Hydraulic Fracturing in New Brunswick: Trust, Deliberation, and Risk Decision-Making

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the role of trust in energy decision-making for shale gas development in the province of New Brunswick, Canada. It examines the role of risk perception as it relates to policy actors’ preferences in the context of public engagement and deliberation, where epistemic risks associated with the practice of hydraulic fracturing (the emerging technology that enabled the development of shale gas on a major scale) existed between 2007 and 2017. The goal of the chapter is to understand how engaging in the context of risk and uncertainty shapes policy actors’ learning along with the policy alternatives they advocate for, and ultimately deem acceptable. The Advocacy Coalition Framework is used to assess policy learning and to demonstrate the role of integrating an understanding of the importance of trust in managing risk. The analysis questions the notion that more engagement leads to better policy outcomes, and demonstrates that it is important to integrate lay knowledge as a fundamental component of risk management practices. The chapter concludes with recommendations to strengthen trust in energy decision-making in Canada.

Introduction and Context

This chapter examines the role of trust in energy decision-making for shale gas development in the province of New Brunswick (NB), Canada. Building on theoretical frameworks in public policy studies, the study assesses the role of risk perception in shaping policy actors’ preferences in the context of public engagement processes between 2007 and 2017. As with many other types of energy development in Canada, shale exploration and production are under provincial jurisdiction and therefore regulated by the province. With the potential for large-scale shale development in its jurisdiction, the provincial government set out to engage the public in 2011, as the assessment of NB’s geology by energy corporations was taking place to test the viability of production. The case of NB is therefore interesting to understand from a democratization standpoint—with the potential for shale gas development on one-fifth of the province’s land mass, the government set out to put citizens at the heart of decision-making (GNB, 2010) and employed a series of engagement activities in the context of risk and epistemic uncertainty surrounding the practice associated with producing shale gas. However, in 2014, a moratorium was imposed on hydraulic fracturing and it was extended indefinitely in 2016 after a commission established by the government toured the province.

Shale gas development involves the deployment of a technological practice of hydraulic fracturing, a practice that fractures rock horizontally and employs chemical compounds in large volumes of water to release gas from the rock that is then pumped back to the surface (NRCan, 2020), at which point the gas is separated from the water for transportation and use. A relatively recent breakthrough in the technology that enabled multi-stage hydraulic fracturing has led to the boom in production in North America. More commonly referred to as fracking, the practice has raised considerable fears about its impacts on the environment and human health. Potential risks include groundwater contamination, earthquakes, increased greenhouse gas emissions, and risks to health from endocrine disruption to impacts on newborns (Council of Canadian Academies, 2014). Shale development is not new to Canada; however, large-scale production has mainly taken place in Canada’s Western provinces (with a few small-scale activities taking place in NB).

Throughout the period of this case study (2007–2017), the public controversy surrounding shale development had taken prominence on the global stage. Public opposition to fracking was rising in many countries, and the documentary Gasland by Josh Fox, capturing the image of tap water lighting on fire, had caught attention. Controversies surrounding scientific research on the impacts of hydraulic fracturing remained evident (Dunlop et al., 2021)—experts disagreed on the causes of methane in groundwater or seismic activity linked to fracking. These are considerations that featured in the public debate in NB about permitting shale development to take place on a large scale in the province. This research is interested in how theory helps us understand the implications of risk for decision-making in the process of engaging the public. Specifically, this study is interested in the role of trust and lay knowledge, and their impact on learning among policy actors.

Multidisciplinary literature asserts the importance of public engagement in different ways. Different strands of the literature aimed at understanding the association between public perceptions and expert risk assessment, question the privileged role of expert views over lay knowledge. The “deficit” model under the Public Understanding of Science (PUS) frame, which asserts that expert knowledge needs to be used to educate lay people to make rational decisions, has been challenged very broadly. Science and Technology Studies (STS), where the role of expert knowledge is privileged, has also seen a turn in the literature toward participatory approaches emphasizing the role of communicative action and lay knowledge.

