as the relativistic premise characteristic of contemporary philosophies.

  3. 3.

    Perhaps the assertion of my thesis involves the vicious circle fallacy; perhaps a relativistic premise cannot be applied to the system of which it is a premise. But since such application does often seem to be intended, I should like, tentatively at least, to indicate the result of taking this intention seriously.

  4. 4.

    Cf. General Theory of Value (New York, 1926).

  5. 5.

    New York, 1912, pp. 99 ff.

  6. 6.

    C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order, 10.

  7. 7.

    Reason and Nature (New York, 1931), 302.

  8. 8.

    Critique of Pure Reason, A 87, B 119.

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Glicksman, M., Edited by., Katzav, J., Vaesen, K. (2023). Relativism and Philosophic Methods. In: Katzav, J., Vaesen, K., Rogers, D. (eds) Knowledge, Mind and Reality: An Introduction by Early Twentieth-Century American Women Philosophers. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24437-7_6

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