Skip to main content

Return to Kabul

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Afghanistan and the Vietnam Syndrome
  • 174 Accesses

Abstract

Tripathi’s focus here is on the circumstances in which the United States withdrew from Afghanistan, and the Taliban’s return to power. How did the American project to rebuild the Afghan state fail? What was the Taliban’s strategy to reorganize and confront the foreign forces, and what factors helped the Taliban to succeed? Tripathi examines the ways in which different Taliban groups operated independently, but also cooperated toward their common goal, and made advances to expand control of Afghan territory. He looks at the tactics of the most agile Haqqani network and a number of local councils (shuras), their leaderships, and strategies. The chapter concludes with how the crisis intensified in Afghanistan, and what lay behind President Trump’s policy to end the war.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 24.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 32.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    On the Bonn conference and how the Taliban were kept out, see William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (London, UK: Macmillan/Red Globe, 2021), 215–221.

  2. 2.

    Alissa J. Rubin, “Did the War in Afghanistan Have to Happen,” New York Times, August 23, 2021.

  3. 3.

    “Text: Pentagon Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld,” Washington Post, November 19, 2001.

  4. 4.

    Ben Barry, “Understanding the Taliban’s Military Victory,” International Institute of Strategic Studies, August 19, 2021.

  5. 5.

    Theo Farrell, “How the Taliban won,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, October 10, 2021.

  6. 6.

    Barnett Rubin, Afghanistan: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020), 18–22.

  7. 7.

    Ibid, Antonio Giustozzi, principal author of chapter “More War, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency,” 230–254.

  8. 8.

    Ibid, 231.

  9. 9.

    World Almanac of Islamism 2014, American Foreign Policy Council (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 1043.

  10. 10.

    Declan Walsh, “Strategic Balochistan becomes a target in war against Taliban,” Guardian, December 21, 2009.

  11. 11.

    “Quetta Shura Taliban (QST),” Afghan War News.

  12. 12.

    See Matt Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky: The relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan insurgents,” Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, June 2010. Also, “Pakistani agents ‘funding and training’ Afghan Taliban,” BBC, June 13, 2010.

  13. 13.

    “Haqqani Network,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University, updated November 8, 2017.

  14. 14.

    Joe Sommerlad, “What is the Haqqani network linked to the Taliban and al-Qaeda?,” Independent, September 7, 2021.

  15. 15.

    “Haqqani Network,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University.

  16. 16.

    See Anand Gopal and Alex Strick van Linschoten, “Ideology in the Afghan Taliban,” Afghan-Analyst.org

  17. 17.

    Giustozzi (principal author), “More War, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency,” in Rubin, Afghanistan: What Everyone Needs to Know,” 234–235.

  18. 18.

    Ibid, 234. Also, Sarmad Ishfaq, “South Asia’s Most Notorious Militant Groups,” Diplomat, December 31, 2019.

  19. 19.

    Gretchen Peters, “Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry,” Combating Terrorism Center, West Point. This study gives an account of sources of the network’s income, protection money from shop owners, and medium to large firms operating in Haqqani-dominated areas of North Waziristan, bank robbery, drug trafficking, and kidnapping for ransom.

  20. 20.

    Antonia Giustozzi, “The Taliban and the 2014 Presidential Elections in Afghanistan,” Conflict, Security and Development, 16(6), 557–573.

  21. 21.

    Giustozzi (principal author), “More War, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency,” in Rubin, Afghanistan: What Everyone Needs to Know,” 234.

  22. 22.

    Shanthie Mariet D’Souza, “Afghan Peace Talks and the Changing Character of Taliban Insurgency,” ISAS Brief No 291, Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore, July 26, 2013.

  23. 23.

    Giustozzi, “More war, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency,” 234.

  24. 24.

    William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (London, UK: Macmillan/Red Globe, 2021), 269–270.

  25. 25.

    Ben Farmer, “Afghan election: Hamid Karzai’s rival crosses ethnic divide,” Telegraph, August 13, 2009.

  26. 26.

    Maley, The Afghanistan Wars, 271.

  27. 27.

    Craig Whitlock, The Afghanistan Papers (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2021), 200.

  28. 28.

    Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 200–201. Also, Andrew Buncombe, Omar Waraich, and David Usborne, “US on alert as it hails success of mission to kill terrorist chief,” Independent, May 3, 2011.

  29. 29.

    Juan Cole, “Obama: The Tides of War are Receding,” Informed Comment, June 23, 2011.

  30. 30.

    “Admiral Mike Mullen interview,” Charlie Rose Show, June 14, 2011.

  31. 31.

    Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 203.

  32. 32.

    Defense Secretary Leo Panetta’s statement, “Hearing to Receive Testimony of the US Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq,” Senate Armed Services Committee, September 22, 2011.

  33. 33.

    Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 202.

  34. 34.

    “Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” June 23, 2011. Also “Taliban momentum broken in Afghanistan, says Clinton,” BBC News, June 23, 2011.

  35. 35.

    Lt. General Ronald Burgess, “Annual Threat Assessment: Statement Before the Armed Services Committee,” February 16, 2012. Also, Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 209.

  36. 36.

    In Iraq, the withdrawal of US combat troops in December 2011 still left thousands of soldiers to protect the US embassy in Baghdad, and consulates in Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk. See James Denselow, “The US departure from Iraq is an illusion,” Guardian, October 25, 2011. Also, “Last US troops withdraw from Iraq,” BBC News, December 19, 2011.

  37. 37.

    Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 227.

  38. 38.

    “Statement by the President on the End of Combat Mission in Afghanistan,” White House Press office, Washington, DC, December 28, 2014.

  39. 39.

    For an account of repeated military setbacks to the US-led forces in 2015–2016, see Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 232–239.

  40. 40.

    Meghan Keneally, “What Trump has said about Afghanistan,” ABC News, August 21, 2017.

  41. 41.

    Daniel L. Davis, “Trump Came This Close to Getting Afghanistan Right,” American Conservative, October 25, 2018.

  42. 42.

    Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 242–246.

  43. 43.

    Neta C. Crawford, “Afghanistan’s Rising Death Toll Due to Airstrikes, 2017–2020,” Costs of War Project, Watson Institute, Brown University, December 7, 2020.

  44. 44.

    Andy Gregory, “Taliban peace deal: what is the Doha agreement signed by the Trump administration?,” Independent, August 19, 2021.

  45. 45.

    “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America,” US State Department, February 29, 2020.

  46. 46.

    Lindsay Maizland, “US-Taliban Peace Deal: What to Know,” Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, updated March 2, 2020.

  47. 47.

    Whitlock, Afghanistan Papers, 247.

  48. 48.

    Ibid, 272–273.

  49. 49.

    Eugene Kiely and Robert Farley, “Timeline of US Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” FactCheck. Org, August 17, 2021.

  50. 50.

    “‘It’s Time To End This Forever War.’ Biden Says Forces to Leave Afghanistan By 9/11,” NPR, April 15, 2021.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Tripathi, D. (2023). Return to Kabul. In: Afghanistan and the Vietnam Syndrome. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23555-9_7

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics