Keywords

Traditional notions of security have focused on the protection of civilians by the state. Although the state is perceived as and is expected to be the primary provider of protection, governing authorities in a violent conflict may not necessarily feel obligated to provide protection for all of the population living within its territory. Apartheid, settler colonialism, ethnic cleansing, war atrocities and genocide can all be perpetuated by a state or governing authority against the civilians it’s supposed to protect. What are the gaps between international norms and realities in national protection of civilians, and what is the potential roadmap towards bridging them? Who is the protector, who are the protected and who lacks protection? To what extent does national or group security provide protection for all civilians? Protection is commonly in the hands of a small national elite with the military and private companies under its control, while the vulnerable population can remain unprotected and at times exploited. This is especially the case within violent civil conflict, where responsible authorities generally blame the opposing group for the lack of civilian protection and can feed off public insecurities to justify their own positions. Thus, for hard-line leadership, public insecurities may be beneficial, even necessary to maintain political control and power.

Protection can be provided by the state, a group, a non-governmental organization, or a local, regional or an international entity. Each entity can be attempting to provide protection for a group, specific segments of the population or all of the population within its territory or under its jurisdiction. In recent years, much of protection has fallen into private hands. In a context of conflict, a weak state can also appeal for protection to an external intervener. Civilian protection can range from being effective, selective, ineffective, belligerent and exploitative. This manuscript will explore the differences between the provision of individual, group and national protection. It will examine the challenges in national security and protection of civilians related to; power dynamics, dependency and expected loyalty to the protector and the potential for violations and exploitation.

Absence and abuse by national or state protection have brought international global actors to the forefront of altruistic attempts to enhance civilian protection. International protection norms, namely Responsibility to Protect (R2P), have normatively given diplomatic precedence to human security and civilian protection over state sovereignty. Although R2P and human security are part of today’s discourse and have evolved into an international norm, it has failed to become operationalized. Although there is an international agreement on its principles, within divided conflicts regional and international bodies are commonly paralysed and have little impact on protection of civilians in the midst of a divisive context.

As noted by Canadian PM Justin Trudeau, ‘The number one job of any government is to keep their citizens safe’ (Trudeau 2017). However, states in violent conflict commonly engage in a myth of protection where security measures designed to ‘protect’ further expose the most vulnerable, rather than provide for their security. Indeed, traditional notions of national security commonly fall victim to the myth of protection where national authorities and the military, ostensibly used to protect the vulnerable population, not only fail to protect but also to exploit their superior position to remain in power. Amending international security approaches from state to individual human security suggests the use of non-lethal tools and a deeper emphasis on inclusion and resilience (Chandler 2012). Although security and protection regimes that emphasize human security and resilience have shifted international protection norms, these have been applied seldomly and selectively.

Absence of civilian protection is a key public policy issue and concern studied by gender scholars, security specialists and conflict resolution experts in many contexts and conflicts including within the Middle East. Feminist scholars looked to human security as one way to include gender in the security discourse (Hagen 2016, p. 316). Human security is a term introduced by 1994 UNDP human development report essentially focused on ‘people centered security’ (Hagen 2016). Human security places individual security ahead of that of the group and the state, which can make some individuals or groups expendable. A key challenge in national security is the relationship between protector and protected, which is by definition asymmetric, since one has access to legitimate force, while the other is dependent on its delivery. This creates a dependency that can be problematic since it does not necessarily provide incentives to the protector to deliver worry-free protection. There is an implicit bargain between the protected who submit to a security order and the protector, who in return expects obedience and loyalty (Young 2003). The dependency can open up potential space for abuse of power as well as lack of accountability. In addition, national protection can be based on a membership of a group and which encompasses protection for only a certain proportion of the population. Thus, the most vulnerable part of the civilian population is commonly not part of the national group and has access to least protection.

This manuscript has selected to examine protection in a single conflict-ridden contested space to illuminate on some of the gaps of national and international security and protection strategies. Although highly complex due to the various national and international authorities and entities, the Israeli/Palestinian case provides a wide array of experiences of protecting and protection. Within the same case, it is possible to examine protection by a strong state, a weak or a failed state, national groups, private organizations and various international interveners. Differentiating between the different areas within Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, it’s also possible to distinguish between instances of: effective, selective, ineffective, belligerent and exploitative protection. Violence and protection or its absence is closely monitored and reported on within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, providing rich data for analysis. This research is based on years of analysis of documentation, surveys and dozens of interviews with Israeli, Palestinian and international actors monitoring or responsible for aspects of civilian protection.

Examining security and protection within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, this study will analyse national and international security strategies as they apply to the protection of Israeli and Palestinian civilians. Although security has been on the top of the Israeli agenda, how does this translate into protection for all civilians? ‘It’s a national security issue’ is the code for civilians and outsiders to unquestionably accept protection strategies from national authorities. How secure is the population with the current strategies of protection? Actions in the name of security have justified severe security measures but have they had a positive or an inverse effect on not only Palestinian but also the protection of Israeli civilians? What can be revealed about the effectiveness of Palestinian national protection strategies by Hamas in Gaza and Palestinian Authority (PA) in areas of the Occupied West Bank? UN, EU and other external programmes and missions have poured funding and assistance to Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza; however, how effective has this been in contributing to the protection of Palestinian population?

