Long-term Future Expectations and Collective Hope

Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to extend and explore the definition of collective hope as the shared desire for a better future not only for oneself, but for the entire social community, the belief that a better future for all is possible but not necessarily guaranteed or even likely, and the trust in the human capacity to cooperate and support each other towards the realization of a better world despite current struggles and challenges. Conceptually we chose an interdisciplinary approach, integrating insights from Positive Psychology, Futures Studies, and Pragmatic Hope Philosophy. After introducing the concept of collective hope we present the nature and role of images of the future in terms of probable, possible and desired future trends and scenarios. Based on data collected with the Hope Barometer across 12 countries in November 2019 (N = 10,665), we evaluated people’s long-term future expectations regarding the general quality of life, social trends and expected as well as wished-for future scenarios. We then related these expectations to perceived hope and social well-being. Our results suggest that long-term social expectations are significantly more pessimistic in European than in non-European countries and that personal hope levels are significantly higher in countries outside Europe. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of participants in this study preferred a social-sustainable over an individualist-competitive future scenario. Whereas future prospects had a significant effect on hope and (social) well-being, desirable images of the future hardly displayed an effect. Our findings highlight the importance of encouraging people to develop new positive pictures of the future which could foster hope, belief, and trust in a flourishing and sustainable world and to get engaged in its realization.

4.1 Introduction

Until now, research fields in psychology dedicated to future and prospective thinking (Oettingen, 2012; Baumeister et al., 2018; Seligman et al., 2016), positive and negative future expectations (Scheier & Carver, 1987; Seligman, 1990) and hope (Snyder, 1994; Scioli et al., 2011) have primarily been focused on personal goals. In this chapter, we will go beyond personal hopes of the individual and address collective social expectations and hopes in a global context. Our focus of analysis will be the wider societal future trends and scenarios as perceived by people in different countries and their impact on perceived hope (Krafft et al., 2019) as well as on personal and social well-being (Keyes, 2014). For this purpose, we followed an interdisciplinary approach, integrating Positive Psychology, the humanistic discipline of Futures Studies and the philosophy of collective hope as theoretical foundations guiding our empirical research. Accordingly, the current chapter broadens the scope of analysis as recommended by authors like Lomas et al. (2021), Wissing (2018, 2022), and Marujo and Neto (2014), incorporating an interdisciplinary perspective, highlighting the importance of social processes, and taking into account the cultural context shaping hope and well-being.

4.2 Theoretical Background

4.2.1 Collective Hope

Conceptually, we define hope as a wish or desire, whose fulfilment is believed to be possible (although not necessarily probable), as well as the trust in the availability of personal, social, or other resources for realizing this wish. Collective hope represents a particular form of hope, namely shared desires for a better world (Braithwaite, 2004; Kleist & Jansen, 2016; McGeer, 2004; Shade, 2019; Stahl, 2019; Stitzlein, 2019). This kind of social hope refers to common wishes and beliefs that people share with others for the realization of certain values and dreams of a community (Blöser & Stahl, 2019). Collective hope connects people to other people, with whom they build a community with common interests and goals (Stahl, 2019). From this larger social perspective, collective hope is therefore the wish or desire for a better future, the belief in the possibility (although not likelihood) that a better future for a community of people might be possible, and the trust in some collective resources to positively deal with current problems and challenges (such as environmental degradation).

Therefore, collective hope begins with shared visions for a better future of society (Braithwaite, 2004; Rorty, 2002). Instead of focusing only on individual goals, people engage in a larger community to pursue overarching social, environmental and economic goals. At the core of collective hope is an interest in shaping the world in a positive way so that all members of a community can live better.

According to Rorty (1998), the value of collective hope lies not just in the hope of a better future, but also in the belief that people can shape a better future together through collective goals and efforts. This basic belief can also be formulated as: We can take the current problems of humanity in our hands and change something together. Social oriented hope is filled with a belief in future possibilities and a trust in the powers of collective determination and action. An essential question, therefore, is: What kind of common wishes and desires people do hold for the future and what do they believe in? In order to change things together, a community needs specific ideals. According to Rorty (1999), we must dream the future. Positive pictures of the future aim to mobilize a greater number of people to realize them. The belief in the possibilities of the dreamed vision lies not in the evidence, but in the inspirational quality of the vision itself. Common visions offer people an image of an ideal future to work for (Gutiérrez, 2001). These ideals serve to broaden individual perspectives and widen personal horizons. The more conscious these ideals are, the more they can motivate individuals to act and work together.

4.2.2 Futures Studies and Images of the Future

The discipline that deals with prospective thinking by systematically exploring and creating alternative images of the future of society is called Futures Studies. The main purpose of Futures Studies, as Bell (1996, 2009) defines it, is to maintain or improve the welfare of humankind and the life-sustaining capacities of the Earth itself. Whereas Positive Psychology is primarily concerned with the good life and the flourishing of the individual, families and institutions, the scope of Futures Studies is about the nature of the good society and the flourishing of the entire world including the natural environment as well as the well-being of future generations (Bell, 1997, 2004). Both Positive Psychology and Futures Studies aim to contribute to human betterment and to make the world a better place in which to live. Taking the societal perspective, Futures Studies deals with long-term trends and scenarios, with overarching goals and values, and studies the images of the future held by diverse groups of people.

4.2.3 Images and Scenarios of the Future

Researchers in the field of Futures Studies do not predict the future but try to uncover how people think about the future (Bell, 1997). The pictures that people consciously or unconsciously maintain about the future affect their decisions, choices, and actions in the present (Hicks, 2003). On a broader scale, collective images of the future are influenced by psychological and cultural factors and can determine social progress or stagnation (Holden, 2002). Therefore, the main focus is to create and evaluate alternative images of the future, including peoples’ general expectations, hopes and fears (Dator, 1996). These general hopes and worries regarding a good or a threatening future can influence the way people engage themselves at both the personal and the societal level.

One essential instrument to study people’s images of the future is the development and evaluation of different future scenarios (Hicks, 2003). Basically, future scenarios are like cognitive maps, short portraits, or stories about the future, in which different trends are taken into account. The purpose of scenarios is to guide people’s attention and imagination by highlighting the consequences of different trends and to anticipate a range of possible future developments. Therefore, the word “futures” is used in plural because there is not only one future but many possible futures.

Usually, people are focused on the immediate future, engrossed in their daily challenges but they are not used to think about long-term trends and prospects. The task of researchers in Futures Studies is to encourage and guide people to become aware of their long-term expectations, to open up the horizon for imagining new future opportunities and to identify and become conscious about desirable futures, both for themselves and the world (Bell, 2003; Eckersley, 2002; Hicks, 2003). This means that researchers must challenge prevalent ways of thinking and daily habits, consider, and evaluate new possibilities and alternatives, and analyze values, norms, goals, attitudes, and preferences of the population (Bell, 2004). In sum, Futures Studies aims to explore probable (what is likely to be), possible (what can or could be) and preferable (what ought to be) images of the future as seen by different people.

4.2.3.1 Probable Futures

Probable futures are defined by people’s beliefs and subjective estimation concerning the future they expect to be most likely. For a systematic investigation of the probable, people are assisted to consider past, present, and future trends and developments. One frequently asked question is what the most probable future would be if things continue to unfold the way they have done until now. What would the most probable future be, if we continue to behave as we usually do (Bell, 2003)?

4.2.3.2 Possible Futures

Guiding people to imaging possible futures seeks to draw their attention to alternative scenarios and to new future opportunities. The fundamental purpose here is to encourage individuals to think about what could be if things change, or if they took an alternative route, and to believe that a different future is possible. Basically, considering possible futures fosters new perspectives, increase future options, and broaden possible choices. Often, people are encouraged to think about completely unconventional and creative scenarios. It involves constructing a variety of clear and powerful, both positive and negative images of the future (Bell, 1996).

4.2.3.3 Desirable Futures

After contemplating the many possible future scenarios, and considering that some futures are better than others, the core question that remains is: which of these scenarios are the most and the less desired by people? This comprises an assessment of the value judgements, the general goals, preferences, and the priorities of different groups of individuals. Central to this question is what people consider to be the characteristics of a good society (Bell, 2004). In order to know what is the desirable, people are asked which futures they want to achieve and which futures they want to avoid (Hicks, 2003).

The contemplation of probable, possible and desirable future scenarios creates positive and negative images of the future, which in extreme cases tell stories of ideal and feared futures in the form of utopias and dystopias. Four typical scenarios usually evolve (Hicks, 2003):

• 1. More of the same: Basically, everything will remain the same or continue to unfold as it always did.

• 2. Technological development: New technologies will solve current problems and enable continued progress.

• 3. Catastrophe: Current developments will lead to multiple economic, environmental, and social crises.

• 4. Sustainable development: New forms of production, consumption, and behavior are evidence of a change in consciousness and will give rise to new kinds of social norms and structures.

4.2.4 Global Futures, Hopes and Fears and their Impact on Well-being

In many empirical studies, researchers discovered a huge discrepancy between what people expect will happen in the future and what they would wish to happen (Eckersley et al., 2007; Inayatullah, 2000, 2002). People’s expectations regarding global future trends and scenarios are often in sharp contradiction to what they hope for the world (Hicks, 1996). Furthermore, another paradox is the dissonance found between people’s optimistic view of their personal life and the pessimistic assessment of social and global futures (Rubin, 2002; Toffler, 1974). Particularly young people are hopeful with regard to their future job opportunities, their families, and their expected living conditions. In contrast, the images of the future of society and the world are influenced by the global problems such as environmental crises, population growth, economic turmoil and health issues. The negative view of the global future can be an effect of people’s perception of growing complexity, uncertainty, and loss of personal control (Brunstad, 2002).

