Compact Symbolic Structures in a Futuristic Idea System

Abstract

This chapter briefly reviews the origins of the Chinese Communist Revolution as it pertained to the formal and informal leadership of Mao Zedong. It explains how this idea system, which predicates heavily on futuristic, theoretical visions, was constructed through an ideationally driven mode of codification. The building blocks of ideas were “fitted images” made by people fitting information into clear-cut, categorical codes. Creative numerical and metaphorical aggregations were also key techniques to generate components for thoughts.

Another thing I need to say pertains to the Great Cultural Revolution. I have made a mistake and created a trouble [闯了一个祸], which was the publicizing and mass-distributing of the big-character poster [at Beijing University]…. Another one is the letter I wrote to Tsinghua University High School [清华大学附属中学]. Yet another is that I also authored a big-character poster of my own.…The Cultural Revolution movement happened within a short period. June, July, August, September, and now October—only less than five months.…The period has been very short; the trend and momentum have been very fierce [时间很短来势很猛]. Even I did not anticipate that after the mass-pronouncement of one big character poster [at Beijing University]….the whole nation would be shaken [全国轰动了].… Every school and every kind of Red Guards have been formed; Beijing itself has three or four command centrals. When the Red Guards rush forward, they rushed over all of you [把你们冲得不亦乐乎] (Mao Zedong, “Comments at a Central Party Work Conference”. (October 25, 1966), CD. [毛泽东,, “在中央工作会议上的讲话” (10月25日, 1966), 光碟。] Unless otherwise noted, the primary data come from Song Yongyi, Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, 3^rd Edition (2002; Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press), CD. [宋永毅, 中国文化大革命文库 第三版,(2002; 香港:香港中文大学出版社), 光碟。])

China was effectively “carved up like a melon” by an alliance of Western powers in the late 1800s under the rule of the Qing imperial government. Coastal locations such as Hong Kong, for example, were leased to Great Britain in July 1898 for 99 years; in a similar fashion, Guangzhou Bay was leased to France, Qingdao to Germany, Macau to Portugal, and Port Arthur to Russia. At the same time, Japan was also repeatedly taking hold of Chinese territories, exerting its political and military might in the areas encompassing Korea, Manchuria, Jinan, Shanghai, Nanking, and Taiwan (Formosa).

The Chinese Communist Movement—as well as the Communist Party of China (CPC)—was founded in 1921 by Li Dazhao [李大钊] and Chen Duxiu [陈独秀] with the French concession of Shanghai, several years after the Russian Revolution (1917–1918). The CPC had initially collaborated with the Nationalist Party (also known as Kuomintang or Guomindang), which arose as one of the indigenous resistance movements against foreign occupation. In 1927, the Nationalist Party, led by Chiang Kai-Shek [蔣介石] (also translated as Jiang Jieshi), turned against the Communists. The Communists suffered significant military setbacks in the years that followed; the loss was signified by their eventual forced retreat to a remote countryside area called Yan’an, between 1934 and 1935. During this now legendary 6000-mile “Long March,” the Communists had to escape amidst the Nationalists’ aggressive military campaigns; the Communist troops were reduced from approximately 80,000 to 10,000. The Long March also established Mao Zedong [毛泽东] and Zhu De [朱德] as the main leaders of the movement. ¹ During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), the Communists collaborated with the Nationalists, which were supported by the United States, to combat the Japanese forces in China. During that time, the Communists gained significantly in power and popularity, which laid the groundwork for defeating the Nationalists when the Chinese Civil War commenced in 1946.

While the Nationalist Party had appeared to dominate much of the domestic political scene from 1928 until 1949 (when its forces were defeated by the Communists and then retreated to a territory now known as Taiwan), in reality the divided China was ruled by different factions of juntas—a state of warlordism [军阀主义]. Corruption, uncertainty, material deprivation, food shortages, and war pervaded China during that warlordist era. When the CPC defeated the Nationalist Party during the 1946–1949 conflict and founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, it was the first time that the nation’s political power was visibly consolidated by a unified group of indigenous leaders. The nation of “New China” was born. During the initial phase of New China, the CPC represented a party that brought peace and ended much of the endemic corruption.

The Mao Era refers to the period 1949–1976, from the time the PRC was founded to the time that Mao died. The Mao Era is so named because—even though Mao receded from the political center for several years after the failure of the Great Leap Forward—he had returned to power, and his influence in policies, governance, and social movements pervaded from 1949 to 1976. Because in this book we are primarily interested in idea systems and their activation and operation, we therefore focus on a restricted set of events and campaigns during Mao’s rule (see Table 8.1). The history of this period is unsettled, with obvious divides between Western and Chinese accounts. The timeline is not meant to be comprehensive; it is intended to anchor the reader’s attention to the chronology of events to be discussed in the following chapters. To further organize the listing, I divide the Mao Era into six phases in Table 8.1. Each phase marks a certain cohesive dynamic, which faces a significant transition as it moves onto another phase.²

Table 8.1 A timeline of selected campaigns and events during the Mao Era, in five phases

The first phase is between 1949 and 1952, a period of initial consolidation. Along with eradicating the problems of prostitution, civil disorder, and inflation in the cities, the PRC carried out a Land Reform campaign (1950–1952) in rural areas. Modeled after earlier experiments in Communist-occupied villages, the land reform essentially redistributed land ownership from the landlord class to the peasants. In addition, approximately one million landlords were executed. The New Marriage Law [新婚姻法] was passed on May 1, 1950, which eradicated arranged and forced marriage, as well as the concubine system. Concomitantly, Mao initiated the Three Antis (1951) and Five Antis (1952) campaigns³ [三反五反运动] to eradicate the problems caused by government officials and the urban-capitalist class, respectively. The “Three Antis” pertained to the issues of government corruption [贪污], waste [浪费], and bureaucratism [官僚主义]. The “Five Antis” targeted bribery [行贿], theft or fraudulent acquisition of state property [盗骗国家财产], stealing and evasion of taxes [偷税漏税], defrauding and cheating on government contracts [偷工减料], and stealing the state’s economic information [盗窃国家经济情报]. Additionally, a Thought Reform movement (1951–1952) was initiated to target the intellectual class. While intellectuals were deemed to be valuable resources for a country in which most people were still illiterate, it was believed that many did not hold the values needed in order to appropriately serve the country in revolution. Therefore, many of them were sent to special schools and camps for thought remolding, in addition to being subject to various struggle and public criticism sessions.

The period 1953–1957 can be characterized as the second phase of the revolutionized China. This was the period when the first Five-Year Plan was developed. Collectivization was gradually implemented in the countryside, in which peasants at first combined their lands to work on larger fields—forming small-scale cooperatives. Income greatly equalized as peasants were largely paid based on their labor input; peasants were also allowed to cultivate private lots alongside their activities in the cooperatives. In terms of his ideological program, Mao launched the Hundred Flowers movement in 1956–1957. The movement initially encouraged everyone to candidly voice opinions and input on party policies, based on the idea of ‘letting a hundred flowers bloom.’ However, within only a year, the campaign was abruptly terminated, followed by an Anti-Rightist movement starting in 1957. Dissidents who had spoken out were punished, imprisoned, and silenced. The abrupt policy change was cast by Mao as a means to “entice the snakes out of their caves.”

The third phase of the revolutionary years can be considered as the significant, bold measures taken by Mao with the intention of boosting China’s development, which then experienced significant setbacks. This phase spans the years of the Great Leap Forward movement being launched in 1958, followed by one or two years of massive policy setbacks. The target of the Great Leap Forward campaign was intended to explosively accelerate the country’s productivity and technology, a popular slogan being to catch up and surpass the United Kingdom within 15 years. It was believed by Mao that total collective mobilization in China toward audacious reform in production could achieve this aim. By 1958, small-scale cooperatives were abolished and merged into large-scale communes operated by the state. In these communes, the peasants were mobilized to work night and day to practice innovative agricultural efforts as directed by the party officials. In order to stimulate mechanization and industrialization, the campaign also directed the population to collect scrap pieces of metal to create steel in “backyard furnaces.”

