Introduction

China is engaged in peacebuilding activities in several fields: UN peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, conflict mediation, and development/investment activities. Of the UN Security Council’s permanent members, China contributes the largest number of peacekeeping personnel and the second-largest amount of funding to UN peacekeeping, after the United States. Moreover, China has expanded its humanitarian assistance since 2003, as well as its contribution to development assistance under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative. Since the early 2010s, China has also increased its political mediation activities.

Critics accuse China of promoting an illiberal or authoritarian peacebuilding agenda (Vanderhill 2013; von Soest 2015; Bader 2015; Yakouchyk 2019). China’s pressure to reduce the number of human rights positions in UN peacekeeping operations is often cited as evidence of this trend (Gladstone 2018). Problems identified in relation to China’s investment activities, such as the non-conditionality of lending and the “debt trap” in BRI projects, also add more narratives to such accusations. Others argue, however, that this accusation ignores the fact that China does not have a peacebuilding policy as such (Hirono 2021). The Chinese conception of peacebuilding is fragmented and consists of activities individually and separately conceptualized, such as those of UN peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, conflict mediation, and infrastructure development/investment activities. China’s official documents rarely discuss the concept of “peacebuilding” or present a clear overarching conception that captures what the UN calls peacebuilding. The Chinese government’s discussion on peacebuilding is linked to either concrete programs, or to the broad idea called the “community of shared future of mankind,” but there is no clear definition or policy of peacebuilding, nor a systematic practice of peacebuilding. The policy is unclear, and the practice is fragmented.

This debate on China’s peacebuilding approach is highly relevant to the adaptive peacebuilding focus of this book. Critics of China’s peacebuilding assume that China takes an authoritarian approach to peacebuilding, another determined-designed approach and an alternative to liberal peacebuilding. However, the latter, which focuses on fragmentation, opens a window through which to examine China’s peacebuilding in relation to the analytical framework of deterministic, context-specific, and adaptive peacebuilding discussed in Chap. 2 of this book.

This chapter seeks to answer the following questions: (1) Did Chinese peacebuilding actors adapt their peacebuilding approaches and practices in South Sudan, and, if so, how? (2) How effective have any such adaptations been in sustaining peace in that country? These questions are examined by analyzing China’s policies and practices related to peacebuilding in South Sudan, encompassing UN peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, conflict mediation, and development/investment activities.

Twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted with members of the South Sudanese peacebuilding communities in Nairobi and Addis Ababa in July 2018. For the interviewees, two to three were selected from each of ten categories that were likely to express diverse perspectives on China’s peacebuilding efforts: South Sudanese government officials, academics, journalists, officials working for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (the regional organization that provides conflict mediation in South Sudan), businesses, refugees, students, civil society actors, rebel groups, and the diplomatic corps. In the spectrum of views on China’s contribution to South Sudan’s peacebuilding process, this research expected that South Sudan’s government officials’ comments would fall into the praising end of the spectrum, whereas comments by expatriates from Western countries would fall into the critical end. In-between these two extremities are comments by various other actors in the rest of the categories. Content analysis was used to examine the data obtained.Footnote 1

This chapter argues that China’s policy structure does not allow it to take a determined-designed approach. Rather, the case of China’s peacebuilding in South Sudan shows more complex realities. This chapter identifies three features of China’s peacebuilding of the late 2010s. First, Chinese peacebuilding actors adapted more to the local South Sudanese situation in the late 2010s than they did in the early 2010s. Such adaptation, however, was introduced in a “top-down” manner not necessarily deriving from China’s experimentation and learning in South Sudan. Rather, it emerged as a result of the Chinese government’s global policy shift from a sovereignty-centered, hands-off approach to conflict, to an approach based more on a flexible interpretation of sovereignty. Second, while the Chinese government’s new approach to peacebuilding allowed it to be context-specific, it was extended only to the South Sudanese government. To the vulnerable populations in South Sudan, China’s peacebuilding approach remained deterministic or indifferent. Third, this mixture of approaches determines the effectiveness of China’s peacebuilding. China’s context-specific peacebuilding was effective in the sense that it helped the South Sudanese government and rebel groups to form an agreement for a unity government in 2018. In contrast, China’s deterministic approach to peacebuilding with regard to the vulnerable populations led to the ineffectiveness of its peacebuilding effort.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section draws upon the discussion in Chap. 2, and establishes the analytical framework consisting of deterministic, context-specific, and adaptive peacebuilding approaches. The second section identifies key peacebuilding actors in South Sudan at national, local, and international levels, and examines whether their policies are deterministic or context-specific. In so doing this section aims to set the ground against which the third section examines whether China’s peacebuilding approach is deterministic, context-specific, or adaptive, and how effective it is for South Sudan.