Various labels and terminology have been associated with realities of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and Israel’s actions in the Occupied Territories including: intractable conflict, ethnic conflict, ethnocracy, settler colonialism, apartheid, ethnic cleansing, war atrocities, war crimes and genocide. The conflict is divisive and the terminology, though commonly contested, is relevant to different aspects of the realities within the conflict. The state of Israel has commonly been described as an ethnocracy (Yiftachel 2006). As noted by Yiftachel, the term not only means the dominance of a specific ethnic group but also denotes the prominence of ethnicity, most notably religion, in all aspects of communal life (Yiftachel 2006, p. 295).

Increasingly, Israel has also been described as an apartheid state, especially by INGOs and Israeli NGOs monitoring the politics and human rights within the state and the Occupied Territories. The crime of apartheid is perpetrated when particular serious human rights violations are committed with the ‘purpose of establishing and maintaining a system of domination by one racial group over another and systematically oppressing them’ (UN Apartheid Convention 1973). According to a 2021 Human Rights Watch Report, Israeli authorities are ‘committing crimes against humanity of apartheid and persecution’ against Palestinians living in the occupied territory including East Jerusalem (Human Rights Watch 2021). Many critical Israeli NGOs have also begun to use the term apartheid referring to policies within Israel, East Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories. In 2021, B’TSelem ‘reached the conclusion that the bar for defining the Israeli regime as an apartheid regime has been met after considering the accumulation of policies and laws that Israel devised to entrench its control over Palestinians’ (B’TSelem 2021). Amnesty International’s 2022 report, ‘Israel's Apartheid Against Palestinians: Cruel System of Domination and Crime Against Humanity’, noted that Israeli authorities must be held accountable for committing the crime of apartheid against Palestinians (Amnesty 2022). Israel reacted strongly against all the accusations, labelling the reports and organizations as antisemitic. However, thirteen key Israeli human rights organizations publicly defended Amnesty’s report, noting that ‘the debate around the crime of apartheid of which Israel is accused … is not only legitimate, but absolutely necessary’ (Human Rights 2022).

Ethnic cleansing has been used to describe systematic and commonly violent Israeli eviction practices in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Richard Falk, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, noted that: “The continued pattern of settlement expansion in East Jerusalem combined with forcible eviction of long residing Palestinians are creating an intolerable situation that can only be described, in its cumulative impact, as a form of ethnic cleansing” (Falk 2021). War atrocities and war crimes have been used to label Hamas or other Palestinian militant groups targeting Israeli civilians, as well as Israel’s indiscriminate targeting of Gaza with rockets or shooting of unarmed Palestinian civilians. Subsequent to the latest round of bombardment of Gaza during May 2021, the UN launched an investigation, condemning Israel and Hamas for indiscriminate firing and killing of civilians. As noted by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet who called for the investigation, ‘If found to be indiscriminate and disproportionate in their impact on civilians and civilian objects, such attacks may constitute war crimes’ (Hughes 2021).

Some observers have even gone as far as to label Israeli policies in Gaza as attempts at genocide. Israeli historian Ilan Pappe defined the Israeli policy towards the Gaza Strip as an incremental genocide (Pappe 2014). According to the 1948 Genocide Convention, genocide means any of the following acts: committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, such as killing members of the group and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (UN Genocide 1948). Examining different realities within Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, this manuscript will discuss ethnocracy, apartheid and ongoing incidents of ethnic cleansing and other war atrocities. The evidence gathered in this book does not support reasoning for the term genocide. Although Israel is deliberately inflicting on a Palestinian’s conditions of life to bring about its partial destruction, the manuscript refrains from referring to Israel’s policies as genocide, even an incremental one. First, the label of genocide was created in the context of the Holocaust which may diminish the significance of the brutal killing of over 6 million Jews. The label of genocide was also given in the context of Rwanda where a million people were killed and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Serbia and paramilitary groups not only killed and displaced the Muslim Bosnian population but also systematically erased any evidence of their history and culture including levelling and destroying all Mosques and cultural artefacts (Spitka 2014). Although many red lines have been crossed, Israel has still tended to, for the most part, respect the cultural and religious rights of the Palestinian population. The terminology above including apartheid, ethnic cleansing and war atrocities is severe enough, without bringing in the most severe accusation of genocide. Although there is much debate on the subject, using appropriate terminology is important not only because of the associated meaning behind the terminology but also because of its implication and relevance within the international arena.

