Keywords

Introduction

The Israeli/Palestinian conflict embodies a wide gap between international protection norms and the absence of national and international protection. Lack of international consensus on the conflict, particularly within the key international and regional bodies including the UN Security Council (UNSC), the European Union (EU) and the Quartet, has translated to humanitarian assistance, monitoring human rights abuses and limited Band-Aid solutions. Beyond reprimanding statements, there has been little consensus on protection, and the Palestinian population, particularly in Gaza, and Israeli Occupied parts of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, remains as some of the least protected civilians in the world. The international discourse today is polarized in Washington, Brussels and New York between two A-words: “apartheid versus antisemitism” (Strömbom and Persson 2023). However, few political leaders utilize the word Apartheid for fear of being labelled antisemitic.

Currently, the international community is using protection tools that focus on humanitarian assistance and monitoring human rights breaches that contribute to understanding protection needs, but fails to address them. As noted in previous chapters, the lack of protection is the most acute in Gaza, where local authority contributes to the lack of protection and no civilian can be considered safe. Since 2007, the population in Gaza has been almost entirely closed off with millions being collectively punished and suffer from the lack of basic human needs such as adequate drinking water. Cycles of violent escalations between Israel and Hamas, indiscriminate targeting and lack of adequate national or international protection tools or solutions have all contributed to ineffective, belligerent or exploitative protection. International protection measures, such as the creation of ‘safe areas’ inside schools, where many women and children were herded during deadly the 2014 Israeli airstrikes, were ineffective and distressing since many were erroneously or deliberately targeted by Israel.

Effective multilateral intervention is related to the degree of consensus among key interveners on a type of international intervention (Spitka 2017). Consensus on foreign policy and intervention in a conflict can be constructed along various spheres including international norms, a peace process, an agreement on a solution to the conflict, national security or human security. Divisions among states and within international and regional bodies on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict have made interventions minimal and largely ineffective. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict has generated the highest number of vetoes at the United Nations Security Council. Since 2000, the US has vetoed more than 18 United Nations Security Council resolutions including: sending unarmed monitors to the West Bank and Gaza (2001), condemning all acts of violence including extrajudicial executions and terror (2001), immediate cessation of Israeli settlement activities (2011) and condemning Israel for its massive violations of international law in Gaza and the West Bank (2015). Unconditional support of Israel by the US has meant that Israel has been able to ignore international condemnation. As noted by a UN officer working on Palestinian issues: ‘Israel has the most powerful ally at its side, it’s lucky and basically untouchable’ (Interview 2021).

Over the past decades, various official peace agreements and peace processes have failed, leaving a sense of national and international disillusionment with any peace efforts. Oslo was performance based, with the first Oslo Accord signed in 1993. Initiated by Norway, it was the only process that had initial results and engaged the public. Today, the Oslo framework maintains the divisions within the West Bank, as the measures, designed to be temporary, are used to justify a system of apartheid. The 2000 Camp David II official mediation towards a two-state solution failed and contributed to not only disillusionment but also violence, as the frustration became the catalyst for the second intifada. The 2003 Quartet’s Road Map was a failed attempt at another performance-based peace process. With the exception of Oslo, most peace processes were US-led and none were inclusive, with no engagement of civil society, opposition or women’s groups. Trump’s latest Middle East peace process had not included any women and even excluded the Palestinians from the talks. The takeaways imply a fundamental need for international consensus, working within and not hypocritically against international norms and a need for non-biased interventions.

External intervention in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has been concentrated on humanitarian solutions for Palestinians and state security for Israelis. Cycles of violence including the Gaza wars have drawn attention and international condemnation of the conflict but lack of consensus within the key international bodies including the UNSC, the EU and individual states have rendered diplomatic tools weak and ineffective. The divisions among states and within international and regional bodies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have made interventions beyond humanitarian assistance marginal. As discussed in Chapter 2, Israeli security measures and tools have prioritized the protection of Israeli soldiers and civilians but at the expense of Palestinians civilians. Humanitarian solutions have avoided a complete collapse of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas-run Gaza and assured some basic human needs for survival, but failed in the protection of Palestinian civilians.

Since its creation, the US has been the principal supporter and funder of Israel. As noted by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, through FY2020 the US provided Israel with $146 billion in military, economic and missile defence funding (Ruebner et al. 2021). Indeed, Israel receives more US foreign military funding than all other countries in the world combined (2021). Although international norms have been at the forefront of a framework for United Nations and European Union efforts, norms and conventions have been readily disputed and ignored by Israeli and US administrations, in particularly under President Donald Trump (Panke and Petersohn 2017). In 2017, President Trump formally recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and subsequently moved the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The move has been fiercely contested not only by Palestinians but by almost all states, and regional and international bodies including the UN, which voted to reject the unilateral resolution noting that the status of Jerusalem, claimed as a capital by both Israel and the Palestinians, can only be settled as an agreed final issue in a peace deal. By a vote of 128 in favour to 9 against (Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Togo, US), with 35 abstentions, the Assembly adopted the resolution “Status of Jerusalem”, by which it declared “null and void” any actions intended to alter Jerusalem’s character, status or demographic composition (UN 2017). The resolution also called on all States to refrain from establishing embassies in the Holy City demanded states comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions and work to reverse the “negative trends” imperilling a two‑State resolution of the Israeli‑Palestinian conflict (UN 2017). The US Embassy in Jerusalem has become a new status quo, which is not being disputed by President John Biden’s administration and it, along with the policy which runs contra to international norms, remains in place.