Analytical Framework: Defining Deterministic, Context-Specific, and Adaptive Approaches to Peacebuilding

This chapter uses three approaches to peacebuilding as its analytical framework: deterministic, context-specific, and adaptive approaches. This section operationalizes these approaches in the South Sudanese context so that the framework can be used as a means to assess China’s approach to its peacebuilding effort there. In a nutshell, this chapter sets two criteria to assess a particular approach to peacebuilding. First, whether an approach to peacebuilding is deterministic or context-specific is assessed by the level of compatibility of peacebuilding policies with the vulnerable populations. Second, whether an approach to peacebuilding is deterministic or adaptive is assessed by a process of deliberation in which their pre-set policies should change when practicing peacebuilding. This section briefly mentions the three approaches and clarifies how this chapter uses them.

As de Coning explains, a deterministic approach to peacebuilding is “a causal model where the outcome is more or less guaranteed if the design is followed” (Chap. 2). It is prescriptive in nature—a specialist “diagnoses the problem by identifying the root causes” (Chap. 2). The policy decision is made in a top-down or outsider-led manner, based on imported theories or values. The theory that the US and other Western actors based the cases of their interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, was neoliberalism. Today, analysts question whether China’s peacebuilding approach signifies yet another theory or value based on the so-called China model. Some say developmental peace (kaifa heping) is such a theory (He 2017)—an idea that peace derives from development. Others say that China strengthens authoritarianism and weakens democracy through the various activities it conducts, which include peacebuilding (Nathan 2015; Pillsbury 2015). Is China bringing about a change in the international peacebuilding model in the context of the declining power of the West? A significant proportion of the debate about China’s roles in peacebuilding relates to this question.

In contrast to the fact that a deterministic approach focuses on prescriptive policy in a top-down manner, context-specific peacebuilding derives from the primacy of local actors in peacebuilding, and the policy is created in a bottom-up manner. The “context” of the context-specific situation is a local one rather than an outsider’s one. Further, there are some variations in context-specific peacebuilding. When the “local context” means the interests and needs of local actors, it can be called grassroots peacebuilding (Lederach 1997), but when the coexistence of international and local agendas is emphasized, it can be hybrid peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2011; Uesugi 2020).

However, the deterministic and context-specific approaches share two problems. First is the assumption of a dichotomy between “top” and “bottom.” The reality in South Sudan is that actors are so diverse that it is extremely difficult to distinguish the “top” from the “bottom.” Is the South Sudanese government the “top” or the “bottom”? Are rebel groups “top” or “bottom”? Are the Chinese oil companies “top” or “bottom”? The dichotomy of top and bottom is inherently hierarchical in its worldview that international actors are regarded as the top, and local actors as the bottom. This dichotomy does not offer a useful analytical lens for two reasons. The first is because it is impossible to define the “local context.” The “local” is completely separated and scattered into diverse groups who fight civil wars against one another. The second is because once various national and local actors are regarded as peacebuilders, “being deterministic” could mean pursuing a wide variety of agendas, including attacking enemies. The agenda of the South Sudanese government (to secure its regime and legitimize it) is far from that of the South Sudanese civil society (to have their voices heard and their living standards improved, and some to question the legitimacy). Which of these local agendas and interests should peacebuilders respond to?

Given the very complex relationships amongst different interests, this chapter modifies the definition of the deterministic approach to an approach compatible with the interests of the vulnerable populations, such as refugees and women. This means that even though the peacebuilding approach might be based on a predetermined diagnosis of problems and an assumed prescription, if the policies are compatible with the interests of the vulnerable populations, then it is deterministic as well as context-specific. These two approaches are not mutually exclusive.

The second problem is that these two approaches assume that peacebuilding policy is static. Policy and practices develop over time as a result of interaction, experiment, learning, and adaptation. Adaptive peacebuilding addresses these problems. It does not conceptualize particular peacebuilding actors as top or bottom, and it does not assume any peacebuilding agenda in a static manner. Adaptive peacebuilding emphasizes the dynamic and iterative process of experimenting, learning, and adapting by various peacebuilders. According to de Coning, “adaptive peacebuilding is a complexity-informed approach where peacebuilders, including communities and people affected by conflict, actively engage in a structured process to sustain peace, by employing an iterative process of experimentation, learning, and adaptation” (Chap. 2).

The question of whether a particular peacebuilding approach is deterministic or adaptive can be assessed in terms of dynamic policies or practices, rather than static policies or inaction, as a result of learning. It is assessed based on the extent to which policies or practices have been developed and changed in accordance with the nature of the conflict. It is possible that as a result of engagement with the local population, actors recognize that the pre-set (determined) approach should remain. Then it is possible to be deterministic as a result of considering the possibility of adaptation. So a more important question than whether a particular policy or practice is deterministic or adaptive is whether the actor(s) went through the process of deliberation in which their pre-set policies could be changed when practicing peacebuilding.