Psychologically speaking, the inner tension and lack of coherence existing between probable, possible, and desirable futures can be a source of mistrust, anger, anxiety, and apathy (Eckersley et al., 2007; Grund & Brock, 2019; Hickman, 2020; Searle & Gow, 2010). Based on a sense of powerlessness of being unable to change anything beyond one’s own life, people focus on what they can influence, that is, short sighted but attainable personal goals. However, these are often deprived of a deeper meaning and purpose, which in turn increases the negative view toward the larger society and the disengagement from global issues (Eckersley et al., 2007).

In recent years, researchers started to emphasize that personal well-being is not only determined by pleasurable experiences and satisfaction with personal domains in life, such as the family, work, closer friends and so on, but that social issues and developments and the perception of the future of the world may also have a significant impact on well-being (Eckersley et al., 2007; Keyes, 2014). Researchers in the field of Positive Psychology have already revealed that psychological well-being is closely related to a greater meaning and purpose in life and the attachment to something larger than the self (Delle Fave & Soosai-Nathan, 2014; Delle Fave et al., 2011, 2013, 2016; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995). However, the connection between global threats and personal well-being is something that still has to be investigated more in detail.

In short, Eckersley (1999, p. 88) noticed that a “failure to provide a broad cultural framework of hope, meaning and purpose in young people’s lives could be weakening their resilience, making them more vulnerable to these problems”. Likewise, Hicks (2012, p. 7) argued that “clarifying hopes for the future can enhance motivation in the present and thus positive action for change.” Researchers in the field of Futures Studies clearly distinguished between optimism/pessimism on the one hand, and hopefulness/hopelessness on the other (Slaughter, 2002; Nordensvard, 2014). Optimistic (unrealistic) visions based on the belief that at the end, everything will be fine, could be detrimental if they fail encouraging people to action. What is needed is an active hope that motivates people to commit themselves to overcome the problems and difficulties the world is facing. Moreover, people with pessimistic images of the future can remain hopeful if the negative expectations do not lead to helplessness (Grund & Brock, 2019; Nordensvard, 2014). The combination of negative future scenarios with images of preferred futures can motivate people to become engaged in addressing contemporary problems, and therefore preventing the negative expectations from becoming a reality. This could foster the achievement of the desired future conditions (Eckersley et al., 2007).

4.2.5 Personal and Social Well-being

In order to examine the relationship between global expectations for the future and well-being, it is necessary to briefly present different concepts of well-being. Researchers in Positive Psychology have identified two types of well-being (Delle Fave, 2020; Delle Fave et al., 2011; Ryan & Deci, 2001): Hedonic well-being is basically related to positive experiences and emotions and comprises feeling good and being satisfied with one’s life (Diener, 2000). Eudaimonic well-being, on the other hand, is a more complex psychological construct and addresses the way people relate to and function in the world (Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Ryff & Singer, 2008).

In his model of complete mental health, Keyes (2002, 2014) has differentiated two domains of eudaimonic well-being: The psychological and the social sphere. Psychological well-being is about personal growth and optimal development as an individual. It comprises experiencing purpose and meaning in life, maintaining good personal relations with other people, feeling competent in relation to one’s tasks and having an overall good view of oneself (e.g., being a good, loveable, responsible, and engaged person) (Ryff, 1989). Social well-being, on the other hand, refers to the relationship of the individual to the wider community and society. A positive relationship between the individual and the social environment is typically characterized by shared social goals and values (Massimini & Delle Fave, 2000), by meaningful and accepted social norms and structures, by a sense of belonging and feeling part of society, by mutual appreciation, respect, and recognition with other people, by having something to contribute to the community, and by experiencing a positive development of society and the world at large.

According to Keyes and Haidt (2010), a person can flourish when he or she achieves a harmonious balance between feeling good, functioning well as an individual and interacting positively with others as member of a community embedded in elevating social structures. However, Keyes (2014) recognized that especially the relationship between the individual and society and its contribution to well-being still requires more investigation. Delle Fave and her colleagues (Delle Fave et al., 2011) noticed that social issues seem to be less relevant for individual well-being, which could have detrimental effects for collective welfare.

In this sense, Frank Polak, one of the fathers of humanistic Futures Studies, formulated a provocative thesis: “The rise and fall of images of the future precedes or accompanies the rise and fall of cultures. As long as a society’s image of the future is positive and flourishing, the flower of culture is in full bloom. Once the image begins to decay and lose its vitality, however, the culture cannot long survive.” (Polak, 1961/1973, p. 19). For Polak, images of the future are like a mirror of the respective zeitgeist. In his eyes, the degree of optimism or pessimism is a measure of the health and well-being of the population. The lack of positive images of the future is therefore an obstacle to social progress, especially because it can turn the future into a projection field of fears instead of hopes.

4.3 The Present Study

4.3.1 Aim and Objectives

The aim of our study was to investigate the long-term expectations concerning the future quality of life, both in general and in several life and social domains, as well as the outlooks regarding probable and desirable long-term future scenarios (in 20 years’ time) across 12 countries and relate these images of the future to people’s perceived personal hope and well-being.

Based on measures developed by Eckersley (1999), our first objective was to identify similarities and differences across countries in how people perceive future prospects regarding the general quality of life as well as particular social domains in their country, such as family life, mental health of the population, the natural environment etc.

The second objective was to evaluate expected and desirable social scenarios across countries. Firstly, we analyzed the subjective likelihood people ascribe to two possible scenarios portraying a flourishing and a declining future full of crises. Afterwards, we assessed the desirability of two other scenarios describing a (modern) competitive and individualistic society, on the one hand, and a (post-modern) sustainable and communal society, on the other (Eckersley, 1999; Eckersley et al., 2007).

Our third objective was to assess the relationship of future expectations and scenarios with the general level of perceived hope as well as with hedonic, psychological, and social well-being. Specifically, we wanted to establish the association of future expectations and future scenarios on perceived hope and social well-being.

We assumed that the expectation of negative future trends and scenarios will have a significant negative association with hope and well-being and that positive scenarios will display a positive relationship. Moreover, desired scenarios could have a positive connection with hope and well-being.

4.3.2 Procedure and National Samples

Data was collected as part of the Hope Barometer in November 2019 (a few months before the outbreak of the COVID19-pandemic) through announcements in online newspapers, social media, and e-mails. No incentives were offered. We selected 12 countries displaying a robust database of at least 200 participants. People younger than 18 were excluded from the analysis. A total of 10,759 people completed the questionnaire, from which 94 were removed due to a high number of missing values and obvious erroneous answers (e.g., always 0 or 1).

Participants were from Australia (N = 474), Colombia (N = 311), the Czech Republic (N = 469), India (N = 1092), Israel (N = 884), Italy (N = 272), Nigeria (N = 665), Poland (N = 481), Portugal (N = 507), South Africa (N = 574), Spain (N = 529) and Switzerland (N = 3935). The questionnaire was administered in English (Australia, Northern and Southern India, Nigeria, and South Africa), Spanish (Colombia and Spain), Czech (Czech Republic), Hebrew (Israel), Italian (Italy and Switzerland), Polish (Poland), Portuguese (Portugal), Malayalam (Southern India) as well as French and German (Switzerland).

The demographic structure of the samples is exhibited in Appendix 4.1. Gender distribution was quite balanced in Australia, Colombia, India, South Africa, and Switzerland. In the Czech Republic, Israel, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain, more women than men (about 70/30) and in Nigeria more men than women took part in the survey. The mean age ranged between the youngest people participating in Colombia (M = 26.29, SD = 8.63) and the oldest in Australia (M = 47.53, SD = 13.05) and Switzerland (M = 46.82, SD = 15.67).

4.3.3 Measures

Long-Term Future Expectations and Scenarios

Long-term future expectations and scenarios were measured implementing questionnaires developed by the Australian futurologist Richard Eckersley (Eckersley, 1999; Eckersley et al., 2007). Participants were initially asked to imagine their country in twenty years’ time (around 2040) and to rate on a five-point Likert-scale (from 1 to 5) if the general quality of life would be better, the same or worse than it is today. Afterwards, they could assess their long-term expectations in eleven social domains (e.g., public health, family life, employment, natural environment, etc.). Participants were not asked to assess their own life but the general outlooks in their country. The Cronbach alpha coefficients of the twelve items exhibit good scores in all samples between α = 0.89 and α = 0.97.

The next step was to assess the likelihood of two scenarios in 2040. The first scenario describes a world in which a larger population, environmental destruction, new diseases, and ethnic and regional conflicts would drive the world into times of crises. In the second scenario the world would continue a path of economic and technological development, enabling humanity to overcome the obstacles it faces and to enter a new age of sustainability, peace, and prosperity. The two scenarios could be rated on a six-point scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 6 (very likely).

To assess the desirability of future states in 2040, two additional scenarios were provided. The first scenario portrayed a fast-paced, internationally competitive society, with the emphasis on the individual, wealth generation, and technological advancements. The second scenario represented a greener, more harmonious society, where the emphasis is on cooperation, community and family, more equal distribution of wealth, and greater economic self-sufficiency. Both scenarios were rated on a six-point scale from 1 (highly undesired) to 6 (highly desired).

Perceived Hope

To assess the general level of personal hope we employed the Perceived Hope Scale (PHS) (Krafft et al., 2019, 2021; Marujo et al., 2021; Slezackova et al., 2020). The PHS consists of six items to measure the level of hope as perceived by people in a direct manner and free from any preconceptions regarding the nature and quality of hope. The PHS is especially suitable to assess the level of general hope in different cultures since it avoids any bias regarding potential sources, roots, dimensions, and elements of hope. The items of the PHS evaluate the degree of hope in general (“I feel hopeful”), in one’s life (“I am hopeful with regard to my life”) and in difficult situations, the belief in the possibility of fulfilment of one’s hopes and the intensity of general hope vis-à-vis the feeling of anxiety (“In my life hope outweighs anxiety”). The six positively worded items were rated on a 6-point Likert scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). In the current study the six items achieved a high internal consistency in all samples with Cronbach alpha values between α = 0.79 and α = 0.90.

