Keywords

Introduction and Context

This chapter examines the role of assessment and risk management in the decision-making processes for selecting a permanent site for the long-term storage of Canada’s high-level nuclear waste. Geographically, it focuses on two areas: the potential storage sites and, once a site is selected, the transportation routes used to access the site. Temporally, it focuses on the planned site and route selection processes up until the facility is licensed to operate.

Nuclear waste management policy and regulatory frameworks are under federal authority. Canada’s radioactive waste management policy framework is defined by Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) while the Nuclear Safety and Control Act established the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) to act as an independent regulator responsible for the use of nuclear material. Under the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act (NFWA), the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) was established in 2002 as a not-for-profit corporation responsible for the site selection process for a deep geological repository (DGR) to store Canada’s used nuclear fuel. The NWMO will make a recommendation to the CNSC in due course.

There were 12,718 cubic meters of high-level nuclear waste at the end of 2019, with a predicted 21,015 cubic meters projected by 2050 (Natural Resources Canada 2021). Temporary storage solutions include wet and dry licensed facilities. A permanent solution must be developed in order to deal with the current and future nuclear waste.

The NWMO’s Adaptive Phased Management (APM) plan “requires used fuel to be contained and isolated in a deep geological repository. It also calls for a comprehensive process to select an informed and willing host for the project” (NWMO 2017a). The multi-step process involves finding a willing host community in a geologically suitable region and conducting a vast array of tests, with the support and input, of local citizens and surrounding communities, including Indigenous groups.

The APM framework contains nine steps. The first two steps, Process Initiation and Initial Screening, are completed. The third step, Preliminary Assessments of Suitability, is ongoing. Additional steps are:

  • Detailed site evaluations (Step 4)

  • Confirmation of acceptance by willing host community (Step 5)

  • Formal agreement to host the repository (Step 6)

  • Step 6 is concurrent with the CNSC regulatory review and approval process (Step 7)

  • Construction of the repository (Step 8)

  • Operation of the repository (Step 9).

The NWMO has four key guiding questions: Is there the potential to find a safe site? Is there the potential to foster the well-being of the community? Is there the potential for citizens in the community to continue to be interested in the process through subsequent steps? Is there the potential to foster the well-being of surrounding communities? (NWMO 2017i).

During the Initial Screening phase (Step 2), the NWMO evaluated the potential suitability of the interested communities based on a list of screening criteria.Footnote 1 21 of 22 communities passed initial screening and requested a more formal “assessment of suitability.” By the end of 2014, all communities had entered Step 3, with the preliminary assessment, conducted through a series of activities: desktop studies and fieldwork to complete both scientific and technical studies, as well as community well-being assessments. Resources to support communities are available.

The most common reasons to exclude a community from the process are (i) the limited geological potential and (ii) the NWMO’s assessment that the community no longer represents a potential host (NWMO 2020). On the last point, however, the NWMO does not provide further explanation.

The NWMO has progressively narrowed the number of communities from 22 to five and then to two: Ignace and South Bruce (NWMO 2020a). The best possible site and willing host could be chosen by 2023, but no time frame was put in place to allow flexible design and iterative planning. As of September 2022, borehole drilling has restarted after a pause due to the COVID-19 pandemic. “Testing and analysis of core samples from both areas is now well underway. These are significant steps that will enhance our understanding of whether the siting areas can meet robust regulatory requirements” (NWMO 2022: 7).

Once identified, the NWMO will apply for a license to build a DGR to contain and isolate used nuclear fuel. In brief, the proposed technology consists of a “multiple-barrier system,” with nuclear fuel bundles introduced into copper-coated canisters and encased in bentonite clay boxes, placed 500-meters-deep underground.

Once the site is selected, and before the repository is built, conceptual routes may be selected to transport the waste from current on-site temporary storage facilities in Manitoba, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Ontario to the DGR. The selection of transportation routes represents another important element of the overall risk management framework, with a draft planning document currently under a public consultation process (NWMO 2020b).

This chapter has five parts. Part one is a methodology statement. Part two describes the risks and uncertainties that are related to nuclear waste management. Part three evaluates people’s level of affectedness by the project. Part four analyzes the types of risk management tools involved in nuclear waste siting. Part five provides a preliminary assessment of the level of democratization characterizing Canada’s site selection decision-making process.