Much of the scholarly literature and practitioners’ debates have tended to reflect the divisions in the Israeli /Palestinian conflict by placing the blame either on Israel or Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Focusing on national protection, the bulk of the studies focus on national security and fail to address gaps in strategies and practices that have an adverse effect to providing protection to all civilians. This research unravels some of the complexities and contradictions in traditional national and security studies and focuses on the promises, the delivery and the gaps in protection of civilians. Examining security and civilian protection strategies in a single case study, this manuscript reveals some of the realities and myths about national and international protection. To what extent do national security strategies prioritize the protection of all civilians? To what extent are international norms and international presence including: humanitarian missions, monitoring missions, international police and military observers’ contributing to civilian protection? The subsequent sections will introduce the nature and responsibility for protection, national protection strategies, international protection norms and practice before delving into examining protection of civilians under the umbrella of Israeli, Palestinian and international authorities within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

What is Protection and Who is Responsible?

Protection of the individual is the most basic human need and the most fundamental responsibility for a state. The primary entity responsible for protection of its population is the state. Max Weber defined state as an entity which has a ‘monopoly on the use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber 1972). Robert Rotberg noted that the ability to provide human security is the central political good for a state (Rotberg 2003). State protection of a population can come from numerous sources including the police, the military, rule of law and the judiciary. However, the state does not necessarily provide protection for all who reside on its territory. The state may provide protection for only a portion of its population, be failing in providing protection, may privatize protection or rely on external protection. In a violent conflict context, international protection is commonly requested, offered or at times imposed and can come from numerous types of protection-focused operations including: humanitarian aid, state-building, monitoring missions, peacekeeping, police training or restructuring or military missions. The state remains the main entity responsible for the allowance to realize basic human needs and the well-being of a person.

The first challenge in protection is defining it. Protection can be defined as simply the safety and security of an individual or may be based on a wider definition focused on the well-being of a person including their freedom of movement, freedom of speech and other liberties. Definition of protection by humanitarian and human rights actors goes beyond physical protection and includes all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law (UN DPKO 2009). This study understands protection to be connected to human security and the realization of basic human needs. Human security is based on the normative claim that the ultimate referent for security ought to be the human individual, not the state or some other collective (Bellamy 2016). At the basis for human security are basic human needs. Johan Galtung has identified four basic human needs: freedom, identity, survival and well-being (Galtung 2005), of which all are non-negotiable and necessary for the well-being of a person. In this research, I define protection as an aim to enhance human security of a person in line with the attainment of basic human needs.

State Protection

States commonly attempt to have a monopoly on protection tools within their borders including the army, police, border guards, intelligence and the judiciary. Elites at the helm of the state may have differing interests on protection as they are related to other priorities, such as economic security, managing diversity, military engagement or build-up or re-election that can work in tandem or clash with security and protection of the country’s civilians. One of the fundamental questions in analysing security versus protection is who does the state protect and who does it not protect? Populations left out of protection, particularly in conflictual contexts, can include: civilians perceived as belonging to the enemy, non-citizens, minorities or groups regarded as hostile, divergent populations, such as political opponents and activists, gender minorities and women.

Power dynamics between the protector and the protected become more pronounced when the protectors are made up of different ethno-national groups than the protected. Who makes up the military and who is represented in the police force has a major impact on the perceptions of legitimacy and effectiveness of protection. In Northern Ireland, few Catholics in the police force prior to the Good Friday Agreement made the police less legitimate and effective in providing protection to all residents. Restructuring the Northern Ireland police involved a 50/50 recruiting quota, so that half of new officers came from Catholic backgrounds. By 2011, up to 30 percent of the force was Catholic, from just around 8 percent prior to the peace agreement. With current levels still hovering around 30%, the debates over the makeup of the police force continue to be at the top of the political agenda (Moriarty 2019). In Bosnia, the military and the police were engaged in war efforts and were all ethnically divided at the time of the signing of the Dayton peace agreement. The creation of a single unified military was a fundamental step towards state security and protection. The creation of a mixed Bosnian police force has been a 20-year-long UN and EU effort, which is yet to be completed in Republika Srpska. Proportional ethno-national and gender representation within security forces, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, can be one of the fundamental elements of effective policing.

State protection varies in its effectiveness and selectivity. In many states, protection is not necessarily made available equally for all civilians, most notably the vulnerable segment of the society that includes visible and invisible minorities. State protection can be effective in protecting certain groups, while ineffective, malignant or exploitative towards other groups. State and politicians at its helm can feed on insecurities of the population that feel vulnerable and dependent. For nationalistic leadership, providing the assurances of full protection might undermine their position as the needed protector. While the population is dependent on the state for its protection, the state is in a position to demand loyalty in return for its services. States often justify their expectations of obedience and loyalty by appealing to their role as the protector of the citizens (Young 2003).