Hedonic, Psychological, and Social Well-being

For a differentiated evaluation of hedonic, eudaimonic and especially social well-being, we reverted to Keyes’ (2002; Keyes et al., 2008) Mental Health Continuum (MHC-SF). The MHC-SF comprises 14 positively worded items, with three items representing hedonic well-being (happy, interested in life, and satisfied), six items evaluating psychological well-being (functioning well in one’s personal life) and five items describing social well-being (the relationship between oneself and the larger community/society). Participants were asked to rate how often in the past month they felt in a specific manner. Items are rated on a six-point scale from 1 (never) to 6 (every day). Reliability coefficients were good in all samples, achieving levels between α = 0.78 and α = 0.92 for hedonic well-being, between α = 0.80 and α = 0.89 for psychological well-being, and between α = 0.80 and α = 0.88 for social well-being.

4.3.4 Data Analysis

We started our analysis by calculating mean values and standard deviations of the long-term future expectations, presenting the rank order among countries, and comparing the results via univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA). Afterwards we computed the ascribed likelihood to the crisis and the flourishing scenarios for each country, compared both mean values and assessed if the differences were significant (ANOVA). In order to evaluate the gap between both scenarios, we devised two groups of participants for every country: The first group contains people that have judged the crisis scenario 1 to be more likely than the flourishing scenario 2 and the second group those who considered the flourishing scenario 2 to be more likely than the crisis scenario 1. We then calculated the proportion of people belonging to each group and the mean values of both scenarios and compared them with and between the groups (scenario 1 vs. scenario 2 within groups and scenarios 1 and 2 vs. scenarios 1 and 2 across groups).

A similar procedure was performed with both scenarios judged as more or less desirable (the individualistic-competitive and the social-sustainable). After calculating mean values and standard deviations and comparing mean values of both scenarios via ANOVA, we created two groups of participants for each national sample and compared their individual scores within and between groups. Group 1 comprised people who assessed the individualistic-competitive scenario 1 to be more desirable than the social-sustainable scenario 2. Group 2 consisted of participants believing that the social-sustainable scenario 2 would be more desirable than the individual-competitive scenario 1.

The final step assessed the mean levels of perceived hope as well as hedonic, psychological, and social well-being across countries. Before starting with the analyses, we tested group invariance for the PHS across the 12 countries via multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA). We applied the nested model procedure to examine configurational, metric, scalar, and full invariance by means of Maximum Likelihood estimation. The goodness of the models was assessed with the Comparative fit index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) (study criterion ≥0.95 as ideal and ≥ 0.90 as the acceptable level), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) (study criterion ≤0.08) and the standardized root mean residual SRMR (study criterion ≤0.08) (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The recommended criteria to demonstrate invariance are changes in CFI and TLI between comparison and nested models of ≥ − .010, a change in RMSEA of ≤0.015 and a variation in SRMR of ≤0.030 (for loading invariance) and ≤ 0.010 (for intercept invariance) (Chen, 2007).

Performing ANOVA, we compared the mean values of hope and well-being of the different groups of participants, those believing in the likelihood of the crisis or the flourishing scenario, as well as of both groups supporting the individual-competitive or the social-sustainable scenario more. Afterwards, we computed partial bivariate correlations between expectations and scenarios with perceived hope and the well-being indicators (controlling for demographic variables). Finally, we performed a series of hierarchical regression analyses for every country to predict perceived hope, on the one hand, and social well-being, on the other. As predictor variables we employed the composite score of future social expectations in the first analyses, both “likely” scenarios (crisis and flourishing) in the second series of analyses, and both desirable scenarios (individual-competitive and social-sustainable) in the third wave of analyses (after demographic variables).

4.3.5 Results

4.3.5.1 Future Expectations

Participants were asked to think about their country in twenty years’ time, around 2040, and to consider whether they believe that the overall quality of life will be better than it is now, about the same, or worse than it is now. Afterwards we invited the participants to assess different life domains, and indicate whether they expect these to get better, remain the same, or get worse until 2040.

Results in Fig. 4.1 and Table 4.1 point out that Nigeria, Colombia, and Portugal were the countries with the most optimistic expectations regarding future quality of life, and likewise in almost all individual life domains. The most negative countries with regards to the future development of the quality of life were Switzerland, Spain, South Africa, and Italy (all samples F = 110.89, η2 = 0.107, p < 0.001). Looking at the single life domains, the countries with the most negative outlooks were Switzerland, India, and South Africa.

Fig. 4.1

Mean values of quality of life 2040 across countries

Table 4.1 Mean values and standard deviations of future expectations across countries

In most countries, the life domains with the most positive prospects were physical health, employment opportunities, the fight against racism and the general economy. India was the exception, with a negative outlook on the domain of physical health, the Czech Republic concerning the negative prospects about future employment opportunities, Poland on the subject of rising racism and Spain about the adverse development of the general economy. The greatest concerns in almost all countries were related to the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, the deterioration of the natural environment, of family life and of the mental health of the population.

4.3.5.2 Expected Future Scenarios

In the next step, we presented two scenarios describing different possible futures: a crisis and a flourishing image of 2040. We asked the participants to assess how likely or unlikely these scenarios are, in their opinion.

In Table 4.2 we present the mean values and standard deviations of the ascribed likelihood to the respective scenarios in each country. Figure 4.2 reveals that for participants in most countries the crisis scenario (1) was considered more likely than the flourishing scenario (2), with exception of Nigeria and Israel where both scenarios exhibit a similar likelihood. Differences between the country samples regarding the likelihood of the crisis scenario are rather low but significant (all samples F = 20.13, η2 = 0.021, p < 0.001). Whereas people in South Africa, Italy, Switzerland, Poland, and Spain were the most pessimistic about a future full of crises, people in Australia, Colombia, Czechia, and Israel were a little bit less concerned. Likewise, participants in Switzerland, Poland, Spain, Czechia, Portugal, and South Africa showed the lowest endorsement of a flourishing scenario. On the other hand, people in Nigeria, Israel and Colombia were the most positive about a flourishing future (scenario 2). Here the differences between the countries were slightly more pronounced (all samples F = 91.04, η2 = 0.090, p < 0.001).

Table 4.2 Mean values, standard deviations and mean value comparisons of the likelihood of scenarios across countries and between different groups of participants

Fig. 4.2

Mean values of expected scenarios 2040 by country

In order to assess how many people were positive and how many negative about the future, we divided the samples into two groups: those who considered the crisis scenario more likely than the flourishing scenario (group 1) and those who deemed the flourishing scenario more likely than the crisis scenario (group 2). Table 4.2 displays the distribution of both groups along with the mean values of scenario 1 and 2 for each group. Between 60.2% of the participants in Israel and 82.6% in Switzerland judged the crisis scenario to be more likely than the flourishing scenario. In Switzerland, Poland, Spain and South Africa, people were especially concerned about the future prospects of their countries, since between 76.8% and 82.6% of the participants considered the crisis scenario more likely than the flourishing scenario. Remarkably, in all countries the mean values of scenario 1 and 2 (MCS1 and MFS2) differ significantly from each other, both within the single groups as well as between the two groups (MCS1 and MFS2 for group 1 vs. group 2) (p < 0.001). Further, the samples from Switzerland, Poland, Spain, and South Africa presented the largest gap between both scenarios.

4.3.5.3 Desirable Future Scenarios

After assessing the likelihood of the crisis and flourishing scenarios, we portrayed two new scenarios describing possible futures in 2040: the first, describing an individualist and competitive (modern) society and the second, other describing a sustainable and social oriented (post-modern) future. We asked the participants to judge how desirable or undesirable these scenarios were to them.

Similar to the previous analysis, we divided the national samples into two groups. Group 1 consisted of participants that supported the individualist-competitive scenario more than the social-sustainable scenario. Group 2 included people that esteemed the social-sustainable scenario as more desirable than the individualist-competitive scenario. Comparing mean values of both scenarios among the national samples as well as within the two groups (MIC1 and MSS2) and between groups (MIC1 and MSS2 of group 1 vs. MIC1 and MSS2 of group 2) provided significant differences in all countries (p < 0.001).

The results in Fig. 4.3 and Table 4.3 reveal that participants in all countries preferred the social-sustainable scenario 2 more than the individualistic-competitive scenario (between 85.7% in South Africa and 94.1% in Spain). Participants in Nigeria, South Africa and Portugal exhibited the highest scores in support of an individual-competitive future, and those in Poland, Spain, Switzerland, and Italy the lowest. The differences between the countries were the most pronounced (all samples F = 128.02, η2 = 0.122, p < 0.001). Moreover, participants in Italy, Portugal, and Spain displayed the strongest support for the social-sustainable future, however, the differences between countries were significant but rather small (all samples F = 39.44, η2 = 0.041, p < 0.001). In Nigeria, South Africa and India, the gap between the desirability of both scenarios was the lowest, suggesting that the individualistic-competitive scenario is to a certain extent also a worthwhile development. The largest gap between both scenarios was perceived in Italy, Spain, Poland, and Israel, followed by Switzerland and the Czech Republic (all samples F = 55.85, η2 = 0.057, p < 0.001). These results suggest that people in poorer and economically less developed countries may desire to catch up with the wealthier and more competitive countries in the West, but in a social and sustainable way.