In summary, based on the above understanding, this chapter defined being deterministic or context-specific as the level of compatibility of the peacebuilders’ policies to the needs of the vulnerable people. Also, the definition of being deterministic or adaptive is described in this chapter as the extent to which the practices have been deliberated, and if necessary developed and changed, in accordance with the nature of the conflict. Adaptive peacebuilding is, as mentioned above, the learning process where peacebuilders actively engage in a structured operation to sustain peace.

Based on this discussion, this chapter assesses particular peacebuilding policies and practices based on the following criteria. If the answer to the following question is yes, a particular policy or practice can be categorized as deterministic, context-specific, or adaptive:

  • Deterministic approach: Is the peacebuilding policy or practice prescribed based on a particular theory?

  • Context-specific approach: Does the peacebuilding policy or practice address the needs of vulnerable populations?

  • Adaptive approach: Does the peacebuilding policy or practice emerge as a result of an iterative process of experimentation, learning, and adaptation?

Analysis of Key Actors’ Peacebuilding Policies: Are the Key Actors’ Policies Deterministic Or Context-Specific?

This section examines the peacebuilding policies of key actors focusing on the South Sudanese government, the South Sudanese civil society actors, the UN, IGAD, and the Chinese actors, by focusing on the question of whether their peacebuilding policies amount to a deterministic or context-specific approach when using the analytical framework introduced in the previous section. This section deliberately conducts a static analysis of existing policies of key actors rather than the dynamic analysis of the change in policies and practices in the next section. Here, the following two points should be noted. First, the South Sudanese warring factions remain deterministic about their approach to peace, while the South Sudanese civil society actors have their own deterministic approach to peacebuilding but are context-specific in a sense to address the needs of vulnerable populations. Second, the UN, IGAD, and regional governments uphold deterministic policies, but their attempts to engage with the vulnerable populations amount to being context-specific.

South Sudanese Government’s Peacebuilding Policy

First, it is important to bring to the forefront the South Sudanese national government as a key peacebuilder, although the degree of success in peacebuilding is outside of the question here. While it may sound problematic to consider the South Sudanese government as a peacebuilding actor because it is fighting a war rather than making peace, it is inappropriate to ignore the fact that the government remains the key actor in determining the nature of the peacebuilding in the country. The following is the question addressed in this section: To what extent are the South Sudanese policies compatible with the interests of the vulnerable population? Examining the 2018 peace accord offers a platform from which to explore this question.

In September 2018, President Salva Kiir, Chairman and Commander in Chief of the SPLM/SPLA-IO Riek Machar, and other conflicting and relevant parties signed the “Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)” (IGAD 2018), which aimed to end the civil war that had erupted in 2013. The R-ARCSS specifies the tasks to be implemented by the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) for the 36 months transitional period, and designates the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) to monitor and oversee the implementation of the tasks. These tasks encompass governance, security, humanitarian affairs, economic and financial management, transitional justice, and constitutional affairs. Since the RTGoNU was formed on 22 February 2020, the RJMEC has undertaken periodic reviews (RJMEC 2021).

According to the RJMEC’s report on the first year of the transitional period, governance and security are the principal areas of the agreement that the RTGoNU implemented (RJMEC 2021, 2). These areas relate to the power sharing among the conflicting parties by allocating the appointment of key governing positions to them. Further, “the Parties have largely adhered to the provisions of the Permanent Ceasefire” (RJMEC 2021, 2). On the other hand, issues that are directly relevant to the vulnerable people’s daily lives have not seen much progress. The RJMEC report states:

None of the tasks related to humanitarian assistance and reconstruction that were expected to start on the formation of the RTGoNU has been implemented. However, modest progress has been made in creating an enabling political, administrative, operational and legal environment for delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection; and in delivering programmes for relief, protection repatriation, resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of IDPs and returnees. Also, a critical task where implementation was expected to give a significant boost to the humanitarian effort was the creation of the Special Reconstruction Fund, which so far has not been established. (RJMEC 2021, 2)

The delays in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction derive from attacks on humanitarian aid workers (124 aid workers died in South Sudan from 2013 to February 2020), fighting between some warring factions, and “illegal roadblocks, impassable roads, and community-based violence” (RJMEC 2021, 5). But at a more structural level, the ways in which the South Sudanese government paid disproportionate attention to power sharing among elites show that it is taking a deterministic approach to peacebuilding, rather than a context-specific one that pays attention to the vulnerable population.

The literature argues that the South Sudanese government only addresses the interests of the elites. Wight (2017, 2), for example, argues that the power sharing “has descended into a contest between the country’s politico-military elite over how the spoils of patronage are dispersed.” The interviewees in the present study also suggest that civil society and refugees all consider that the South Sudanese government addresses the interests of the elites, rather than the interests of the people (Civil society actor 2018; South Sudanese refugees 2018).