There has also been recognition of the role of citizens in the processes of risk communication and management (Fiorino, 1990; Slovic, 1993). Advocates argue that democratic legitimacy and trust can be improved by including the public in government decision-making regarding controversial technological innovations (Renn and Levine, 1991). Stern and Fineberg (1996) argue that from a governance perspective, “the instrumental rationale for broad public participation is that it may decrease conflict and increase acceptance of or trust in decisions by government agencies” (p. 24). This is especially the case in the context of governing risks, where distrust can create conflict (Stern and Fineberg, 1996). While the approach to the model of the individual may differ among the various approaches, the idea that involving people in a deliberative process can create new understandings of problems, and potentially more effective ways to address them, is a common driving thread. This is also evident in the literature on environmental planning and management, where the role of citizens in deliberating on the regulatory and policy decisions that impact them is emphasized (Fischer, 2000; Coburn, 2003).

The concept of public engagement has evolved from one of informing people about science and technical expertise to make rational decisions (a deficit model), to one about recognizing the knowledge that people hold and their views regarding risks that can be incorporated into the process (Petts and Brooks, 2006). Studies point to the importance of learning among participants in decision-making forums and processes to bring public values and perspectives to the table with technical expertise. Learning writ large is posited as a process of updating preferences based on new information or experience that can potentially lead to more effective outcomes. This is not exclusive to just citizens learning: the idea that experts can engage and learn as well is an important consideration of this approach.

The policy literature has also been challenged with “argumentative” and “deliberative” turns underlining the importance of engaging the public in government processes. Theoretical frameworks that seek to explain policy outcomes have also tended to privilege the role of experts and technical information. Therefore, in trying to assess democratization and its role in risk management in the case of shale development in NB, this study is focused on how policy actors (including experts and engaged citizens) learn and whether it influences policy change.

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a major theoretical framework to consider when it comes to understanding policy change (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), and it has been widely applied in the literature to study energy and environment subsystems (Litfin, 2000; Elliott and Schlaepfer, 2001; Bomberg, 2013; Heikkila et al., 2014). For the ACF, the basic unit of study is a policy subsystem that consists of advocacy coalitions and, according to the framework, is the most useful unit of analysis to understand how policy changes over a period of 10 years or more (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994).

Coalitions are mainly composed of policy elites¹ that have high levels of interest and knowledge in the respective subsystem. These coalitions compete to dominate the subsystem, whereby they succeed in translating their beliefs into policy (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). For this to occur, they need to gather allies, formulate strategies, and share resources. The central argument that forms the basis of the framework is that policy participants will partner with those who share similar beliefs, and that if they partake in a “nontrivial degree of coordination,” they form an advocacy coalition (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). As such, beliefs play an important role in their ability to bring participants together and form the interests that they then aim to transform into policy.

The ACF contends that there are four major paths to policy change: policy-oriented learning, external shocks, internal shocks, and a hurting stalemate (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). In this chapter, the focus is on policy-oriented learning, a path to policy change that occurs as a result of belief change within a coalition. Importantly, policy-oriented learning relative to policy participants is defined as “relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and/or new information and that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, p. 123). Thus, knowledge plays an explicit role in the change of beliefs that ultimately creates a change in policy through the process of policy-oriented learning.

However, for this to happen, the ACF specifies a set of conditions and a requirement for knowledge to be evidence-based “scientific and technical information” (Sabatier and Weible, 2007). As such, the ACF puts forward a very “rationalistic, technocratic understanding of learning” (Fischer, 2003, p. 109). The ACF argues that expert debate is what stimulates learning between the participants, and argues that certain technical capacities and specific contexts are a requisite for this to take place. The role of experts is privileged in the ACF, and they play a significant role in the dissemination and modification of ideas, rendering the model a technocratic one that emphasizes policy elites. Furthermore, the approach neglects the social aspects associated with learning and the socially constructed foundations of expertise (Fischer, 2003).