Fig. 4.3

Mean values of desirable scenarios 2040 by country

Table 4.3 Mean values, standard deviations, and mean value comparisons of the desirability of scenarios across countries and between different groups of participants

Finally, we calculated the difference between the desired social-sustainable and the expected flourishing scenario and found that the gap was significantly wider in the European countries. Specifically, it was more pronounced in Spain (M = 2.04), Italy (M = 2.00), Portugal (M = 1.96) and Poland (M = 1.87) than in the non-European countries, where it was the smallest in Nigeria (M = 1.02), Israel (M = 1.29), India (M = 1.30) and Australia (M = 1.32) (all samples F = 26.84, η2 = 0.028, p < 0.001).

4.3.5.4 Group Invariance of the Perceived Hope Scale (PHS)

In order to be able to compare mean values of perceived hope across countries and correlate these values with the future expectations and scenarios, we first tested the measurement invariance of the PHS. Table 4.4 presents the fit indices of the MGCFA to assess the goodness of fit for the general sample and of the five models to test different levels of group invariance. The one-factor model for the total sample revealed a good model fit (CFI and TLI > 0.95, RMSEA and SRMR < 0.08). The first step of configurational invariance across the groups (equal form) provides a good fit to the data for the TLI, RMSEA and SRMR but not for the CFI. According to Marsh (1994) and Marsh et al. (1996) the difference between the TLI and the CFI is that the TLI also penalizes model complexity (thereby appropriately rewarding model parsimony). This property of the TLI has been noted as particularly useful in tests across multiple groups (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). We therefore focused our assessment on the TLI, the RMSEA and the SRMR. All models compared to the baseline model were under the threshold values recommended by the literature (TLI > .01, RMSEA and SRMR < 0.015) with exception of the TLI = 0.003 in the full uniqueness model. These results suggest (with caution due to the CFI results) that the PHS exposes a strong invariance across the samples of the investigated countries and that we could continue to compare individual scores. This would indicate that perceived hope has been conceptualized in a similar form across countries and that correlation analyses with other constructs are possible.

Table 4.4 Multi-group CFA and analysis of group invariance for the PHS

4.3.5.5 Perceived Hope and Well-being

In all samples, participants report moderate to high levels (above the center of the scale) of perceived hope, relatively high levels of hedonic and psychological well-being, but only moderate levels (around the center of the scale) of social well-being (Table 4.5). Comparing scores between country samples, the first remarkable finding is that the non-European countries displayed significant higher levels of hope than the European countries. Whereas Nigeria, Australia and India, followed by South Africa, Israel and Colombia, showed the highest levels of perceived hope, Switzerland, Poland and Spain, followed by the Czech Republic, Italy and Portugal presented the lowest (all samples F = 70.12, η2 = 0.071, p < 0.001). Moreover, participants in Nigeria, Australia and Colombia reported the highest levels of hedonic, psychological, and social well-being. Poland, Italy, and Israel exhibited the lowest levels of hedonic well-being (all samples F = 20.76, η2 = 0.022, p < 0.001). Furthermore, people in Poland, Czechia and India exhibit the lowest levels in psychological well-being (all samples F = 30.76, η2 = 0.032, p < 0.001) and people in Italy, Switzerland, and Poland the lowest in social well-being (all samples F = 79.07, η2 = 0.079, p < 0.001).

Table 4.5 Mean values and mean value comparisons between groups of “likely” scenarios of perceived hope and well-being

Further, we compared mean values of perceived hope and well-being indicators between the two groups of participants that expected either the crisis scenario (group 1) or the flourishing scenario (group 2) to be more likely (see Table 4.5). With exception of India and Nigeria, people who expected the flourishing scenario to be more probable than the crisis scenario displayed significantly higher levels of perceived hope. Given that most people judged the crisis scenario to be more likely than the flourishing scenario (see Table 4.2), the consequence is that most people belong to those displaying weaker levels of hope. Similar results emerge when comparing mean values of hedonic, psychological, and social well-being. Those who expected the crisis scenario more likely to become true, expressed lower levels of hedonic well-being (except in India), psychological well-being (not significant in Colombia, India, and Nigeria), and particularly of social well-being.

A similar analysis is presented in Table 4.6, comparing mean values between the groups of participants preferring an individual-competitive future (group 1) and those favoring a social-sustainable future (group 2). With only few exceptions, there seems to be no differences between both groups in hedonic, psychological, and social well-being. Only in India and South Africa, people who preferred a social-sustainable future were higher in psychological well-being than those who preferred an individualist-competitive scenario in the first place. With regards to perceived hope, only in Czechia, India, Nigeria, and South Africa people who preferred a social and sustainable future exhibited higher levels of hope than those favoring the individual-competitive scenario.

Table 4.6 Mean values and mean value comparisons between groups of “desirable” scenarios of perceived hope and well-being

4.3.5.6 Partial Bivariate Correlations and Hierarchical Regression Analyses

We report the partial bivariate correlation coefficients for every single country between future expectations and scenarios, on the one hand, and perceived hope and hedonic, psychological, and social well-being, on the other, in Appendix 4.2.1–4.2.12. First, the overall findings indicate that most of the future oriented variables correlated positively and significantly with the hope and well-being indicators, but with notable differences between countries. The correlations of the expected crisis scenario displayed significant negative coefficients with hope and well-being, while the flourishing scenario showed positive effects in most countries. Furthermore, the correlation coefficients between both “desirable” scenarios and hope and well-being are either very low or not significant at all. For a better comparison of the effects between countries, we performed a series of hierarchical regression analyses with perceived hope and social well-being as dependent variables.

4.3.5.6.1 Predictors of Perceived Hope

In the first series of analyses to predict perceived hope, we entered the demographic variables in step 1 and alternatively in separate analyses the composite score of future expectations 2040 (Table 4.7), the two “expected” scenarios (crisis and flourishing) (Table 4.8), and both “desirable” future scenarios (individualist-competitive and social-sustainable) (Table 4.9) in step 2.

Table 4.7 Hierarchical Regression Analyses for perceived hope with future expectations 2040 by country

Table 4.8 Hierarchical Regression Analyses for perceived hope with expected scenarios 2040 by country

Table 4.9 Hierarchical Regression Analyses for perceived hope with desirable scenarios 2040 by country

Results in Table 4.7 indicate that long-term future expectations had a significant and moderate positive predictive effect on perceived hope in all countries. The explained variance of hope was the highest in Israel, South Africa, Poland, Spain, and Italy and the lowest in India, the Czech Republic, Nigeria, and Portugal. Essentially, the more pessimistic the long-term future expectations, the weaker the perceived personal hope of the country sample.

As observed in Table 4.8, the crisis scenario yielded small but significant negative changes in perceived hope in Czechia, Israel, Poland, and Switzerland (and nearly in Italy). In most countries, the positive prediction of the flourishing scenario on hope was stronger than the negative effect of the crisis scenario. The effects were more pronounced for samples from South Africa, Colombia, Israel, and Spain and less so for India, Czechia, and Nigeria.

Finally, the “desired” scenarios hardly had an impact on perceived hope, as evidenced in Table 4.9. The individualist-competitive scenario revealed a small but significant positive change in variance of hope in Australia, Colombia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Nigeria. The social-sustainable scenario had a small positive relationship with hope in Nigeria, South Africa, India, Czechia, Spain, Poland, Portugal and to a lesser extent but still significant in Switzerland.

In sum, our results revealed that long-term future expectations and envisaged scenarios had a significant predictive power on perceived hope in all countries. This means, that the gloomier the future outlooks are, the lower is also the perceived hope in people’s life. Likewise, the less people believe in a flourishing future and the more a crisis scenario is expected, the lower is the level of perceived hope. Finally, the preferred scenarios hardly had a connection with hope. People that hope for a social-sustainable scenario, barely express higher levels of hope than people who do not. However, in several countries the relationship was small but positive.

4.3.5.6.2 Predictors of Social Well-being

To assess the impact of long-term future expectations and scenarios on social well-being, we entered the demographic variables in step 1, hedonic and psychological well-being in step 2, and future expectations, expected scenarios and desired scenarios respectively in separate analyses, in step 3. First, regarding long-term future expectations, we observe in Table 4.10 that the predictive effect on social well-being is moderately positive, most accentuated in Israel, Switzerland, and Australia and of lower magnitude in Colombia, Czechia, and Portugal. Consequently, negative future expectations were associated with lower levels of social well-being.

Table 4.10 Hierarchical Regression Analyses for social well-being with future expectations 2040 by country

Results in Table 4.11 demonstrate a significant connection of the expected future scenarios on social well-being (after hedonic and psychological well-being), contributing about 2 to 6% of the explained variance in social well-being. Believing that the future holds a crisis scenario (which was judged as much more probable in samples from most countries) had a negative predictive effect and the belief (or lack of belief) of the flourishing scenario a positive association with social well-being. In most countries the expected flourishing scenario had a stronger association with social well-being than the negative crisis scenario, which could mean that even a slight belief in a flourishing future would be more related to well-being than the expectation of a gloomy future. The negative association with the crisis scenario was particularly accentuated in Israel, India, Switzerland, and Poland, while it was less strong in Spain, Colombia, Czechia, Italy, and Nigeria. The effect of the flourishing scenario was similar across all countries and especially strong in Spain.

Table 4.11 Hierarchical Regression Analyses for social well-being with expected future scenarios 2040 by country

Finally, the results in Table 4.12 indicate that there were almost no or very little associations between the desired scenarios and social well-being. The individualistic-competitive scenario displayed a small positive association with social well-being, primarily in South Africa, Switzerland, and Colombia. In most countries the social-sustainable scenario showed no relation to social well-being, with exception of South Africa and Italy, where a slight negative relationship emerged. This implies that the social-sustainable scenario, which has been considered as highly desirable by a large majority in all countries, does not foster a sense of social well-being. The mood seems to be even direr in South Africa and Italy because the more people wished for a social-sustainable future, the lower their social well-being seemed to be.