South Sudan’s Civil Society Groups’ Peacebuilding Policy

In contrast, South Sudan’s civil society organizations (CSOs), by their bottom-up nature, are expected to focus on helping the vulnerable populations, but the story is not that simple. While many CSOs attempt to focus on a specific issue and dedicate their work to the vulnerable people in South Sudan, as far as the policy is concerned, South Sudan’s CSOs are still underdeveloped. Geoffrey L. Duke, the director of the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms, points out the difficulties that South Sudan’s CSOs face. While CSOs in South Sudan have begun to engage in broader policy issues such as security sector reform, which itself is a welcome development, the engagement with policy issues still needs further improvement to properly address the needs of the vulnerable population. “The absence of mechanisms of long-term engagement [and] a particular lack of attention paid to security at the local level such as implementing individual components of larger policy document” means that the CSOs’ policy direction still needs further development to make it more “context-specific” (Duke 2019, 2).

The United Nations’ Peacebuilding Policy

The UN’s peacebuilding policy in South Sudan has shifted from a deterministic approach to a context-specific approach. In terms of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandates, the major shift took place in 2014. When the UNMISS was established in 2011, the prioritized mandates were “support for peace consolidation and thereby fostering longer-term state-building and economic development” and “support the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protect civilians,” among others (UNSC 2011). However, conflict erupted in Juba on 15 December 2013, which led to the killing of nearly 400,000 people by 2018 (Specia 2018), and 4.3 million had been displaced by 2021 (USA for UNHCR n.d.). Given that “tens of thousands of civilians fled” from war zones and “arrived at UNMISS compounds … to seek refuge (UNMISS n.d.),” the UNMISS then opened the UN compounds for the protection of civilians—as many as 85,000 people (UNMISS n.d.). The UN Security Council Resolution 2132 (2013) of 24 December approved the increase in the troop and police strength to address the emergency situation, and Resolution 2155 (2014) of 27 May “reprioritized the UNMISS mandate” toward the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring, and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance (UNMISS n.d.; UNSC 2014). The UN Security Council also “urge[d] all parties to engage in an open and fully inclusive national dialogue seeking to establish lasting peace, reconciliation and good governance, including through the full and effective participation of youth, women, diverse communities, faith groups, civil society, and the formerly detained SPLM leaders” (UNSC 2014). This change shows that the UN policy has shifted from a deterministic liberal peacebuilding agenda to context-specific peacebuilding, addressing the needs of the vulnerable.

However, the extent to which this policy is meaningful on the ground is questionable. The UN mission is so overstretched that even UN Secretary-General António Guterres questions its ability. In remarks made to the Security Council, he stated, “I urge Security Council members to sharpen and streamline mandates. Please put an end to mandates that look like Christmas trees. Christmas is over, and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan cannot possibly implement 209 mandated tasks” (Guterres 2018). In short, while the UN policy has shifted from a determined-designed to context-specific approach, the magnitude of the tasks the UN faces presents significant challenges.

IGAD’s Peacebuilding Policy

What is IGAD’s policy in South Sudan’s peacebuilding? IGAD was originally a regional organization that addressed drought and desertification in East Africa, but its mandate was expanded in 1996 to promote peace and security in that region (Dersso 2014, 8). IGAD mediated a conflict between the north and the south in Sudan, and this eventually led to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, which led to South Sudan’s independence in 2011. IGAD’s primary policy to South Sudan’s post-2013 conflict was mediation. It became IGAD-PLUS, consisting of the IGAD members, the African Union, the UN, the EU, the Troika (the US, the UK, and Norway), China, and the IGAD Partner’s Forum, with the aim to put unified international pressure on the South Sudanese conflicting parties (ICG 2015, 3). The main aim was, yet again, power-sharing between warring factions in South Sudan. According to Betty Bigombe, Uganda’s special envoy to South Sudan, “the peace process suffers from an overemphasis on power sharing” (Boswell 2022). She states that no grassroots consultation is taking place, and “a more inclusive national dialogue is needed that brings together the political elites, civil society and refugees” (Boswell 2022). In short, the IGAD’s approach to peacebuilding is akin to that of the South Sudanese government, in the sense that it takes a deterministic approach focusing on the need of the elites, rather than on the needs of the vulnerable.

China’s Peacebuilding: Deterministic, Context-Specific, Or Adaptive?

