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One could expect my two field research trips to Turkey to be poles apart. In fact, many things have changed dramatically between the summers of 2019 and 2021. Covid-19 caused millions of deaths around the globe and seriously affected the health of many more. The pandemic has shaken the foundations of the world as we know it, leaving no place unwavering. And Turkey was no exception. Throughout this period, in order to limit the spread of the virus and avoid the overload of the healthcare system, the country deployed numerous means, among them a series of lockdowns and other restrictions. At the same time, as in other places around the world, Turkey has struggled to balance the indispensable carefulness with the desire of its people to live “normal lives.”

When I arrived in July 2021 in Gaziantep and later in Istanbul, both cities seemed to thrive again, even though caution was clearly evident. I went to Turkey to better understand the situation of Syrian refugees based there. From the start, I observed ceaselessly bustling presence of various civil society organizations supporting refugees. I hoped to explore their activities, as well as the motivations and values declared by their representatives, employees, and volunteers.

During both trips, I spent days traversing both locations, going from one interview to another, moving between stately headquarters of major international organizations and community centers run by neighborhood-based NGOs. During both trips, I passed by people in a rush and elements of urban landscapes no different from so many other places in the world. I also walked by unique pearls of architecture: beautiful mosques with their gleaming domes and slender minarets that have been there for hundreds of years and are still used as places of worship and spaces to socialize for local community members. Some of the mosques are located in close proximity to numerous new construction sites and mosques, which seem to have been just completed and opened to the worshipers. They drew my attention even more as my interlocutors often mentioned religion and gave their own meaning to these spaces and religious matters in general. Even though in an incomparably less abrupt and dramatic way, this has changed as well between my two visits: religion came up more often in the conversations during the second research trip. Some of the statements referred directly to the latest three major developments: the construction and opening of Turkey’s new largest mosque—Grand Çamlıca Mosque in 2019, reconverting the Hagia Sophia and Kariye Museum into a place of Muslim worship in 2020, and the inauguration of a new mosque in Istanbul’s central Taksim Square in 2021. National and international media commented extensively on these, deemed by many, controversial developments. In this chapter, I explore the historical antecedents of these events and try to make sense of the role religion plays in contemporary Turkey. While doing so, I put particular emphasis on religion’s significance for the situation and experiences of Syrian refugees based there.

In the Face of the Syrian Civil War

When the violent conflict broke out in Syria in 2011, everybody expected that it would end soon just like the other uprisings in the region collectively labeled the “Arab Spring.” The Turkish elites were among those convinced that the situation in Syria would resolve itself fast and end the regime of Bashar Assad (Demirtaş, 2021).

In April 2011, Turkey under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), opened its doors to fleeing Syrians assuming they would soon return to their homes. It was estimated that around 100,000 people would come and leave the country within two to three weeks (Kaya, 2020). Those who crossed the border with Turkey were registered under the auspices of the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), the representative of the state in the area of humanitarian help, and offered shelter, food, access to health services, and later also to education and vocational training. To this end, 22 temporary accommodation centers (camps) were set up in the border regions. At the same time, many Syrians chose to remain outside of these formal structures, settling in all major Turkish cities, a trend, which was further propelled by the 2018 decision to gradually close the camps. As a result, 98% of approximately four million Syrians became urban refugees (Kınıklıoğlu, 2020). In this context, the two cities chosen for the study seem to be of particular importance. Istanbul accommodates over 500,000 registered and many more unregistered Syrians, while Gaziantep became home to nearly 400,000 Syrians (who constitute 19% of the total population). Located in close proximity to the border, it became an important hub linking both sides and facilitating humanitarian help in the region.

Turkey is a signatory to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Regarding Refugees. However, the country retained a geographical limitation making it possible only for people coming from European countries to receive refugee status. At the beginning of the conflict, while maintaining an open-door policy, Syrians were referred to as “guests” and did not have a formalized legal status. Various studies indicate the significance of the concepts of hospitality and deservingness and how they are linked to asylum and reception (Dimitriadi & Malamidis, 2020; Marchetti, 2020). Lamis Abdelaaty (2021) points out that such choice of labels in the Turkish case directs attention to the host’s charity and hospitality rather than to the fulfillment of its legal obligations. As more and more Syrians sought protection from the deteriorating situation in their country, the Turkish government changed the legal framework to accommodate them. In October 2014, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and the Temporary Protection Regulation were put in place. These changes were accompanied by the establishment of the new Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), which eventually became the main institution managing migration.

The newly created temporary protection measures were a major policy shift as they shielded Syrians against refoulment and allowed them at least theoretically to gain access to education, health care, and labor market. Tahir Zaman points out, however, that the temporal nature of the protection exposes the character of the offered support in which “the primary concern for the Turkish authorities is on managing displaced people rather than protecting them” (2016, p. 169). This newly created legal status does not provide long-term stability. While guarantying access to some rights, it nevertheless creates precarious conditions (Baban et al., 2017). My findings also demonstrate that such an approach hinders full integration.