Table 4.12 Hierarchical Regression Analyses for social well-being with desired future scenarios 2040 by country

4.4 Discussion

The aim of our study was to investigate the long-term expectations concerning the future quality of life, both in general and in several life and social domains, as well as the outlooks regarding probable and desirable long-term future scenarios (in 20 years’ time) across 12 countries and relate these images of the future to people’s perceived personal hope and hedonic, psychological, and particularly social well-being. We defined the broader concept of collective hope as a wish or desire for a better common future, the belief that the realization of a better future for all is possible (although not necessarily probable) and the trust in the availability of personal, social, and other resources to deal with current challenges and to overcome obstacles and setbacks. Our study was therefore focused on what people believe will happen in the future, what they long for and the relationship thereof to hope and well-being.

Many authors from the field of Futures Studies have already argued that people’s images of the future could have a substantial effect on the evolution and the well-being of society (Boulding, 1994; Dator, 1996; Hicks, 1996; Polak, 1961/1973). Hopes and fears of the population often influence their decisions and actions in the present. Whereas fears might prevent people from following daring new paths, hope can encourage them to take necessary actions for a positive transformation (Hicks, 2012). The results from our study support previous research in showing that many people, especially in western countries, have a very clear picture about their desirable future, but at the same time have lost their belief and hope in a flourishing global future (Brunstad, 2002; Gidley & Hampson, 2005). In their eyes, technological and economic development will not solve the burning problems humanity is currently facing and would have to deal with in the future.

In previous studies, researchers revealed that future expectations of the population (especially of young people) regarding the general quality of life and specific social domains are overall pessimistic (Eckersley, 1999; Hicks, 2003; Stewart, 2002). In our study across 12 countries a more differentiated picture emerged. Our results demonstrated that people in certain (poorer) countries like Nigeria, Colombia and Portugal held prevalently optimistic outlooks regarding future quality of life in their countries and that people in other countries like Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and South Africa were widely pessimistic. Whereas the economic development and employment opportunities were expected to improve, the most negative prospects and urgent concerns arose with regard to the spreading gap between the rich and the poor, the deterioration of the natural environment, the threats to family life, and the decline in mental health of the population.

Scenarios are images of the future, which could be more or less probable, possible, and desirable. We asked our participants to assess the likelihood of two opposite possible future scenarios portraying a crisis and a flourishing image of the future. A majority of the participants in almost all countries considered the crisis scenario to be more probable than the flourishing scenario, as already noticed in past studies (Brunstad, 2002; Nordensvard, 2014; Rubin, 2002). People in European countries such as Switzerland, Spain, and Poland, but also in South Africa, were much more pessimistic regarding the apparent threat of the crisis scenario and held a weaker belief in a flourishing future. Surprisingly, people in poorer countries like Nigeria and Colombia could held a stronger belief in a flourishing future.

It is particularly noteworthy that the population in Switzerland, the country in our study with the highest GDP per capita, had the grimmest expectations regarding future quality of life and that people in Nigeria, the poorest country in terms of GDP per capita, held the most positive expectations. This can be interpreted in a historical and cultural context. Since the late nineteenth century, Europe was spurred by the belief in a universal economic growth and progress, which was further reinforced during the reconstruction after World War II. Nowadays, people in countries with a high level of prosperity mostly fear a deterioration of their living conditions (Adolph et al., 2016). For example, in countries like Switzerland with a high level of personal safety and low criminality, people fear an increase in insecurity and violence. Economic prosperity and technological progress have been the driving forces in the past decades, but they no longer serve as desirable visions for a better future and do not offer people a higher sense of meaning and purpose, particularly because their negative effects on health, well-being and the natural environment are seen as not tolerable anymore.

Different economic and cultural realities in other countries spur other needs and hopes. People in poorer countries have the wish and belief that their situation may improve. It is perfectly understandable that people in countries such as Nigeria, Colombia, and India long for prosperity and well-being. Furthermore, in recent decades people in many developing countries already experienced positive developments. For example, in Colombia, the peace process to overcome the civil war has occasioned a general economic and social stability. However, this should not obscure the fact that many young people in Africa and Latin America feel deprived from future opportunities.

Long-term expectations towards the future of society and the planet can have significant effects on the level of hope and well-being of the population (Eckersley, 2002). Our results disclosed that the levels of perceived personal hope, hedonic and psychological well-being are moderately high in all investigated countries but that the social well-being of the population is considerably more restrained. Remarkably, participants in non-European countries exhibited significantly higher levels of personal hope than those in European countries. Moreover, whereas some countries like Nigeria, Australia and Colombia, countries which seem to be more optimistic regarding the future quality of life, and less concerned about future crises, showed higher levels of hedonic, psychological, and social well-being, other countries like Italy and Poland displayed the lowest.

In a further step, we found that people who not only believe in a crisis-like future scenario and who were also more sceptical with regard to a flourishing future, especially people in Switzerland, Poland, and Spain, also displayed significantly lower levels of personal hope. Moreover, the impaired belief in a positive future seemed to have more negative effects on hope and social well-being than the expectation of a dreadful future. People in Poland, Italy and Switzerland were especially pessimistic with regard to the future prospects and likewise reported lower levels of perceived hope and all facets of well-being.

A special case worthy to be mentioned separately is South Africa. People in South Africa are as concerned as e.g., Swiss and Italians regarding the dire prospects in their country. They held little belief in the improvement of their quality of life and in a future flourishing society and were concerned regarding future crises. However, despite these pessimistic outlooks, the South African participants seemed able to remain hopeful and enjoy somewhat higher levels of psychological and social well-being comparable to those in Nigeria, Australia, and Colombia. This suggests that people in South Africa may retain sources of hope and well-being that are less available to people in other countries such as Poland, Italy, and Switzerland.

Finally, we want to address the results related to the desirable future scenarios. The first and overall finding is that people in all countries clearly preferred and longed for a social and sustainable future much more than an individualist, competitive and materialistic world, supporting past research (see for example Boulding, 1994; Hicks, 1996). However, in most European countries the gap between the mostly desired sustainable future and the less favored individualist and competitive future is much more pronounced than in other countries like Nigeria, South Africa, and India. People in the latter countries seem to wish to achieve economic and financial prosperity and at the same time protect the environment and preserve social cohesion. In contrast, during the past decades, people in Europe have experienced not only the blessings of economic welfare but also the negative effects of an overly competitive and individualist society.

The sobering finding is that the desire for a better future, be it in materialistic or in ecological and social terms, has only a small impact on perceived hope and well-being. Interestingly, a significant relationship between the wish for a better future and perceived hope was found in Nigeria and South Africa, which are two of the fastest developing countries in Africa. In the European countries, the wish for a social and sustainable future was related to slightly higher levels of hope than the wish for a more competitive and individualistic future. Furthermore, the desire for a sustainable and social future does not spark a stronger feeling of well-being among people, like the desire for more economic wealth and modern technology does in some countries such as Colombia and South Africa. This could indicate that the desire for a social and sustainable future, while inspiring a little bit of hope, does not nurture a sense of meaningfulness, belonging and integration in the social community.

The current mood among people seems to reflect that we have reached a point in history where they feel that things cannot continue to go on like this. Many people, especially in Europe, are uneasy about the direction in which the world is currently heading: Destruction of the natural environment, climate change, natural disasters, wars, political radicalism and the exploitation of the population’s mental health due to increasing pressure and competition. At the same time, they feel powerless because they have the impression that they cannot do anything about it. Therefore, the coming decades are generally seen as an age of crises and problems instead of peace and prosperity. These experiences seem to trigger negative feelings of worry and helplessness.

The question, as Snow (2018) formulates it, is whether we want to be a community of hope or of worry. Snow attests that the United States has become a nation of worriers, largely because past administrations have failed to spread social hope. Our societies lack positive and widely accepted images for the future that could provide guidance and direction, as well as the belief that the world’s current problems can be solved. Images of the future that merely convey the feeling of more of the same rob people of their passion and enthusiasm for their lives and for the world in general.

Researchers from the fields of Futures Studies and Positive Psychology recognized that it makes little sense to focus only on problems (Slaughter, 1994). According to Hicks (2003), only when a society creates new and powerful pictures of desirable futures, it can begin to mobilize its creative energy again. What the world will look like in the future depends above all on the extent to which we are able to develop positive images of a desirable future. What sustains us are hopes and dreams of a world worth living in. Positive scenarios offer people the vision of an ideal future to work for and emphasize human freedom and dignity. Humans are always free to imagine and strive for a completely different and better world. The goal is to engage in alternative and desirable visions of the future, in the conviction that we must not merely surrender to current constrains and adapt to a bleak future, but actively and responsibly shape it. This requires future designs and concrete goals based on individual and collective values and dreams of a better world. In this sense, collective hope should help to overcome anxiety and apathy, inspiring faith, and trust in the achievability of a better future (Blöser & Stahl, 2019; Braithwaite, 2004; McGeer, 2004; Shade, 2019; Rorty, 2002). This is especially possible within a human community, where people focus on the positive aspects of life, especially on the hope, belief, and trust that even in difficult times, despite problems and disappointments, it is possible to live a better life if we take the appropriate attitude towards it and actively work together to achieve it.