Many scholars have argued against such a technocratic understanding of policy-oriented learning and make calls for its revision (see, for example, Fischer, 2003; James and Jorgensen, 2009; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). They emphasize the role of discourse and lay knowledge. Shulock (1999) argues that it is insufficient to only consider technical and scientific information, and underscores the importance of an approach that includes knowledge from those affected by policy. Fischer (2000) argues that the conception of the type of knowledge that is used in policymaking needs to change. This research points to the importance of integrating the role of interactive knowledge in learning in the ACF. “Expert-knowledge generation is institutionalised and exclusive and shared through peer-review processes, whereas lay knowledge is embedded in the world around and directly impacting on individuals” (Petts and Brooks, 2006, p. 1046). Knowledge in a societal context is shared and developed informally among people; the emphasis is on contextualized knowledge in local settings. This is an interactive form of knowledge that is built on experience and interaction (Bryant, 2001).

The case of NB presents an opportunity to assess learning based on the integration of lay knowledge, where an extensive set of mechanisms for public participation² regarding shale development was implemented between 2010 and 2015. In the context of a high degree of uncertainty and perceived risk associated with hydraulic fracturing, the role of lay knowledge in learning and its effect on change can therefore be examined.

According to the ACF, beliefs are the core explanatory factor in understanding coalitions. It is on the basis of pre-existing beliefs that actors perceive the world in the ACF and therefore coordinate to influence policy. Beliefs are layered and start fundamentally with (a) the deep core connected to worldviews (e.g., ranking of values such as freedom and security based on cultural orientations and political ideologies), (b) the policy core of key policy positions based on worldview perspectives (e.g., government intervention versus market drivers based on problem severity and cause), and (c) secondary beliefs associated with instruments and tools to achieve policy objectives (instrumental means for achieving policy core ends or goals). For the ACF, cognitive components identify the basic causes of problems and favoured solutions (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). Ultimately, cognitive and normative elements are the ways in which actors find the “most appropriate” means to attain specified values and objectives. If changes happen to the policy core of a coalition, this can lead to policy change (Sabatier, 1998). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that if enough changes occur at the secondary level, this can also trigger a change of policy core beliefs (Weible and Nohrstedt, 2012).

The ACF posits that the parameters of learning are differentiated by cognitive and normative perceptions that can drive change, where cognitive precepts have a higher degree of influence on altering behavior or thought (Weible and Nohrstedt, 2012). Interested in the role of lay knowledge, this study aims to test a proposed hypothesis that interactive knowledge can serve to inform normative beliefs, which can in turn lead to belief change and therefore policy change. To do so, the research looks at the case of New Brunswick where a policy change in 2014 introduced a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing, after years of engagement on the opportunities of shale gas development in the province.

New Brunswick Case Study and Engagement Overview

In 2009, the government of NB leased out approximately one-fifth (1.5 million hectares) of the province’s landmass for exploration to several energy corporations. In 2011, members of the New Brunswick Energy Commission (Bill Thompson and Jeannot Volpe) were appointed by the government to lead the consultations on the future of energy policy in the province. Their report, published in 2011, identified natural gas as an energy transition fuel, as a part of the province’s energy mix that could support the transition to a low carbon economy. While shale development was not exclusively discussed in detail, the potential through unconventional gas became an obvious opportunity for production. The government aimed to engage the public in NB around the development of a regulatory framework for shale gas in the event that it would be technically and economically feasible to advance in the province. There were ten major public engagement initiatives related to fracking in New Brunswick starting in 2012.³ They include⁴:

• Two-person panel in 2010 to highlight key areas of concern for a provincial energy strategy through public engagement and recommend the establishment of an energy commission for the province;

• NB Energy Commission to engage New Brunswickers on the province’s long-term energy plan over the course of 2010/11;

• Stakeholder Forum in 2011 hosted by the Natural Gas Steering Committee (NGSC);