Methodology

This study relies on official NWMO documents, supplemented by secondary material from other organizations, books, academic articles, and news pieces. Importantly, this study includes eight semi-structured interviews from participants in two potential host communities: Hornepayne (removed from consideration) and Ignace (still involved in the process). Individuals were initially contacted through their involvement with the Community Liaison Committees (CLCs), but we used snowballing techniques to increase the number of respondents. All respondents had closely followed the site selection process over many years. There was a range of opinion within the two separate communities: some wanted their community to host the DGR, others did not, and some were undecided. Respondents were promised anonymity such that remarks are indicated as ‘Hornepayne resident’ or ‘Ignace resident’.

There were no interviews with Indigenous communities that were adjacent to potential sites. The authors had initially arranged for interviews with members of the Constance Lake First Nation, but when Hornepayne was removed from consideration, the band members canceled them. In addition, there were no interviews conducted of community members along transportation routes because these will not be identified until after a host site is selected.

Risks and Uncertainties in Nuclear Waste Management

There are six types of risk (technological, environmental, human health, political, security, and financial) and three categories of uncertainties (epistemic, semantic, and normative) applicable to the nuclear waste management case study. Technological risks deal with the safe construction, operation, and closure of a geological repository, with the storage casks capable of safely containing the nuclear waste for thousands of years, but also accessible should reprocessing solutions become feasible in the future. Environmental risks include geological processes, tectonic movement, and climate change, which could damage the DGR. Risks to the environment also include the potential for contamination of the soil and water around the repository, as well as possible contamination due to accidents along the transportation routes. Human health risks include exposure to radiation through the DGR or contamination of soil or water. These risks to human and environmental health are magnified by having a large quantity of high-level nuclear waste at one localized site and the long-term radioactivity associated with the waste. Accidents along the transportation routes could also impact human health, a frequently noted concern of the interview participants.

In addition, the existence and perception of risks to the environment may have social effects with political, security, and financial implications. Political risks may arise from the NWMO’s requirement to consult with the affected communities. These affected communities not only include those considered for the final site of the DGR, but also those communities on or near the transportation routes. There may even be political risks from communities that are nowhere near the DGR or the transportation routes; broader public opinion, at the provincial or national level, may simply be opposed to a permanent nuclear waste site. The government’s final decision to approve the DGR construction is also highly political. Will a federal cabinet be willing to support such a project if public opinion becomes highly mobilized against it, and will a prime minister be willing to make such a decision part of his or her political legacy? Security risks include accidents or terrorist attacks during transportation or at the facility itself. Financial risks include the costs of building and maintaining the site and maintaining or improving the methods of transportation to the site (e.g., roads, rail, airport, etc.).

Uncertainty is reflected in the key common questions: How do we know the nuclear waste storage is going to be safe, and the technology durable, for a million years? More broadly, can we keep safely producing nuclear energy, and waste, in Canada in the future? While nuclear advocates believe the long-term waste storage technology is safe and reliable, opponents argue that a series of epistemic modeling risks and uncertainties are left unanswered; corrosion, pressurization, earthquakes, future ice ages, or human interference could result in dramatic consequences for environmental and human health. NWMO replies to those concerns stating that the DGR rock formation will be highly stable and the multiple-barrier system is a proven technology. Semantic uncertainty is also high: How do we warn future populations to stay away from the nuclear repository? The key concern here is how to ensure no one will excavate nuclear waste in the future. To do this, a universal sign that will be understood thousands of years from now to communicate: “Don’t dig here!” must be found. The NWMO has not yet addressed this semantic issue. This risk ranked high in the minds of some residents: We “can’t forget that we have repositories in our country.”

Although not constructive toward dealing with existing nuclear fuel waste, normative uncertainty also remains about whether Canada should continue to produce nuclear energy. Opponents believe that the entire nuclear supply chain should be assessed, rather than a single waste management project, and a phase out from nuclear energy must occur.

It is also important to mention that not building a repository for used nuclear fuel is not risk free. An isolated DGR is a benefit with limited surface access (including inadvertently). All Canadian nuclear fuel waste is currently stored in temporary surface facilities that require management and surveillance in perpetuity: nuclear power reactor sites (Bruce, Darlington, and Pickering in Ontario; Gentilly in Quebec; and Point Lepreau in New Brunswick) and Canadian Nuclear Laboratories sites (Whiteshell Laboratories in Manitoba and Chalk River Laboratories in Ontario).