Vulnerable populations commonly include those which are not part of the majority, populations that were vulnerable before the conflict, and populations that lie on the fringe of society. These may include ethnic or visible minorities, migrants, dissidents, women, gender minorities (LGBTQ+), disabled, elderly, children and teens. Children and teens are not only vulnerable in situations of violent conflict; they are also susceptible to exploitation and recruitment by extremists or the state. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 4, children and teens living within a violent conflict are easy targets for exploitation by militants or by the military establishment of the state. Social media has made it easier to reach and recruit pre-teens and teens. The relative ease in the recruitment of teens compared to older adults makes them also a prime target for detentions and strong security measures.

In current conflict contexts, civilians are commonly intertwined with the perpetrators of the conflict. As noted by critical security scholars, in modern times, the borders of war are blurred in both time and space, and it is difficult to pinpoint when and where the war starts and ends (Harel-Shalev 2018; Gregory 2018). New technologies including lighter weapons, smart weapons, remote battlefields, surveillance and social media are changing the perpetrators and victims in conflict. It is questionable whether the tools of protection have caught up with the new realities. Even under altruistic intention to protect, effectiveness of protection regime can be difficult in complex, contested settings and runs the risk of unintended effects.

Protection is clearly problematic when it comes at the cost to freedom and civil liberties. The practice of surveillance, intimidation, detention and repression of criticism and dissent cuts into civil liberties, yet have all been justified as part of the costs incurred as a benefit of protection. Much has been written about the post-9/11 curtailment of civil liberties that were cut at the expense of increased security which questionably increased the protection of US civilians. National protection, however, does not take place in a vacuum but rather is integrated within a regional and an international context that can contribute to, or alternatively may jeopardize, civilian protection. When a state fails to provide protection, it can also request assistance or members of the international community can propose and offer some type of external intervention. However, as can be witnessed in many ongoing conflicts, such as the Israeli/Palestinian or the current occupation by Russia of Ukraine, international protection is limited.

International Protection

International intervention that attempts to contribute to protection can come in many forms including: humanitarian assistance, policing missions, military monitoring or other forms of diplomatic, economic and military intervention. Even under the umbrella of altruistic intervention, external intervention is challenging since it requires consensus and pushes the boundaries of sovereignty. Agreed to by the largest gathering of the heads of states in 2005, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) provides the latest and arguably a crucial roadmap towards international intervention focused on protection. According to supporters of the norm, R2P may be the most significant normative development of our time, since it has managed to finesse the tensions between sovereignty and protection from atrocity crimes (Thakur and Weiss 2009). Sceptics, however, rightly point to R2P as being applied selectively and only when the interests of the great powers align (Mamdani 2010). While R2P has become integrated into the formal international normative agenda, the operationalization of the norm has been difficult especially when the interests of the great powers do not align. R2P is also only relevant in cases when a state or groups are engaged in atrocity crimes, notably: ethnic cleansing, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. While R2P has failed to prevent atrocities in some of the most volatile and divisive conflicts, the concept that civilians have a right to protection within any internal boundary has received widespread international support (Western and Goldstein 2013).

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm was created to prevent the failure of non-intervention in cases of war atrocities in conflicts such as Rwanda and Bosnia (BiH). In both conflicts, gangs of armed thugs, supported by a state and leadership of ethnic groups, systematically pillaged, raped and killed civilians, while the international community failed to reach a consensus on minimal measures to end the atrocities. R2P stands on three pillars and acts as a normative framework for intervention to prevent war atrocities. Under Pillar I, the state is primarily responsible for protecting the population from war atrocities, and Pillar II encompasses the responsibility of the international community to assist states to meet this obligation. Under Pillar III, it is the responsibility of the international community to take timely and decisive collective action when a state is ‘manifestly’ failing in meeting this obligation. Activation of Pillar III, triggered by the failure of national authorities to fulfil their protection responsibilities, has been the source of most contention due to fears of abuse and the potential for unintended effects. Implementation is also selective and challenging given the divisions within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The shift from a normative discourse on prioritizing protection of individuals vulnerable to atrocity crimes, to operationalization of R2P in the most difficult conflicts, has been problematic. There are currently many cases of violent conflict and internal atrocities such as in the Ukraine, Syria, Yemen, Darfur as well as in Israel/Palestine, where Pillar III of R2P may be applicable, however, the international community has been challenged to reach a consensus on appropriate tools that prioritize protection for those vulnerable to war atrocities. Effective operationalization of protection under R2P is dependent on a common international consensus on the realities of the conflict, common agreement on the culpability for atrocity crimes and a construction of a collective framework for a protection regime. Although the international community is more commonly able to reach a consensus on providing humanitarian aid, such as the creation of a humanitarian corridor or sending investigators or observers, military or policing missions that prioritize protection are far more difficult to establish.