• A public discussion period based on the Natural Gas Group’s (NGG) 2011 engagement to develop a policy and regulatory framework for oil and gas development;

• An engagement tour led by Dr. Louis LaPierre, a professor from the University of Moncton, to seek further input on the shale gas regulatory recommendations across nine different locations in the province in mid-2012;

• Meetings with the Assembly of First Nations Chiefs of New Brunswick held by both industry and the NGG in 2012;

• Virtual town halls held by the Department of Energy and Mines where questions were posed to the Minister and experts in 2012;

• New Brunswick Energy Institute Roundtable evidence-based series in 2013;

• Over 70 presentations by the NGG to various groups such as municipal associations, chambers of commerce, and other government departments, with more than 2,200 people that attended between 2011 and 2012.

• The New Brunswick Commission on Hydraulic Fracturing (NBCHF) in 2014, led by John McLaughlin, Cheryl Robertson, and Marc Léger to study the issue of fracking and determine whether five conditions set out by the government could be met.

Methodology

This research is focused on a single in-depth case study of policy change in the province of NB, Canada. This approach helps develop a rich account of the case, and it is designed to account for the real-world context and deep understanding of decision-making for the policy actors involved (Yin, 2009). The study uses theory testing formulating a mechanism within existing theory to test causality. It adopts a mechanistic understanding of causality and employs process tracing, where outcomes are produced through “interactions of a series of parts that transmit causal forces from X to Y” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 176). The major mechanism under examination here is policy-oriented learning, a mechanism through which a change in beliefs leads to policy change. The key policy change for this study took place in 2014, when a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing was applied and then indefinitely extended in 2017.

To assess beliefs and strategies, 17 semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to understand policy actors’ perceptions. To triangulate, a media review was also conducted as well as an extensive review of relevant documentation and available public materials. Also, through the Right to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (RTIPPA), the researcher submitted requests to the Department of Energy and Mines and that of Environment and Local Government in NB. For the media review, the researcher searched the Canadian Major Dailies database for Telegraph-Journal⁵ articles, with the terms “shale gas,” “hydraulic fracturing,” and “fracking.” The search resulted in 439 articles, and by employing the methodology outlined by Lodge and Matus (2014), the articles were coded for key claims by actors and associated dates of the claims. The media analysis was used to assess key coalitional actors and their policy core and secondary arguments. Public documents, national media, and interviews were used to bolster this analysis and to assess deep core beliefs.

Analysis

This section presents the empirical findings from this analysis and details the normative and causal claims related to hydraulic fracturing in NB to determine the nature of policy learning among key coalitional actors. This research is focused on the normative and causal dimensions of policy core beliefs as outlined by the ACF, and hypothesizes that normative claims as defined earlier can lead to policy change.⁶ The research hypothesizes that preferences are determined and altered through social interaction and that they have an effect on normative components of the policy core. This is particularly the case where the process of decision-making has opened up the policy process to a broader segment of engaged citizens. A secondary hypothesis is a supporting notion that contrary to what is proposed in the ACF, it is not the causal components⁷ that are more likely to change, but rather, it is the normative components that have a significant effect through information from the social world and experience.

The basis of the ACF is coalitions, and in the case of NB, two coalitions involving a wide range of actors, including officials from government (both elected officials and officials in the public service), interest group leaders, environmental and business organizations, experts, the media and citizens, competed to advance their objectives regarding shale development. The media analysis identified a pro-development and an anti-shale gas coalition, with distinct policy statements regarding the environmental risks versus the economic benefits of shale gas. The pro-development coalition, composed of elected officials, industry representatives, experts, journalists, and citizens, argued broadly at the policy core level for the economic benefits of shale development to the province. Their more nuanced policy positions included claims for economic development in the context of promoting good paying jobs, ensuring a natural gas supply for the region, as well as the potential for investment attraction. A small minority of claims argued that fracking is fundamentally safe. The claims are represented in Fig. 6.1 by frequency.