Reception and Support

At the early stage of the reception, the state and its institutions were the sole providers of needed assistance. It came in a form of well-organized camps “in extremely good conditions, both in terms of infrastructure and their ability to meet societal needs” (Kaya, 2020). However, the vast majority of Syrians became urban refugees and relied on private housing and informal settlements. At first with no support from the state, they could only turn to civil society organizations (Yilmaz, 2019). With the arrival of the Syrians, many existing non-governmental organizations changed their focus to adjust to the newly emerging needs and many new programs were established. The presence of foreign, international organizations also increased. Together, they offered support addressing the most basic needs such as shelter and food. With time, they have also expanded their programs to cover areas such as legal assistance and help with registration, education and language, employment, and livelihood (Aras & Duman, 2019). Some of them were also involved in advocacy efforts.

The presence of international organizations though welcomed was approached by the Turkish government with suspicion and fear. In order to have an office in Turkey, they were required to obtain special permits and register their foreign employees. Moreover, they worked under close scrutiny, which tightened significantly after the failed 2016 coup. As a result of the introduced state of emergency, several major organizations were named a threat to national security and expelled, while permits of others were not renewed (Boztaş, 2019). Nevertheless, intense cooperation and exchanges, as well as competition between local and foreign organizations resulted in an emergence of a vibrant civil society, which was farther propelled by funding provided by international donors who often required partnerships (Sunata & Abdulla, 2020). Also, the deal between the EU and Turkey struck in 2016, contributed greatly to further development of the local civil society. While the bargain was criticized by many for being incompatible with values claimed to be at Europe’s core, it offered six billion euros for humanitarian assistance. It also urged the Turkish government to cooperate closely with diverse groups of civil society in order to gain legitimacy over such resources (Boşnak, 2021).

With time, the open-door policy turned into a more restrictive approach leading to the tightening of border controls, partial introduction of visas, and the construction of a border wall. Moreover, organizations active in the region reported cases where border guards shot at and blocked Syrians from entering Turkey and pressured them to return to the northern parts of Syria, controlled by the Turkish military forces instead (Batalla & Tolay, 2018). In the time of the pandemic, the government introduced further limitations. By October 14, 2021, 3,721,057 Syrians were registered in the country under the scheme of temporary protection (Directorate General of Migration Management, 2021).

The situation of the majority of Syrians remains very difficult as they face numerous challenges in trying to survive with no clear hope in sight. Civil society organizations fill the gaps between regulations and policies. In reality, accessing some rights might be very problematic if not impossible (Sunata & Tosun, 2019). The temporary protection could be revoked at any time. Very few refugees are granted citizenship, while the rest do not know what to expect in the future (Ineli-Ciger, 2017). These challenges notwithstanding, Turkey has provided tremendous help to asylum seekers at a time when many other countries did not get involved other than financially or at all. At the same time, Turkey has not only responded to the crisis happening at its doors but was also instrumental in shaping the situation in the region. Turkey provided political and military support to some Syrian opposition groups and aspires to play a leading role in Syria’s post-war reconstruction following its neo-Ottomanist aspirations in the region (Bélanger & Saracoglu, 2019).

Between Religion and Secularism

After the abolition of the Ottoman sultanate in 1923, the Republic of Turkey was established. Mustafa Kemal, the first president introduced a range of reforms to turn the country into a modern, Western-oriented democracy with a secular constitution. As a result, Turkey has no official religion, and the basic law guarantees freedom of religion and conscience. Despite the fact that the majority of the Turkish population were Muslims, Islam was framed as something standing in the way of progress and its influence over the state’s institutions was consistently erased. At the same time, such drastic measures contributed to the consolidation of opponents willing to fight for “more religion-friendly secularism” which led to open conflicts on how laiklik, the Turkish secularism, and the place of Islam and other religions within it are to be understood (Mustafa, 2019). One example of such debates was the “headscarf controversy,” which began in the 1980s and referred to the presence of religious symbols at Turkish universities. The topic became a figurative manifestation of the polarization of Turkish society.

In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the election and has stayed in power until the present day. Religion constitutes a central element of AKP’s conception of the Turkish nation. With AKP in power, Sunni Islam is to a large extent organized and supported by the state. For instance, the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), responsible among other issues for the management of all mosques, has at its disposal an annual budget of over 2 billion USD and 120,000 employees (Howard, 2017). Furthermore, increasing funds are allocated to religious schools. The government also tries to affect the behavior of its constituents by discouraging alcohol consumption (for example). Construction of new mosques in symbolic, crucial places like central Taksim Square or Çamlıca Hill with a tremendous view or the re-establishment of Hagia Sophia as a mosque also speak to the increased role Islam is playing in Turkey.