The full potential of protection tools is directly linked to consensus among interveners. Whether it’s a military intervention, policing mission, boycott or sanctions, none are effective if intervention is divided, especially if key powers are working on opposing sides. The veto rights of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, US, China, Russia, France and UK, have been obstructive in advancing protection in the most volatile conflicts including the Ukraine, Syria and Israel/Palestine. Sixty-three states as well as the EU have called for reform of the Security Council outlining restraint on the use of veto in mass atrocity situations (Adams 2015). France proposed that the Security Council develop a conduct where the permanent members agree to refrain from using a veto when it comes to mass atrocities (Adams 2015). These measures, however, are far from the realities of the current divisive international context. The subsequent sections will outline relevant international law and protection strategies under the different types of authorities operating in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, namely Israeli, Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas and international, in order to examine the challenges of effectiveness and expose some of the gaps and myths in protection.

Israeli/Palestinian Conflict and International Law

The current Israeli/Palestinian conflict rose out of the ashes of the Holocaust against the Jews and the subsequent Nakba [catastrophe]—the violent expulsion of Palestinian civilians. The extermination of more than 6 million Jews in European concentration camps created circumstances sympathetic to Jewish suffering and the creation of the Jewish state of Israel. The Jews killed represented around one-third of world Jewry and about two-thirds of European Jewry (Holocaust Encyclopedia 2018). Even prior to the Holocaust, due to antisemitism and violent persecution, the creation of a Jewish Homeland gained some sympathy internationally with Britain noting: ‘His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’ (Balfour Declaration 2017). “A land without a people for a people without a land” became a widely cited phrase associated with the Zionist settlement movement to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The British controlled Palestine oversaw an influx of Jewish settlement and a succession of protests and revolts between the Jewish and the Palestinian Arab communities. After a quarter of a century under the British Mandate, Great Britain washed its hands of the issue and submitted what had become “the Palestine problem” to the United Nations on the ground that the Mandatory Power “was faced with conflicting obligations that had proved irreconcilable” (UN Question 2022).

In 1947, the newly created UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181, recommending a plan to partition Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state, with Jerusalem as a separate entity to be governed by a special international regime. Subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly recognizing Palestinians as a people with national rights and their right of return have been consistent with the basic conception of partition and two States in Palestine (Mallison and Mallison 1979). Resolution 181 contributed to an intensification of fighting between the local Jewish and Palestinian population, and six months later, Israel’s unilateral declaration of independence sparked regional invasion and the first Arab–Israeli War. Israel defeated the Arab incursion, expelling not only the foreign armies but also more than 750,000 Palestinian civilians living within Palestine. The territory was divided into three parts: the State of Israel, the West Bank under the control of Jordan and the Gaza Strip under the control of Egypt.

However, in the 1967 Six-Day war, Israel gained military control over the territory of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Old City of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The territory under Israeli military occupation is the area with greatest vulnerabilities for civilian populations and ongoing infringements of international law. A key area of concern is the illegal Jewish settlement, which is a source of violence and escalations. Article four of the Geneva Convention prohibits individual or mass forcible transfers or deportations of persons living in Occupied Territories. “Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive” (Geneva Convention 1949). There have been many subsequent objections and resolutions that have condemned ongoing infringements of international law. The 1988 UN Resolution S/19443 called on Israel ‘to abide immediately and scrupulously’ by the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of war and to abstain from policies and practices that are in violation of the convention (UN Secretary General 1988). Israeli violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention have been frequently also noted in NGO and INGO reports including of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). As noted by the ICRC, the violations have included attempts to alter the status of Jerusalem, the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, deportations of Palestinian civilians from the Occupied Territories, collective punishments and destruction of homes (UN Secretary General 1988).

Acts of terrorism by Palestinian armed groups including Hamas have also been condemned for breaches of international law including: indiscriminate targeting, the use of human shields and exploitation of civilians including youth for violence and terrorism, which are considered war crimes. Hamas has also violated the Geneva Conventions including: conflicting parties must “distinguish between the civilian population and combatants”; prohibition of indiscriminate attacks where the “method or means of combat cannot be directed at a specific military objective”; and parties must “avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas” (Geneva Convention 1949). As noted by the head of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, heavy rocket barrage towards Israel by Hamas and other armed groups also constitute “a clear violation of international humanitarian law” (UN News 2021).

The 1990 UNSC Resolution 681 created the scope to discuss international protection to Palestinians in the OPT, under the aegis of UNRWA (UNSCR 681 1990). The resolution urged the Government of Israel to accept the de jure applicability of the Geneva Convention ‘relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War’ (UNSCR 681 1990). Resolutions also condemned incitement and the construction of the barrier. In 2000, the Security Council deplored the provocation carried out at Al-Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem and the subsequent violence that resulted in more than 80 Palestinian deaths. The 2003 General Assembly Resolution (ES-10/13) noted that the barrier was “in contradiction to international law” and demanded that Israel “stop and reverse” its construction (UN General Assembly 2003). Israel called the resolution a “farce”. In 2004, the United Nations passed the issue to the International Court of Justice which ruled that the portions of the Israeli West Bank barrier that are located within Occupied Palestinian Territories are illegal under international law (International Court 2004).