No Peacebuilding “Policy”

To begin with, there is no such thing as China’s peacebuilding policy. China’s policy documents do not mention peacebuilding (heping jianshe) as such. Rather, its approach to building peace consists of four areas of activities such as UN peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, conflict mediation, and development/investment activities—not necessarily policies. China has developed its UN peacekeeping policy, but it has no policy on humanitarian assistance. Conflict mediation is a relatively new phenomenon—emerging from the mid-2010s—and is not based on publicly identifiable policies. China’s development and investment is under the direction of the Belt and Road Initiative, which itself is not a policy, but only an “initiative” or a frame of reference. Again, there is no specific policy about where and how China offers development assistance, nor do China’s state-owned enterprises invest. Practices come first, and policies are developed later to explain these practices.

The reason for the lack of policy on peacebuilding lies in what is called “fragmented authoritarianism” (Mertha 2009; Lieberthal 1992; Jakobson and Knox 2010). Despite the image of China being a “China Inc.”—an authoritarian, top-down decision-making process centering on Xi Jinping—China’s bureaucratic complexity plays a significant role in the policymaking process, particularly when the policy does not relate to the top agenda for the Communist Party. China’s economic policies, domestic stabilization, and the US–China relations, for example, are the clear top agendas that require Xi Jinping’s constant attention. In contrast, peacebuilding, or the amalgamation of the four areas of activities mentioned above, is usually not in that top agenda. In this context, the incentive to employ holistic decision-making, or to create a substantial coordination mechanism among all relevant ministries and departments, is quite low (Hirono 2019). In other words, one must question who “China” is in this context. What is usually referred to as “China” consists of a variety of actors associated with the People’s Republic of China, each of which has its own interests to meet through its “peacebuilding” activity—whatever that means.

Each of the four areas of activities has been dealt with by specific ministries and departments, and these activities are regarded as something quite different in their nature. In the main, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Liberation Army, and the Ministry of Defense are in charge of UN peacekeeping; the Ministry of Commerce is in charge of humanitarian assistance; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Communist Party’s Foreign Relations Department are in charge of mediation; and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administrative Commission of the State Council (SASAC) and the Ministry of Commerce are in charge of development/investment activities.

In this fragmented context, “China’s peacebuilding policy” in South Sudan does not mean that the Chinese government has some systematic policy. Rather, it is actually a reflection of the shifting practices that various Chinese actors are making with respect to South Sudan.

Shifting Practices

Some of the shifting practices that have been observed since the middle of the 2010s are the Chinese government’s approach to dealing directly with not only the South Sudan government but also nongovernmental groups, such as civilians, civil society groups, and multilateral institutions. More specifically, these practices have been seen in the following: (1) China sending infantry forces in the UN peacekeeping role, which allows China’s peacekeepers to protect civilians, (2) the increasing engagement with civil society groups and multilateral institutions in humanitarian aid delivery, and (3) an increasing level of engagement with rebel groups in the conflict mediation context as well as on the ground. While these shifts are significant in nature, the level of change is still moderate, and is not considerable enough to the extent that it changes the general tendency of a Chinese government that prioritizes its relations with the South Sudanese government over those with civil society actors.

In UN peacekeeping, China sent 700 strong infantry forces to UNMISS in January 2015. Prior to this, China focused on sending force enablers. This shift took place as a result of the UNSC Resolution 2155 (May 2014) to change the UNMISS mandate to civilian protection. Some of the Chinese forces guarded the UN Protection of Civilian (POC) sites in Juba. This allowed Chinese peacekeepers to address the needs of the vulnerable populations. However, Chinese peacekeepers, and other UN peacekeepers as well, have significant difficulty in protecting civilians in the midst of conflict. A conflict in Juba in July 2016 was a painful lesson, as it not only killed two Chinese peacekeepers and injured four, but also brought some international criticism to the Chinese peacekeepers, as they “abandoned” their POC sites in Juba, leaving thousands of civilians behind (Center for Civilians in Conflict 2016, 5; UNSC 2016, 4). Ban Ki-moon ordered an Independent Special Investigation, which reports that “a lack of leadership on the part of key mission personnel had culminated in a chaotic and ineffective response to the violence”, which was also responsible for the Chinese abandonment of the POC sites (UNSC 2016, 3–4).Footnote 2 In this context, China’s contribution to the vulnerable population should be noted, but the operating environment made it extremely difficult to help the vulnerable populations.