Rhetoric Concerning Syrians

The notion of hospitality has been present in the public discourse in Turkey since the early days of the Syrian conflict and was often inspired by religion. It was stressed that migration was also a part of the history of Islam and the experience of the Prophet Muhammad—who fled Mecca to Medina to seek refuge from religious persecution. Syrian migration to Turkey was depicted as a modern-day hijrah (migration) (Demirtaş, 2021). While addressing the situation of Syrians, President Erdogan repeatedly used the term muhacir (refugee) to recall Muslims who left Mecca and ensar (helper) to evoke people who welcomed them.

Religious rhetoric was used to encourage assistance to Syrian “Muslim brothers and sisters.” At the same time, however, the religious affiliation of the majority of Syrians, as well as the constant emphasis on Sunni Islamic affinity was of concern to Erdogan’s opponents and religious minority groups. Many believed that this approach was chosen not merely to help Syrian refugees, but also to change the religious demographics in order to emphasize Sunni national identity and gain political support from Syrian current and future voters (Abdelaaty, 2021).

Religion was not the only symbol used to encourage and strengthen people’s openness towards refugees. Since 2002, a romanticized image of the Ottoman glory has been part of the AKP’s political agenda. Hilal Alkan (2021) points out that references to the Ottoman past served to frame Syrians as part of the (former) empire, stress their geographic and religious proximity, and thereby evoke feelings of paternalistic responsibility.

The two described main frames of reference—related to religion and to the Ottoman Empire—do not exhaust the range of employed rhetorical figures. In contrast to the religious and nationalist approaches, other groups and public figures raised the issue of solidarity, justice, and human rights (Boşnak, 2021).

The Turkish government’s rhetoric promoting outright openness to refugees was quite prominent, especially in the initial phase of refugee reception. Over time, the government emphasized Turkey’s generosity and juxtaposed it with Europe’s indifference if not hostility, especially towards Islam and its followers (Iscan, 2021). The positive self-representation and the construction of Europe as the hostile, intolerant Other allowed AKP to discursively “claim moral superiority,” especially when the weight of the economic burden constituted by refugees’ presence was repeatedly raised (Polat, 2018).

Lived Experiences: Religion That Connects

Religion and religious symbolism were highly visible in the public discourse. They were tangibly transformed into actions on the ground, at the national or municipality levels. Also, institutions in charge of religious matters were very much involved in providing support to refugees. For instance, Diyanet, the Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs, was assigned the task of promoting hospitality and openness towards Syrians among Turks. At the same time, the agency provided aid and religious education to Syrians both in Turkey and Syria (Demirtaş, 2021). Furthermore, major faith-based organizations, often with direct support from the state, have also been very active. As they shared conservative views with the government, they were often preferred as partners over groups, which promoted more liberal, secular values (Boztaş, 2019). Didem Danış and Dilara Nazlı (2019) describe this arrangement as “faithful alliance” due to the religious references at its core and loyalty characterizing organizations, which assume a subordinated, supportive role in relation to the state.

I had a chance to witness the mobilization of faith-based organizations during the celebration of Kurban Bayramı (Eid al-Adha in Arabic). The holiday is reminiscent of the story of Abraham, who, showing his complete devotion to God, was ready to sacrifice his own son. In accordance with the tradition, an animal should be slaughtered and shared between family, friends and relatives, and those in need demonstrating people’s commitment to charity. Nowadays, many Muslims, especially those from large urban centers, rather than to carry out the tradition in a literal sense, choose to donate money. When I arrived in Turkey, several faith-based organizations I approached were busy collecting such donations dedicated specifically for Syrians.

Also, much smaller organizations and informal solidarity networks were actively engaged in providing help. In fact, local faith-based charity organizations supported Syrian refugees by collecting and distributing the most needed things and assisting them since the earliest days. Everyone who declared to be motivated by religion emphasized that they provided help to all refugees, no matter their religious affiliation, focusing especially on bringing relief to the most vulnerable. Sözer (2019), while indicating the very problematic nature of the notion of vulnerability and thereby the necessity for its cautious application, demonstrates that the religious background of some organizations might not be entirely insignificant. For the Turkish religiously motivated networks she studied, vulnerability had nationalistic and religious undertones, as for them, the most vulnerable were the women and children whose closest relatives were “martyrs.” Families of Muslim men who lost their lives fighting on the “right side” of the Syrian conflict were the first to receive support.

Some networks of support were totally informal. They were formed within neighborhoods, often based on the closest ties with family members and friends. They were often first to react to the most urgent needs of refugees (Alkan, 2021). One of my interlocutors summed up succinctly the initial openness by saying: “People saw welcoming Syrians as a right thing to do. They were perceived as their Muslim brothers and sisters.”