As the largest donor to the Palestinian Authority and the largest trading partner with Israel, the European Union (EU) and its member states could play a significant role in the conflict. However, pronounced divisions have limited potential instruments within all European institutions, including the European Parliament, the European Council and the European Commission. The rise of populist regimes such as in Hungary has boosted support for Israel, blocking the European Union consensus (Kingsley 2019). Divisions can also be witnessed within the Middle East Quartet (made up of the US, European Union, Russia and United Nations). Created to coordinate a peace process, the Quartet has also in recent years been incapable of accomplishing more than funding humanitarian solutions and producing statements that go ignored. James Wolfensohn, the first Special Envoy of the Quartet, resigned in frustration, complaining that his mandate was too weak and his work was undermined by the American administration. Under Tony Blair, the Quartet became even more depoliticized, shifting its focus from mediating between conflicting groups to managing the Palestinians (Elgindi 2015).

The US and the EU have made some contribution to the Palestinian security sector and provide support to the Palestinian police and the security forces of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank. In 2005, the US set up the office of the US Security Coordinator (USSC), which coordinates with the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to enhance security cooperation in the Occupied Territories. USSC advises the Palestinian Authority on security sector reform and contributes to the development of a self-sustaining Palestinian security sector (US State 2022). Most of the US funding and support, however, has been designed to boost Palestinian efforts to combat Hamas and prevent terrorist attacks against Israel. While the US in 2018 slashed funding for health and education services for Palestinians, including all its support for the United Nations Relief Works and Agency (UNRWA), it continued to fund Palestinian security forces, allocating US $60 million in non-lethal assistance to the PA security forces (Congressional Report 2018). In 2005, the European Union established the Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS), however, its mandate has been limited to training of Palestinian police in Area A of the West Bank.

The lack of civilian protection any peace process and for Palestinians has led to increasingly frequent calls for more robust international intervention. This chapter will examine the current contribution of external interveners towards protection of civilians in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. First, it will discuss the principles of protection, second will examine some of the former and current protection international missions including: Norway’s former Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), EU Bam Rafah, EU COPPS and the Protection Cluster. Finally, it will examine and analyse perceptions of international protection, propaganda wars and justifications of non-protection. Examining some of the core assumptions on protection will shed light on the specific principles of practice and potential roadmap towards the future.

International Principles on Protection

Agreeing to fundamental principles on the type of intervention is an essential step towards an effective international intervention. However, although there is a general agreement on some basic principles, such as the two-state solution as an end to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, there is no roadmap, time table or the readiness to get there. When it comes to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, there is also a lack of an agreement or the willingness to deal with non-compliance with international law and severe human rights abuses including apartheid, ethnic cleansing and ongoing war atrocities. Although non-compliance by Hamas and the PA is addressed with economic sanctions which have led to severe hardships among the general population, particularly in Gaza, there are no mechanisms in place for sanctions against Israel. Due to lack of consensus, most international interveners do not have the mandate to work with the Israeli side and only work in the Occupied Territories. In an effort to neutralize their own political involvement in a highly contentious field, the international bodies operating in Palestine have also depoliticized contentious issues into questions of technicalities. The majority of international mandates in Israel/Palestine are thus focused on humanitarian and technical assistance, leaving political work to NGO’s. NGO’s, however, have been attacked and marginalized by Israel and Hamas and have struggled to take on this burden. Despite the large efforts and billions of dollars in international investment, the gap between international norms and the practice of protection within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has not narrowed.

There are many international tools that can potentially contribute towards civilian protection including: (1) observing, monitoring and reporting, (2) humanitarian aid, (3) training and advising, (4) diplomatic statements, manoeuvring and pressure, (5) naming and shaming, (6) international judiciary, (7) policing, (8) trusteeship, (9) economic and political sanctions and (10) military deployment. The tools above range from the least invasive, to robust interventions such as trusteeship and the use of international military. Thus far, the international tools used within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict have been for the most part limited to observing, monitoring and training, far from being either invasive or robust.

International principles on protection of civilians in armed conflict are based on international humanitarian law including the Geneva Conventions. International humanitarian law does not regulate whether a state may actually use force but rather creates ground rules for the use of force to which all countries are signatories. International humanitarian law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict, protecting persons who are not participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare (ICRC 2004). The law protects those who do not take part in the fighting, such as medical and religious personnel and those who have ceased to take part, such as wounded and sick combatants and prisoners of war (ICRC 2004). In addition, international humanitarian law ‘prohibits all means and methods of warfare which: fail to discriminate between those taking part in the fighting and those, such as civilians, who are not’ (ICRC 2004).