Fig. 6.1

(Source Author’s own source)

Frequency of claims: economic benefits (2007–2017)

The anti-shale gas coalition was composed of elected officials (including members of the opposition and municipal representatives), government officials, experts, environmental organizations, Indigenous representatives, citizens, labour organizations, and journalists. They argued at the policy core level against shale gas development predominantly in relation to the environmental risks associated with the practice. More nuanced policy positions included claims about the environmental risk of shale development in the context of climate change more broadly and Indigenous representatives asserted their land rights against the risks of fracking. The claims of the anti-shale coalition are demonstrated in Fig. 6.2 by frequency of claims.

Fig. 6.2

(Source Author’s own source)

Frequency of claims: environmental risks (2007–2017)

The analysis differentiated between problem severity and causal arguments versus normative claims. The pro-development coalition relied on arguing that shale gas could be produced safely with the right regulatory measures, thereby managing the risks associated with the practice to profit from the economic benefits. The anti-shale gas coalition argued that more information about the impacts of fracking was needed for decisions to be made. They raised concerns about the uncertainty associated with the practice and made calls for the implementation of a moratorium on fracking, until the risks could be better understood. In doing so, the anti-shale gas coalition questioned the assertion of the pro-coalition that regulations would truly protect the people and the land in NB if fracking were to proceed on a large scale.

The media analysis assisted in sketching out some of the key differentiations at that level of policy core beliefs. However, it is limited in providing a deeper understanding of the context. Interviews and document analysis provide a much clearer understanding of the impact of engagement and risk on the nature of policy learning. Thus far, this section has established the coalitional positions and some of the basic claims made by each. The next section will highlight the findings according to the categories of assertions outlined in the methodology. This includes claims about information, risk, and uncertainty, as well as public engagement. A summary of the key beliefs that emerged from thematic examination of the data from the interviews in addition to the data from the media analysis is provided in Table 6.1. The findings will be discussed in the following discussion.

Table 6.1 Belief systems of pro-development and anti-shale gas coalitions in New Brunswick

Claims About Information

Interview participants from both coalitions claimed that in the early stages of learning about fracking (2007–2011), there was very little information available. On the one hand, the members of the pro-development coalition relayed their experiences in trying to ensure that information was aggregated and disseminated in a reliable manner (interviews 2, 6, 14, 15). As one industry representative put it: “the interest in hydraulic fracturing was just getting underway so it’s something new to people, new to the government and the industry, and there wasn’t a lot of information available in particular to the public” (interview 5). On the other hand, anti-shale gas coalition members noted the difficulties in finding information to understand the impacts of fracking.⁸

During this initial four-year period, a strategy that was adopted by both coalitions was to engage with people who experienced fracking. The pro-coalition did this by arranging a fact-finding mission to jurisdictions in the United States (US) and Canada with a recent history of fracking activities. In some cases, joined by members of the anti-coalition, they spoke with industry representatives and farmers working in and experiencing shale gas development. An elected official noted: “I wanted to see it [fracking process] with my own eyes and hear it with my own ears. And that’s why we went to Texas, Houston, we went to Pennsylvania, we went to the northern part of BC and went to Calgary and then northern Alberta to where operations have been in process” (interview 2).

Members from the anti-shale gas coalition likewise were interested in hearing first-hand about the experience. As one environmental advocate noted, “the reality is that people want to hear from people. I want to hear stories, and I want to hear what’s your experience with this” (interview 1). To counter the approach, they arranged for bringing knowledge in from the US as well. As one environmental advocate noted: “initially, in the beginning it was about bringing experience of the United States from a civil society perspective and expertise to those who would be involved in policy development and regulation [in NB]” (interview 3). During this period, the public debate about shale gas development was only beginning to emerge, and the claims recorded for or against the resource’s extraction were not as frequent (see Figs. 6.3 and 6.4).⁹

Fig. 6.3

(Source Author’s own source)

Distribution of economic benefit claims by date (2007–2017)