The campaign failed miserably. Most experimental practices simply fell flat, and they diverted much-needed energy toward projects that were completely unproductive. Severely aggravating the situation were the widespread behaviors of government officials in concealing uncomfortable information, fabricating facts, scapegoating enemies, and disallowing deviation and nonparticipation. Although many Great Leap Forward policies were moderated or even abandoned by 1959—that is to say, in around a year’s time after the campaign was launched—the efforts proved to be too late to prevent nationwide devastation. The exact statistics are hard to compile and are now the subject of intense debate.⁴ However, more than 20 million people allegedly died, and industrial production declined by around 40% during the “Three Difficult Years” of 1958–1960. These damages were intermixed with and compounded by the major natural disasters of floods and droughts during these troubled years. While a still influential cultural figure, Mao lost a significant amount of power inside the Party. After the historic Lushan Conference in summer 1959, Defense Minister Peng Dehuai [彭德怀] was, more or less, indicted and purged following his open attack on Mao and the Great Leap Forward policies. He was replaced by Lin Biao as defense minister. Two months later, Mao himself stepped down as PRC chairman as a result of the situation. Although Mao retained his chairman position in the CPC, Liu Shaoqi—Mao’s informal heir—succeeded Mao as the government’s new chairman.

The fourth phase is 1961–1965, after Mao receded into the political backstage and then reemerged from it with renewed grassroots and political support. Liu Shaoqi, along with Deng Xiaoping, reversed many of the Great Leap Forward policies and programs after they took power.⁵ Agricultural and industrial productivity recovered and rose rapidly within a few years under new economic reforms, though inequality also rose visibly between 1961 and 1965.⁶ While new economic reforms took hold under the new leadership of the CPC, Mao cultivated new allies and support from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which was largely operated and controlled by civilians rather than by state bureaucrats. He launched a state-supported Socialist Education Movement [社会主义教育运动] between 1962 and 1965. A special feature of this movement was that it often encouraged criticisms of anti-revolutionary tendencies and behaviors of not only intellectuals, but also leading Party members and officials. To counteract the state bureaucrats (most markedly Liu Shaoqi) who seem to have been traveling on a capitalist road, the Socialist Education campaign glorified the revolutionary spirit of the Red Army, including a Learn from the Red Army [向红军学习] campaign in early 1963.⁷ A critical figure in the PLA who collaborated with Mao was Lin Biao, who orchestrated the publication of the famous “Little Red Book”—a pocket-size booklet consisting of Mao’s quotations—in 1964. The booklet was widely circulated and used in both classrooms and informal study sessions. Almost a billion copies of the work had been printed within just a few years, along with 150 million copies of Mao’s Selected Works and an innumerable number of portraits, posters, and photographs.⁸

The fifth phase would be the first three years—the most turbulent times—of the Cultural Revolution. This period dated from approximately May 1966 with the “May 16th Notification” [五一六通知] to late 1968, when the PLA and Mao ended the turbulence. Essentially, it was a period in which Mao was reinstated to a position of power, and a series of campaigns were enacted to revolutionize the operation and everyday life of the country.

By late 1965, Mao had begun to escalate his critique of the Communist Party. A provocative incident in the fall of 1966 at Beijing University attracted almost 2 million young people to Beijing to meet Mao Zedong at Tiananmen Square on August 18 in an event organized by the Red Guards. Almost all professors were denounced to some degree, and some were killed or sent to labor camps. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping—denounced as capitalist roaders and counter-revolutionaries—were effectively removed from power; Liu was officially expelled from the Party in the fall of 1968.⁹ Shortly after the first Tiananmen Square rally, the Red Guards spread their campaign from the city to the countryside, from universities to elementary schools, disrupting political, religious, cultural, artistic, family, and educational institutions everywhere they went.¹⁰ Intellectuals, writers, and teachers were aggressively targeted. A drive toward cleansing counterrevolutionary elements and the “Four Olds” (old ideas, old cultures, old customs, and old habits) heightened revolutionary fervor to an unprecedented level. Books, artwork, and religious icons were ritualistically destroyed. Millions of people were affected by the violence and chaos—first carried out by a cohesive Red Guard movement, and then by chaotic, warring factions of self-declared, passionate revolutionaries; Party cadres also played their part when they fought for self-protection and institutional control. From late 1968, Mao, with the support of his revolutionary corps, steadily took over the government. By then it was also clear that the Red Guards were causing legitimacy and logistical problems,¹¹ and that they were precipitating intractable and factional strife. The Mao quote, cited in the beginning of this chapter, referred to the havoc fiercely ignited across the nation. At that point, Mao withdrew his support. Launching the “Up to the Mountains and Down to the Villages Movement” [上山下乡运动], in 1968, the Mao-controlled government orchestrated more than 12–16 million predominately middle-class city youths being relocated to the countryside, effectively dissolving the Red Guards. The reasons for doing so might also have had a strong economic pretext,¹² but the stated objective then was for those youths to “learn from the farmers” to be reeducated.¹³ Most of these youths were barred from returning to the city.

The fifth phase was from 1970 to 1976, which is characterized as a period during which Mao’s political power was resecured and in which he gradually ailed in health. Around the same time, China faced pressure to redefine itself internationally. While the United States had been an arch enemy—as partially expressed in the wars in Korea and Vietnam—the relationship with the Soviet Union had rapidly degenerated, from diplomatic cordiality to military tension by April 1969.¹⁴ Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai strategically formed diplomatic relations with the United States, which eventually led to the secret and official visits by Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon in 1971 and 1972, respectively. In addition, Mao permitted many members of the former Communist Party cadres to return to power, even apologizing for the harsh measures taken against them during the Cultural Revolution. Both of these actions were strongly opposed by Lin Biao, Mao’s informally chosen successor and one-time staunch supporter. Lin was systematically and discreetly disempowered from late 1969 onward and suddenly disappeared from public sight in September 1971. In July 1972, it was announced that he had failed in a coup d’état to assassinate Mao Zedong and had died in a plane crash while fleeing to the Soviet Union. For a brief moment in late 1972, Lin Biao was commonly defined as an ultra-leftist who was responsible for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. In 1974, Mao and Jiang Qing launched a “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius” movement [批林批孔运动], to urge villagers to denounce the two figures. Moreover, Confucius was criticized as backward and inherently antirevolutionary; Lin Biao—cast as a follower of Confucian thought—was additionally represented as disloyal, opportunistic, conspiratorially minded, Soviet-friendly, anarchistic, and “ultra-rightist.”

Factional conflict escalated between Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping (who returned to power in March 1973) on one side of the camp, and Jiang Qing and three other associates known as the “Gang of Four” on the other. Deng and Zhao more or less carried out the normal operations of the government, with Zhao gradually falling out of the scene as his health deteriorated due to cancer. Jiang Qing made repeated attempts to seize power, including forming cabinets and leading new criticism campaigns targeted at Zhao and Deng. During these years, Mao curbed the power of the Gang of Four, which aggressively sought to expand their influence, while also publicly criticized Zhou Enlai repeatedly, subjecting him into self-criticisms, especially during official meetings organized by the Central Political Bureau.¹⁵ Zhou Enlai died in January 1976; his national funeral on April 4 in Tiananmen Square—which Mao did not attend—turned into a spectacular two-million-citizen gathering and memorial, including vocal criticisms of the Gang of Four and public expression of discontent. The funeral was deemed a counterrevolutionary event and was broken up on April 5. Shortly thereafter, Deng Xiaoping was again removed from his position. Mao died in September 9, 1976, naming Hua Guofeng [华国锋] as his successor. The Gang of Four were arrested by the Party on October 6, 1976, which officially ended the era associated with Mao’s reign.

The Mao Era of 1949–1976, from the time People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949 to the time Mao died, does not have a unified history, and it is not the objective of this book to develop an authoritative one. This era introduces a pattern of keen interest for this book. The vision of a Communist movement was one of maximal liberation—of building a rich, egalitarian, harmonious society, eradicating suffering for all citizens. Yet, despite some positive outcomes and accomplishments in literacy, food security, foreign affairs, equality, development, and so forth, the Mao Era was also marked by recurring, episodic moments of chaos. How did an idea system rooted in liberatory purpose and proclamations also create the dynamic of chaos that, in Mao’s own words, had gotten “the whole country…shaken” as it did in 1966–1968? A key part of the answer lies in the unusual inherent quality of an ideational mode of codification; while the normal activation of this mode may be safe and useful, the abusive activation of it could be dangerous and uncontrollable.

An Ideal Vision as Preexisting Knowledge

The idea system revolving around the Chinese Communist Revolution, particularly the efforts led by Mao, was not based on the dynamics located in traditional folk beliefs or indigenous religion. Neither was it founded on established empirical knowledge. Rather, it was based on an entirely new vision—one of a total revolution to establish a social order not impeded by oppression in the economic, political, or cultural realms.