4.5 Limitations

At this point it is necessary to mention a number of limitations of our study. The cross-sectional design of our research impedes us to drive any conclusion about causality. The most likely is the existence of a reciprocal effect. Happy and hopeful people usually hold more optimistic views of the future and vice-versa: positive expectations of the future will foster people’s hopefulness and well-being. A further limitation is the lack of representativeness of our samples and of homogeneity across samples. However, due to the dissimilar demographic structures of the national populations, the criteria of representativeness and homogeneity across samples remain in competition with each other. The more representative the individual samples, the lower the homogeneity across samples and vice-versa. The survey was performed via online channels. A certain proportion of people with restricted or no access to online media are excluded from the study. This may especially be the case in samples from developing, non-western countries, where access to internet is often restricted to certain socio-economic groups. From the four goodness to fit indices utilized to test group invariance of the PHS, three revealed adequate results and one (the CFI) did not, however to a small extent.

4.6 Conclusions

In this chapter we extended and examined the definition of hope encompassing the social and long-term future expectations and yearnings of the population. People will hope for a better world once they can develop and manifest desired images of the future and believe that despite current adversities and challenges, a flourishing future could be possible if we trust in our collective capacity to work together towards common ideals and visions. Our findings draw a rather gloomy picture of people’s global future prospects, but underscore the strong universal wish for a sustainable, harmonious, just, and cooperative human community. It lies in our hands to encourage and support people to capture this vision and form communities of hope and action to overcome current fears and worries and contribute to the realization of their hoped-for future. For this, we need to develop, implement, and examine hope interventions that not only focus on personal hopes and foster hopefulness at the individual level, but bring people together to join their particular strengths, form a community in which members respect, encourage and support each other and work hand in hand in concrete initiatives and institutions of social hope. By doing so, we will not only build a better future together but also enhance our personal and social well-being in the here and now.

Appendices

Appendix 4.1: Demographic Structure

4.1.1 Number of Participants, Mean Age and Standard Deviation and GDP Per Capita

	N	%	Mage	SDage	GDP per capita in U$S
Australia	474	4.7	47.53	13.05	51,693
Colombia	311	3.1	26.19	8.63	5335
Czech Republic	469	4.6	32.75	15.54	22,932
India	1092	8.7	31.15	12.60	1928
Israel	884	2.7	41.65	14.98	44,169
Italy	272	6.5	41.86	13.78	31,714
Nigeria	665	4.7	32.26	8.47	2097
Poland	481	5.0	31.58	10.82	15,721
Portugal	507	5.6	36.45	14.74	22,176
South Africa	574	5.2	39.27	14.85	5656
Spain	529	38.6	35.19	15.22	27,063
Switzerland	3935	10.7	46.82	15.67	87,097
Total	10,193	100.0	40.04	15.76

4.1.2 Gender

		Australia	Colombia	Czech Rep.	India	Israel	Italy	Nigeria	Poland	Portugal	South Africa	Spain	Switzerland	Total
Male	n	232	151	132	529	262	75	434	140	124	252	116	1797	4473
	%	48.9%	48.6%	28.1%	48.4%	29.6%	27.6%	65.3%	29.1%	24.5%	43.9%	21.9%	45.7%	41.9%
Female	n	242	160	337	563	622	197	231	341	383	322	413	2138	6190
	%	51.1%	51.4%	71.9%	51.6%	70.4%	72.4%	34.7%	70.9%	75.5%	56.1%	78.1%	54.3%	58.0%

4.1.3 Marital Status

		Australia	Colombia	Czech Rep.	India	Israel	Italy	Nigeria	Poland	Portugal	South Africa	Spain	Switzerland	Total
Still living with my parents	n	20	182	136	469	92	45	112	85	142	106	206	231	1921
	%	4.2%	58.5%	29.0%	42.9%	10.4%	16.5%	16.8%	17.7%	28.0%	18.5%	38.9%	5.9%	18.0%
Single, unmarried	n	41	63	67	140	108	36	295	71	84	82	67	589	1710
	%	8.6%	20.3%	14.3%	12.8%	12.2%	13.2%	44.4%	14.8%	16.6%	14.3%	12.7%	15.0%	16.0%
Living in a partnership but in separate households	n	16	10	44	9	46	33	11	43	17	14	26	314	592
	%	3.4%	3.2%	9.4%	0.8%	5.2%	12.1%	1.7%	8.9%	3.4%	2.4%	4.9%	8.0%	5.6%
Living together in a partnership	n	54	17	70	18	82	60	4	101	65	92	58	719	1420
	%	11.4%	5.5%	14.9%	1.6%	9.3%	22.1%	0.6%	21.0%	12.8%	16.0%	11.0%	18.3%	13.3%
Married	n	298	35	117	428	500	79	228	166	150	224	150	1531	4079
	%	62.9%	11.3%	24.9%	39.2%	56.6%	29.0%	34.3%	34.5%	29.6%	39.0%	28.4%	38.9%	38.2%
Divorced / separated	n	42	4	27	16	45	16	11	14	46	43	21	459	781
	%	8.9%	1.3%	5.8%	1.5%	5.1%	5.9%	1.7%	2.9%	9.1%	7.5%	4.0%	11.7%	7.3%
Widowed	n	3	0	8	12	11	3	4	1	3	13	1	92	162
	%	0.6%	0.0%	1.7%	1.1%	1.2%	1.1%	0.6%	0.2%	0.6%	2.3%	0.2%	2.3%	1.5%

4.1.4 Education

		Australia	Colombia	Czech Rep.	India	Israel	Italia	Nigeria	Poland	Portugal	South Africa	Spain	Switzerland	total
Did not finish school	n	4	0	0	4	5	0	1	0	0	6	12	41	79
	%	0.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	0.6%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	0.0%	1.0%	1.1%	1.0%	0.6%
Primary school	n	0	0	16	36	1	18	0	4	1	4	61	190	335
	%	0.0%	0.0%	3.4%	3.3%	0.1%	6.6%	0.0%	0.8%	0.2%	0.7%	5.9%	4.8%	2.9%
Secondary school	n	54	67	287	214	96	54	23	185	147	211	361	1111	3013
	%	11.4%	21.5%	61.2%	19.6%	10.9%	19.9%	3.5%	38.5%	29.0%	32.1%	34.5%	28.2%	26.5%
Professional training / Diploma	n	126	14	0	526	110	69	22	64	226	140	271	2146	4186
	%	40.0%	4.5%	0.0%	48.2%	12.4%	52.7%	3.3%	13.3%	44.6%	24.4%	25.9%	54.5%	36.8%
Tertiary education / University	n	131	230	166	312	672	131	619	228	124	212	349	447	3750
	%	41.6%	74.0%	35.4%	28.6%	76.0%	48.2%	93.1%	47.4%	24.5%	37.1%	66.0%	11.4%	33.0%

4.1.5 Main Activity

		Australia	Colombia	Czech Rep.	India	Israel	Italy	Nigeria	Poland	Portugal	South Africa	Spain	Switzerland	Total
In education or training (student)	n	23	178	236	504	150	62	171	144	171	83	216	197	2197
	%	4.9%	57.2%	50.3%	46.2%	17.0%	22.8%	25.7%	29.9%	33.7%	14.5%	40.8%	5.0%	20.6%
Household / raising children	n	16	2	15	118	17	13	7	18	2	16	12	181	432
	%	3.4%	0.6%	3.2%	10.8%	1.9%	4.8%	1.1%	3.7%	0.4%	2.8%	2.3%	4.6%	4.1%
Part-time job	n	77	13	33	57	143	41	102	33	45	73	62	830	1567
	%	16.2%	4.2%	7.0%	5.2%	16.2%	15.1%	15.3%	6.9%	8.9%	12.7%	11.7%	21.1%	14.7%
Fulltime job	n	312	113	155	352	492	126	276	269	260	293	202	1777	4866
	%	65.8%	36.3%	33.0%	32.2%	55.7%	46.3%	41.5%	55.9%	51.3%	51.0%	38.2%	45.2%	45.6%
Unemployed	n	22	5	0	46	28	16	103	7	17	68	13	212	601
	%	4.6%	1.6%	0.0%	4.2%	3.2%	5.9%	15.5%	1.5%	3.4%	11.8%	2.5%	5.4%	5.6%
Retired	n	24	0	30	15	54	14	6	10	12	41	24	738	1002
	%	5.1%	0.0%	6.4%	1.4%	6.1%	5.1%	0.9%	2.1%	2.4%	7.1%	4.5%	18.8%	9.4%

4.1.6 Professional Status

		Australia	Colombia	Czech Rep.	India	Israel	Italy	Nigeria	Poland	Portugal	South Africa	Spain	Switzerland	Total
No position in an organization (eg. at school, housekeeping, unemployed, retired)	n	47	63	154	224	101	69	101	32	111	127	136	657	1934
	%	9.9%	20.3%	32.8%	20.5%	11.4%	25.4%	15.2%	6.7%	21.9%	22.1%	25.7%	16.7%	18.1%
In education / training	n	23	101	91	499	110	34	159	147	68	90	98	168	1656
	%	4.9%	32.5%	19.4%	45.7%	12.4%	12.5%	23.9%	30.6%	13.4%	15.7%	18.5%	4.3%	15.5%
Employee	n	150	58	155	242	319	55	162	195	199	138	196	1705	3691
	%	31.6%	18.6%	33.0%	22.2%	36.1%	20.2%	24.4%	40.5%	39.3%	24.0%	37.1%	43.3%	34.6%
Junior / Middle management	n	64	53	32	70	151	16	79	49	71	102	42	729	1543
	%	13.5%	17.0%	6.8%	6.4%	17.1%	5.9%	11.9%	10.2%	14.0%	17.8%	7.9%	18.5%	14.5%
Senior management / Board of directors	n	49	24	6	18	95	21	47	9	22	37	37	275	666
	%	10.3%	7.7%	1.3%	1.6%	10.7%	7.7%	7.1%	1.9%	4.3%	6.4%	7.0%	7.0%	6.2%
Entrepreneur / Business owner	n	141	12	31	39	108	77	117	49	36	80	20	401	1175
	%	29.7%	3.9%	6.6%	3.6%	12.2%	28.3%	17.6%	10.2%	7.1%	13.9%	3.8%	10.2%	11.0%