The ways in which China provides humanitarian assistance have also shifted somewhat in the sense that the Chinese government engages increasingly more with South Sudanese and Chinese civil society groups and multilateral institutions. While the majority of assistance is still delivered from the Chinese government to the South Sudanese government directly, there have been two noteworthy developments since 2015. First, an increasing amount of donations was given to multilateral institutions. China donated US$5 million to the World Food Program (WFP) in South Sudan in 2015, 10 million in 2017, and 7 million in 2019 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2017). Further, in the context of COVID-19 response from 2020 to 2021, the Chinese government offered a total of US$1 million to UNICEF, US$200,000 to the WFP, and US$100,000 to the World Health Organization—all in their South Sudan office (UNICEF 2021; Seetao 2021; Radio Tamazuj 2020). Second, China’s civil society organizations participated in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Jack Ma Foundation and the Alibaba Foundation donated medical supplies to the South Sudanese government in March and April 2020 (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in South Sudan 2020a, 2020b). The China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation also collaborated with the Chinese embassy in Juba to deliver 1800 school bags to the Jonglei State government as part of the flood response of 2021.Footnote 3

In China’s effort in conflict mediation, the extent to which China brought the interests of the rebel group to the negotiation table is unclear, but China was repeatedly thanked by the South Sudanese government for its mediation efforts, showing that China maintained good relations with the government actors. However, China knows that it is important to maintain some relations as part of the IGAD framework with the rebel groups as well, and the Chinese ambassador gets in touch with Riek Machar. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held consultation with the IGAD and conflicting parties of South Sudan in January 2015 (Xinhua 2015). As far as China’s oil interests are concerned, the interviewees in this study suggested that China needed to have good relations with rebels around the oil field, so some on-the-ground discussion with rebel groups was taking place (Journalist (Anonymous) 2018).

While some changes are taking place, the Chinese government’s approach to peacebuilding is not geared toward changing the state structure but toward “deferring to ‘African solutions’ or leaving the tough-talking to African or Western mediators” (Xie and Copeland 2017). For this reason, China abstains from UN Security Council resolutions to put sanctions against particular individuals and any arms embargo. In the words of Foreign Minister Wang Yi, “we need to adopt an objective and impartial attitude, understand where the issue has come from, and establish the basic facts. We shouldn’t just listen to one side of the story and we shouldn’t write out the wrong prescription” (Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union 2015). The Chinese actors take a nondeterministic approach in a sense that it does not offer any blueprint to conflict resolution, but to leave it to the decisions by conflicting actors.

However, the extent to which China’s peacebuilding is context-specific—whether it addresses the needs of vulnerable populations—is questionable. While China’s use of multilateral institutions such as UN peacekeeping and the above-mentioned new efforts of humanitarian assistance through multilateral institutions may reach the vulnerable populations, bilateral humanitarian assistance mainly goes to urban areas and benefits people who can afford such assistance, according to the interviewees. For example, China modernized and expanded “the country’s main referral hospital, Juba Teaching Hospital” and renovated Kiir Mayardit Women’s Hospital (Xinhua 2017). However, “they are used by the rich. The vulnerable people do not have access to the hospitals” (Civil society organization A 2018). In other words, China has a specific, predetermined approach to humanitarian assistance and development aid, which does not reach the vulnerable populations. As China gives aid to the South Sudanese government, the aid goes along with the South Sudanese government’s priority areas, and these are not the vulnerable people. As discussed above in the South Sudan’s government section, this approach to vulnerable people is deterministic.

In summary, while the Chinese government’s approaches to peacebuilding allow the possibility of making it locally context-specific, its application is only extended to the South Sudanese government. With regard to the vulnerable population in South Sudan, China’s peacebuilding remains mostly deterministic. It is, however, useful to add that China traditionally does not distinguish between the government and the vulnerable population. It assumes that the other government it deals with (e.g., the South Sudanese government) represents the legitimate interests of their people. This is based on the Confucian ideal: “The state-centric nature of China’s approach acknowledges the principle of unity between a state and its people—strengthening the state by successfully providing assistance in disaster areas will inevitably enhance the degree of harmony between the state and its people” (Hirono 2012).

Chinese Actors’ “top-down adaptation”

The shift in China’s peacebuilding practices is a reflection of China’s adaptation to the local context because they “actively engaged in a structured process to sustain peace” (de Coning and Osland 2020). However, their adaptation is derived not only from the examination of local conditions but also from the overall geostrategic policy of China, because the same kind of adaptations can be observed in other conflict-affected areas outside of South Sudan. This can be called China’s “top-down based adaptation,” or, alternatively, Beijing-oriented adaptation.

The Beijing-oriented adaptation derives from the Chinese government’s increasingly flexible interpretation of sovereignty. Such interpretation, in fact, dates back to the 1990s (Carlson 2002, 2004). Given the need to show its responsible “great power” status, China wanted to make more contribution to the international community, which necessitated a more flexible approach to sovereignty (Pang 2009). This was compounded by China’s growing international commercial interests and the need to protect increasing numbers of Chinese citizens in conflict-affected areas in the 2000s onward, and in the context of the “Go Abroad” (zouchuqu) policy, which encouraged Chinese corporations to do business activities overseas (Hirono, Jiang, and Lanteigne 2019; de Coning and Osland 2020). With the development of the Belt and Road Initiative, the above tendency still continues today, and China’s academics and policy community also support the flexible interpretation of sovereignty, as indicated by my interviews with them.