This vision of an unprecedented order, not realized due to existing arrangements, takes its form from what social theorist Karl Mannheim called “utopia.”¹⁶ The utopian vision was not baseless; the revolutionary movement imbued a theoretically grounded vision in the public, using it to serve the purpose of preexisting knowledge. This theoretical vision was certainly informed by the works of Karl Marx, but Mao’s original adaptation of Marx’s ideas was just as important.

Theoretical Contents

Karl Marx had initially theorized the eventual collapse of capitalism and the arrival of a highly advanced, classless society he called communism. For Marx, industrial capitalism, a necessary stage in the history of the humankind, would push human productivity to new heights, principally through the advancement of productive technologies, yet in the process also concentrate such technologies—the means of production in society—into a very limited number of hands and decrease the need for human labor. The increasing destitution of the proletariat class was, for the capitalists, at the same time a decreasing market for who they could rely upon to absorb the growing number of products they could produce with increasingly fewer laborers due to these advancements in technology. Such irreconcilable contradictions would become more serious the more capitalism developed—until the system would “burst asunder” and give rise to an entirely new one, in which all means and outcomes of production would be widely distributed to the people (via a government controlled by the proletariat). This society, then, is essentially “classless” because the “private property” among citizens is substantially equal; in fact, resources are managed and distributed akin to the logic of “communal property” observed in past communal societies—except the productivity is now considerably more advanced. Such a state of “communism” could reconcile the intractable contradictions in capitalism, delivering both freedom and productivity to the humankind in a sustained manner.

Vladimir Lenin had modified, or arguably “adapted,” Marx’s theory in one important respect. Marx had believed that a truly Communist society could not be developed until capitalism had reached its most mature stage—until it had proliferated across the globe and had penetrated virtually all locations and cultures. Lenin, in contrast, believed that a Communist Revolution could take place before capitalism reached such a stage. As such, a state like Russia—which was essentially an agrarian society—could initiate a Communist Revolution by having a group of elite, educated, revolutionary intellectuals (that is to say, the “intelligentsia”) organizing a vanguard party. This vanguard party would take over the state apparatus, thereby seizing control of the private properties and means of production previously controlled by a few. The party could then encourage rapid modernization by employing the most productive means, thereby rapidly transitioning the country from an agrarian to an industrial society. Eventually, such a state would reach a state of communism without needing to go through the long, painstaking years of letting capitalism develop and ultimately collapse.

Mao Zedong principally modified Lenin’s interpretation by his focus on the role of the rural peasants. The Russian Revolution placed its emphasis on the vanguard party, and it largely contained its ideological molding and remolding among the intelligentsia in that party. Peasants’ consciousness-raising was only marginally considered. Mao’s approach, in contrast, considered peasants to be pivotal to the Communist Revolution. As such, Mao attempted to conduct ideological molding and remolding not just among the urban elites, but also within the peasant class. Mao was generally skeptical of intellectuals or a vanguard party for their tendencies to be disconnected from the masses. His strategy was to bring in peasants to play a leadership role in the Party, train them in the practices of criticism and self-criticism, and symbolically convert their social status into practical, “intellectuals” of sorts—a kind that possesses the real-world knowledge necessary for social liberation as well as a history of physical and spiritual endurance. These ideas led him to attempt broad-based rural development, rural education, and rural-urban integration. Mao believed that mobilizing the peasant class would allow it to expedite the transition toward a highly advanced state of communism, much more so than the Russian strategy, which underestimated the potential resources and energy that could be offered by the rural peasants—the national majority.

Although other Party members’ and scholars’ writings were also read and discussed—such as Liu Shaoqi’s How to Be a Good Communist, published in 1939—the historical turn of events would show that Mao’s words had an incomparable authoritative status compared to the other revolutionaries. It was his vision of communism, his theory of social action, his definition of correct interpretation, his reading of controversial situations that became socially “incorrigible.” His thoughts rendered a specific Chinese phrase, literally “Mao Zedong Thoughts” [毛泽东思想], that revolutionaries referenced, and it was distinct from the body of thoughts of other left-wing thinkers such as Marx, Hegel, or Lenin. Mao’s superb ability to rationalize and theorize events, combined with his legendary role in history and personal charisma as well as the ritualistically evoked songs and slogans, was pivotal to the authoritative status of his interpretations.

While the revolutionary idea was very much rooted in theories and theoretical interpretations, the idea system itself certainly did not manifest itself in the form of dry theories and propositions. In both speech and writings, Mao integrated historical and theoretical insights to interpret current events, often mingled with incredible humor and provocative, poetic metaphors.¹⁷ His “whole” idea might be too complex to be truly comprehensible by the general population (excepting the educated intellectuals), but his “general” ideas were often circulated in snippets—frequently quoted out of context in conversations, denunciation rallies, pronouncements, documents, and so forth.¹⁸ What was instituted for most of the public was a sense of vision, a promising and theoretically rich image of the audacious communist revolution to be carried out in China.

Compact Symbolic Structures: Based on Fitting Images

Like the ideas related to witches, the ideas defining the revolution also take the form of mutually shared and enacted symbolic structures made up of information. Revolution-related ideas are also formed from coded information, but the epistemic process is less about clarifying the ontological status of empirically uncertain things that have purportedly already existed, like verifying whether people could indeed use ointments to turn themselves into werewolves. Rather, a set of hypothetical and idealized events, objects, and principles is often presupposed at first—and much of the aim is to realize these often not-yet-existing ideational constructs into certain arrangements. The epistemic process heavily involves showing and theorizing how a set of preconceived, quintessential codes could prospectively—reasonably, rationally, justifiably, and so forth—be fitted with qualified materials (people, events, things) in the domains of pre-coded information.

For example, does a specific person’s conduct generally fit the code of a revolutionary? In this instance, the image of an idealized, pure type of “revolutionary conduct” is first evoked; a thinker within the idea system then matches or fits that image with the concrete conduct manifested by a specific person.

The building blocks of the idea system, driven by an ideational mode of codification, seem to be heavily guided by various fitted images (or matched images), as I will shortly demonstrate.¹⁹

The fit with the quintessential, ideational images (codes) was recognized to be potentially imperfect. And if one set of pre-coded or coded information is proven to be ill-fitted for a quintessential image, another set could be sought to take its place. For example, if one revolutionary project is proven to be insufficiently exemplary of the principle of the Revolution—looking too dissimilar to it—another project can serve as an acceptable substitute. It is also recognized that the information itself is subject to change. For example, a person encoded as “revolutionary” could devolve over time; at the same time a not-quite revolutionary person could potentially be molded so that their behaviors and characters could become fitting to the ideal images. Ideals are the most pertinent to the operation of the idea system. The typical concept of empirical evidence in law and science—as in a referential grounding of ideas of being tied to a demonstrably stable, verifiable ontological status with coded objects, pre-coded information, and happenings—plays a secondary role.

These fitted images substantiate ideas in a different way than the case of witch hunts we have examined. Because the empirical referents are not presumed to be fixed but instead malleable, much more inaccuracy is permitted. The “falsified” empirical relations do not threaten the idea system in the same fashion. If “Satan” and his “witches” are suddenly revealed to be mere human fraudsters, and they confess in detail to all the tricks and malign deeds they had caused, showing how extraordinary things were actually produced, then the whole idea of witches and witchcraft—the entire code system of alleged empirical things—would fall apart. In contrast, the idea system that rests upon a set of idealized constructs could conceivably remain intact even if an original set of pre-coded information is proven to be somewhat “false”—such a falsehood could be rectified by finding an alternative set of pre-coded or coded information that is more fitting to the quintessential images.

What structures or structural components are the worldly objects, people, and events (as pre-coded or coded information) supposed to be fitted to? They fit into an overarching narrative about what the Revolution fundamentally entailed,²⁰ and where China had found itself at this point in history. The story of the Revolution, including with it the key figures and key episodes of challenges, was well propagated. The Revolution was an unfolding drama; it did not just begin and end in the past; it was actively ongoing in its mid-stages. The task of the Revolution could scarcely be considered completed so long as people were not truly liberated. A great deal of intermediary work still needed to be performed.

Philosopher Kenneth Burke had proposed a “dramatism” approach to analyzing accounts of people’s motives using a pentad of five concepts: the act (what was done), scene (when or where it was done), agent (who did it), agency (how is it done), and the purpose (why is it done) of human actions.²¹ We can use this model to systematically analyze the scheme of codification of an ideationally driven idea system built on fitted images.

