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Establishing a Governance Framework for the Orbital Internet in Outer Space

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The Urgent Need for Regulation of Satellite Mega-constellations in Outer Space

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Abstract

What is the underlying precursor to the space race that is now well underway? This book has positioned its analysis firmly within the context of geopolitical history for a reason: it is my view that nations without reassurance of their security will militarise. In recent years we have seen a dilution of assurances from the world’s traditional Super Power as to whether it is a dependable guarantor of the security of its allies. The success of the post-WWII liberal order lay in two things. First, the renouncement of militarisation and the denial of a sphere of influence to both Japan and Germany. This not only provided an unprecedented sense of security in European and Asia-Pacific neighbourhoods, but benefited Germany and Japan themselves. Liberated from a militarised pathway, both countries were free to focus their national energy on economic success, with miraculous recoveries in both nations the result. Secondly, the US guarantee of the security of its allies created a new liberal world order with America at its heart, such that regional powers were less inclined to invest in their own militaries, which suited all parties. Three-quarters of a century of relative peace was sustained in this way.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kagan (2018).

  2. 2.

    id. 43.

  3. 3.

    ibid.

  4. 4.

    Arguably the hesitation and subsequent equivocation President Obama showed for international intervention in Syria, during that country’s crisis, marked a significant turning point in US foreign policy. See Kagan (2018), p. 143.

  5. 5.

    This shift is combined with an unease among Western allies about whether the US remains committed to come to their aid under the “all-for-one, one-for-all” principle of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. As NATO welcomed its newest State to the Alliance in 2018, President Trump publicly asked: “would we really risk World War III for Montenegro?”: Guardian Staff (2018).

  6. 6.

    ibid.

  7. 7.

    Kagan (2018), p. 43.

  8. 8.

    Byers (2019), pp. 32–47; Byers (2017), pp. 375–402.

  9. 9.

    Hardin (1968), p. 1243. Hardin notes the influence of the Oxford lecture by William Forster Lloyd in 1833, who proposed a similar analogy.

  10. 10.

    id 1244.

  11. 11.

    id 1246.

  12. 12.

    ibid.

  13. 13.

    ibid.

  14. 14.

    There is perhaps a parallel in the manner in which the global community continues to grapple with the fact that the Tech Giants operate everywhere, but pay tax nowhere. It is another example of exploitation of the commons by these players, who benefit from getting “something for nothing”.

  15. 15.

    https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx (Last accessed 03.08.2020. Link no longer accessible).

  16. 16.

    Article I OST.

  17. 17.

    Agreement between US, UK, EU, Russia, China and India would likely lead to international consensus, because other nations would see it as in their interests to refrain from establishing mega-constellations in LEO as long as the major players are prepared to.

  18. 18.

    Mentioned in Articles I, III, V OST.

  19. 19.

    The phrase used by Ambassador Gregory Schulte, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the US Department of Defense.

  20. 20.

    Martinez (2019), p. 1.

  21. 21.

    Interview with Dr. Gaida by European Space Agency (ESA): http://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Engineering_Technology/The_Kessler_Effect_and_how_to_stop_it (Accessed 15.08.2022).

  22. 22.

    On transactional cost theory see Williamson (1996).

  23. 23.

    Prepared Testimony of NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine to the US House of Representatives, 27 March 2019, C-Span.

  24. 24.

    A further Russian ASAT test followed on 15 November 2021: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-12/news/russian-asat-test-creates-massive-debris (Accessed 15.08.2022).

  25. 25.

    Hardin (1999), Letter to the Editor, p. 4.

  26. 26.

    Hardin (1998), pp. 682–683.

  27. 27.

    Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Art. 44 (ITU Constitution) 1992.

  28. 28.

    Tronchetti (2009), p. 131.

  29. 29.

    Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, Art. 44 (ITU Constitution) 1992.

  30. 30.

    ibid.

  31. 31.

    ibid.

  32. 32.

    id 167.

  33. 33.

    ibid, noting this was specifically required in the drafting because of a scientific view that GEO is actually inexhaustible.

  34. 34.

    Interview with Prof. Heino Falcke by the author on 7 January 2020.

  35. 35.

    id 167. The current drafting of Article 44 of the ITU Constitution was adopted in 1992.

  36. 36.

    See Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications, ITU Res. No. Spa 2-1 (1971) and discussed id 174.

  37. 37.

    Dunoff (2015), pp. 267–300.

  38. 38.

    ibid.

  39. 39.

    id 269.

  40. 40.

    Howard (2013) and discussed in Martinez (2019), pp. 1–6, 5, noting that Howard published her book before taking up this role with the US Department of Commerce.

  41. 41.

    Kalshoven and Zegveld (2011).