The coalitions also turned to the experiences within the province to understand and learn about fracking. Experiences were shared from residents in the Penobsquis area in Kings County who lost their well water starting in 2004, where Potash Corporation operated a large mining project. The residents cited loss of water in direct relation to the seismic¹⁰ and drilling activity that Potash Corporation and Corridor Resources (a proponent in the case of fracking) undertook in the area. About 60 wells went dry, and for several years, the provincial government supplied the community with water that was trucked in and rationed per head. Several interview participants cited these concerns with water loss and a lack of appropriate remediation¹¹ as potentially negative experiences to be had with the resource industry. An environmental advocate noted: “the courts were allowing them to do that so […] the whole legal system was geared to protect the industry and not the people, and so what happens if we allow that to happen here?” (interview 8). While the causes of water loss are disputed, this experience is one that associated risk in a province where many households depend on well water for their daily consumption. The province estimates that there are upwards of 100,000 private water wells in NB (GNB, 2020). A First Nations representative noted: “NB has a lot of groundwater, we have a lot of people who are living in rural areas, and so [there was] the concern that that this would somehow impact the groundwater” (interview 4).¹²

Risk to water resources from hydraulic fracturing activity emerged as a key concern in the analysis. Public reports summarizing various phases of the public engagement process identify water protection as a key concern (OCMOH, 2012; LaPierre, 2012; NBCHF, 2016). This is a core issue identified in the interviews as well, where the anti-coalition pointed to the lack of baseline water testing in the province and the repeal of wetland protections in 2012. They argued that without these basic measures it would be difficult for the government to monitor and enforce measures to protect water in the province. They also pointed to experience with the province’s capacity to ensure adequate oversight. As one government official noted, people “are not trusting the government and those that apply the regulations. Because in other industries there is not a sufficient amount of people to ensure that it is followed [regulation] by the letter, and so when they see that in other types of industries or sectors, they ask why would this sector have more resources?” (interview 9).

The anti-shale gas coalition was also concerned about the required capacity and infrastructure to support wastewater management from fracking operations. NB is largely composed of unincorporated regions governed by Local Service Districts (LSDs) with unique governance at the local level but no policy or financial levers.¹³ Incorporated regions also have limited authority in terms of municipal policy and regulatory functions, and in a province where municipal water treatment systems are small scale, anti-coalition members from local government questioned the province’s capacity to support effective water treatment. The Chief Medical Health Officer (CMHO) reaffirmed this when a key recommendation in a CMHO report raised the need to establish capacity to manage the infrastructure around fracking activities. Members of the anti-coalition relied on their experiences with local government to question the effectiveness of regulating a large-scale industry like shale gas in their province.

Claims About Risk and Uncertainty

As more scientific research about hydraulic fracturing emerged in the period between 2011 and 2014, the frequency of claims for or against hydraulic fracturing increased significantly (see claims in Figs. 6.3 and 6.4). This was also accompanied by the rollout of several public engagement mechanisms in NB and a rise in the controversies surrounding development in the province. As noted earlier, the government released public discussion documents in 2012. One key document in May 2012, titled Responsible Environmental Management of Oil and Gas Activities in New Brunswick—Recommendations for Public Discussion, proposed 116 changes to the regulatory framework governing oil and gas production (GNB, 2012). To engage people on the proposed rules, the government appointed Dr. LaPierre with a mandate to solicit feedback from citizens, record public sessions, review submissions, and ultimately provide a report that summarized the issues related to the regulations for shale gas development in New Brunswick. Within the same time frame, NB’s CMHO Dr. Eilish Cleary was mandated with developing recommendations for protecting public health in light of potential shale development activities.