The top-down adaptation in the field of UN peacekeeping is observed in the policy need for force protection, which has been discussed in China’s policy circle since the late 2000s (China-based policy analyst 2009). Due to the international tendency where UN peacekeepers are dispatched to locations with “no peace to keep,” the danger to peacekeepers becomes a significant international problem. The increase in Chinese peacekeeping “martyrs” has attracted attention in the Chinese media too (Xinhua 2021). Even though dispatching infantry forces goes a step ahead in terms of China’s nonintervention principle, the urge to protect peacekeepers is felt inside and outside of China. As a matter of fact, China also sent its infantry forces (called a “guard detachment”) to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013 (F. Wang 2015). The decision to dispatch infantry forces was a result of China’s learning process, but it is not necessarily bottom-up learning deriving from South Sudan, but more of top-down learning.

China’s increasing use of multilateral institutions in humanitarian delivery in South Sudan is also top-down adaptation. In 2015, for example, approximately 15% of China’s humanitarian assistance was provided multilaterally, but this had rapidly increased by 2017. Then, approximately 51% of humanitarian assistance was given via multilateral institutions (Hirono 2018).Footnote 4 This shift in South Sudan, therefore, does not show that the adaptation took place by learning the local context in South Sudan. It rather shows that China’s humanitarian assistance to South Sudan now goes more along with the global tendency of China’s humanitarian assistance. The increasing presence of China’s civil society organizations in humanitarian assistance also derives from the Chinese government’s policy of social organizations’ “going abroad” (Hirono 2018, 26).

With regard to conflict mediation, again this is to do with China’s global tendency rather than deriving from the local South Sudanese context. China had long supported a government-to-government approach to diplomacy, and stayed away from contacting nongovernmental actors such as rebel forces. This is because doing so was regarded as a breach of the nonintervention principle. However, China’s domestic opinion had become more forthcoming and flexible toward the nonintervention principle by the early 2000s. According to the questionnaire survey that Zhao Lei and his group conducted in 2010, 43.19% of respondents (mainly academics, policymakers, and university students) responded negatively to the question of whether or not China should always maintain the principle of consent of host states when deciding to dispatch peacekeeping operations (Lei 2011, X). Further, Wang Yizhou (2011, 2018), one of the top international relations specialists at Beijing University, published a book called Creative Intervention, arguing that China should engage in more UN peacekeeping operations and conflict mediation. China’s mediation efforts have increased since then, Myanmar since 2013, Afghanistan since 2014, and Syria since 2015, for example. China’s effort in conflict mediation in South Sudan should be understood in the context of China’s foreign policy development. The International Crisis Group’s signature report on China’s approach to South Sudan’s conflict is rightly titled “China’s Foreign Policy Experiment in South Sudan” (Xie and Copeland 2017). Having said that, China’s sanctions policy remained the same, prioritizing the principle of sovereignty and so-called political solutions. Yet again, this is China’s foreign policy, rather than being based on a careful calculation of local situations in South Sudan.

All these adaptations derive from the policy changes in Beijing, rather than directly from China’s experience in South Sudan. The iterative process of learning—a sign of adaptive peacebuilding—can be observed in Beijing, rather than in South Sudan. In short, the shift in China’s peacebuilding practice is a reflection of China’s top-down adaptation, rather than bottom-up adaptation through learning from the local contexts.

Effectiveness of Chinese Approaches

No matter where China’s adaptation derives from, how effective has China’s approach been in order to sustain peace in South Sudan? This issue addresses the fourth question of this book: Does a context-specific approach to peacebuilding result in more effective adaptations? What matters in thinking about this question is “whose context” and “effective for whom.” There is a significant division between the government actors and the vulnerable populations in South Sudan. The context and effectiveness need to be discussed while paying attention to this division.

As far as the South Sudanese government is concerned, China’s top-down adaptation mentioned above was perceived effective in sustaining peace. In the words of the South Sudanese ambassador to Kenya, James Morgan, China’s conflict mediation is regarded as highly effective because of its nondeterministic approach, customized to the South Sudanese government’s needs:

In mediation, [Chinese actors] feel that the mediation or the agreement must come from the people of South Sudan themselves. China stood with us when other countries even wanted to impose sanctions. Sanctions never solve any problems. You can never solve a problem with creating another problem. When Western countries wanted to impose individual targeted sanctions on the leaders of South Sudan, or arms embargos on the government of South Sudan, China—in the UNSC—has been very straightforward by saying ‘This cannot be, and this cannot bring peace.’ When you sanction the government, the rebels will have an upper hand in the conflict. So, what will happen? It will be a continuation of war without end. This is where the people and the government of South Sudan feel that China is a friend—not only a friend, but also a friend in deed and a friend in need. (Morgan 2018)

China’s nondeterministic approach to the South Sudanese government has led to a somewhat effective adaptation—“somewhat” in the sense that China’s pressure on the South Sudanese government led to an agreement for a unity government—but the agreement is still fragile. In contrast, the adaptation has not been felt by the vulnerable populations, according to interviews with civil society actors and refugees. China’s deterministic approach to the vulnerable in South Sudan still led to ineffective adaptation—ineffective because China’s assistance is mainly delivered to the national government and does not necessarily reach the vulnerable. It does not empower local agencies to fully participate in the decision-making process—the key gap between the Chinese approach and the South Sudanese people’s perceptions of peacebuilding by China.

