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Revisiting Related-Key Boomerang Attacks on AES Using Computer-Aided Tool

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Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2022 (ASIACRYPT 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13793))

Abstract

In recent years, several MILP models were introduced to search automatically for boomerang distinguishers and boomerang attacks on block ciphers. However, they can only be used when the key schedule is linear. Here, a new model is introduced to deal with nonlinear key schedules as it is the case for AES. This model is more complex and actually it is too slow for exhaustive search. However, when some hints are added to the solver, it found the current best related-key boomerang attack on AES-192 with \(2^{124}\) time, \(2^{124}\) data, and \(2^{79.8}\) memory complexities, which is better than the one presented by Biryukov and Khovratovich at ASIACRYPT 2009 with complexities \(2^{176}/2^{123}/2^{152}\) respectively. This represents a huge improvement for the time and memory complexity, illustrating the power of MILP in cryptanalysis.

Patrick Derbez, Pierre-Alain Fouque and Phuong Hoa Nguyen were partially supported by the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche through the DeCrypt project under Contract ANR-18-CE39-0007.

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Notes

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Univ Rennes, CNRS, IRISA, Rennes, France

    Patrick Derbez, Marie Euler, Pierre-Alain Fouque & Phuong Hoa Nguyen

  2. Direction Générale de l’Armement, Rennes, France

    Marie Euler

Authors
  1. Patrick Derbez
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  2. Marie Euler
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  3. Pierre-Alain Fouque
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  4. Phuong Hoa Nguyen
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Patrick Derbez .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India

    Shweta Agrawal

  2. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Dongdai Lin

A New Distinguisher on AES-192

A New Distinguisher on AES-192

Table 2. Key schedule difference in the AES-192 trail
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Table 3. Internal state difference in the AES-192 trail
Full size table

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Derbez, P., Euler, M., Fouque, PA., Nguyen, P.H. (2022). Revisiting Related-Key Boomerang Attacks on AES Using Computer-Aided Tool. In: Agrawal, S., Lin, D. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2022. ASIACRYPT 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13793. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22969-5_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22969-5_3

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