Abstract
In this article, Ellen Bliss Talbot explores the free will/determinism debate through an examination of the notions of individual unity, uniqueness, and self-sufficiency.
Ellen Bliss Talbot: Originally published in 1909 in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 18, No. 6, pp. 600–614
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Notes
- 1.
The purpose of this paper limits us to the ordinary notion of individuality. Such an analysis as Professor Royce, e.g., attempts in his Supplementary Essay to The Conception of God (p. 135ff.) is not called for. I wish simply to show that human individuality, in the sense in which we ordinarily take it, is not in any way endangered by the denial of real alternatives in men’s choices. This limitation of the problem seems justifiable because the protests against such denial are commonly made from the point of view of the ordinary conception.
- 2.
It is true, of course, that ‘quantitative’ and ‘qualitative’ are not wholly unrelated terms. As Hegel has shown, differences in degree often pass over, by almost imperceptible stages, into qualitative differences. But the general distinction between qualitative and quantitative uniqueness is clear, and of this distinction my statement holds.
- 3.
That the human being is, in some sense, part of a whole every one except the mythological solipsist will, I suppose, admit. The most thorough-going pluralist will hardly carry his doctrine of the independence of the individual to the point of denying this.
- 4.
I say ‘if at all’ because, while it seems clear that the whole of reality has self-sufficiency and a certain kind of uniqueness, its possession of any high degree of unity is often questioned.
- 5.
Though some who call themselves ‘indeterminists’ might dissent, I think that we are justified in saying that this is the vital point in the present-day discussion of ‘freedom’. And at least three prominent champions of ‘freedom’ seem so to regard it. Cf. James, “The Will to Believe and other Essays” (1897), p. 150ff.; Schiller, “Studies in Humanism” (1907), p. 392ff.; Perry, “Freedom as Practical Postulate,” International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XIII, pp. 42, 46, 51.
- 6.
‘Freedom,’ of course, is still more misleading. Professor James, with his humorous reference to “the word-grabbing game” (op. cit., pp. 149, 179), has called attention to the fact that determinists and indeterminists alike have an ardent affection for the term and are equally anxious to be known as believers in ‘freedom.’ The reason for this is not far to seek. The word has so many associations with what we hold highest and dearest,—with political liberty, with intellectual and social opportunity,—that the desire is by no means unnatural.
- 7.
To this, the believer in real alternatives might raise the objection that it asserts a greater unity in human nature than actually exists. A character that is completely self-consistent and coherent, he might urge, could act, under given circumstances, in only one way. But for any being that lacks this perfect coherence there may be, in many cases, real alternatives. (Cf. Schiller, op. cit., p. 399ff.) My reply to this would run somewhat as follows. There is, of course, a sense in which one might say that two quite different acts are possible for the ordinary man. His personality is not perfectly harmonious; there are in him opposed tendencies, conflicting desires. Hence, you may say that, taking the man as a whole,—a whole of many selves,—each of the opposed courses of action appeals to, something in him and is possible for him. But in the moment of decision, the self which chooses is fairly coherent. It is not many selves; for so, there could be no choice. One of the many selves chooses. And if there is any bond of union between the self and its acts, this choosing self could not find its expression in either one of two directly opposed courses, but only in one.
- 8.
“Logic,” Bk. VI, Chap. II, § 2.
- 9.
No one has better voiced this feeling than Mr. Bradley, in his essay on “The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility” (Ethical Studies, Essay I). See particularly pp. 16, 18 f.
- 10.
Many determinists, indeed, have assumed that it is. And this is one reason why I have not used the word ‘determinism,’ in the present paper, to designate the position which I am defending.
- 11.
I say ‘theoretical’ because we all admit that our actual predictions of conduct are, at best, only highly probable.
- 12.
‘Every element of reality,’ I have said. But of course all that is needed for the purposes of the argument is what immediately follows, that every human being and every real choice is unique.
- 13.
Humanly speaking, i.e. What a divine intelligence could or could not do, I hardly feel qualified to suggest. It seems safe to say, however, that no mind could exactly foretell my future save one,—if such a one be possible,—to whose gaze the future is open just as the present is to ours. And of such an intelligence it would hardly be accurate to say that it foretells.
- 14.
Those philosophers who say that it must, might well be asked to try to discover whether, in point of fact, it does.
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Talbot, E.B., Edited by., Katzav, J., Rogers, D. (2023). Individuality and Freedom. In: Katzav, J., Vaesen, K., Rogers, D. (eds) Knowledge, Mind and Reality: An Introduction by Early Twentieth-Century American Women Philosophers. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24437-7_27
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