Table 8.2 depicts the overarching narrative of the Revolution. This narrative, we must note, is idealized as an ongoing event, a story that while rooted in its past is still being written. The structure of codification allows various coded things and pre-coded information—in the past, present, and future—to fit into the drama. In symbolic interactionist terms, this drama can generate ideas that are highly meaningful. The kinds of “facts” (pre-coded or coded information) being discovered did not have to be extraordinary in themselves; but with the application of codes and subsequent connection with the drama, extraordinary ideas that looked egregious could be created, but mainly because they were spoken and depicted into being extraordinary. For example, the act of running away from or giving food to an enemy soldier when they invaded, or a random act of corruption, could be fitted with extraordinary meanings once connected to the narrative of the Revolution.

Table 8.2 Ideational codes in an overarching narrative of the Revolution

The Mao Era idea system largely operated by people eliciting local examples that fit with or measure against (a) the image of a nationally known example, or (b) the model idea as depicted in a theoretically legitimate text, statement, or analysis. In other words, the overarching narrative does not contain all the contents; the contents of the unfolding drama come from local examples that “fit.”

When Mao and his associates in leadership positions waged a new national campaign, each of them suggested the coming of a new event and a new scene, caused by some new problems and obstacles, or that a change in priorities or past interpretations. The masses were then to participate, with creativity and agency, in constructing the concrete, fitting images. The localized campaign experiences, then, became a critical part of the national campaign experience. Table 8.3 uses prime (’) symbols to demarcate how the overarching narrative represents an original form for its different components, whereas different localities were in charge of creating fitting images—variant forms—of the larger narrative.

Table 8.3 A basic model of an ideational mode of codification

To give a concrete example, Table 8.4 depicts the revolutionary moment around 1966–1969, when the public identity of President Liu Shaoqi became drastically redefined into an enemy of the people, which acted as a catalyst for various localities to execute the Revolution locally. There was only one Liu Shaoqi, but there were many who might look or behave like him, who might have sided with him against Mao, and who might also be in a highly comfortable position within the Party. Furthermore, how revolutionaries struggled at the headquarters was different from how local revolutionaries did so as individuals and collectives. In some ways, it was up to the local participants themselves to create their local versions of a revolutionary campaign that resemble the national, idealized one.

Table 8.4 Recalibration of fitted images after President Liu Shaoqi was redefined as an enemy during the cultural revolution campaign (1966–1969)

The principles of “informational density,” “compact structures,” and “justification” that applied to compact symbolic structures in Europe’s witch hunts also apply here, albeit in a different form. Rather than vivid details that would demonstrate the empirical manifestation of witchcraft, here vivid details people may provide about the matching imageries would be valuable for the idea system. Provided with enough dense information, the match ought to be self-evidentiary.

Rather than a compactness in evidence that would demonstrate a web of causal linkages, in the case of the Revolution a compactness in ideas among fitted images and their relations is more important. That is to say, comparing to a person who can only comprehend a single thread of ideas and express a few quotes by Mao, a person familiar with different bodies of revolutionary writings, various historical precedents and figures, and the profound connections among them activates the true potential of the idea system.

“Justification” primarily pertains to the fit of idealized images or ideas. “Proof” as an activity would be used to measure the level of deviation from the grand vision and narrative, deriving from such measurement one could then projectively theorize the causes and effects.

Clear Categories and Categorical Aggregates

Two features in particular were distinct about the revolutionary idea system’s operation: (a) the use of clear categories, and by this principle it also involved (b) the use of various categorical aggregates. Both features are pivotal in supporting inferencing activities that built upon fitted images (which form more complex ideas).

Categorical Versus Continuous Thinking

No society has been able to function without categories. But not all embrace the use of “categorical thinking”—at least not to the same extent employed by the Revolution directed by Mao.

By categorical thinking I am here contrasting it with “continuous thinking.” Continuous thinking is practiced to envision permeability between categories, such as those arranged in a spectrum. Continuous thinking incorporates probability into the core of its mental models, and it is tolerant of ambiguity and hybrids.

These two modes of thinking have their respective strengths and weaknesses.

Obviously, detailed categories have allowed, for example, biologists to classify different types of bacteria. But simple categories can be more useful in some contexts. Humans could process natural colors that have a wavelength between 400 and 700 nanometers, but their discrete classifications have enabled the use of simple three-color traffic lights. Morally speaking, without moral categories it is hard to even say what is “right” and “wrong” if they are just part of a spectrum of behavior, are “relative” to some other reference, or if every case is ridden with ambiguity, hybridity, and situational and perceptual dependence.

Categories often become instruments of symbolic rituals. In symbolic rituals, categories need to be clear. If categories lack sharply defined boundaries—being too flexible and permeable—then the symbolic, moral message behind the rituals would not be distinct.²² The extensive and repetitive use of labels—a set of quintessential images, functioning as codes—is a characteristic of the Cultural Revolution. It trains people to think discretely, sometimes even when the information and stimuli are mixed, muddled, or ambiguous. Discreteness, though coarser, is more prone to action. It is easier to take action against someone who is a discrete “capitalist roader” than against one who is perhaps a “49% capitalist roader.” Yet both representations could be created by the same information.

Thinking in categories is also dangerous. It prompts actors and institutions to encode information into already existing categories, thereby almost inevitably foregoing a large amount of ambiguity and nuances.

Political categories. The Revolution’s idea system implanted a wholly new set of codes—a new set of clear-cut political categories (and quintessential images) to classify the world.

Two major kinds of political categories were implanted. One is moral categories (related to moral categorization) which explain and specify the relations between the sacred and the profane. This is most obvious in the construction of classes of enemies in the Revolution. Another kind is instrumental categories (related to instrumental categorization) that facilitate the instrumental execution of sacred ends. This is exemplified by the types of pests that need to be managed to facilitate agricultural production.

Enumeration and gradations are sub-practices of categorization. They help to develop sub-codes within a code—or subclassifications within a classification—on the one hand, and streamline different classes of codes into an elegant, nonredundant, well-demarcated, and organized format on the other.

Enumerations are not simply the numbering and listing of items. Instead, as per Cartesian methods, enumerations of ideas mean a great deal more: they are “a partition of the simple natures.”²³ By highlighting the essence of a thought in its simplest form, it simultaneously contributes to clarity and focus. It establishes relationships of equivalence and differences (distinctiveness) between things. Moreover, at its best, enumeration helps to capture the essence of a whole, complex program without omission. In Descartes’ words, “in every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted.”²⁴ Therefore, when moral categories are enumerated and divide the world into discrete types, and when such categories were mutually exclusive and all-encompassing, it facilitated people to think and act according to narrated situations.²⁵ When enumeration is successfully carried out with a strongly moral doctrine, it carries a force because of its elegance.

In Buddhism, there are the “Four Noble Truths” and the “Eightfold Path.” We know of the “Ten Commandments” and the “Seven Deadly Sins” in Catholicism; in Protestantism, we find the “Five Solae,” and in Islam the “Five Pillars.” These concise enumerations signified organized, instead of random, relations, which automatically increased their legitimacy.

Gradations specify a hierarchical order. Throughout the Revolution, the Party classified peasants’ class backgrounds into rich peasants, middle-rich peasants, middle peasants, middle-poor peasants, and poor peasants, where only the rich or middle-rich peasants were struggled against. They had a higher potential for being exploitative, brutal landlords in the pre-1949 era. Those peasants whose family backgrounds had always been “poor” were, in contrast, considered to be from “good” class backgrounds. They were the previously exploited class, and after the Revolution they were given some exclusive privileges, if not simply respect. An easy way to envision a literally “revolutionary” change was to empower the “poor” or “poorer” peasants against those from “rich” or “richer” backgrounds. Regarding the classification of enemies, “historical” counterrevolutionaries were constant suspects; “active counterrevolutionaries” were targeted for prosecution, subject to varying degrees of punishment and confinement. Ordinary “rightists” who did not commit major misdeeds and expressed the will to reform might be subject to demotion and political study sessions; the harsher treatment was to commit them to reform schools (the “Laojiao center” or “Labor education center”). Those who were labeled as active counterrevolutionaries were subject to the much severer types of units (“Logai camp” or “Labor-reform camp”).

In the Revolution, except for those classified to be the severest offenders, most offenders were considered to be “reformable”—and some might even be depicted as “victims.” Thus, there was a system of magnitude and proportion built into the idea system, which was to control excess, enact “justice,” and ensure the actions taken toward deviants were “fair” and maximally beneficial for the entire Revolution (productiveness, distribution, class relations, etc.). Clear-cut demarcations made such systematic efforts much easier.

Aggregation

Whereas categories construct classes (codes) in the process of codification, aggregation covers a diverse range of processes but primarily involves the filtering and rearranging of both pre-coded and coded information toward the creation of new classes of “facts” (mental objects). The formation of such new patterns or objects (so-called facts) could then be used as “data” to substantiate ideas.