Fig. 6.4

(Source Author’s own source)

Distribution of environmental risks claims by date (2007–2017)

Public opposition to fracking in the province was on the rise in 2012, and this was evidenced by the organization of public rallies, blockades, and petitions. In May 2012, before the engagement tour was slated to take place, there was a large parade organized in May in Fredericton outside of the legislature, and many community groups spoke out against shale development in the province (NBEN, 2012a). In early fall of 2012, controversy emerged around the CMHO’s report as it became clear that the report had been written but not released to the public. It is not clear how this information emerged, but the opposition Liberals and many members of the anti-shale gas coalition demanded the report’s release, and the media controversy surrounding the government’s lack of commitment to releasing the report stimulated public outcry. Anti-shale members encouraged people to take civil action, including writing to their MLAs to request the report’s release (NBEN, 2012b).

During this period, despite sustained engagement and the government’s effort to democratize the decision-making process, opposition intensified against shale development in NB. This emerged as the pro-development coalition’s narrative that hydraulic fracturing could be done safely solidified. The engagement tour concluded and in October 2012 released a report with recommendations for shale gas development, titled The Path Forward¹⁴ (LaPierre, 2012). Advancing a path for shale gas development to proceed based on what was heard, the report identified a number of key areas for work aside from just addressing the proposed changes to regulation of oil and gas.

The report also claimed that industry and government had failed at providing information to New Brunswickers to understand the implications of shale gas development (LaPierre, 2012, p. 26). On the same day in October, the CMHO’s report was also released and it contained several recommendations from a health perspective. A key recommendation that gained a lot of traction with the anti-shale coalition was the establishment of health impact assessments alongside environmental ones, and more monitoring to understand the cumulative impacts of fracking on health. Furthermore, with a section titled “What we know and what we don’t know,” the report also made clear that there was more information needed for decision-making about shale development. In hindsight, an industry representative asserted that: “one of the key things would be the fear of the unknown. Looking back over the course of four years the number one thing that kept coming from the public at large was we don’t have enough information” (interview 6).

Several interview participants noted their disappointment in the Path Forward report. It appeared to carve out a way forward when they felt they had been vocal during engagement processes about their views for not moving ahead with shale gas development just yet. This was evident in a public release by the anti-shale gas coalition that stated that the report “did not reflect the will of the people as expressed at public meetings held in 2012, and Dr. LaPierre did not gather evidence over the course of the public meetings to support his opinion finding that a moratorium on shale gas development was or was not warranted” (NBEN, 2012a). Participants also accorded a significant degree of credibility to the CMHO’s report, citing the need to have more information to protect public health. More broadly, the coalition asserted that the province could not proceed without more information, particularly in terms of regulating unknowns.

Claims About Public Participation

Claims about environmental risks rose, as demonstrated in Fig 6.4. A robust narrative emerged from the anti-shale gas coalition claiming that there was not enough information to make a decision to proceed with development. The calls for a moratorium from the anti-shale gas coalition also grew between 2013 and 2014. The pro-development coalition argued that the regulations that they developed were among the most stringent in North America. They released an Oil and Gas Blueprint that highlighted the key planks to move forward with shale gas development. Additionally, Dr. LaPierre was appointed to head up the New Brunswick Energy Institute (NBEI) to provide reliable scientific data to inform decision-making around shale. Figure 6.3 shows the increase in claims that fracking is a practice that can proceed safely if well managed for all the risks associated with the practice.

The anti-coalition undermined this narrative, questioning how this would be done. As one environmental advocate noted, there were “a lot of unknowns, so how can you regulate something that is still evolving? And then there’s the bigger questions around climate change. Whether this is safe or not is one question but then there’s a whole other context of should we do it even if it is safe?” (interview 1). They also advanced their perspective that they did not trust the government to regulate the resource, and noted limited capacity in NB at the provincial and municipal levels to provide an adequate degree of oversight to ensure that the regulations were enforced.