Conclusions

The argument in this chapter is threefold. Firstly, while the Chinese government’s approaches to peacebuilding allow for the possibility of making it locally context-specific, its application is only extended to the South Sudanese government. With regard to the vulnerable population in South Sudan, China’s peacebuilding remains deterministic. To elaborate further, one major difficulty present during research is the huge diversity on the ground. The word “local” does not capture the complexity of South Sudan. Dichotomizing the “local” into the elites and the vulnerable does not justify the analysis either. However, during the interviews, a recurring theme to emerge from the answers of the interviewees was that the Chinese are paying attention to the powerful, and not to the vulnerable. No matter how simplistic that might sound, this is the perception of the South Sudanese people (elites and the vulnerable), and the analysis made in this chapter confirms that.

Hence, to take this finding into consideration, this chapter puts importance on distinguishing at least who is the local, thus dividing the population into two groups: the South Sudanese government and the vulnerable population. For the South Sudanese government, China allows the possibility of a context-specific approach, letting the government take the lead in peacebuilding and providing support for their initiatives. However, when it comes to the vulnerable population, China’s peacebuilding remains very deterministic in the sense that China still relies on the South Sudanese government for the distribution of humanitarian goods, for example.

The second argument is to do with the concept of top-down adaptation. For instance, China’s peacebuilding efforts have been adapted to the local context to some extent. However, this does not necessarily derive from the South Sudanese situation but comes from a shift in China’s global policy toward conflict-affected regions, and the shift is from a sovereignty-centered, hands-off approach in the past to a more engagement with a flexible interpretation of sovereignty.

Last but not least, the third part of the argument is about effectiveness, and it includes two directions since the effectiveness of China’s peacebuilding approach is mixed. On the one hand, China’s context-specific peacebuilding has been effective in the sense that it has helped to form an agreement for a unity government between the South Sudanese government and rebel groups. On the other hand, China’s deterministic approach to peacebuilding with regard to the vulnerable population led to its ineffective adaptation. Therefore, the question concerning the linkage between context-specific approach and effectiveness must be further addressed in this part of the argument.

In conclusion, answers to the four questions brought up at the beginning of the chapter are provided. Regarding the first question that asked whether the local, national, or international peacebuilding actors have implemented deterministic or context-specific approaches to peacebuilding, this study found that the answers are different depending on which context it is being discussed in. For instance, in the case of the South Sudanese government and the rebels, the approach is deterministic, while in the local civil society context, it is context-specific. Also, while the Chinese actors operate a context-specific approach to the South Sudanese government and are deterministic to the vulnerable population, other international actors do the opposite. As to the second question that queries the effectiveness of each approach in terms of their contribution to sustaining peace, it was discovered that the context-specific approach was somewhat effective for the South Sudanese government in making a peace deal, while a deterministic strategy with the vulnerable population was ineffective.

Concerning the third question about their inclination to adapt, this chapter observed that adaptation in all aspects (conflict mediation, UN peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and development/investment activities) mainly derived from China’s global strategy, not from bottom-up considerations (“top-down adaptation”). In regard to the fourth question that asked about whether the context-specific approach to peacebuilding results in more effective adaptations, this chapter could not identify such a causal relationship in the case of China in South Sudan. This is because, even though China takes a context-specific approach vis-à-vis the South Sudanese government, China’s adaptation derives from its own global policy rather than the result of the context-specific approach. Context specificity and adaptations are two separate issues in the case of China’s peacebuilding.

For the policy implications, this study is keen to note that while China’s adaptation in conflict-affected areas is welcomed, Chinese peacebuilding needs to pay more attention to vulnerable populations. This also means that Chinese companies’ CSR should go beyond the current charity model, such as merely providing money to schools and hospitals, and address more contextual issues. In addition, the South Sudanese government should also recognize the importance of paying attention to their vulnerable populations, which, in turn, affects the legitimacy of the government. In other words, rather than being satisfied only with the Chinese contribution made to the South Sudanese government, they must become more attentive to the vulnerable populations and make suggestions to the Chinese government to also better the situation for the vulnerable.