Failure to protect civilian populations have led to international tribunals and new normative frameworks, most significantly the Global Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P norm gives responsibility to the international community to take timely and decisive action when a state or relevant authorities are manifestly failing to provide protection from atrocity crimes. Although R2P has gained much traction as an international protection norm, its operationalization, particularly under Pillar III, has encountered many hurdles. Under Pillar I, the state is primarily responsible for protecting the population from war atrocities and Pillar II encompasses the responsibility of international community to assist states to meet this obligation. Under Pillar III, it is the responsibility of the international community to take timely and decisive collective action when a state is ‘manifestly’ failing to meet this obligation (Bellamy 2015). Activation of Pillar III, triggered by the failure of national authorities to fulfil their protection responsibilities, has been the source of most contention due to fears of abuse and the potential of unintended effects.Implementation is also selective and challenging given the divisions within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Although apprehension with Pillar III has been largely due to concerns over the use of the military, the range of potential tools it contains is vast and includes: diplomacy, mediation, advocacy, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, economic, political and strategic inducements, peacebuilding and peacekeeping (Bellamy 2015).

However, the main effort in terms of protection for Palestinians has been humanitarian. Humanitarian NGO’s typically stress three guiding principles in their work: neutrality, impartiality and independence. However, neutrality and independence can be a serious challenge in an asymmetric conflict or when the state or group is hostile to humanitarian and human rights work. Neutral intervention may also have little impact on powerful non-cooperative actors. The challenge with a neutral intervention is that in the case of a powerful, uncooperative group or a state, a neutral intervention may not be forceful enough to end serious atrocities and war crimes (Spitka 2017). As noted by scholars and practitioners, relying on a purely humanitarian response to civil war and genocide is an ineffective and potentially harmful placebo (Lischer 2007).

Many Western countries, in particularly the US and Canada have consistently expressed commitment to the security of Israelis, providing financial and military support for this purpose. The security of Palestinians has consisted of humanitarian efforts and ineffective criticism of parties’ lack of efforts to provide protection. The underlying assumption is that the security of Palestinians will come as a result of a peace deal, whereas for Israelis a peace deal is conditional upon security (Hart and Forte 2010). The reality is that Israeli security comes at the expense of Palestinian security but international divisions have prevented the IC from taking robust actions. In March 2021, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court announced the opening of the investigation into the situation in the state of Palestine. Chamber found that the ‘Court’s territorial jurisdiction in the situation in Palestine extends to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, namely Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem’ (ICC 2022). The ICC trial is a very long process made even more cumbersome by a lack of international consensus and non-cooperation by Israel.

The international policing missions inside Palestine have been operating under the principle of neutrality with the approval of Israel and have limited mandates. EU COPPS mandate is limited to training and equipping and refrains from dealing with larger issues. As noted by an EU COPPS representative; ‘That is not our mandate, as frustrating it is for people on the ground when they see the realities, we have no voice to discuss the political situation or the occupation, we highlight it as a problem for access to justice, but we are mandated to deal with what, you know, reality on the ground … we don't have a mandate to work with the Israeli side’ (Nafstad 2018, p. 115). Thus, the distance between international principles focused on protection whether humanitarian law, equality or R2P, is far removed from the practice of protection. Subsequent to the Rwanda genocide, ‘R2P was the flavour of the decade, states signed on to it but did not implement it’ (Unofficial UN Interview 2021).

Practice

Despite the vast amount of monitoring and available information, the IC’s engagement in the practice of protection is limited, frequently focused on escalations and dependent on the conflict’s relative importance to other conflicts and the agendas of international institutions and states. The international missions operating in recent years and discussed below tend to focus on monitoring, training and investigations with some attempts at naming and shaming. There are also diplomatic pressures, boycott of settlement products against Israel, sanctions against Hamas and the initial stages of investigations by international judiciary of potential atrocities by Hamas and Israel. The tools used in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are far removed from international trusteeship within conflicts as in Bosnia and Kosovo and massive economic sanctions against Russia and military support to Ukraine in the context of the 2022 Russian/Ukrainian conflict, which is currently on the top of the international agenda.

There are large number of organizations focused on humanitarian aid and protection in the West Bank and Gaza that employ thousands and costs billions of dollars’ worth of aid. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates emergency response ‘to save lives and protect people in humanitarian crises’ (OCHA 2022a). OCHA coordinates several West Bank and Gaza humanitarian clusters including; food security, shelter and non-food items, health and nutrition, WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene), education and protection (OCHA 2022a). International interveners are engaged in additional clusters including: human rights and gender equality, which are also linked to the Protection Cluster. The clusters include all key international humanitarian agencies including: AIDA (Association of International Development Agencies), UNICEF, NCR (Norwegian Refugee Council), UN Women, WHO and OHCHR. The budget of around 30 million dollars per year comes mostly from European states (OCHA 2022b). The United States (US) plays and EU pays’ is very much applicable as it’s the European funding that buys Europeans a strategic seat at the table, though the US has remained, or at least attempted to remain, the most powerful inervener (Le Moore 2008). Beyond the humanitarian aid that keeps Palestinian civilians alive and the gathering of data which informs about the needs, little effort has been undertaken to fundamentally change the ongoing reality of Israel’s military occupation and daily human rights abuses.

