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ACS: An Efficient Messaging System with Strong Tracking-Resistance

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Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing (CollaborateCom 2022)

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Abstract

The increasingly rampant network monitoring and tracing bring a huge challenge on the privacy protection, because even if the message data is encrypted, the communication privacy is difficult to be hidden. Existing anonymous systems sacrifice anonymity for efficient communication, or vice versa. In this paper, we present ACS, an efficient messaging system which leverages a two-layer framework to provide tracking-resistance. The first layer is the entry layer, which consists of entry servers to relay messages. The second layer is the exchange layer, which consists of exchange servers to exchange messages. Users divide its message into different shares and send each share to exchange server via a randomly chosen entry server. Users only provide their pseudonyms to exchange servers for message exchange. Then, entry servers have no information about the message exchange, and exchange servers have no information about users’ identities. The exchange servers also provide message storage service in case that the receiver of these messages are offline, in which way, the communication becomes more simple and flexible. The experimental results show that our proposed system guarantees the strong tracking-resistance and high communication efficiency.

Supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China under Grant No.2019YFB1005205.

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Acknowledgment

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions on this paper. This work was supported in part by the National Key Research and Development Program of China under Grant No.2019YFB1005205.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100093, China

    Zhefeng Nan, Changbo Tian & Yafei Sang

  2. School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100049, China

    Zhefeng Nan, Changbo Tian & Yafei Sang

  3. Chinese Asset Cybersecurity Technology CO., Ltd, Beijing, 100041, China

    Guangze Zhao

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  1. Zhefeng Nan
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  2. Changbo Tian
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  4. Guangze Zhao
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Changbo Tian .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Shanghai University, Shanghai, China

    Honghao Gao

  2. Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Suzhou, China

    Xinheng Wang

  3. Zhejiang University City College, Hangzhou, China

    Wei Wei

  4. London South Bank University, London, UK

    Tasos Dagiuklas

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Nan, Z., Tian, C., Sang, Y., Zhao, G. (2022). ACS: An Efficient Messaging System with Strong Tracking-Resistance. In: Gao, H., Wang, X., Wei, W., Dagiuklas, T. (eds) Collaborative Computing: Networking, Applications and Worksharing. CollaborateCom 2022. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 461. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24386-8_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24386-8_4

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