Before being organized as data, a pool of pre-coded information—even if it has the potential to support an idea—exists in a rather disordered, fragmented state. Until it is aggregated, it does not facilitate the development of crisp, clear meanings.

Aggregation could take many forms, from an elaborate investigative document embellished with numerous details to a one-pager or one-liner, or even to just a “score” or a “label.” In fact, a chain of aggregation could be developed, wherein an original lengthy summative document is summarized and resummarized until it becomes a crisp representation of a few key patterns or facts. We can see this in the cases of Anna Fessler and Urban Grandier, wherein a wealth of information was progressively “aggregated” by different parties. Aggregation is hardly a neutral activity; it involves subjective interpretations, and it is an activity in which filtering (legitimate or illegitimate) inevitably takes place.

In the cautionary stories about the Revolution, a case often began as coarse accusation or suggestion of a person fitting a category prospectively. In the next stages of the event, as people bring forth more “empirical” information to discuss the case, people aggregate various information into mental objects and propositions. Even though the discussion may involve “empirical investigation,” the key point often lay in whether the accusers could mobilize the new, fitting aggregate characterization to be accepted by the public or by the institution. Re-interpretation of existing information (including re-extrapolation of information) and new application vof codes are a vital part of idea construction.

Categorical Aggregates as Filters

Whenever clear-cut ideational categories are applied to certain aggregated information, a heavy filtering process occurs.

Table 8.5 depicts how a post-filtered revolutionary reality (Reality 2) is a much more organized and non-convoluted reality than its pre-filtered counterpart (Reality 1).

Table 8.5 Aggregate categorical filter and pre-filtered and post-filtered realities

At the end of the first row, the element “A” becomes emphasized and organized, because it has the most frequent appearances among potentially relevant factors, whereas elements that are fewer in appearance or have negligible relevance are either given a highly flattened, leveled representation (“0”) or filtered out of the final representation altogether.

The second row depicts a slightly more complex scheme. More than just the most frequent element “Z” can be included in the final representation; “D” and “C” are also included. However, in this case, an unfair distortion might have occurred by the use of aggregation, because “H” and “L” are potentially relevant elements that have emerged twice, but unlike element “C” they are excluded in the final representation.²⁶

Many organizations, including schools, businesses, and hospitals, use these filtering devices to sharpen institutional functioning. Individual students, business workers, or patients may have their “progress” assessed by the use of these filters. When they are functional, these filters expedite and streamline processing; when they are dysfunctional, they can filter out complex reality in a way that leads to poor or unfair judgments. But even in the functional scenario in which the filtering serves admirable functions to service the world of practical reality, epistemologically it is always somewhat disturbing to see Reality 2 treated as the only reality that there is, whereas information in Reality 1 is obliterated out of existence after Reality 2 is derived. This “problem” is not exclusive to the Revolution case, but to all systems of ideas.

In any event, the Revolution was designed to fit the world into ideational categories. Some forms of aggregation include certain truisms, idioms, slogans, or metaphors that could facilitate analogic thinking. There were also the activities of summative enumerations, assessments, and projections. In the European witch hunts, such activities existed, but they were relatively peripheral to the idea system since the empirical aggregation played a predominant role. In the Revolution, the use of these devices—with subjective judgment—was essential to the heuristic activities, and they were used—by the masses and institutional officials alike—in great frequency.

The Idea System in Basic Use

One example shows the general way in which Mao put the idea system into practice in practical contexts. We will use an excerpt from Mao’s remarks during a meeting in 1964, when he was conducting the “Rural Village Socialist Education Movement” [农村社会主义教育运动], which involved the “Four Cleanups.”

The Four Cleanups movement [四清运动] had a slight shift in its public expression. Initially, the movement belonged to “Small Four Cleanups,” directed toward (1) accounting, (2) warehouse, (3) finance, and (4) work points [清理帐目, 清理仓库, 清理财务, 清理工分]. The items sounded technical rather than political, but they were directed toward government officials in rural areas, especially corrupt local officials. Later, the campaign morphed into the “Big Four Cleanups,” focusing on “thoughts, politics, organizations, and economy” [清思想, 清政治, 清组织, 清经济], and it had larger and more explicit goals that went beyond the local level.²⁷

The forum transcript included ten points of discussion. The following excerpt reproduces five of these for an illustrative examination.

2. We have not engaged in class struggle for ten years. We did it once in 1952 and once in 1957. And these were only done in bureaucratic departments and in schools. This time we must carry out the Rural Village Socialist Education Movement well, using at least three or four years. I said three or four years at the least; it could also be five or six years. In some places, the plan is to complete 60% this year. Do not rush; intending to rush could have the opposite effect to reaching the destination [欲速则不达]. Of course, this is not to say that the work can be sluggish; a problem is that the movement is already started. Henan [河南] is too rushed. Saying that this movement is the second land reform; the depiction makes sense.

4. If a test point has failed; it is not surprising. The work has to carry on even if it fails. Special attention should be given to summarizing the lessons from failure.

…

7. The ox ghosts and snake spirits should be let out. Them coming out halfway would still not work; they would retrieve back to where they were. …

…

9. (Some people say that university professors go to the countryside to carry out the four cleanups, saying that they did not know anything.) The intellectuals (or “knowledge elements”) actually have the least amount of knowledge. Now that they have admitted defeat. Professors are not as good as students, and students are not as good as peasants.

10. Others have handed over their machine guns, so let’s stop arresting them. Arresting them is to pass on the contradictions to the higher ups. The higher ups do not understand the situation. So it is better for them to be placed in the supervision by the masses.²⁸

In this forum, which took place in 1964, Mao was updating people on how to act in the new scene. First, he set a scene of “class struggle” campaigns, comparing them with the ones in 1952 and 1957. Loosely defined, class struggles of all kinds had been instituted during the emblematic land reform era of 1950–1952; campaigns in the domains of journalism, culture, government, education, and the arts were encompassed. The 1957 class struggle Mao was referencing, I presume, was the Hundred Flowers movement of 1956–1957. Theoretically, the Great Leap Forward campaign between 1958 and 1960 could also be characterized as such; in an abstract sense, it was an effort to increase production in order to surpass the productivities of external enemies. But in this instance, the “class struggle” was selectively related to the pictures in 1952 and 1957, when the Three-Antis, Five-Antis, and Anti-Rightist campaigns took place. The imageries revolved around identifying and dealing with internal enemies rather than increasing production. The point of the aggregate statement, “this is just like the times A and B,” was to set the context and the scene that was the most appropriate for people to relate. It focused people’s attention to certain images and not others.

The use of numbers here is not meant to be precise. “At least three to four years, if not five to six,” was an aggregate depiction conveying Mao’s intention that it was not to be a short campaign that would end in a few months, that he felt that a good effort could not be rushed, or perhaps he was saying that in order to convey an intimidating impression for the cadres.²⁹ This time frame was so broad as to encompass the whole movement, but at each location the timing depended on the specific circumstances. Mao had said that it could be half a year in some places, and for some places the work would take much longer—and it took about that long to execute a reform correctly. ³⁰

“We plan to finish 60% by this year” was not a precise statement, even if it involved a specific percentage. How much campaign progress had been made was undefined, but it was a rough percentage in the view of Mao in terms of completion. It was not clear why Mao thought that it would need so many years to complete the rest of the “40%” of the campaign; but we could extrapolate from this depiction to mean that, in Mao’s view, substantial progress had already been made by resurrecting unfinished campaigns deserted in prior times, so that the works that had been performed in the past year had led to substantial progress.

The instruction not to rush—evoking the phrase “attempt to rush may work against reaching the destiny” [欲速则不达], a Chinese idiom—was generally wise advice. But he had clearly been displeased by the slow pace in other places, so he added to the instruction, “not to go slowly, as the movement has already started,” to counterbalance a previous depiction. On the one hand, there was a problem of the movement being stalled or stagnated.³¹ However, on the other, there was also the problem of the movement being too rushed. These opposite depictions, then, were meant to address both of his points.³²

Mao briefly approved of the current movement through the image of the “second land reform.” This was meant to be a sign of praise. The first land reform was deemed to be successful and instrumental. The image of the two movements could be similar: they were drastic, experimental, and had the purpose of removing a domineering class from power. It had a damning significance: if the land reform movement targeted the landlord classes, the Four Cleanups movement essentially equated some government officials’ deeds with those of the landlords. Mistakes might also be made, and the actions might seem extreme, but at least the intention, reasoning, and outcomes were generally valid. The scale of significance might be comparable to the first land reform for the revolutionary movement.³³

If one test case fails, then the idea that one should try again and learn from the mistakes was generally wise advice. The other expression also involved an approximation of sorts; it is an analogy to “ox ghosts and snake spirits,” another folk idiom. The snake imagery stands out more than the ox: Mao’s point was that if the target (snake) is not completely exposed, it would retreat entirely. The specific description expressed Mao’s view at the time of how events would generally transpire in the given situation, and people could comprehend the idea because it “looked like” it could conceivably happen.