The Protection Cluster Working Group (PCWG) is comprised of United Nations humanitarian, human rights and development agencies and actors, as well as local and international non-governmental organizations in Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The PCWG works on several focus areas including: the protection of life and personal integrity, land and property, liberty and freedom of movement, child protection, preventing forced and unlawful displacement and protection of family unity. The Protection Cluster points to the most urgent protection issues and needs. The 2021 PCWG report focused on protection risk areas including: psychological distress among children and vulnerable groups in Gaza, specific risks facing women and girls, explosive Remnants of War and Deterioration in mental and physical well-being within West Bank including East Jerusalem (PCWG 2021). The 2022 programmatic interventions of the Protection Cluster is ‘to foster increased respect for IHL and IHRL and accountability for violations while ensuring that vulnerable Palestinians have access to protection’ (Protection Cluster 2022). The Protection Cluster ‘will achieve this aim by monitoring and documenting violations, particularly to increase accountability and inform advocacy to prevent further violations; rights-based advocacy with duty bearers, including third states; a protection presence for communities at risk of settler violence and displacement; legal aid services; inclusive multi-sectoral responses to gender-based violence (GBV) survivors, … child protection services including individual case management; mental health and psychosocial services (MHPSS) for adults and youth….’ (Protection Cluster 2022).

Although most of the effort is focused on humanitarian and rights assistance, documenting violations and drawing attention to the lack of protection, some efforts are also engaged in advocacy and naming and shaming. The PCWG’s advocacy messages included ‘both Israeli and Palestinian authorities have a responsibility to calm the violence, both in words and actions’ and raised Israeli bombardment of the Gaza Strip, settler violence and forceful eviction among some of the serious human rights concerns (PCWG 2021, p. 9). The report also criticized the Israeli forces for increased use of live ammunition in response to Palestinian protests, and IDF’s statements indicating an intention to “target main rioters” raise significant concerns with regard to excessive use of force (PCWG 2021, p. 6). The report found particularly worrying ‘the ongoing harassment by [Israeli] police and authorities in Sheikh Jarrah against those most active in protests, including police arriving at night to their houses, and in some cases using violence, arresting family members or imposing movement restrictions. Harassment and arrests of human rights defenders have been reported, with at least 50 human rights defenders, including 7 women, arrested between mid-April to mid-May’ (PCWG 2021). A report on Gender Based Violence (GBV) in Gaza also pointed to some of the key challenges such as the prevalence of child marriages in Palestine, which is at 24% of all marriages (OCHA 2022a).

The United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC) and the EUPOL COPPS policing missions are the main organizations intended to transform Palestinian security. USSC is the key channel for American-Palestinian security coordination mandated to retrain the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF). USSC oversaw the PA-led counterinsurgency campaign against Palestinian armed militias and ensured the return of West Bank’s Area A to PA control (Bhungalia et al. 2019). Funded by the US State Department Bureau, the USSC troops were trained by US troops and vetted by Israel, directed to fully cooperate with the Israeli security and intelligence establishments (Bhungalia et al. 2019). Although they have assisted in curbing attacks against Israeli civilians, there is little to indicate that the USSC has had a positive impact on the security of Palestinian civilians. Indeed, the forces have raised concerns among Palestinians for restricting civil liberties and many civilians express fears of being apprehended for their political leanings and lack of support for the current regime.

Established in 2006, EUPOL COPPS was designed to assist the PA in improving its law-enforcement capacity. As of 2022, the mission has 71 international staff from 27 EU member states as well as Norway, Canada and Turkey. EU COPPS is engaged in mentoring, training and advising Palestinian police in parts of West Bank that fall under the Palestinian Authority (PA). The mission is “a technical office” which attempts to stay clear of political problems with a mandate to ‘separate the political from the technical’ (Kristoff 2012). However, not dealing with ‘political issues’ such as the military occupation, and addressing Israel’s security concerns while ignoring Palestinian security concerns, creates a dichotomy that is problematic. As noted by Kristoff, ‘Israeli security concerns require cooperation between Palestinian security forces and Israeli authorities, using the Palestinian police to suppress security threats to Israel that emanate from Palestinian territory, in contradiction to the overriding Palestinian desire for their police to protect and serve their community’ (Kristoff 2012, p. 24). The contradictions, including the inability to move Palestinian police officers and equipment across territory, are seldomly voiced publicly. Henrik Malmquist, the former Head of the EUPOL COPPS mission between 2010 and 2012 noted: ‘We were and still are totally handicapped’ (Bouris and İşleyen 2020, p. 442). ‘Everything we do is done with the approval of the State of Israel. Any equipment we bring in has to be approved by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories’ (Bouris and İşleyen 2020, p. 442). As an example, ‘a police station can be 100 metres away from another police station in Area B. We need permission from the Israelis to go from one to another’ (Bouris and İşleyen 2020, p. 443). Since the mission does not have an executive mandate, EU COPPS can only be present where the Palestinian police are permitted to operate by Israel and thus are required to abide by analogous constraints.

