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Efficient ECDSA-Based Adaptor Signature for Batched Atomic Swaps

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Information Security (ISC 2022)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 13640))

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Abstract

Adaptor signature is a novel cryptographic primitive which ties together the signature and the leakage of a secret value. It has become an important tool for solving the scalability and interoperability problems in the blockchain. Aumayr et al. (Asiacrypt 2021) recently provide the formalization of the adaptor signature and present a provably secure ECDSA-based adaptor signature, which requires zero-knowledge proof in the pre-signing phase to ensure the signer works correctly. However, the number of zero-knowledge proofs is linear with the number of participants. In this paper, we propose efficient ECDSA-based adaptor signature schemes and give security proofs based on ECDSA. In our schemes, the zero-knowledge proofs in the pre-signing phase can be generated in a batch and offline. Meanwhile, the online pre-signing algorithm is similar to the ECDSA signing algorithm and can enjoy the same efficiency as ECDSA. In particular, considering specific verification scenarios, such as (batched) atomic swaps, our schemes can reduce the number of zero-knowledge proofs in the pre-signing phase to one, independent of the number of participants. Last, we conduct an experimental evaluation, demonstrating that the performance of our ECDSA-based adaptor signature reduces online pre-signing time by about 60% compared with the state-of-the-art ECDSA-based adaptor signature.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Both parties use time-lock to lock the exchange coins on-chain, and the timeouts \(t_1< t_0\) to ensure that \(U_1\) can have enough time to react.

  2. 2.

    Common verification scenarios require that everyone can verify signatures. However, the pre-signature of the adaptor signature is not published on the blockchain, so it is always used in the specific verification scenarios where only the participants verify the pre-signatures off-chain and others (such as miners) need not verify pre-signatures.

  3. 3.

    The zero-knowledge proof system requires straight-line extractor, also namely online extractor [12]. The straight-line extractability property allows for extraction of a witness y for a statement Y from a proof \(\pi _{Y}\) in the random oracle model and is useful for models where the rewinding proof technique is not allowed, such as UC [2].

  4. 4.

    This zero-knowledge proof system does not require straight-line extractor. Such a proof can be derived by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [11] to Chaum-Pedersen \(\sum \)-protocol [6] for the language comprising valid DDH tuples.

  5. 5.

    The signer can be seen as a hard relation chooser who is the protocol initiator and holds the witness y.

  6. 6.

    All parties use time-lock to lock the exchange coins \(c_0\) with the timeouts \(t_0\) and \(c_{i}\) with the timeouts \(t_i\), and the timeouts \(t_i< t_0\), \(i\in [n]\) to ensure that \(U_i\) can have enough time to react.

  7. 7.

    The function f is defined as the projection to x-coordinate.

  8. 8.

    \(U_0\) must check all pre-signatures, because any full signature is published on blockchain, the witness y can be extracted, and all coins can be taken.

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Acknowledgements

We thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. This work is supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (Grant No. 2021YFA1000600) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 62272269).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Cyber Science and Technology, Shandong University, Qingdao, 266237, China

    Binbin Tu, Min Zhang & Chen Yu

  2. State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, P.O. Box 5159, Beijing, 100878, China

    Binbin Tu, Min Zhang & Chen Yu

  3. Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Qingdao, 266237, China

    Binbin Tu, Min Zhang & Chen Yu

Authors
  1. Binbin Tu
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  2. Min Zhang
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  3. Chen Yu
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Chen Yu .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Willy Susilo

  2. Xidian University, Xian, China

    Xiaofeng Chen

  3. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Fuchun Guo

  4. University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Yudi Zhang

  5. Petra Christian University, Surabaya, Indonesia

    Rolly Intan

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Tu, B., Zhang, M., Yu, C. (2022). Efficient ECDSA-Based Adaptor Signature for Batched Atomic Swaps. In: Susilo, W., Chen, X., Guo, F., Zhang, Y., Intan, R. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2022. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13640. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22390-7_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22390-7_12

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