These facilities are licensed by the CNSC under the NFWA, with the regulated “wet/dry” approach designed to last at least 50 years (CNSC 2014b). Life span extensions or repackaging are identified as additional risk management options. Monitoring and regular inspections help to ensure the safety of the interim storage facilities.

While interim storage facilities are considered a safe and reliable option in the short and medium term, these are not a practical solution for thousands of years into the future. According to the NWMO, “Although the used fuel's radioactivity decreases with time, chemical toxicity persists. The used fuel will remain a potential health risk for many hundreds of thousands of years. For this reason, it requires careful management” (NWMO 2018c). Simply put, the “do nothing” option is not risk free.

Level of Affectedness

To assess individuals’ level of affectedness and agency in risk exposure, three questions guide the analysis: Do individuals have a voice? Do they have a choice? And are they able to mitigate risks? Nuances may emerge, in part based on the stage of the decision-making process.

This case finds both individual-affected and individual-dependent assessments of risks. Canada’s DGR will be located in a willing host community (individual-dependent), but the diffusion of risks may have some effects at a much larger scale (individual-affected). Under the APM approach, early stages of the site selection process are more prone to integrate public inputs, i.e., give Canadians a voice and local communities a choice. But once the site has been selected, and technical work has commenced, the individuals may become more affected and people’s agency progressively reduced.

Primary Risk Management Intervention Tools

The REACT risk management framework identifies options in five categories, namely regulatory, economic, advisory, community-based, and technological (Krewski et al. 2007). All five tools are important in the DGR context: a strict federal regulatory framework, economic incentives for host communities to participate in the site selection process, advisory interventions involving knowledge transfer, community involvement in the site selection process, and technological developments and assessments of site suitability, combined with the multi-barrier system. Each tool is reviewed separately here, but it is also important to note that they remain highly intertwined in practice.

Regulatory Interventions

The regulatory framework is central to the project’s completion as it determines the boundaries of action for the NWMO, guides the consultation and information process, determines the financial compensations for participation, and determines the benefits to the host community.

The Radioactive Waste Policy Framework is the overarching policy implemented by NRCan, stating that the “federal government is responsible for ensuring that long-term radioactive waste management is carried out in a safe, environmentally sound, comprehensive, cost-effective and integrated manner” (Natural Resources Canada 2022).

Within the policy, nuclear energy, from cradle to grave, is a highly regulated field. The sole Canadian federal regulator is the CNSC, established in 2000 by the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, to replace the previous Atomic Energy Control Board. The CNSC’s mandate is to regulate “the use of nuclear energy and materials to protect health, safety, security and the environment; to implement Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and to disseminate objective scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public” (CNSC 2018a).

The quasi-judicial CNSC reports to Parliament through the Minister of Natural Resources, although decision-making is at arm’s length from the government. The Federal Court of Canada is the only body that can review CNSC decisions, and while it cannot reverse a decision, it can make a referral back to the CNSC for reconsideration if it believes the CNSC acted outside its mandate. The Canadian Parliament can also temporarily bypass CNSC decisions, although this has only occurred once (Bratt 2012, 42–45; CNSC 2014a).

The regulatory framework used by the CNSC to fulfill its mandate consists of the laws passed by Parliament, and the regulations, licenses, and documents that the CNSC develops (CNSC 2017). The four key federal laws are: the Nuclear Energy Act (1985) regarding the research and development of nuclear energy in Canada; the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (2000) for the use of nuclear energy in Canada; the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act (2017) that defines responsibilities of liability in case of accident; and the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act (2002), that, as previously mentioned, provides a framework for decision-making on the management of nuclear fuel waste. In addition to creating the NWMO, the NFWA established a trust fund into which every major owner of used nuclear fuel in Canada must deposit to finance the long-term management of used nuclear fuel (NWMO 2018d).