Critics have noted that although the Palestinian police force has perhaps become more skilled and equipped, they have also been easily co-opted by political leaders and do not contribute to a sense of security for Palestinians. ‘From the perspective of ordinary Palestinians, the EU-supported reforms have led to the professionalization of authoritarian policing and added a new layer of human insecurity without bringing about either an independent or a democratic Palestinian state’ (Tartir 2015, p. 159). Indeed, due to the limited technical nature of their intervention, both the USSC and the EUPOL COPPS have failed to support democratic governance and improve civil oversight and accountability (Tartir 2015).

The Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) began operating in Hebron after the 1994 massacre of 29 Palestinian worshipers at the Cave of the Patriarchs. Security Council Resolution 904 called for protection measures, including a temporary international presence, to guarantee the safety of Palestinian civilians. The monitors had a limited mandate that consisted of observing and reporting on breaches of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. The monitors were also to contribute towards a feeling of security among Palestinians in Hebron, and to promote projects to enhance their well-being. The TIPH, however, would not perform any military or police functions and ‘would not interfere in disputes, incidents, or activities of the Israeli security forces or of the Palestinian police’ (Baruch and Zur 2019). It was because of this limited mandate that they were commonly referred to as Ice Cream Soldiers, since they wore white and had the reputation of melting at the first sign of trouble. After 22 years, the mission ended, as Israel did not renew its mandate. In January 2019, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu contended that the force “operates against us” and announced his decision not to renew the mandate (Baruch and Zur 2019). The mission ended subsequent to the publication of a confidential report leaked to the press, analysing 20 years of TIPH activities (OCHA 2019). The report recorded over 40,000 incidents, found that Hebron “is more divided than ever, due to the actions of the Israeli government and Israeli settlers”. It also found that Israel is in “severe and regular breach” of the right to non-discrimination and of the obligation to protect the population living under occupation from deportation, while “radical Israeli settlers” make life in the Israeli-controlled area difficult for its Palestinian residents (OCHA 2019). Subsequent to the termination of TIPH’s mandate, the Protection Cluster has observed an increase in the number of incidents of settler harassment and intimidation (OCHA 2019).

From its launch in 2005, the new EU mission EU Bam Rafah began as a ray of hope in a Gaza. The Rafah border was able to operate with the presence of the monitors whose task was to monitor, mentor and train Palestinian border police. It, initially, meant unprecedented freedom of movement for the tens of thousands of Palestinians who had been able to cross the border. The election of Hamas in 2006, however, subsequent sanctions and the string of threats and kidnappings of foreign nationals has placed the EU mission on a long-term freeze. Until the election of Hamas, the success of the EU BAM Rafah was high on the agenda for the EU. Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy called it “the most important internal security mission in the Middle East” that the EU has taken part in (Solana 2007). Public information officer Julio De La Guardia Rivera expressed hopes that with the success of this mission, EU would be asked to assist in other activities such as the monitoring of Gaza’s future Airport and sea port (Interview, 2007). Under its Mandate, the Mission tasks were to monitor, verify and evaluate the performance of the Palestinian Authority’s Border Police and Custom Services at the RCP and contribute to the confidence-building between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The mission was also task to train in advanced border-control-related activities, the use of new/state-of-art technologies and on specialized skills. The Rafah crossing has been operated by Egypt since 2011 with frequent closures by Israel and Egypt.

The other key international bodies which are not humanitarian in nature are UNTSO and UNSCO. UNTSO, the United Truce Supervision Organization, is the oldest UN mission with military observers stationed regionally including in the Golan Heights. The unarmed mission has the mandate to ‘monitor ceasefires, supervise armistice agreements, prevent isolated incidents from escalating and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region to fulfil their respective mandates’ (UNTSO 2022). Officially, the office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) has a formidable role, but has been paralyzed due to internal divisions. UNSCO represents the Secretary-General and leads the UN system in all political and diplomatic efforts related to the peace process, including in the Middle East Quartet. The Quartet designed to coordinate policies of the UN, EU, Russia and the US itself has become the reflection of the lack of effective multilateralism. As noted by one observer, ‘the Quartet was viewed as a convenient means to provide the impression of multilateral action, without the baggage of international law that comes with it’ (Tocci 2013). Alvaro de Soto’s, the former UNSG representative noted, “The Quartet has become a sideshow it is as much about managing transatlantic relations as anything else, it is only about the Middle East, it isn't a very apt mechanism for solving the Israeli-Pale conflict” (Tocci 2013).