Commissions of UN inquiries examining the legality of Israel’s military occupation have led to condemnation, but with no effect. On 27 May 2021, the UN Human Rights Council held a special session on “the Grave Human Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem” and adopted a resolution “Ensuring respect for international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in Israel” (UNGA 2021). The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, was given the mandate to investigate all alleged violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of international human rights law leading up to and since 13 April 2021 (UN Inquiry 2021).

The Commission of Inquiry Report concluded that ‘some of the policies and actions carried out by the Government of Israel that are leading to permanent occupation and therefore to de facto annexation may constitute elements of crimes under international criminal law’ (International Commission 2022, p. 26). The Commission Chair, Navi Pillay, noted that “By ignoring international law in establishing or facilitating the establishment of settlements, and directly or indirectly transferring Israeli civilians into these settlements, successive Israel governments have set facts on the ground to ensure permanent Israeli control in the West Bank” (UN News 2022).

The report also noted that since the occupation began, Israel has used military justifications to issue permanent and temporary closure orders for vast areas in the West Bank (International Commission 2022). In practice, much of the land has not been used for military purposes but for the construction of settlements. Israel has declared approximately 18 percent of the West Bank closed military zones, including in Area C. Over half of Area C (1.765 million dunams) has been officially designated as closed military zones. Israeli settlers have cultivated over 14,000 dunams of land in closed military areas, some of which is on private Palestinian land. UN Secretary-General also noted that measures such as the closure of Palestinian towns and villages following attacks against Israelis “may amount to collective punishment” (UNSG 2017). Security Council Resolution 242 emphasized “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”, referring to the legal status of areas captured by Israel in 1948 and 1967.

The Palestinian population living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is protected by international humanitarian law. As noted by the UN Human Rights Council, ‘as the occupying power, Israel has the duty to protect the population of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and to uphold public order and safety’ (UN Human Rights 2017, p. 4). Israel’s military occupation and control over Palestinian civilians, illegal Jewish settlements and Palestinian displacements and deportations, permanent and military checkpoints, violent incursions and daily discrimination, hardship and violence have deprived the Palestinian population of basic human rights (Amnesty 2022). In 2022, an UN-appointed Commission of Inquiry stated that “Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory is unlawful under international law due to its permanence and the Israeli government’s de facto annexation policies” (UNGA A/77/328 2022). As noted by the Inquiry, to date 14 settlements have been established in East Jerusalem with a total population of more than 229,000 persons. Restrictive planning and zoning regimes in East Jerusalem have obstructed adequate housing, infrastructure and livelihoods for Palestinians, contributing to shrinking space for Palestinians (UNGA A/77/328 2022). Israel has consistently taken the position that it does not formally accept the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention but that it has decided since 1967 to act in accordance with “the humanitarian provisions” of that Convention.

When it comes to what it perceives as a threat to its own security, Israel has not abided by international law. Sympathy, guilt and ongoing accusations of antisemitism have prevented a tougher stance against the violation of international laws by Israel and side-lined united international action. Lack of accountability and violent actions with impunity have become a source of international condemnation. UN’s Human Rights Council noted; “the failure to ensure accountability creates an environment of impunity where victims and families have little or no redress, which may encourage further abuses on all sides… Accountability for violations committed by all parties would be key to breaking the cycle of violence” (UN Human Rights 2017). Systematic discrimination against Palestinians has also become institutionalized. Apartheid is an increasingly frequently utilized label used to describe the current state of Israel. Apartheid is ‘considered a crime against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination, as defined in article II of the Convention, are crimes violating the principles of international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and constituting a serious threat to international peace and security’ (UN Apartheid Convention 1973). As genocide, piracy, enslavement, torture and wars of aggression, apartheid is considered a peremptory norm of international law, which means that no state may withdraw from its obligation.

Protection of Civilians Under Israeli and Palestinian Authorities

Since the birth of Israel, security and protection of the civilian population has been the stated priority of the state. Under Israeli authority, protection is very selective with the highest degree of protection for Jewish Israelis, and ineffective or malignant protection for minorities, most notably Palestinians living within Israel or under its military occupation. As will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, malignant protection is most evident for residents of East Jerusalem, Area C of the West Bank and Gaza. The key question is to what extent are Israeli security strategies and measures designed to protect the civilian population? Wars and cycles of violence have been the reality for the population residing within Israel as well as the Palestinian population living under the military occupation. Israeli civilians are impacted by terrorism and rocket attacks that indiscriminately target along border areas and increasingly beyond, and in Israeli eyes serve to justify the Israeli military crackdown on the Palestinian population. Although the number of Israeli civilian casualties compared to that of the Palestinian population is very low, rocket fire and terrorism aimed at civilians and civilian infrastructure create anxiety and infringe on human security. Palestinian security infringement by extreme groups has been utilized to justify a system of apartheid, which discriminates against and collectively punishes the Palestinian population. Collective punishment of the Palestinian population living under the occupation, ethnic cleansing, executions, destruction of Palestinian homes and the failure to distinguish between civilians and combatants are some of the violations of the Geneva Convention (UN 2020).