The NWMO is also subject to obligations under the Impact Assessment Act, 2019, that stipulates that an environmental assessment must be conducted by the Impact Assessment Agency for designated nuclear projects and the CNSC supports the agency in the conduct of environmental assessments. Thus, even after completing the public engagement process associated with finding a willing host community, additional public engagement and technical processes will likely be required under the environmental assessment or impact assessment legislation in place, with obligations under the CNSC regulatory process. The latter currently include CNSC Regulatory documents 2.11.1, Waste Management, Volume I: Management of Radioactive Waste and Waste Management, Volume III: Safety Case for Long-Term Radioactive Waste Management (CNSC 2019c).The CNSC has also drafted guidance relevant for DGRs, REGDOC 1.2.1: Guidance on Deep Geological Site Characterization that may be used in subsequent license applications (CNSC 2018b).

While the CNSC is the licensing authority, it works closely with other federal and provincial bodies to ensure that regulatory requirements are met, and it is ultimately the responsibility of the license applicant to meet all applicable requirements. Provinces are also responsible for protecting public health and safety, property and the environment within their borders, and regulating resource exploitation and extraction. Therefore, the provinces will likely require their own studies of the environmental impacts of this project. Both provinces and municipalities also have their own permits, licenses, approvals, and/or bylaws that must be upheld (NWMO 2017k). All of these factors are taken into consideration for each specific project overseen by the CNSC.

The responsibility for regulating the transportation of nuclear waste is shared between the CNSC (Packaging and Transport of Nuclear Substances Regulations, 2015—SOR/2015-145) and Transport Canada (Transportation of Dangerous Goods Regulations). As a result, the NWMO “will need to demonstrate to these authorities the safety and security of its transportation system” (NWMO 2018a), including the use of a CNSC-certified transport package that meets all the license requirements and regulations and implementation of a Transportation Security Plan and an Emergency Response Plan. Periodic reviews and audits are also part of the plan. A discussion document for “Planning Transportation for Adaptive Phased Management” (NWMO 2016a) and a questionnaire (NWMO 2016b) are available online for those who want to share their thoughts on this issue. According to the NWMO, transportation of nuclear waste to the DGR should not begin before 2040.

It is important to emphasize that citizens can influence regulatory interventions in a number of ways. For example, there are established processes for citizen consultation on all regulatory documents and throughout the licensing and in-service phases of the project.

Residents of Ignace and Hornepayne recognized and in fact were quite knowledgeable about the role of the NWMO and CNSC in the site selection process and approval. They knew that the NWMO’s job was finding a technical solution to the nuclear waste problem and solving the political problem by locating a suitable community, with the CNSC’s job to evaluate whether or not the project can demonstrate safety. If it becomes licensed, periodic safety evaluations would form part of its licensing basis. Those interviewed believed that the NWMO and CNSC played a “vital” role in the site selection process. Even those interviewees that were openly hostile toward hosting a DGR and very critical of the NWMO mentioned that the CNSC was much more effective and would always answer their questions.

Economic Interventions

There are two types of economic intervention tools in Canada’s nuclear waste management sector. The first one is industry-related: the Nuclear Liability and Compensation Act (Canada 2015) establishes the compensation and liability regime in case of a nuclear accident. This Act specifies that the nuclear operator is liable for damage caused within Canada at the facility or during transportation of nuclear material (including but not limited to bodily and property damage, economic loss, and environmental damage) of up to $1 billion.

The second type of economic intervention tool is community-related and refers to financial compensation as a core incentive for communities to host the DGR. Beyond the prospect of job creation within the willing host community, interested communities have already received money for participating in the site selection process. Members of the communities of Hornepayne and Ignace who were interviewed noted the benefits of NWMO support for community projects while participating in the site selection process. Each community (including First Nation and Métis communities) that participated in preliminary assessment and engagement processes was allowed to receive between $250,000 and $600,000, depending on how far along they were in the ongoing assessment process. Some Indigenous organizations have also received up to $150,000 for their participation in the process (NWMO 2017c, d, e).

The chosen host community should receive substantial financial compensation for hosting the nuclear waste facility, but the numbers remain unknown. Such financial compensations represent a key economic intervention tool in the process of finding Canada’s permanent site for high-level nuclear waste. In this case, the interview participants believed this is the core reason why their communities were/are willing to host the repository. Concerning both the ongoing funding and the DGR compensation, critics said, however, that it was “bribe money.”