Currently, due to international divisions and lack of readiness to take action, none of the international organizations that operate in Israel/Palestine have a mandate to move far beyond observing, monitoring and training. In 2006, the Europeans and the Quartet cut off aid to Hamas until it renounces violence and terror, disarms and recognizes the state of Israel. Thus far, Hamas has refused to do so, though there have been some shifts in increasing use of non-violent tools such as demonstration and in its discourse. Although the security forces remain officially subordinate to President Mahmoud Abbas, the PA has limited ability to influence or control the violence of Hamas or of other extreme groups such as Al-Aqsa Brigades, a violent offshoot of the ruling Fatah. Palestinian population thus feels abandoned by the international community. Israeli actions beyond the reach of international norms and laws. During the 2014 Gaza war, UN called on Israel, Palestinian Authority and Hamas to take immediate steps to safeguard the protection of the population. Human rights organizations that investigated the Gaza war found indiscriminate and not-proportionate targeting of civilians including at UN schools that were sheltering fleeing civilians. The UNHRC report noted, “impunity prevails across the board” and recommended an enquiry into war crimes by Israel and Hamas to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Bellamy 2016). A 2016 report from the Middle East Quartet made several recommendations including for all sides to deescalate tensions, protect lives of civilians, cease incitement to violence, foster a climate of tolerance and invited resumption of meaningful negotiations (Report, 2016). Discussing the increasing number of children who have been killed and injured by live fire UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein noted that ‘These trends call into question to what extent the ISF’s rules of engagement, which are not public, are in line with international law, or at least to what degree the ISF abides by its own rules’ (OHCHR 2018). However, with no punishment for non-compliance, these statements are largely ignored.

Although there is much diplomatic shaming, with full US backing, no country stands up to Israel. The EU is divided and the UN, for Israel, is not considered important enough to be listened to. Israel, for example, declined to meet with the 2021 Commission to investigate ‘all alleged violations of international humanitarian law and all alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law leading up to and since 13 April 2021’ (Human Rights Council 2022). In its resolution S-30/1, the Human Rights Council decided to urgently establish an ongoing independent, international commission of inquiry to investigate in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected Human Rights Council resolution S-30/1 and responded that: “Israel cannot and will not cooperate with such an investigation” (Human Rights Council 2022). The Commission noted that it ‘regrets the lack of cooperation by the Government of Israel, and its refusal to allow entry to Israel and to permit access to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, despite the desire of the State of Palestine to allow the Commission to visit. This refusal obstructed the engagement of many Israeli and Palestinian victims, witnesses and other stakeholders with the Commission’ (Human Rights Council 2022, p. 2).

Given the lack of international protection, much of the protection work falls on the lap of national NGO’s that have been on the front lines protecting human rights, which are themselves subject to attack by Israel. In 2021, six Palestinian human rights organizations were labelled as terrorists by Israel including: Addameer, Al-Haq, Defence for Children International—Palestine, the Union of Agricultural Work Committees, the Bisan Center for Research and Development, and the Union of Palestinian Women Committees. The Association of International Development Agencies (AIDA), which represents more than eighty INGO member organizations, strongly denounced the Israeli Minister of Defence’ designation of six leading Palestinian human rights organizations as ‘terrorist organizations’ (AIDA 2021). ‘The designation of the six NGO’s as terrorist organizations comes after years of misinformation campaigns aimed at discrediting and delegitimizing local civil society groups by the Government of Israel and a network of lobby groups. This includes targeted misinformation, constant harassment, reputational attacks, administrative restrictions, physical assaults, and the detention of staff and the seizure of assets’ (AIDA 2021). The claims led to suspension of funding, later reversed as there was no evidence to justify the accusations.

While national protection ranges between selective, belligerent and exploitative, current international ‘protection’ is marginal and ineffective. Israel’s security is narrow, selective group security for the Jewish population leaving vulnerable groups and Palestinians without protection. Divisions on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict run through key states and international institutions. Although perceptions and opinions on the conflict tend to strongly support Israel or Palestine, interventions are not invasive as countries and institutions have selected not to go against Israel or its sponsor, the US. The lack of progress has been noted by interveners. Tor Wennesland, the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, underlined the need to avoid approaching the current situation incident by incident as stand‑alone issues noting that: “We can no longer lurch from crisis to crisis” (UN Security Council 2021). However, there is no attempt to alter the current status quo of observation of atrocities without any international action. The failure of the Camp David II summit has had dire long-term consequences since it tarnished the potential for other peace talks. Washington did not use its leverage on the Israelis and was unsuccessful in imposing a solution on the Palestinians. Israeli and Palestinian public disillusionment with the peace process, coupled with political incitement, led to an intifada and a spiral of violence and shelved the possibility of a negotiated settlement. September 11, Iraq and the war on terror resulted in a few more efforts at collaboration and the formation of the Quartet that was tasked to lead the peace process. Former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross summed up the reasoning behind the new strategy: “with the tactical need to gain support for or at least acquiescence in its Iraq policy, the administration agreed to work with the European Union (EU), the United Nations, and Russia in drafting a roadmap …an unprecedented step in the US approach to Arab–Israeli issues” (Ross 2004, p. 788). Although the US created the Quartet and was its key member, Washington’s continual support for Israel trumped and undermined its functioning. James Wolfensohn, the first Special Envoy of the Quartet, resigned in frustration and under Tony Blair, the Quartet became even more depoliticized, shifting its focus from mediating between conflicting groups to managing the Palestinians. Trump Peace Plan was called by its proponents as “the deal of the century”, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas referred it as the “slap of the century”, chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat referred to it as “fraud of the century” and a Haaretz journalist referred to it as: “joke of the century” (Verter 2020).