Escalations and cycles of violence have resulted in Israel using draconian security measures that impact on the security of individuals, particularly Palestinians living in Occupied Territories or those who are already part of vulnerable groups. Within Israel, weapons are carried by police, border guards, members of IDF (Israeli Defence Forces), members of private security companies, many settler groups as well as private individuals. Thirteen percent of Israeli households have some sort of weapon, and since 2005, Israel is the country to have the most significant global increase (57%) in the proportion of homicides committed by firearms (Aharoni, Lewin & Saar, TBP 2019). Many Israelis express personal security fears at the hands of their state institutions. In a 2016 survey conducted by the Israeli Knesset on the Status of Women, more than 59 percent of women and 54 percent of men polled were concerned about being harmed by state institutions (Survey 2016). Most concerned were Palestinian/Arab women, of whom 74 percent worried about damaging behaviour by state agencies that would negatively affect their personal security (Survey 2016).

Critical politicians, such as MK Dov Khenin from the Joint List, have noted that Israeli society lives in fear and ‘unfortunately, there are those who build their politics on fear’ (Knesset Press Release2016). Within the state of Israel, protection is selectively effective for Jewish Israelis and ineffective for minorities and vulnerable populations and malignant for Palestinians living within the contested spaces such as East Jerusalem. Political incitement, influence of social media and vigilantism have all contributed to the lack of security that has been particularly hard on teens. Children, especially teens, have been on the front lines of this conflict, subject to harsh realities, political manipulation, extrajudicial killings, detentions and other severe security conditions (Spitka 2018). Several members of the Israeli government praised extrajudicial killings by police, private security guards and vigilante civilians. MK Yair Lapid declared that “you have to shoot to kill anyone who pulls out a knife or screwdriver”. Most Jewish Israelis support the harsh security measures and select leadership who are perceived to provide the greatest sense of security.

Palestinians (Israeli-Arabs) are particularly vulnerable in East Jerusalem where the inadequate security is compounded by lack of final status agreement, institutional isolation, non-citizenship and lack of police or security force considered legitimate by the population. Lack of access to institutional protection has left Palestinian residents of Jerusalem vulnerable to harsh collective security measures, institutional and domestic violence, expulsions, abuse by Jewish settlers and private and public security personnel. This gap in protection has been felt particularly deeply by vulnerable minorities, teenagers and women. Jerusalem Women’s Coalition, which includes NGOs and East Jerusalem Feminists, in October 2015 issued an urgent request for international protection. “We …call upon the international community to protect our families, community, and children. We are calling for the protection of our bodily safety and security when in our homes, walking in our neighbourhood, reaching schools, clinics, work places, and worships venues” (Woman’s Coalition 2015). Despite some progress in Area A in the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority has been building a security apparatus that has been used to squash dissent and abuse journalists and protestors. The Hamas authority has used civilians as human shields and encouraged children to participate in violent activities. In Gaza, children, minorities and women are particularly vulnerable since they are susceptible to exploitation and have no one to turn to for protection.

Under international law, specifically the Geneva Convention, International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law, Israel is responsible for the protection of the population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which includes East Jerusalem (GA/PAL/1186, 8 March 2011). Measures that were designed to be temporary and transitional under the Oslo Agreement, including the divisions of West Bank into Areas A (under Palestinian Authority), Area B (Joint Israeli/Palestinian Control) & Area C (under Israeli Military Authority), have become a permanent reality contributing to the complicated protection arrangement. In Areas ‘A’ of the West Bank, it is the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian security and police, who are responsible for providing protection. Lack of security is most evident in Area C, where Palestinian civilians live under Israeli military rule without access to Palestinian police or any form of national or international protection. Serious gaps in protection also exist in East Jerusalem where Palestinian residents are not Israeli citizens, do not trust the Israeli police or other Israeli public and private security organizations, whose general tasks are not to provide for their protection but rather to quell dissent (Volinz 2018).

The protection of the civilian population is the most problematic for those residing in Gaza where none of the responsible authorities, Israel, Hamas or the PA can be said to be providing protection. The 2014 hostilities including the massive bombardment of Gaza, which was a response to rocket fire and a terrorist incident against an Israeli youth, destroyed residential buildings and schools, resulting in many civilian deaths, destruction of infrastructure and a displacement of close to a third of the population of Gaza. An investigation by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) found serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law by both Israel and Palestinian militants that are being investigated as war crimes (UNHRC 2015). The UN report noted that of the 2251 people killed in Gaza, 1462 were civilians. Non-governmental organizations have estimated that 241 women and 370 children were killed while inside their own homes (UNHRC 2015). The International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor has opened a formal investigation into alleged war crimes in the Palestinian territories.