Advisory Interventions

Advisory intervention tools refer to the knowledge transfer from experts on nuclear energy and waste management to the communities. During the site selection process, the NWMO has sought inputs from a variety of specialists. Two background papers have been written: Developing a Siting Strategy for a Nuclear Fuel Waste Management Facility by Richard Kuhn and Brenda Murphy (2006) and Learning from the Experience of Others: A Selection of Case Studies about Siting Processes prepared by Stratos Ltd. (2006). Two papers on economic benefits were also published: the Summary of Economic Benefits Linked to Adaptive Phased Management at an Economic Region Level (Aecom Canada Ltd. 2009) and A Preliminary Assessment of Illustrative Generic Community Economic Benefits from Hosting the APM Project (Aecom Canada Ltd. 2010). Professor William Leiss has also prepared three expert papers exploring the concept of risk and risk communication: Thinking About Risk and Safety (Leiss 2009a); How might communities organize their discussions about hosting a site for used nuclear fuel? (Leiss 2009b); and What is happening in other countries? (Leiss 2009c).

Two other individuals seem to have developed considerable knowledge on the topic over the past few years and have become advisory experts communicating with the communities: Gordon Edwards, from the explicitly anti-nuclear Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, and Jason Donev, a physicist from the University of Calgary. Both Edwards and Donev have given presentations to CLCs in special meetings organized by the NWMO. These experts, as one Hornepayne resident put it, “slowly chipped away and increased people's technical, scientific based knowledge.”

Community-Based Interventions

Community-based interventions are central to the nuclear waste disposal facility site selection process. The NWMO has decided to use a bottom-up approach by initiating meetings and information sessions only with communities interested in welcoming the DGR. In fall 2019, the NWMO conducted surveys of the residents from the, at the time, remaining five potential host communities. The surveys measured respondents’ knowledge and awareness of the NWMO, questions about the site selection process (i.e., transportation, infrastructure, security, and safety), sources of information, preferred methods of NWMO communication, and project areas to learn more about (NWMO 2019b). The eventual local host community, and to some extent the neighboring area, must demonstrate its willingness to welcome the DGR on its territory. As a result, the community interventions (be it asking for more information, risk assessments, expressing questions and concerns about survey work, etc.) are at the heart of the NWMO’s approach. However, what type of approval will be required and how the approval from the community will be achieved and sustained remains uncertain. For example, what happens if a community gives approval to the DGR, and then decades later, after the facility has been built and operating, a community changes its mind and wants it closed down? So far, the NWMO argues that it is “committed that the project will only be located in an area with an informed and willing host” and that the “project will only proceed with the involvement of the community, First Nation and Métis communities in the area, and surrounding communities working together to implement it.” Community approval, the NWMO suggests, “will need to be supported by a compelling demonstration of willingness” (NWMO 2017j). What constitutes compelling community willingness to host the site has not been substantiated by the NWMO. Questions then arise as to whether this will be done through a referendum, town hall meetings, local political support, or simply through the absence of local opposition?

The NWMO also recognizes the importance of Indigenous Knowledge as a different epistemology to consider in the site selection process: “Indigenous Knowledge is a complex and sophisticated system of knowledge drawing on millennia of wisdom and experience that constantly grows and expands with the experience of each generation. As we continue to move through the site selection process and engage with communities, there is an opportunity to learn from local Indigenous Knowledge and apply that learning to planning and decision-making processes” (NWMO 2017g). The NWMO also adds that it will “look to Indigenous communities and local Indigenous Knowledge holders in the areas surrounding interested communities to find ways to apply Indigenous Knowledge to the site selection process and protect it in its application” (NWMO 2017g). In order to do so, the NWMO has developed an Indigenous Knowledge policy (NWMO 2016c).

Some criticism has been raised with regard to the actual integration of Indigenous Knowledge into the NWMO’s site selection process. Meagan Sarah Weatherdon argued that the NWMO has “interpreted Indigenous spiritual beliefs and philosophies in ways compatible with their own agenda” and has limited First Nations’ engagement (2017: 94). Weatherdon also suggested that the NWMO’s scientific epistemology seeks to co-opt Indigenous traditional knowledge rather than truly listening to it: “the NWMO interprets indigenous spirituality within its own cosmological and commercial framework, which seems to grant transcendental power to technology and science” (2017: 97). Genevieve Fuji Johnson also raised the flag over First Nations’ involvement in the NWMO’s consultation process arguing, “there is evidence that participants’ perspectives were not weighted equally. There were many accounts of how views were dismissed and excluded from the NWMO’s assessment framework and recommendation” (2015: 79). This was especially true for the Assembly of First Nations and the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples who claimed, in the earlier stages of the process, that they did not have sufficient time and funding to assess the project and express their concerns (AFN 2005).