Perceptions, Propaganda and Justifications Against Non-Intervention

The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is the source of fierce ongoing divisions, propaganda war and diplomatic manipulations. Both Israel and Palestine have worked to portray themselves as victims and the other as the aggressors. Israel has been successful at creating and fostering allies, most specifically in Eastern Europe and Africa, offering aid and state-of-the-art security, know-how in water and irrigation, military arsenal, high tech and digital security. Israel’s close alliance with some East European countries such as Hungary and the Czech Republic has worked to weaken or block EU measures and criticism of Israeli digression from rule of law and foster opposition against BDS. In November 2019, Budapest blocked a joint EU statement condemning a US shift on settlements (Ahren 2019). In May 2019—Hungary and the Czech Republic prevented the EU from adopting an EU resolution that would have condemned the US for moving its embassy to Jerusalem. Subsequently, Hungary and the Czech Republic blocked EU statements criticizing President Donald Trumps’ recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Many states have bought Israel’s military-grade spyware Pegasus produced by Israel-based NSO Group. Pegasus has been used to infiltrate the digital devices of a range of targets including opposition leaders, government-critical NGO’s and journalists (Spike 2001).

Israel’s propaganda machine spends hundreds of millions of dollars on international campaigns, with more than 350 official government social media accounts, with a full range of online platforms including Facebook, Twitter to Instagram, and operating in: Hebrew, Arabic and English (Bradshaw and Howard 2017). The government actively works with student volunteers from Jewish organizations and other pro‐Israel groups around the world (Bradshaw and Howard 2017). The “Solomon’s Sling” currently named “Concert”, was designed to spearhead the Strategic Affairs Ministry campaign to change the global discourse on Israel (Benzaquen 2022). Solomon’s Sling’s mission was described as a struggle against “delegitimization” of the state through “mass consciousness activities”. The use of covert propaganda and the transfer of money indirectly to foreign organizations has drawn harsh criticism especially from abroad. Israel has also utilized accusations of antisemitism to silence criticism and opposition especially with regard to boycott, de-investment and sanctions (BDS).

Palestinian authority likewise places blame on the Israel for any wrongdoings in an intense effort to win over foreign public opinion. Responsibility for acts of Palestinian terrorism is commonly addressed by means of dissociation and non-dispositional attribution, with the PA arguing that it ‘exerted 100 percent effort … to prevent terrorist operations’, but was not free to operate due to Israeli closures, sanctions and violence (Mor 2007, p. 676). Israel’s ties with the EU worsened significantly subsequent to the EU’s November 2015 decision to label products from illegal settlements. The internationalization of the Palestinian struggle and its recourse to international institutions and international law has in many ways moved the Palestinian national narrative closer to the EU’s peacebuilding narrative and Israel’s further away (Müller 2019). Netanyahu frequently referred to the EU as ‘hostile’ and ‘hypocritical’ (The Times of Israel 2018). The media is commonly a source of blame for both Israeli and Palestinian authorities. The 2022 assassination of the popular Palestinian/American Aljazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh was followed by international statements of condemnation and requests for independent investigation of the incident. EU’s head of mission to the West Bank and Gaza Strip Swen Kuhn von Burgdorff noted that: ‘we need to call for a swift and an independent investigation so that the perpetrators of this terrible crime can be brought to justice’ (Al Jazeera 2022).

Despite Israel’s growing isolation, there is little evidence of change. Burgdorff, conveyed a sense of impotence noting: ‘Journalists are the ones who hold the politicians accountable…What can we do [EU]? We cannot impose ourselves’ (Al Jazeera 2022). We don’t have the mandate is the most common justification for the lack of any progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There has been little to no accountability for any of the war atrocities committed. Close alliances with Israel and divisive perceptions on victim vs perpetrator within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are increasingly dividing the international community, including the EU, and the US, and these divisions simply paralyze efforts to address the conflict. This can be juxtaposed against the unity on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which resulted in swift and comprehensive actions. In a matter of weeks, the EU and the US imposed an unprecedented 6,000 plus national and industry sanctions on Russia. In addition, between February 22 and 13 July 2022, Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), France, Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US imposed restrictions on at least 7,271 Russian elites and oligarchs (Statista 2022). The Brooking Institute, which tracks sanctions, noted that ‘the extent of the sanctions is staggering: It is the most comprehensive set of multilateral economic sanctions ever applied to a major global economy’ (Eisen et al. 2022). The double standards in addressing 2021 Russia’s Occupation of the Ukraine versus Israel’s ongoing Occupation of Palestine have not been lost on observers. The ‘West's blatant hypocrisy … the speed with which all cultural, academic and political organizations, and sports, businesses and parliaments have imposed blanket boycotts and sweeping sanctions against Russia and even against ordinary Russians, only days after the invasion of Ukraine, sends a very clear, racist message … that our lives and our rights as people of colour do not count in the eyes of the imperial, colonial West’ (Middle East Monitor 2022).