  42. 42.

    Kadomtsev (2020).

  43. 43.

    ibid.

  44. 44.

    The oft-repeated phrase used by Ambassador Gregory Schulte, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the US Department of Defense.

  45. 45.

    Bowman and Boyle (2002), p. 5.

  46. 46.

    Gavanas et al. (2018), pp. 294–307.

  47. 47.

    Egre and Senecal (2003), pp. 215–224, and more recently: Parsons (2020).

  48. 48.

    Williams (2019).

  49. 49.

    Weaver (2008), pp. 91–98.

  50. 50.

    Fischer et al. (2019), pp. 165–178.

  51. 51.

    Joao et al. (2011), pp. 170–180.

  52. 52.

    Da Silva (2020), pp. 3–15.

  53. 53.

    Gupta (2016), pp. 20–43. The author recognises the OST has a narrow exception to this, in providing that “adverse changes in the environment of the Earth” must be avoided by States, and that States should adopt measures to avoid “harmful contamination” of celestial bodies. See Article IX OST.

  54. 54.

    For discussion of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) see: Fischer (2019); Nooteboom (2019), pp. 369–370.

  55. 55.

    This is discussed in some depth in Sect. 5.4 of Chap. 5.

  56. 56.

    Hendricks (2019).

  57. 57.

    ibid.

  58. 58.

    IAU (2001).

  59. 59.

    The US FCC regulates interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and US territories. An independent US government agency overseen by Congress, the FCC is the federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing US communications law and regulations. See: https://www.fcc.gov/about/overview (Accessed 15.08.2022). Commercial, as well as government, space actors have also become accustomed to compliance with the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) Guidelines for space missions, which also adopt risk-based probability analysis.

  60. 60.

    See https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/rulemaking-process (Accessed 15.08.2022).

  61. 61.

    See https://www.fcc.gov/proceedings-actions (Accessed 15.08.2022).

  62. 62.

    As a member of the IAU Working Group on Dark Skies/Mega-constellations, SATCOM 2020, the author proposed the pursuit of a regulatory strategy which was rejected by the Working Group in favour of pursuing proposals in relation to luminosity at UNCOPUOS.

  63. 63.

    I recognise that reform via these institutions remains important, but it requires a longer-term view, for which there is insufficient time given the licensing and launch of mega-constellations continues unabated.

  64. 64.

    Basu and Kurlekar (2016), pp. 44–70, 49.

  65. 65.

    EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016.

  66. 66.

    GDPR has succeeded where previous Directives failed, because serious consequences flow from non-compliance—up to €20 million penalties or 2% of global revenue, whichever is the greater. For discussion see: Rhoen (2017), pp. 603–617 and Macenaite (2017), pp. 506–540.

  67. 67.

    Witze (2020), p. 577.

  68. 68.

    Jenkins (1999), pp. 87–96.

  69. 69.

    Adilov et al. (2015), pp. 81–98.

  70. 70.

    Attempts were made to model the value of the combined astronomy infrastructure of EU bodies—EUMETSAT and ESO—for this book. This proved impossible as neither organisation accounts for its infrastructure or investment in the way that a corporation is required to, and neither budgets nor asset values are accessible on their websites. Historically perhaps such organisations have been circumspect about the disclosure of budgets spent on astronomy, in order to avoid horrifying the public. This position should be reversed. If we understand the value of an investment in terms of tax-payer money, it can be defended from interference by new entrants, on the basis of defending “shareholder value”. Greater transparency is required in the astronomical community.

  71. 71.

    Tronchetti (2009).

  72. 72.

    Reunification with Taiwan, reintegration of Hong Kong, and international recognition of its sovereignty in the South China Seas, are clearly on China’s agenda. See Kagan (2018), p. 117.

  73. 73.

    Mendis and Wang (2019), p. 36.

  74. 74.

    id 33.

  75. 75.

    Deng (2018), p. 30.

  76. 76.

    ibid.

  77. 77.

    ibid.

  78. 78.

    Ni and Davidson (2021).

  79. 79.

    On response to Covid-19 see: Reuters Staff (2020) and more generally: Deng (2018), p. 30.

  80. 80.

    Under the Trump administration the world witnessed US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and from the confidence-building arms treaty, Open Skies. See: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-12/news/us-completes-open-skies-treaty-withdrawal (Accessed 15.08.2022).

  81. 81.

    See https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/176155.htm (Accessed 15.08.2022).

  82. 82.

    Deng (2018), p. 30.

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Millwood, S. (2023). Establishing a Governance Framework for the Orbital Internet in Outer Space. In: The Urgent Need for Regulation of Satellite Mega-constellations in Outer Space. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19249-4_4

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