Hospitality was therefore not merely a rhetorical tool. It was something people enacted in concrete settings, in ways they chose and could afford. Religion became a source of inspiration and encouragement. It also allowed seeing Syrians not as “Others,” but as someone familiar given the common religious affiliation. Also, Syrians who found religion important were able to search for familiarity in mosques and feel more at home. One of the interviewed Syrians in Gaziantep admitted: “Mosques are the most important place, place where people have a chance to meet, where problems are solved. It would be very difficult without them.”

One of the Syrian women I had a chance to talk to while visiting Çamlıca Mosque explained that she was very grateful to Erdogan for letting her and her family be there and assured me that she would not want to go anywhere else as she wanted her children to grow up in a Muslim country. Similarly, participants of the Cultural Orientation (CO) programs organized by international organizations for those in the process of resettlement perceived religion and issues stemming from religious beliefs as a main difference between residing in Turkey and in a third country. Interviews with CO facilitators demonstrate that questions related to the possibility to practice one’s religion freely and still being accepted were raised in every training group.

Lived Experiences: Beyond Faith

While religion inspired many concrete actions, it is not the only source of motivation to act. Many organizations that are not faith-based chose to respond to the emerging crisis. One of the representatives of a well-established civil society organization recalled in an interview:

NGOs in Turkey, no matter their profile, were always there to organize help in case of crises. Up until then it meant they were needed to cope with the aftermath of earthquakes. For us, the refugee crisis was something very similar that is an urgent matter, something to respond to. The problem is that no one has expected that the situation would turn into a kind of “permanent crisis.”

Many interlocutors talked about “permanent crisis,” stressing the fact that many years passed since the war in Syria begun, there are still no future-oriented policies, which would allow people to feel safer and more settled and let the NGOs plan their work better. While many underscored that the introduction of the temporary protection legal framework constituted a major policy shift, they also expressed great disappointment. One person explained:

For now, people are in limbo, they don’t know what will happen to them. What we try to do is give them some skills so that they have a job in Turkey, something they can use when they are back in Syria or in Europe or wherever. So, this is what you can do, at least this, give them some skills.

Some of the interviewed organizations clearly position themselves as entities promoting and acting upon values different from those supported by the government. The stressed difference lies on the axis of religion and secularity:

Now government has some projects that provide “value training,” and these values are of course about Islam, not about human rights or anything like this, nothing that our secular organization would teach about.

Several organizations pointed out that non-religious organizations face many challenges. Many of the interviewed service providers mentioned feeling a sense of constant control. In addition, other reports describe the relation between the civil society and the state as “complicated,” as the former encounters “repression, and bureaucratic and legal restrictions” (Aras & Duman, 2019, p. 3). One such restriction concerns education: NGOs cannot provide educational activities unless the organization is certified by the Ministry of Education.

While religion is crucial to some, others are guided by different values or ideas. A young Syrian volunteer in an international organization in Istanbul described that for him the sense of freedom, the chance to gain formal education, but also to learn from other people representing different worldviews constitute the highest value. Being involved in helping not only allows him to regain his agency, but also build ties with like-minded people.

Another young Syrian man interviewed in Gaziantep, while stressing that being a Muslim is important to him, also underlined that he built his relations not necessarily through the mosque, but through the university. He speaks perfect English and Turkish and spends his time learning to code in a class where the majority are female students. He is among the lucky ones: only very recently he found out that he has been granted Turkish citizenship. My conversation with him not only indicated that religion is not always at the center of the sense of belonging or attempts to build it. It also hinted at the fact that sometimes it might still not be enough if concrete, potent and well-fitting actions facilitating integration are not in place. While admitting the difficulties, he still celebrated the chances offered in Turkey. At the same time, he confessed that his father has really hard time adjusting. He complains about the frivolous lifestyles people lead in Turkey, and that the Turks are not religious enough.

Summary

The multitudinous influences of Islam are clearly visible in contemporary Turkey. The country is shaped by the ruling party’s decisions, which position religion at the center of its values and nation-building project. It is no wonder that Islam also played a significant role in the public discourse about Syrians seeking refuge from the war and persecution in Syria. Religious references promoted hospitality and openness. These, in turn, brought about concrete even if not fully sufficient changes in the law and actions to respond to people’s needs. As a result, the Turkish government followed an open-door policy and introduced temporary protection measures.

With time, religion ceased to be solely an impulse to provide basic humanitarian assistance and turned into search for more durable solutions, even if still rather timid ones. Religion became a common ground for some Turks and Syrians. Mosques and spaces created by faith-based organizations allowed for the discussions on how to solve common problems and build communal life.

At the same time, many refugees received support from groups motivated by secular values, focused on the promotion of solidarity, social justice, and human rights. For these activists, as well as refugees receiving support, not religion, even if sometimes still found important, but rather the attachment to these values constituted the common ground.