In the ninth point, Mao made a general statement that intellectuals have no knowledge, and “now they had admitted to defeat” [现在他们认输了]. A few individuals with university positions admitting to ignorance could be the empirical basis for this. Such an abstract representation was not necessarily false, even though they could be depicted in other ways. But in fitting the information into these exact imageries, Mao depicted a situation of limited progress for the movement. The characters in the overarching narrative were re-specified: a reverse hierarchy—in knowledge and in revolutionary virtue—was depicted in characterization. Peasants held more knowledge and other attributes that benefit the Revolution than did students and professors, in that counterintuitive reverse order.

In the tenth point, Mao offered some advice to those executing the cleanups: if others hand over their machine guns, then let’s not arrest them [人家把机关枪都交出来了, 就不要再逮捕他了]. This is a peculiar form of imagery if it is applied to wartime, and it contains its inherent wartime morality. It presumes the point of the battle is not to kill the other person, but rather to defeat them, making sure that they no longer have the power.³⁴ And, without being stated explicitly, an overuse of power at the wrong time could have unnecessary, undesirable effects—most obviously, discouraging others from handing over their guns, thus uniting enemies that would otherwise have surrendered. In this case, Mao specified what the problem was: doing so would “[pass] on the contradictions” [把矛盾上交] to the higher-ups who were less knowledgeable than the masses. The meaning and reasoning here are very inexact,³⁵ but the general meaning is cohesive: for whatever reason, Mao advised people not to arrest officials who were removed from power. That was the point in focus. And the actions to be placed on such categories of people were also provided: for them to be “supervised by the masses” [放在群众中监督]. The details are not mentioned, but the image given is clear enough to instruct people what to do “in general” as a next step. Institutions could make a reasonable interpretation based on the bare instruction and then formulate specific guidelines and actions accordingly.

I admit to making guesses in my interpretive “translation.” The reason is not because of a linguistic deficiency. Mao’s utterances often carried a degree of vagueness that simply requires guesswork. The exact meaning was frequently unclear, with the statements often being so broad, so aggregated. Nonetheless, this is not to say that these statements had no meanings at all. The visual images in each statement were cohesively fitted into an aggregate form that could be vividly imagined. A whole movement, like live beings, was being recklessly rushed, was 60% done, that there were ox ghosts and snake spirits being enticed, and that the enemies had possessed and had handed over machine guns. These aggregate depictions could not be stated to be false or unreasonable. No matter what takes place empirically, what exact move or policy was being made, these details were to be fitted into the unfolding drama of the Revolution, the details of which were to be reinterpreted and redefined. Mao exerted his control through providing an ultimate interpretive authority for the ideationally driven idea system.

Enumeration

Mao guided the idea system using elegant enumeration. These enumerations were not simple empirical summaries. Enumerations helped him to achieve several ideational functions, namely to (1) focus diffused actions, (2) organize disorderly thoughts, including priorities, (3) clarify murkiness or contradictions, (4) unify a synthetic theme, and (5) simplify complex ideas. Enumeration brings forth the most relevant and essential aspects of things, organizing them into a concise order. While it is not a given, enumeration can render complex ideas into more easily visualizable, memorizable, and communicable forms, such as increasing the ease in generating posters and organizing actions.

The Party campaigns made use of enumerations to tie together several of the most relevant priorities. Although this is not unusual for any bureaucracy, when they were practiced in the Revolution, the enumerations were often meant to fit into the plot of the overarching narrative.

Take the “Three Antis” and “Five Antis” campaigns of 1952 as examples.

The Three Antis were:

• Anti-Bribery and Corruption [反贪污]

• Anti-Waste [反浪费]

• Anti-Bureaucracy-ism [反官僚主义]

The Five Antis were:

• Anti-Bribery [反行贿]

• Anti-Tax Theft and Tax Evasion [反偷税漏税]

• Anti-Skimming on Labor-Work and Materials [反偷工减料]

• Anti-Stealing and Cheating the Nation’s Property [反盗骗国家财产]

• Anti-Stealing the Nation’s Economic Information [反盗窃国家经济情报]

The first three items directed the activities toward the government. Once the movement was set in motion and the internal bureaucratic apparatus was shaken up and under control, Mao shifted—or more precisely—expanded the categories toward private entities. Doing things the other way round would not have worked as effectively, as government cadres could well protect private entities.

The Three-Antis were corruption, waste, and “bureaucracy-ism” (there may not be an exact translation for this). The enumerated principles fitted together in a specific way. Attacking “bureaucracy-ism” helped to retain the revolutionary movement’s legitimacy and spirit, righting the institutional priority. “Corruption” and “waste” were charges that were not exactly targeting counterrevolutionaries, but corruption was serious enough to warrant officials being investigated or even arrested or removed from office. “Waste” was a slightly lesser charge, but it carried some symbolic values when read together with other items. It conveyed an ethic of asceticism, contrasting officials whose personal or official practices were seen to be outwardly non-frugal. It also legitimized the movement to investigate financial and budgetary documents and records, forcing bureaucratic transparency so that wrongs and wrongdoers could be “exposed.”

The Five-Antis campaign also imbued synergistic meanings into the way that the items were arranged. Rather than individualized bureaucratic problems, they symbolically contrasted the general behaviors of some people who unethically maximized their profit or private interest and behaviors that considered, prioritized, and defended the interest of the public and that of the nation. And by placing the five items in the same “class,” they thus collaboratively form a cohesive mental image, with some interesting practical implications. The charges of “bribery” and “stealing or cheating government property”—noticeably milder wrongdoings—would then be struggled against alongside those who were “stealing or cheating economic information.” For the symbolic connection, a crime such as bribery would thus be suggestively connected to an international context (or counterrevolutionary context), warranting that the offenders be “deposed.” In order to avoid being affiliated with a crime of such magnitude, many private companies became incorporated, or they donated or sold off a large part of their profits to the government—thus transferring the means of production into the hands of the state. The remaining private economic enterprises became much more passive and tempered in their behaviors of profit-making, information-gathering, risk-taking, and politicking. The impetus to conduct trading with foreign or internally suspect partners, for example, might be tempered if they could be symbolically associated with “assisting others in stealing the nation’s economic information.” While the symbolic association is not the same as symbolic equation (a subject we will discuss later), the very inclusion into the campaign suggests that the wrongdoing warranted a great deal of priority at that moment.

Enumerations sharpen people’s focus on a clear set of targets that were easy to remember and communicate—and ideally easy to understand. The items themselves often provided inherent coherence and legitimacy. Morally speaking, some enumerated categories in earlier campaigns contained moral truisms, which, at least on the surface, were hard to argue against. Who could, for example, argue against eliminating corruption and waste? In such a case, it is difficult to oppose a campaign if it makes intuitive sense. And by being clear and enumerated, they add force to actions, helping to direct actions by agents of a moral community. And with a “classification template” being offered, institutional officials and the mass movement could enact more streamlined treatments—connecting moral ideas to ground issues in the same way, sharing approximately the same framework, and using a standardized set of language and classification schemes.

Instrumental enumerations had a less direct connection in terms of their truisms. They functioned to address more complicated and nuanced matters. There were the policy doctrines and documents that involved enumeration: the “First Ten Conditions,” the “Twenty-Four Conditions,” and even the “Sixty Conditions.” Such policy codes were complex, and they did not become memorized slogans. In other words, these enumerations did not serve the purpose of building fitted images the same way that moral enumerations did. They provided more concrete definitions and guidance—and by doing so providing a more concise, actionable course of principles to an otherwise broad organizational agenda. Akin to workplace manuals today, they sometimes perform a “checklist” function to ensure that the campaigns were conducted appropriately and thoroughly through procedural steps. Still, these instrumental enumerations embellished the Revolution with a neat, organized, civilized, and technical appearance. The simple nature of a rationalist appearance adds some moral weight—a form of “rational-legal” authority³⁶—to the actions, as it stands against the appearance of arbitrary actions.