Israeli justification for the military campaign was the ongoing rocket fire launched by armed groups from Gaza. Between July and August 2014, Palestinian militants indiscriminately fired 4881 rockets and 1753 mortars towards Israel, killing 6 civilians (UNHRC 2015). Alarms and safe rooms prevented loss of more Israeli lives. The protection of the civilian population was essentially non-existent for residents of Gaza. Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) claimed that measures such as leaflets recommending evacuation, automated telephone calls and small blasts on the roof served as warnings for people to evacuate buildings targeted for destruction. The IDF warnings were confusing and were contradicted by Hamas which recommended to its population to ignore the warnings. IDF in turn considered anyone who ignored its warnings and remained in areas or buildings a voluntary shield. In addition, many civilians had nowhere to flee; no location in Gaza was considered safe, and those areas that were designated as “safe”, such as UN schools, were also targeted.

Protection measures have also been malignant for Palestinian demonstrators, most notably in Gaza. The widespread Palestinian demonstrations in Gaza since May 2018 have resulted in more than 130 deaths and 3000 injuries from shots fired by IDF snipers. The lethal use of force against unarmed Palestinian civilians has been condemned by most countries and human rights groups, however justified within Israel. Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that lethal force against demonstrators who posed no imminent threat to life may amount to war crimes (Human Rights Watch 2018). In addition, according to HRW, Palestinians in Gaza are entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions as an occupied people and any wilful killing of them would constitute a war crime. In May 2018, Kuwait circulated a draft Security Council Resolution condemning Israel’s use of force against Palestinian civilians, calling for the establishment of a UN protection mission in Gaza. The resolution was, however, vetoed by the US.

Although the international community is widely involved in protection issues within the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the engagement is mostly in humanitarian assistance, monitoring, investigating, naming and shaming and diplomatic attempts to prevent further escalation. Individual states also contribute military arsenal to opposing sides which escalates the conflict. Divisions within the international community have prevented robust initiatives that may have strengthened protection of civilians. The United Nations, the Quartet, the EU, the Arab league as well as individual states have all faced divisions within the organizations as well as between them that have weakened an international response and made interventions beyond humanitarian aid and monitoring implausible or ineffective. Since 2000, the US has used its veto rights in the UN Security Council to block almost every UNSC resolution including: sending unarmed monitors to West Bank and Gaza, Condemning Israel for acts of terror against civilians in the Occupied Territories (2001), cessation of Israeli settlement activities (2011) and condemning Israel for its massive violations of international law in Gaza and the West Bank (2015). The resolutions that did pass were largely ignored.

Conclusion

As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, there exists a wide gap between international norms and principles of protection, national and international strategies and the realities of civilian protection. In today’s conflict settings where much of the conflict takes place in urban areas and perpetrators of violence can be the state or actors who hide among the population, the tools of protection are not designed to provide protection for civilians. Even under the best intentions, the military, particularly foreign military, does not have the capacity, the tools nor the training to deal with civilian populations. As noted by some practitioners, emergencies that do not warrant international military intervention may benefit from a less intrusive and more effective police-keeping strategy (Day and Freeman 2005). Although the police have more effective training and tools than the military, without the support and engagement of local communities, the police can also be a part of the problem. State security institutions, including the police, may also not be providing protection for all civilians. Indeed, the state may be deliberately targeting the civilian population, and in some cases, may stand to politically benefit from fostering insecurities.

Top-down security, such as those from the national governments or international organizations, often does not address the security needs of those from ‘below’ (Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006). Civil society and human rights organizations are commonly on the front lines in the protection of civilian population. However, there is a growing trend towards the criminalization and targeting of humanitarian and human rights work. With a focus on the individual, human security encourages the integration of non-state and bottom-up perspectives to security (Hoogensen and Stuvoy 2006). Inclusive participation, including domestic institutions, civil society, the community policing and independent judiciary, is fundamental towards constructing an effective protection regime. Participation in peacemaking, disarmament, demobilization, the security sector and judicial reform can work towards reparations and non-recurrence (Day and Freeman 2005). In recent years, scholars and practitioners have also recommended that protection should switch from the paradigm of liberal interventionism to the paradigm of resilience (Chandler 2012). As noted by Chandler, “the resilience paradigm clearly puts the agency of those most need of assistance at the centre, stressing a programme of empowerment and capacity-building” (Chandler 2012, p. 216). Far more effort, however, must be made to support and protect human rights defenders.

Ineffective intervention in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict goes beyond the lack of domestic willingness and poor application of effective tools and is linked to the lack of international willingness to stand up against Israeli transgressions. Settler colonialism, apartheid, ethnic cleansing and war atrocities are all ignored by Israeli allies who have turned a blind eye to ongoing breaches in international law and violent actions with impunity. Although international protection and intervention are also limited in other conflicts, such as the ongoing occupation by Russia of Ukraine, there is far more international unity, fierce condemnation and strong sanctions against Russia. Despite the urgent need to change the current reality, there is also little attempt to bring about a political solution. However, as will be discussed, a focus on protection of civilians could create a working roadmap towards a resolution of the conflict. Inclusive protection tools and participation can also make solutions far more feasible.