4.1.7 Religion

		Australia	Colombia	Czech Rep.	India	Israel	Italy	Nigeria	Poland	Portugal	South Africa	Spain	Switzerland	Total
Catholic	n	80	163	101	224	8	130	326	308	244	41	288	1100	3052
	%	16.9%	52.4%	21.5%	20.5%	0.9%	47.8%	49.0%	64.0%	48.1%	7.1%	54.4%	28.0%	28.6%
Protestant	n	43	8	11	14	4	0	131	4	10	69	2	796	1135
	%	9.1%	2.6%	2.3%	1.3%	0.5%	0.0%	19.7%	0.8%	2.0%	12.0%	0.4%	20.2%	10.6%
Another Christian church or community	n	66	8	26	25	0	2	155	11	5	265	1	138	929
	%	13.9%	2.6%	5.5%	2.3%	0.0%	0.7%	23.3%	2.3%	1.0%	46..2%	0.2%	3.5%	8.7%
Muslim	n	5	0	0	215	9	1	14	0	2	16	2	71	347
	%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	19.7%	1.0%	0.4%	2.1%	0.0%	0.4%	2.8%	0.4%	1.8%	3.3%
Jewish	n	17	0	1	0	496	1	0	0	0	5	0	11	535
	%	3.6%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%	56.1%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.3%	5.0%
Hindu	n	14	0	0	533	3	1	0	0	0	8	0	1	568
	%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	48.8%	0.3%	0.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	5.3%
Buddhist	n	9	0	5	0	3	9	0	2	3	1	0	27	60
	%	1.9%	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	0.3%	3.3%	0.0%	0.4%	0.6%	0.2%	0.0%	0.7%	0.6%
I am a spiritual person outside the traditional world religions	n	95	60	156	37	138	32	28	50	96	92	35	340	1236
	%	20.0%	19.3%	33.3%	3.4%	15.6%	11.8%	4.2%	10.4%	18.9%	16.0%	6.6%	8.6%	11.6%
Without religion or confession	n	121	56	137	24	132	86	4	96	120	48	170	1352	2384
	%	25.5%	18.0%	29.2%	2.2%	14.9%	31.6%	0.6%	20.0%	23.7%	8.4%	32.1%	34.4%	22.4%
Something different	n	24	16	32	20	91	10	7	10	27	29	31	99	419
	%	5.1%	5.1%	6.8%	1.8%	10.3%	3.7%	1.1%	2.1%	5.3%	5.1%	5.9%	2.5%	3.9%

Appendix 4.2: Partial Bivariate Pearson’s Correlations Between Future Prospects and Perceived Hope and Well-Being

4.1.1 Appendix 4.2.1: Correlation Coefficients Australia

	Perceived Hope	Hedonic well-being	Psychological well-being	Social well-being
Quality of Life 2040	0.291**	0.179**	0.209**	0.344**
The country’s economy	0.219**	0.151**	0.201**	0.276**
Employment prospects	0.217**	0.176**	0.210**	0.307**
Gap between rich and poor	0.197**	0.125**	0.141**	0.251**
Family life	0.212**	0.214**	0.214**	0.338**
Our natural environment	0.274**	0.187**	0.203**	0.309**
The physical health of the population	0.132**	0.104*	0.116*	0.307**
The mental health of the population	0.176**	0.174**	0.197**	0.383**
Substance abuse	0.208**	0.162**	0.165**	0.295**
Crime and violence	0.193**	0.136**	0.187**	0.351**
Racism	0.152**	0.167**	0.142**	0.248**
Justice and equality	0.170**	0.100*	0.118*	0.267**
Expected Crisis Scenario 1	−0.101*	−0.124**	−0.100*	−0.210**
Expected Flourishing Scenario 2	0.187**	0.152**	0.144**	0.280**
Desirable Competitive Scenario 1	0.145**	0.038	0.060	0.103*
Desirable Sustainable Scenario 2	0.037	−0.020	0.010	0.040

1. Note: **. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level; *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; Control variables: Gender, age, marital status, education, main activity and professional status

4.1.2 Appendix 4.2.2: Correlation Coefficients Colombia

	Perceived Hope	Hedonic well-being	Psychological well-being	Social well-being
Quality of Life 2040	0.256**	0.275**	0.294**	0.272**
The country’s economy	0.220**	0.231**	0.262**	0.267**
Employment prospects	0.263**	0.201**	0.241**	0.231**
Gap between rich and poor	0.243**	0.261**	0.275**	0.309**
Family life	0.213**	0.207**	0.299**	0.266**
Our natural environment	0.254**	0.252**	0.286**	0.241**
The physical health of the population	0.217**	0.205**	0.236**	0.242**
The mental health of the population	0.218**	0.200**	0.259**	0.321**
Substance abuse	0.125*	0.092	0.166**	0.187**
Crime and violence	0.144*	0.211**	0.253**	0.200**
Racism	0.103	0.155**	0.170**	0.122*
Justice and equality	0.226**	0.179**	0.214**	0.241**
Expected Crisis Scenario 1	−0.146*	−0.152**	−0.101	−0.161**
Expected Flourishing Scenario 2	0.309**	0.306**	0.341**	0.369**
Desirable Competitive Scenario 1	0.118*	0.159**	0.169**	0.265**
Desirable Sustainable Scenario 2	0.072	0.043	0.059	−0.029

1. Note: **. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level; *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; Control variables: Gender, age, marital status, education, main activity and professional status

4.1.3 Appendix 4.2.3: Correlation Coefficients Czech Republic

	Perceived Hope	Hedonic well-being	Psychological well-being	Social well-being
Quality of Life 2040	0.151**	0.132**	0.156**	0.244**
The country’s economy	0.127**	0.099*	0.098*	0.183**
Employment prospects	0.169**	0.158**	0.179**	0.223**
Gap between rich and poor	0.192**	0.112*	0.096*	0.146**
Family life	0.017	0.073	0.097*	0.158**
Our natural environment	0.233**	0.138**	0.171**	0.210**
The physical health of the population	0.079	0.070	0.086	0.116*
The mental health of the population	0.181**	0.144**	0.165**	0.201**
Substance abuse	0.065	0.023	−0.005	0.066
Crime and violence	0.096*	0.039	0.067	0.165**
Racism	0.119*	0.071	0.065	0.087
Justice and equality	0.148**	0.085	0.061	0.135**
Expected Crisis Scenario 1	−0.149**	−0.151**	−0.140**	−0.231**
Expected Flourishing Scenario 2	0.127**	0.183**	0.219**	0.319**
Desirable Competitive Scenario 1	−0.040	0.041	0.029	0.032
Desirable Sustainable Scenario 2	0.106*	−0.024	0.010	−0.002

1. Note: **. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level; *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; Control variables: Gender, age, marital status, education, main activity and professional status

4.1.4 Appendix 4.2.4: Correlation Coefficients India

	Perceived Hope	Hedonic well-being	Psychological well-being	Social well-being
Quality of Life 2040	0.185**	0.078**	0.175**	0.191**
The country’s economy	0.088**	0.113**	0.154**	0.177**
Employment prospects	0.066*	0.095**	0.109**	0.196**
Gap between rich and poor	0.116**	0.081**	0.076*	0.152**
Family life	0.138**	0.090**	0.177**	0.245**
Our natural environment	0.051	0.166**	0.120**	0.173**
The physical health of the population	0.121**	0.132**	0.181**	0.256**
The mental health of the population	0.126**	0.136**	0.176**	0.271**
Substance abuse	0.031	0.068*	0.148**	0.180**
Crime and violence	0.055	0.141**	0.108**	0.211**
Racism	0.032	0.015	0.100**	0.198**
Justice and equality	0.041	0.115**	0.161**	0.260**
Expected Crisis Scenario 1	−0.018	0.050	−0.063*	−0.165**
Expected Flourishing Scenario 2	0.044	0.137**	0.128**	0.182**
Desirable Competitive Scenario 1	0.009	0.151**	0.115**	0.139**
Desirable Sustainable Scenario 2	0.138**	0.149**	0.174**	0.100**

1. Note: **. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level; *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; Control variables: Gender, age, marital status, education, main activity and professional status

4.1.5 Appendix 4.2.5: Correlation Coefficients Israel

	Perceived Hope	Hedonic well-being	Psychological well-being	Social well-being
Quality of Life 2040	0.344**	0.258**	0.236**	0.410**
The country’s economy	0.311**	0.259**	0.252**	0.389**
Employment prospects	0.299**	0.267**	0.232**	0.361**
Gap between rich and poor	0.320**	0.239**	0.208**	0.410**
Family life	0.284**	0.238**	0.256**	0.310**
Our natural environment	0.304**	0.249**	0.225**	0.367**
The physical health of the population	0.249**	0.251**	0.239**	0.318**
The mental health of the population	0.367**	0.332**	0.307**	0.401**
Substance abuse	0.164**	0.168**	0.163**	0.265**
Crime and violence	0.286**	0.207**	0.197**	0.349**
Racism	0.290**	0.203**	0.192**	0.391**
Justice and equality	0.315**	0.233**	0.194**	0.403**
Expected Crisis Scenario 1	−0.238**	−0.150**	−0.144**	−0.285**
Expected Flourishing Scenario 2	0.344**	0.271**	0.240**	0.339**
Desirable Competitive Scenario 1	−0.051	0.032	0.020	0.046
Desirable Sustainable Scenario 2	0.050	0.045	0.055	0.044

1. Note: **. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level; *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; Control variables: Gender, age, marital status, education, main activity and professional status