Assessments, calculations, and projections. Communication in the Mao Era often involved numbers in assessments, “calculations,” and projections. These numbers were often vague numbers, hypothetical numbers, or target numbers. They might be “broadly accurate,” and they made intuitive sense, but their primary roles seemed to be to paint a broad-stroke picture, and then direct the actions taken accordingly.

For example, regarding the Four Cleanups campaigns, Mao assessed the progress as being too slow and ineffective. In a verbal statement,³⁷ he had used “annihilation battle” as a metaphor, and then contrasted this with how unnecessarily slow it was for people to use 40 days to learn about documentation before they enacted any actions:

how to fight the fight against annihilation? A county of 280,000 people concentrated on 18,000 people. After two months of un-opening, they learned about documentation for forty days…. I think it is a cumbersome philosophy. I don’t advocate that kind of learning. It is useless to look at it without doing it.

Mao advocated learning from experience. He stated an approach: “use one day to study the documents, start conferencing in day two, and make a decision in about a week’s time” [文件一天就读完了, 第二天就议, 议一个星期就下去]. He then cited a 21-year-old security guard of his who claimed that he had learned nothing during the 40 days; he found it more useful to learn about documentation for 7 days, and then started to learn from practical experience—the practical experience of working with the lower and peasant classes. All of these were somewhat hypothetical numbers that came out of abstract aggregation.

Another set of numbers Mao cited regarded the size of work teams. He said that having 18,000 work team members from a county [县] of 280,000 was too many. He asked:

Why not rely on all 280,000 people in that county—the good ones? For every 28 persons there is a bad one, but there are still 27 good ones. If there are two bad ones, there are still 26 good ones. Why not rely on them? There is no reason why 10,000–20,000 cadres had to take a full month, or even two, to work on a campaign and still for the campaign to be unaroused… If the people were relied on correctly, about 10–20 people are enough…. We did not carry out the Revolution the same way it is now…10,000–20,000 to work on one or two small counties—rain falling like buckets—and the campaign was still unaroused after several months.

This statement shows how numbers and general descriptors were generally used. He also described the specific situation as “cold cold clear clear” [冷冷清清], an expression conveying a state of desolation. Another figure he liked to refer to was the enemy being a minority. Two out of 28 were referred to earlier, and later in Mao’s speech he said that village members should be informed right away that minor cases—like “small thieves small pilferer” [小偷小摸]—are not the targets. The extremely serious cases to be targeted are the “extreme minority.”

In summary, although numbers and numerical descriptors were used, precision was not their feature, nor was it really the point. They were either an aggregated form of pre-coded or coded information to build fitted images, or they themselves worked as a form of fitted image to generate ideas. In the former case, imprecise numbers at least purportedly relate to a specific empirical reality (i.e., the domain of happenings); in the latter case, they related more to ideational, imaginative scenarios. In both cases, they give abstract ideas much more concrete footings, thus forming more solid fitted images. Mao used them creatively to re-specify and modify the unfolding narrative.

Escalation, Redirection, De-escalation

Mao used these image-like, figurative devices skillfully to escalate, redirect, and de-escalate situations. Already, we can see how he sought to escalate and speed up the Four Cleanups campaign. At some point, when the campaign took off and achieved results, he expressed his contentment with the progress through a metaphor:

The more corruption is uncovered the happier I am. Have you ever caught lice [你们抓过虱子没有]? At first there are many on the body, as you scratch and catch more of them the happier you get. [抓得越多越高兴]³⁸

At the same time, Mao had also urged restraint and slowdown for the Four Cleanups. He had previously stated that the efforts “should not be rushed.” He had also asked campaign participants “not to look for ants in places where there are no ants” [没有蚂蚁的地方不要硬找蚂蚁].³⁹ On another occasion, he urged that the campaign should stop after a certain degree: “The toothpaste cannot be squeezed too tightly. Some places only have 18 residing families; when there are no lice, must the lice be caught?”⁴⁰ He asked.

Although the Revolution involved many acts of brutality, Mao also emphasized the need to not to simply kill everyone or exert the harshest penalty possible. He had urged the Four Cleanups campaign to “leave an exit path” [留点出路] for people to come clean and correct themselves, and be reformed by the system under supervision.⁴¹ Proportion was often a part of the theme of Mao’s directives. The approach, Mao articulated, was always to unite the vast majority (95% or more) in a class struggle. For most of those 95% majority, they would merely need some persuasive education, and in the event that they had committed minor errors, they needed to “wash hands and take baths”; the bottom line is they should be mobilized to unite against the authentic enemy, which is a minority.

Mao had also conveyed a sense of proportionality to the general handling of wrongdoers, at least when he perceived an excess. Specific to executing the Rural Village Socialist Education Movement, Mao explained: “do not grab the braids, do not use the stick, do not put the cap on, and additionally do not chase or coerce, do not beat or scold” [不抓辫子, 不打棍子, 不戴帽子, 还要加上不追不逼, 不打不骂]. He added that as long as people honestly admitted to their mistakes and committed themselves to correction, “then count them into the 95%.” This again provides another sense of the figurative nature of precise numbers. He added a metaphor that those whose hands and feet are dirty [手脚不干净] indeed should be criticized, but “after a bath, they still need to work,” probably referring to the need to keep them for their usefulness in economic production, instead of incarceration.⁴² As for physical violence, Mao instructed: “Do not hurt (or injure) too many people, but a minority of people need to be hurt. A group of good people need to be rewarded and encouraged; a small minority of bad people need to be handled.”

Taken together, we can see how Mao used fitted images and figurative devices—not concrete descriptors—to urge caution and to instruct how to institute corrective methods. Mao also played with opposing imageries on the topic of hurting (or injuring) people physically—and by doing so he achieved painting a dynamic “balanced” picture.

Several years later, Mao continued to scale up the movement—up to the point of the onset of the Cultural Revolution. Many cadres were already affected; in fact, whole governmental departments had been paralyzed or taken over.

MAO ZEDONG::

The real four types of (rightist) cadres are only one, two, three percent.

ZHOU ENLAI::

Now the ones identified have far, far exceeded this figure.

MAO ZEDONG::

Exceeding is not to be feared, in the future vindication [rectification] can occur! If some of them could not work in their local places, they could be transferred elsewhere to work.⁴³

At that moment, even though it was brought up that the number of the rightists had exceeded his numerical target and depiction, it was not judged by Mao to be a problem. Vindication and redress were systematically built in as a mechanism since the early days of the Revolution. The idea conveyed is that not only could individuals be corrected, but—even if mistakes should preferably be avoided in the first place—the system could also correct itself if mistakes were made. At that revolutionary moment and situation, the course of action and its momentum were not to be curtailed.

At the onset of the Cultural Revolution, Mao gave a gesture to moderate the excess dynamics, at least slightly. Mao had criticized the vulgarities of the forms of struggle as lacking in content and being low in level. Regarding some ubiquitous posters on Beijing that said “Smash the Heads of Dogs” [砸烂狗头], Mao commented: “There are not so many heads of dogs; these are human heads” [哪有那么多狗头, 都是人头]. He further criticized the jet-plane stance used in struggle sessions. He publicly urged the comrades to be “more civilized,” raising their forms to a higher level.⁴⁴

As the Cultural Revolution waged on, it eventually demanded intervention by Mao to stop the ongoing clashes. This was most noticeable when the conflict at Tsinghua University came to a three-year stalemate between different factions. The two main battling factions were the Sky [天派] and the Earth [地派]. The episode was tense, involving 1000 people being injured, about 30 permanently maimed, and 18 dead at the university.⁴⁵

In a face-to-face meeting with some of the movement leaders on July 30, 1968, which lasted about five hours, Mao criticized them for fighting.⁴⁶ Fitted imageries were put to work. Mao said that in the Cultural Revolution, a “minority” of university students were not engaged in struggles—and if they were, they were struggling with each other physically [武斗]. Mao told the leaders:

now workers, peasants, warriors, and residents are not happy. The majority of the students are not happy; even those students who support your faction are not happy. You all have separated from workers, separated from peasants, separated from military teams, and separated from the majority of students [你们脱离了工人, 脱离了农民, 脱离了部队, 脱离了居民, 脱离了学生的大多数].

“Separate from the Masses” was an image that ran counter to the revolutionary idea of uniting the masses, participating in the collectivist ideal, rather than alienating them. Mao continued: “The masses does not like [to fight] a civil war.”