The AboriginalFootnote 2 and treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples in Canada are recognized and affirmed in Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The Supreme Court of Canada has found that the Crown (the federal and provincial governments) has a duty to consult Aboriginal peoples whenever it contemplates conduct that could adversely impact potential or established Aboriginal and/or treaty rights. The courts have struck down infrastructure projects that do not meet the standard of the duty to consult. Since all of the potential sites, and transportation routes to them, are on or pass through treaty areas, asserted or established traditional territories, or near First Nations communities, the duty to consult is an essential component of the nuclear waste site selection process.

The CLC, as the residents of Ignace and Hornepayne recognized, was obviously the key mechanism for community-based input. There was a separate CLC for each potential site community and each had between 8 and 12 members. Members went through an open selection process, but were appointed by the town council. Some positions were set aside for specific demographic groups, i.e., Indigenous representative, youth representative, and adjacent communities representative. The town’s mayor and 1–2 councillors were also on the CLC. CLC members from Ignace and Hornepayne believed that the CLCs were inclusive and provided a good reflection of the community. A minority, however, felt that the CLCs were stacked to the pro-side. One Hornepayne resident noted that “what we had [with] the nuclear waste Community Liaison Committee [was] that the majority of that committee was all pro-repository members. And that's a fact. So we had no voices at the table asking or digging into tougher questions. Adding, I call it tension or friction. When you add that to the table, you're not all necessarily going to agree. But that tension and friction bring those better answers in the end of how to move forward. So do I have to say no, I don’t think all voices individually got heard.” It was a new process, so “the NWMO took a lot of lead on setting up community, the committees, the liaison committees. And there was a miscommunication of exactly whose committee that is…. Hindsight [is] 20/20, [and] it would have been better to have a third party group that helps set the community up and not be attached to the NWMO.”

Technological Interventions

Techno-scientific expertise has been, and will be, highly solicited during the DGR’s site selection and construction process. Additional work considers site maintenance and closure as well as waste transport parameters.

The DGR consists of a “multiple-barrier system.” While the first barrier is the site itself, this also includes the technology to encase the waste. Nuclear fuel pellets “made from uranium dioxide powder, baked in a furnace to produce a hard, high-density ceramic,” are then inserted in a sealed tube made of Zircaloy, a corrosion-resistant metal, and then bundled with other such tubes to create a log-shaped package. This fuel bundle is introduced in a fuel container made with carbon steel pipe and copper. Finally, each of these containers “will be encased in a highly compacted bentonite clay buffer box” 500-meters-deep underground (NWMO 2017b). The NWMO asserts that placing nuclear fuel deep underground is a proven method with minimal risks. In Finland, where the world’s first civilian spent fuel DGR is currently under construction, a very similar technology is being used (Ialenti 2020).

To better familiarize the communities with the technology, the NWMO brought some of the residents to the technology, and in other cases, they brought some of the technology to the community. For example, many of the interviewed residents mentioned the trips that they took to the NWMO’s test proof facility in Oakville, Ontario, to examine the canisters and other technological innovations. In addition, as a further example of the advisory-based approach, the NWMO developed a mobile Learn More Centre, containing “3D models, interactive technology, hands-on learning opportunities, videos, and photos” (NWMO 2019a). This mobile unit was sent to the potential site communities. Participants noted that times were set aside for different age groups to attend information sessions, such as for school groups and seniors.

Level of Democratization

This section presents a preliminary assessment of the level of democratization associated with the siting of the DGR. The four criteria, based on democratic principles, include: transparency, inclusiveness, deliberative quality, and accountability. Further assessment could evaluate the level of democratization more systematically.

Interviews with members of the affected communities give a preliminary assessment of these parameters: How did the NWMO interact with local communities? Did local communities feel that their concerns were addressed and their voice heard? Do Indigenous communities perceive that they were properly involved in the decision-making process? These are among the key questions that need to be answered through direct enquiries. By doing so, divergences may be observed between the NWMO’s perception of democratic practices and communities’ vision of that aspect of the interaction with the project proponent.