4.1.6 Appendix 4.2.6: Correlation Coefficients Italy

	Perceived Hope	Hedonic well-being	Psychological well-being	Social well-being
Quality of Life 2040	0.223**	0.158**	0.138*	0.250**
The country’s economy	0.255**	0.131*	0.149*	0.218**
Employment prospects	0.321**	0.158**	0.158**	0.226**
Gap between rich and poor	0.272**	0.209**	0.175**	0.293**
Family life	0.196**	0.121*	0.124*	0.209**
Our natural environment	0.252**	0.244**	0.190**	0.263**
The physical health of the population	0.212**	0.182**	0.179**	0.284**
The mental health of the population	0.281**	0.215**	0.216**	0.319**
Substance abuse	0.159**	0.047	0.079	0.152*
Crime and violence	0.247**	0.179**	0.181**	0.245**
Racism	0.208**	0.118	0.109	0.256**
Justice and equality	0.201**	0.162**	0.212**	0.279**
Expected Crisis Scenario 1	−0.213**	−0.171**	−0.190**	−0.253**
Expected Flourishing Scenario 2	0.291**	0.162**	0.281**	0.327**
Desirable Competitive Scenario 1	0.052	0.135*	0.157*	0.126*
Desirable Sustainable Scenario 2	0.026	0.030	0.015	−0.085

1. Note: **. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level; *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; Control variables: Gender, age, marital status, education, main activity and professional status

4.1.7 Appendix 4.2.7: Correlation Coefficients Nigeria

	Perceived Hope	Hedonic well-being	Psychological well-being	Social well-being
Quality of Life 2040	0.188**	0.158**	0.108**	0.175**
The country’s economy	0.170**	0.152**	0.105**	0.230**
Employment prospects	0.186**	0.147**	0.103**	0.220**
Gap between rich and poor	0.160**	0.127**	0.090*	0.232**
Family life	0.183**	0.178**	0.173**	0.245**
Our natural environment	0.198**	0.160**	0.134**	0.235**
The physical health of the population	0.192**	0.170**	0.148**	0.230**
The mental health of the population	0.209**	0.164**	0.161**	0.246**
Substance abuse	0.156**	0.123**	0.108**	0.203**
Crime and violence	0.147**	0.132**	0.106**	0.228**
Racism	0.183**	0.150**	0.128**	0.215**
Justice and equality	0.177**	0.130**	0.103**	0.231**
Expected Crisis Scenario 1	0.063	−0.028	0.076	−0.042
Expected Flourishing Scenario 2	0.153**	0.131**	0.171**	0.181**
Desirable Competitive Scenario 1	0.132**	0.089*	0.149**	0.042
Desirable Sustainable Scenario 2	0.186**	0.139**	0.155**	0.033

1. Note: **. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level; *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; Control variables: Gender, age, marital status, education, main activity and professional status

4.1.8 Appendix 4.2.8: Correlation Coefficients Poland

	Perceived Hope	Hedonic well-being	Psychological well-being	Social well-being
Quality of Life 2040	0.311**	0.268**	0.294**	0.317**
The country’s economy	0.287**	0.265**	0.299**	0.325**
Employment prospects	0.304**	0.227**	0.271**	0.269**
Gap between rich and poor	0.225**	0.214**	0.245**	0.300**
Family life	0.192**	0.141**	0.193**	0.265**
Our natural environment	0.240**	0.182**	0.243**	0.271**
The physical health of the population	0.241**	0.188**	0.262**	0.332**
The mental health of the population	0.330**	0.253**	0.288**	0.356**
Substance abuse	0.125**	0.117*	0.153**	0.267**
Crime and violence	0.213**	0.138**	0.237**	0.263**
Racism	0.219**	0.171**	0.158**	0.213**
Justice and equality	0.252**	0.216**	0.221**	0.320**
Expected Crisis Scenario 1	−0.222**	−0.220**	−0.240**	−0.348**
Expected Flourishing Scenario 2	0.265**	0.199**	0.270**	0.387**
Desirable Competitive Scenario 1	−0.007	0.025	0.007	−0.033
Desirable Sustainable Scenario 2	0.092*	0.030	0.074	0.093*

1. Note: **. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level; *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; Control variables: Gender, age, marital status, education, main activity and professional status

4.1.9 Appendix 4.2.9: Correlation Coefficients Portugal

	Perceived Hope	Hedonic well-being	Psychological well-being	Social well-being
Quality of Life 2040	0.232**	0.177**	0.165**	0.315**
The country’s economy	0.249**	0.196**	0.158**	0.246**
Employment prospects	0.244**	0.188**	0.138**	0.242**
Gap between rich and poor	0.215**	0.202**	0.145**	0.197**
Family life	0.239**	0.208**	0.172**	0.251**
Our natural environment	0.160**	0.130**	0.091*	0.182**
The physical health of the population	0.205**	0.213**	0.174**	0.244**
The mental health of the population	0.221**	0.238**	0.182**	0.255**
Substance abuse	0.137**	0.145**	0.080	0.169**
Crime and violence	0.124**	0.138**	0.079	0.175**
Racism	0.138**	0.154**	0.105*	0.186**
Justice and equality	0.214**	0.188**	0.153**	0.240**
Expected Crisis Scenario 1	−0.153**	−0.102*	−0.073	−0.205**
Expected Flourishing Scenario 2	0.249**	0.153**	0.152**	0.300**
Desirable Competitive Scenario 1	0.065	0.017	0.038	0.004
Desirable Sustainable Scenario 2	0.112*	0.174**	0.176**	0.069

1. Note: **. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level; *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; Control variables: Gender, age, marital status, education, main activity and professional status

4.1.10 Appendix 4.2.10: Correlation Coefficients South Africa

	Perceived Hope	Hedonic well-being	Psychological well-being	Social well-being
Quality of Life 2040	0.387**	0.266**	0.194	0.384**
The country’s economy	0.398**	0.289**	0.178	0.250*
Employment prospects	0.365**	0.247*	0.167	0.274**
Gap between rich and poor	0.237*	0.253*	0.141	0.227*
Family life	0.291**	0.404**	0.366**	0.372**
Our natural environment	0.100	0.095	0.011	0.249*
The physical health of the population	0.309**	0.312**	0.223*	0.272**
The mental health of the population	0.263**	0.234*	0.130	0.260*
Substance abuse	0.111	0.221*	0.214*	0.226*
Crime and violence	0.274**	0.277**	0.147	0.293**
Racism	0.181	0.206*	0.124	0.163
Justice and equality	0.189	0.240*	0.165	0.225*
Expected Crisis Scenario 1	−0.199	−0.165	−0.163	−0.338**
Expected Flourishing Scenario 2	0.198	0.070	0.062	0.212*
Desirable Competitive Scenario 1	0.100	0.130	0.075	0.105
Desirable Sustainable Scenario 2	−0.045	0.106	0.130	0.133

1. Note: **. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level; *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; Control variables: Gender, age, marital status, education, main activity and professional status

4.1.11 Appendix 4.2.11: Correlation Coefficients Spain

	Perceived Hope	Hedonic well-being	Psychological well-being	Social well-being
Quality of Life 2040	0.233**	0.201**	0.200**	0.263**
The country’s economy	0.310**	0.265**	0.257**	0.336**
Employment prospects	0.321**	0.284**	0.269**	0.333**
Gap between rich and poor	0.273**	0.242**	0.204**	0.321**
Family life	0.229**	0.220**	0.205**	0.301**
Our natural environment	0.284**	0.249**	0.218**	0.315**
The physical health of the population	0.173**	0.210**	0.125**	0.236**
The mental health of the population	0.278**	0.291**	0.232**	0.326**
Substance abuse	0.182**	0.186**	0.163**	0.230**
Crime and violence	0.301**	0.252**	0.215**	0.297**
Racism	0.238**	0.264**	0.206**	0.284**
Justice and equality	0.262**	0.242**	0.220**	0.312**
Expected Crisis Scenario 1	−0.134**	−0.150**	−0.119**	−0.172**
Expected Flourishing Scenario 2	0.294**	0.255**	0.267**	0.365**
Desirable Competitive Scenario 1	0.033	0.000	0.016	−0.004
Desirable Sustainable Scenario 2	0.084	0.119**	0.068	0.069

1. Note: **. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level; *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; Control variables: Gender, age, marital status, education, main activity and professional status

4.1.12 Appendix 4.2.12: Correlation Coefficients Switzerland

	Perceived Hope	Hedonic well-being	Psychological well-being	Social well-being
Quality of Life 2040	0.266**	0.189**	0.186**	0.347**
The country’s economy	0.181**	0.147**	0.142**	0.273**
Employment prospects	0.234**	0.203**	0.193**	0.318**
Gap between rich and poor	0.210**	0.161**	0.167**	0.282**
Family life	0.197**	0.184**	0.168**	0.248**
Our natural environment	0.199**	0.142**	0.152**	0.272**
The physical health of the population	0.185**	0.145**	0.147**	0.255**
The mental health of the population	0.242**	0.179**	0.166**	0.322**
Substance abuse	0.133**	0.098**	0.081**	0.196**
Crime and violence	0.196**	0.134**	0.144**	0.279**
Racism	0.150**	0.107**	0.117**	0.211**
Justice and equality	0.209**	0.171**	0.167**	0.283**
Expected Crisis Scenario 1	−0.194**	−0.115**	−0.102**	−0.263**
Expected Flourishing Scenario 2	0.244**	0.169**	0.161**	0.315**
Desirable Competitive Scenario 1	0.102**	0.072**	0.089**	0.154**
Desirable Sustainable Scenario 2	0.043**	0.009	0.030	0.008

1. Note: **. Correlation is significant at 0.01 level; *. Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; Control variables: Gender, age, marital status, education, main activity and professional status