In terms of public participation, many members noted that they felt unheard and were frustrated to see the province move ahead with regulations for fracking. The issue became even more contentious when it was revealed that Dr. LaPierre had falsified his credentials and stepped down from the NBEI. The trust of people in the government and in the engagement process emerged as a strong theme in the analysis. As one environmental advocate mentioned “so I mean that kind of a thing where government isn’t even respecting the process […] that is when the trust is really broken because it became apparent they have no interest in trying to get some sort of measure of approval or listen to what was going on” (interview 8). Public protest and civic action rose in NB in opposition to shale gas development and culminated in the clashes at Rexton, NB, where images of police cars on fire made national and international news. An industry representative noted that “people started to mistrust the process itself – public consultation ceased to be about the mechanism anymore – people don’t trust it and why would they?” (interview 6).

In 2014, the Liberals ran on a campaign to put a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing in the province. They won in October of that year, defeating the Progressive Conservative government that had been in power since 2010. The new Premier, Brian Gallant, implemented a moratorium on fracking along with five conditions that needed to be met before fracking could proceed in NB: (a) that a “social licence” be established through consultations to lift the moratorium; (b) clear and credible information on the impacts on air, health, and water so a regulatory regime could be developed; (c) a plan to mitigate impacts on public infrastructure and address issues such as waste water disposal; (d) that a process be in place to fulfill the province’s obligation to consult with First Nations; and (e) that a proper royalty structure be established to ensure benefits are maximized for New Brunswickers (CBC, 2014). To address these conditions, the government appointed three thought leaders in the province, John McLaughlin, Marc Léger, and Cheryl Robertson, to lead the New Brunswick Commission on Hydraulic Fracturing (NBCHF). They were mandated with engaging New Brunswickers and providing their recommendations on whether the conditions could be met.

The NBCHF toured the province, but rather than engaging on shale development itself, they broadened the discussion to one regarding the future of energy in NB (interview 15). The engagement process itself was well received by the anti-shale gas coalition, and in its findings, it reported that the government needed to work on strengthening public trust and instituting an independent regulator to oversee resource development. It does not appear that the government acted on their recommendations, and it is not clear to what extent the rest of the conditions were implemented/advanced. The government extended the moratorium on hydraulic fracturing indefinitely in 2016.

Discussion and Conclusion

The key consideration of this analysis is assessing belief change. As Wellstead (2017) states: “changing a coalition’s core policy belief would eventually alter the basic perception of policy problems as well as the general policy prescription of an issue” (p. 551). Evaluating whether policy-oriented learning led to change requires identifying who learns, what they learn, and to what effect (see Table 6.2, which builds on Bennett and Howlett, 1992).

Table 6.2 Learning by category

The research indicates that the increase in engagement mechanisms allowed the anti-shale gas coalition to find many opportunities to engage in decision-making. The anti-shale coalition was able to contest the goals and means of the pro-development coalition’s strategies. By drawing on the normative claims linked to their policy core beliefs, the anti-fracking coalition was able to successfully challenge the dominant coalition’s policy and push for change. They drove the assertion that there was not enough information to proceed with hydraulic fracturing development in New Brunswick. As the main strategy, the anti-coalition appealed to this argument to undermine the very underpinnings of the pro-development coalition’s claims that it was safe and could be developed safely to expand resource production in the province based on evidence and regulatory best practice.

From the analysis presented here, it is clear that the learning was isolated to the instruments and settings related to shale development in NB. In the case of NB, it is not clear that policy change was due to the alteration of beliefs on behalf of either coalition. Rather, the problem definition was altered to become a question of whether fracking was socially acceptable, rather than how to develop it safely and maximize economic benefit. By evaluating risk differently, the coalition challenged the technocratic management of risk regulation of an emerging technology.

Furthermore, the case demonstrates the importance of trust in risk management. The lack of trust in public authorities in NB meant that the public did not trust that they would be protected from the risks posed by hydraulic fracturing. The process of engagement appears to have amplified that mistrust, but what the case also demonstrates is the role of lay knowledge in decision-making. Members of the anti-shale gas coalition had a deep understanding of their context that they brought to the engagement exercises. Their local knowledge focused more on how policy and regulation would impact their lives and less on the technical aspects of risk governance.