Table 5.1 presents the four criteria based on an evaluation of the NWMO siting process. It includes a preliminary assessment done independently by the authors, based on NWMO documentation and their scholarly knowledge of democratization, and the opinions of the residents of Hornepayne and Ignace, who personally experienced the process. Each criterion has been marked out of 10 (with 0 being a total lack of demonstration of the principle and 10 exemplifying a high degree of implementation of the principle). The average for each democratic principle is then calculated, and the total scores for the combined four criteria are aggregated (rounded to one decimal place). The aggregated mark determines the overall level of democratization: 0–10 minimal; 11–30 moderate; and 31–40 high.

Table 5.1 Level of democratization in nuclear waste management
Full size table

Based on this preliminary assessment of the level of democratization, it appears that the nuclear waste management case displays a moderate level of democratization, with an average total score of 26.4. However, there is a wide discrepancy in scores at an individual level. While Bratt and the co-authors assessed a 7–9 for each principle, in most cases the interviewee score was either between 7 and 10 or it was zero. Those who supported the project gave the NWMO very high scores, but those opposed to the project gave them zeros across the board.

The following section describes how the NWMO integrates the four different democratic principles into the process of finding a permanent site for Canada’s high-level nuclear waste.

Transparency

Average Score: 6.6

Providing publicly available information about nuclear energy and waste management safety is a central part of both the CNSC’s and the NWMO’s mandates. The CNSC’s REGDOC-3.2.1: Public Information and Disclosure (CNSC 2017) clarifies how the licensed nuclear facilities, licensees, and license applicants must “develop and implement a public information program that includes a disclosure protocol. Through an effective public information program, a licensee or licence applicant establishes an atmosphere of openness, transparency and trust.”

The CNSC has organized outreach activities for communities and Indigenous peoples who have expressed interest in learning more about the CNSC’s regulatory role and the licensing process for any application for a DGR for Canada’s used nuclear fuel. For example, in 2018–2019 (the last full year before COVID-19 arrived in Canada), the CNSC held 22 “meet the regulator” sessions in communities across Canada as well as a further 30 meetings with Indigenous communities and organizations (CNSC 2019a).Through these meetings, the CNSC informs communities about how they regulate nuclear energy and waste and how communities can participate in the public hearing process. CNSC staff are also interested in hearing about the most effective ways to involve communities and Indigenous groups and how best to provide information to those who want to know more about the CNSC and other relevant matters within the scope of its mandate.

The CLCs, for their part, seek to engage with the local community, provide information and education, and listen to the citizens. They provided advice to the municipal council regarding the NWMO’s site selection process and APM framework. Information is centralized on one websiteFootnote 3 in which each municipal government has its own webpages describing their mission statement, committee membership, proceedings (meetings, minutes and agendas, public information sessions, news, open houses, etc.), and a Question and Answers page. The NWMO is often invited to those meetings to make presentations and inform the population about the ongoing site selection process. The CNSC may also be invited to explain their role in regulating the nuclear sector. The CLCs do not claim to advocate for the repository site, but rather seek to gather the best possible information to help inform the decision-making process. For instance, Ignace’s CLC was created in November 2011 with the objective “to provide a mechanism for the sharing of information between: the community and the local accountable authority; and the community and the NWMO” (Ignace CLC 2012). Similarly, the Hornepayne CLC was “established by the Township of Hornepayne Municipal Council in October 2011. Our objective is to help Hornepayne learn about Canada’s plan for used nuclear fuel and involve Hornepayne residents in these learning activities” (Hornepayne CLC 2019).

Public information and disclosure is key to the very existence of the CLCs. Their educational role is well understood. What seems less clear, however, is how public input is taken into account by the local authorities and the NWMO, and for what purpose. For example, minutes may not detail discussion items and points of view. One other area where questions about the transparency of the process remain is: Under what criteria is a community deemed unfit to become the deep geological repository’s willing host and thus removed from the process?

The residents of Ignace and Hornepayne had mixed views about the NWMO’s transparency. A majority of them felt the NWMO did an “excellent job.” One Ignace resident said that they were involved in many projects over the years and the NWMO was the “most transparent process that I have ever come across.” As another resident put it, “how do you judge transparency if people are apathetic about learning the information in the first place. You know, your window can be as clean as possible, but if people aren’t peaking into the window. It’s transparent, but nobody is taking advantage of the transparency.” However, a minority were adamant that the NWMO was “not very transparent at all.” One Hornepayne resident complained “I went to open houses and the meetings and was told, more or less, to keep my mouth shut.”