The IC, however, has been supporting the PA, while the PA has been losing its own support among their own public, creating wider distances between existing realities, democracy and rule of law. The Palestine papers that were leaked to the press point to unconditional support for Abu Mazen. In a 2009, meeting between the then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Middle East envoy George Mitchell and Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erakat, Clinton noted: ‘Abu Mazen not running in the election is not an option-there is no alternative to him’ (Swisher 2011, p. 60). Assistant Secretary of State David Welsh noted that ‘The new administration [of President Obama] expects to see the same Palestinian faces (Abu Mazen and Salaam Fayyad) if it is to continue funding the Palestinian Authority’ (Swisher 2011, p. 60). The US administration for some time also pressured the Palestinians not to go to International Institutions on Israeli infringements. In conversations with US Senator George Mitchell, Erakat pleaded with the US not to remove the legitimate non-violent measures: ‘They won’t refrain from doing the illegal things that they do. If they refrain OK but they won’t. This is my only weapon. We have actions by settlers, attacks, provocations, Al Aqsa, home demolitions, families thrown out of their homes. Either we retaliate in a civilized manner or through violence. Which one should we choose? On going to the UN we always coordinate with you. It’s our only weapon. Don’t take it away from us’ (Swisher 2011, p. 297).

More recently, former US President Trump changed the facts on the ground via US recognition of Israeli sovereignty of the Golan Heights and support for an undivided Jerusalem as the Israeli capital. Those hoping for change from Joe Biden’s first visit as the US President to Israel/Palestine in July, 2022, were disappointed. Noting ‘You have an ironclad commitment from the United States of America to Israel’s security’, the visit signalled little attempt at progress or solving even the smallest of issues between Israel and Palestine, reinforcing the long-held US view of Palestinians, not as occupied people but as a problem of terrorism and humanitarian assistance.

Beyond the current lack of protection strategies, discussion of more effective human security ought to be focused on prioritizing protection of all civilians, the use of alternative tools such as community policing and inclusive protection. Half of the population—women—have been almost completely left out of any formal discussions. This is not to imply that simply adding women to the mix would solve the conflict. As will be discussed in the subsequent chapter, research has noted that women are not necessarily any more peaceful then men, though changes in approach need to be focused on inclusion and the empowerment of the marginalized populations.

Conclusion

Despite some effort, the gaps between principles and practice have not narrowed. The 2018 UNSG report on the protection of the Palestinian civilian population (A/ES-10/794) identified four possible types of protection: physical protection, legal protection, general assistance and protection by publicity (Protection, 2018). The main type of assistance for the Palestinian population has been humanitarian assistance, helping individuals cope with life under the occupation; and some naming and shaming, through publicity and attention. Physical protection, for example the deployment of armed forces, has not been possible beyond the monitoring of human rights violations. International protection of civilians within violent conflicts has been traditionally perceived as under the tasks of peacekeepers or an army. The military, however, have only been sent in to monitor and in any case do not generally have the training or the know-how to deal with civilians. International police have only been deployed to train or monitor Palestinians in Area A of the West Bank and do not have access to the areas with least protection including Gaza and Area C of the West Bank. International legal protection, namely the ICC remains the one final hope of powerful sharp tool with the potential of transformation.

Despite the significant funds pouring into the conflict, when it comes to protection of civilians, the international community can be characterized by impotence and complacency, absolving their very clear responsibility of accountability. Indeed, examining the security sector, the international community has become complicit in the maintenance of the status quo in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although there are periodic proposals for peace plans, key interveners have failed to agree on appropriate protection tools and the lack of diplomatic unity has contributed to normalizing rather than resolving the conflict, leaving civilians vulnerable to violence and ongoing war atrocities. The PA has been reined in to the point of losing legitimacy in the eyes of its own population, and the IC with no agreement on stronger tools is currently impotent to deal with either Hamas or Israel. Within Gaza, Area C of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, all civilians are at risk of becoming human shields. Thus far, the US has managed to shield Israel from any repercussions of crossing international red lines including ongoing policies of apartheid, ethnic cleansing and war atrocities. The blind support of Israel and lack of a peace process has only added fuel on the flame, leaving more Palestinians without hope of change and seeing violence as the only solution. Although the threat of ICC investigation and trial is looming, it does not appear to be impacting the behaviour on the ground. The ICC, however, is considered the only international institution with the capacity to reprimand, since much of the realities and attitudes from the IC are ones of divisions, exasperation and complacency. Mediation towards resolution remains the most effective tool for ending violent conflicts. With appropriate tools including incentives for cooperation and threats and sanctions in cases of non-compliance, inclusive mediation can be utilized in the most difficult and intractable conflicts. When mediators are united on the use of appropriate and inclusive process and tools, they can push the conflict towards a resolution.