Calling them “little generals” [小将] who have committed mistakes, Mao suggested unification: “Hope you all won’t separate into Sky and Earth factions. Just create one faction, why the need to create two?” [希望你们不要分天派地派, 搞成一派算了, 搞什么两派]. But before he did so, he issued a severe threat. He announced that a national pronouncement would be made, whereby “whoever continues to commit the violations of beating up the PLA soldiers, obstructing traffic, killing people, or committing arson, would be committing crimes [犯罪]. If a minority refuse to listen and change, insisting against correction, they are bandits [土匪], they are Kuomintang [国民党], and therefore need to be surrounded, and if they continue to resist, annihilation [歼灭] will be executed.”

Taken together, we see step-by-step, escalated fitted imageries being laid out. Fighters who are “separate from the masses” were one image, but a more problematic one was “civil war” participants. At this point, they were still acknowledged as fighters among the revolutionaries. But Mao’s ultimatum was to redefine who they were, according to steps of severity. The fitted picture of “criminals” no longer classifies their actions to be revolutionary; “bandits” even suggests an anti-revolutionary image, and Kuomintang was an outright enemy identity. The threat to surround the enemy, and, if they resist surrender, then annihilate them was a battlefield metaphor used only against an enemy in wartime. Ultimately, several university movement leaders co-issued a statement that summarized Mao’s words, the interjective statements by Vice-Chairman Lin Biao, their own acceptance of the criticism, and their pledge to carry out Mao’s instructions. The whole episode took around one year to completely fizzle out.

Mao also subtly recharacterized or reinterpreted a situation or person, usually at a certain time he deemed to be appropriate, in order to moderate the punishment received by those who were struggled against. These re-fittings of imageries are more subtle because they sometimes still contained a re-criticism, but the new criticism might be milder, which warranted him to suggest an improvement of the treatment of such figures. To some old cadres who were removed from power from the beginning of the Revolution (in a minor event dubbed “February Adverse Current” [二月逆流] by Mao in February 1967, Mao issued a statement saying that: “Regarding all the old comrades and family members related to the February Adverse Current, do not criticize. Work on improving the relations with them.” ⁴⁷ This generous acquittal was possibly due to his own admission that many excesses were committed in the beginning of the Cultural Revolution—as expressed in the statement of “mistake and trouble” that opened this chapter.⁴⁸

Even if he was not sincere, Mao had redefined the priority of the movement—to move away from criticizing the old cadres. He characterized the Adverse Current participants as being people who might be re-formable—or even if they do not change, they should be tolerated in the new context. This “war” situation looked different now.

In a lengthy speech given in late 1968,⁴⁹ Mao noted that “In the world there is always left, middle, and right. If there isn’t a right, where does your left come from? Every faction is left, I do not agree” [世界上总有左中右。没有右, 你左从哪里来呀?没有那么绝。统统是左派, 我不赞成]. Based on this truism, he even left room for rightists, or those who participated in the Adverse Current, to be part of the “nine main representatives” on the conference table; among the left-middle-right division, they could represent the right. Although this sounded like an incredibly precarious position to take, in the specific context the main point was that more tolerance could occur, the treatment of those labeled “rightists” could improve, and that they still had a possible use inside the Party. He explicitly used the example of paying only 20–40 dollars a month to these cadres to be too excessive a punishment, rendering them unable to support their families. Deng Xiaoping was portrayed as unthreatening, and Mao used the expression “separate from the masses” [脱离群众] and “swinging goose-feather fan” [摇鹅毛扇子] to emphasize that he was not an active threat, therefore Mao expressed reservations about the call to remove Deng from office.⁵⁰

Mao reemphasized the general philosophy of rehabilitation and inclusion—that people must also be “accurate” in their prosecutions, using evidence. Even for the two individuals [翦伯赞、冯友兰] he named as examples of “big intellectuals” (or “big knowledge elements”) who were releasing poison [放毒的], Mao’s method was not to kill them. The first job was to criticize them, and the second to ensure that they keep their lives [一批二保], giving them “a bowl of rice” to preserve their lives [给他们碗饭吃] and then have them reformed by laborers, peasants, and soldiers [叫他们受工农兵再教育]. All these evaluations of concrete individuals had a symbolic purpose: these examples helped to create extremely concrete pictures symbolizing the appropriate action to subtly different kinds of people, with subtly different purposes, depending on the timing.⁵¹

In March 1971, a campaign had been waged to target Chen Boda [陈伯达], a high-level cadre believed to be in the same camp as Lin Biao. Several people had been severely criticized for being collaborators of Lin Biao. Mao reviewed the self-criticism statements of some main leaders. He declared that they were well written, and therefore what mattered was their future practice, which was to be observed.⁵² In his evaluative comments, Mao noted that some people had boarded a “ship of thieves” [贼船], or a bandit ship. The metaphor originated from a popular Chinese expression. The rough meaning is that one might climb onboard a ship of thieves by mistake, and by the time one realizes the mistake it is already too late as the ship has already sailed. This involved Mao characterizing that these people had been traveling on Chen Boda’s or Lin Biao’s bandit ship for a long time, and since then had “walked the wrong line” [走错了路线]. Although Mao still criticized these actors for making severe mistakes, at the same time he had created an image that provided a fitting reason to possibly excuse them from the most severe penalties.⁵³ This metaphor was found in several self-criticism statements, as well as a party policy document approved by Mao.⁵⁴ The Party document specified that even those “comrades” who had been “more deeply trapped,” who had “committed severe directional mistakes” after having boarded a bandit ship, if they correct their mistakes and “return to Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line,” then the Party ought to “politically, ideationally, organizationally organize them and trust them.” The bandit ship was an amazingly apt metaphor for the moment.

There were also moments when Mao used fitted images to clarify priorities. One example concerned the concern of “going through the backdoor” [走后门] around 1974. The problem was nepotism—people were using connections with cadres in power to circumvent policies and gain unfair advantages. Mao responded to a letter from a high-level cadre, notifying him of the concern, commenting that the whole issue was “connected to several million people.” He added that “among those who enter through the backdoor there are some good people, and among those who enter through the front door there are bad people”—a fitting image. And because the timing coincided with the “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius” campaign, dealing with this issue might dilute the ongoing campaign [有可能冲淡批林批孔].⁵⁵ A battle scenario was connotated, with the backdrop of the Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius campaign being the central battle at that moment.

The Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius project was waged by Mao’s wife Jiang Qing around 1974. In that campaign, both Deng Xiaoping, who Mao had repeatedly defended and who had risen to power since 1972, and Zhou Enlai were discursively attacked. Zhou was portrayed as being like a follower of Confucius.⁵⁶ Mao intervened when he observed the tendencies and directions to be directed for private power gain, led by Jiang. Mao instructed⁵⁷ people to avoid “forming arbitrary connections” [乱联系], specifically not to abuse slogans that could liberally link to problems and things to the Lin Biao line, and then “infinitely escalate them to higher plane” [无限上纲]. One such slogan was “Upward Hanging Downward Connecting” [上挂下联], used by investigators to expand their scope of investigation. Another illustrative slogan was “Having Routes Any Time, Any Issue, Anywhere” [时时、事事、处处有路线]—presumably meant that cadres had been accused of forming connections and cultivating routes with others—on anything, anywhere.

In that moment, Mao escalated his discursive actions toward his wife Jiang Qing, on several public occasions.⁵⁸ Creative imageries were used. Jiang was described as trying to form a “Four-Person Little Sect” [四人小宗派]—a concise number leaving people to guess who the other three were (which he later called the “Gang of Four” [四人帮]). Memorably, he said to Jiang Qing in a political meeting: “Don’t set up two factories. One is called a steel factory. The other is called a dunce cap factory, putting a dunce cap onto people at every turn” [不要设两个工厂, 一个叫钢铁工厂, 一个叫帽子工厂, 动不动就给人戴大帽子。]. The most severe criticism was articulated when Mao explicitly stated what he guessed her ambition was—that she wanted to be “backstage boss” [后台老板] who told a member of her sect, Wang Hongwen [王洪文], to be the Politburo Committee Chair and herself play the role of CPC chairman—taking Mao’s place; that is to say, thus controlling the entire political machinery of China. These vivid analogies were not merely humorous attacks. Such depictions would be utterly damning for any other person other than Jiang Qing, though Mao dulled the impact of the remarks somewhat by adding phrases like “please pay attention to.” These clear stances and image classification, made in critical moments, probably had curbed the most serious discursive attacks launched against Zhuo and Deng.

As we will see later, Mao was hardly the only one who mastered the techniques to maneuver the idea system. Many actors who were involved in key moments of conflict also vied to propose certain correct interpretations, assigning gradations, and those interpretations involved using certain labels. Mao was outstanding in his moral and political authority. Measuring by creativity and skill, however, Mao would meet his match.