Inclusiveness and Representativeness

Average Score: 6.7

A wide range of inclusion and representation measures exist as part of Canada’s nuclear waste site selection process, including First Nations’ consultation (e.g., integration of Indigenous Traditional Knowledge), the involvement of local communities and surrounding area through the CLCs, including the participation of local elected officials, and consultation with experts in various fields.

However, critics pointed out that the CLCs were not representative. One Hornepayne resident stated that “the majority” of the CLC were “pro-repository members.” This meant that “we had no voices at the table asking or digging into tougher questions.” Those that were on the CLC were heard, but those that were not on the CLC had no voice. Opponents of the DGR felt that they were deliberately excluded from the CLCs. However, other residents said that there was plenty of opportunities, but some people wanted to remain outside of the process.

With respect to Indigenous populations, the Council of Elders and Youth “is an advisory body to NWMO management. It provides counsel on the application of Indigenous Knowledge in the implementation of Adaptive Phased Management. In addition, the Council of Elders and Youth provides advice on issues that could enhance the development and maintenance of good relations with Aboriginal communities” (NWMO 2017f). Interviewees suggested that there was ample consultation with respect to Indigenous engagement.

Looking ahead to the implementation phase, the CNSC’s REGDOC-3.2.2 Indigenous Engagement sets out the requirements and guidance for licensees on Indigenous engagement, in addition to procedural direction in support of the whole-of-government approach to Aboriginal consultation (CNSC 2019b).

Deliberative Quality

Average Score: 6.2

Non-expert public in the interested communities are involved through the different steps of the APM process and invited to collaborate (express concerns, ask questions, participate in local meetings) with the NWMO and the CNSC.

The deliberative qualities of the NWMO’s site selection process will have to be assessed continually as the steps unfold over the upcoming months and years. Consultation, surveys, or interviews with directly affected communities would help assess their perception of the quality of the process. Two issues were discussed frequently by interviewees. Regarding the range of expertise the CLCs invited to the meeting, most individuals acknowledged that the “process demanded that NWMO” bring alternative perspectives to the communities. However, one resident noted that this meant that they put on an equal platform people with “years of science and scholarship” and people who had been “environmental activists for 30 or 40 years, but do not have a scientific background.” With respect to the timeline, those members of Ignace and Hornepayne who supported the project complained that the NWMO was being too deliberative. “It took too long,” was a common refrain.

Accountability

Average Score: 6.9

The concept of public accountability is widely used in democratic systems to describe the fundamental relationship of trust between the citizens (or the public), on one side, and the governing authorities, agencies, and public enterprises who are trusted to make good use of public resources, on the other (Bovens 2005).

The NWMO is at arms-length from the government and is accountable to both the public and the federal government. Oversight of the transportation of nuclear substances is shared between two federal departments, the CNSC and Transport Canada. If the Commission grants a license for a DGR in the future, the CNSC will oversee the NWMO’s activities and ensure its compliance. It is also important to note that while the CNSC is the licensing authority, it works closely with other federal and provincial bodies to ensure that all regulatory requirements are met.

According to the NWMO, accountability is one of the organization’s key values, along with safety, integrity, excellence, collaboration, and transparency. However, the only mention with regard to accountability is that: “We take responsibility for our actions, including wise, prudent and efficient management of resources” (NWMO 2018b).

A critical issue that will be key in the future is the overall perception of the NWMO in the public’s view. Is there a perception gap between public officials and communities with regard to the NWMO’s accountability? If so, how does it affect the site selection process? Critics of the NWMO pointed out that it was funded by the nuclear industry and they felt that is whom the NWMO was ultimately accountable to. On the other hand, those that supported the DGR felt that the NWMO was accountable to the potential host community.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided preliminary information to summarize the risk management framework for the site selection process for a DGR for Canada’s high-level nuclear waste. It has also described the level and type of affectedness, evaluated the applicable risk management intervention tools through the REACT framework, and assessed the level of democratization in the case. These three assessments will help in understanding, and perhaps strengthening, risk management capacity in Canada.