Encoding the Prisoner’s Abuse Scandal

Abstract

This chapter covers part of the backlash faced by the George W. Bush administration following the successful ousting of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq in 2003: the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. It systematically documents how the idea system (which this book terms the “War on Terror script”) was rapidly activated by political actors from both Democratic and Republican parties to make sense of the events, even if they criticized each other in public political discourse. This chapter shows that, besides the Bush administration, media pundits, experts, and party politicians all shared a profound familiarity with how the idea system operated. Overall, the contradictions were largely managed well, as all unfavorable information was cohesively recoded by multiple actors to support the primary idea system.

This chapter showcases how U.S. political figures encoded a scandalous situation to the American public. In April 2004, graphic images which included specific details of ritualized prisoner abuse committed by U.S. soldiers in Iraq were suddenly exposed in the mass media. The information contradicted the previously cohering imageries formed by the War on Terrorism script and threatened some of the script’s core assumptions about U.S. righteousness. Republican and Democratic party politicians, who routinely vie with each other, formed different interpretations of the events. They carried out their contestations on public media by generating ideas that accomplished two objectives at the same time: (1) to reinforce and bolster the War on Terrorism script (partly by using old and new information to create affirmative streamlined patterns, and partly by speculations), and (2) to critique actors in the other party. These elaborative activities thus tempered the potential damage brought forth by the initially contradictory information. How these actors behaved tells us how competent they are at operating a mixture of both ideational and empirical codification.

Outbreak of the Abu Ghraib Scandal on CBS 60 Minutes II

On April 28, 2004, CBS 60 Minutes II hosted by Dan Rather aired an interview with Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt and other military officials. The program showed photos of Iraqi prisoners in various bizarre and degrading conditions. The first photo was of a hooded figure standing on top of a rectangular object and wearing a black robe; his hands, which seemed to be attached with wires, were spread out in a position that resembled a scarecrow or a crucifixion. Thirteen more photos were shown. A few of them depicted nude Iraqi prisoners placed in a variety of positions, such as piled up on top of each other or standing by the wall, and with two U.S. soldiers—one male and one female—smiling and posing for these photos. Between comments made by Brigadier General Kimmitt and telephone conversations with military officials and reservists, Rather mentioned accounts of Abu Ghraib detainees being intimidated with dogs, badly beaten, instructed to strike each other, and even raped by a prison member of staff (a staff translator).¹ U.S. soldiers were reportedly observing and taking photographs of some of these activities.

According to Army Reserve Staff Sergeant Chip Frederick, who was being court-martialed, officials from military intelligence and the CIA, FBI, and other government agencies regularly visited the Abu Ghraib prison where he had been assisting the interrogators. Rather quoted from Frederick’s letters and email messages at home, which stated:

Military Intelligence has encouraged and told us ‘Great job.’ They usually don’t allow others to watch them interrogate, but since they like the way I run the prison, they’ve made an exception. We help getting them to talk with the way we handle them. We’ve had a very high rate with our style getting them to break. They usually end up breaking within hours.

The information indicated that higher-ranking military officials intentionally supported and encouraged the abuse as a means of gathering intelligence. It seemed to squarely contradict the image of U.S. military as “liberators” of Iraq in the War on Terrorism. Dan Rather, as well as other journalists, explicitly addressed such a tension.

Early Codification by the Bush Administration

The Bush administration’s account differed from those of politicians from both the Republican and Democratic parties. But all their accounts had one thing in common: upon codification, the War on Terrorism script was not contradicted by the Abu Ghraib scandal. The U.S. Army was depicted as the initiator of condemnation and as the leading prosecutor of unjust events; U.S. responses served as “evidence” that only reinforced premises in the War on Terrorism script.

This response by President Bush to a reporter indicates the general characterization of the initially ambiguous situation:

First, people in Iraq must understand that I view those practices as abhorrent. They must also understand that what took place in that prison does not represent America that I know. The America I know is a compassionate country that believes in freedom. The America I know cares about every individual. The America I know has sent troops into Iraq to promote freedom—good, honorable citizens that are helping the Iraqis every day. It’s also important for the people of Iraq to know that in a democracy, everything is not perfect, that mistakes are made. But in a democracy, as well, those mistakes will be investigated and people will be brought to justice. We’re an open society. We’re a society that is willing to investigate, fully investigate in this case, what took place in that prison. That stands in stark contrast to life under Saddam Hussein. His trained torturers were never brought to justice under his regime. There were no investigations about mistreatment of people. There will be investigations. People will be brought to justice.²

Applying Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic pentad again, Bush generally characterized the abusive acts in the photos as “abhorrent,” disgusting, and unrepresentative of America; the scene where the acts occurred was restricted to the site of the Abu Ghraib prison; the agents were a “few people” who do not “reflect the nature of the American people”; the agency was “mistakes” and imperfections within democracy; the purpose of those acts was not explained and it was a topic needing to be investigated.

Bush himself not only put forth a depiction of U.S. response, but personally modeled and represented it, as America’s spokesperson. The acts enacted by individual Americans were a sensation of “deep disgust”—an automated, bodily reaction preceding reflective thought; at the collective level, the United States responded by pursuing immediate full investigations into these events. These activities took place in the scene of American democratic society, which implies a larger setting of the War on Terrorism given the contrast Bush made with Saddam Hussein’s regime. The agents of these activities were Americans as individuals and as members of a nation. The agency was legal and investigative, and the prosecution mechanisms were designed to find truth and justice. The purpose to conduct extensive investigations was simply the compassionate American desire to serve justice and democracy.³

An even more masterful repairer of the War on Terrorism idea system was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The following was his opening statement at a congressional hearing on May 7, 2004. It was a widely reported hearing, which addressed the prisoner abuse scandal.

However terrible the setback, this is also an occasion to demonstrate to the world the difference between those who believe in democracy and in human rights, and those who believe in rule by terrorist code. We value human life. We believe in individual freedom and in the rule of law. For those beliefs, we send men and women of the armed forces abroad to protect that right for our own people and to give others who aren’t Americans the hope of a future of freedom. Part of that mission, part of what we believe in, is making sure that when wrongdoings or scandal do occur, that they’re not covered up, but they’re exposed, they’re investigated, and the guilty are brought to justice. Mr. Chairman, I know you join me today in saying to the world, judge us by our actions, watch how Americans, watch how a democracy deals with the wrongdoing and with scandal and the pain of acknowledging and correcting our own mistakes and our own weaknesses. And then, after they have seen America in action, then ask those who teach resentment and hatred of America if our behavior doesn’t give a lie to the falsehood and the slander they speak about our people and about our way of life. Ask them if the resolve of Americans in crisis and difficulty, and, yes, in the heartbreak of acknowledging the evil in our midst, doesn’t have meaning far beyond their hatred. Above all, ask them if the willingness of Americans to acknowledge their own failures before humanity doesn’t light the world as surely as the great ideas and beliefs that made this nation a beacon of hope and liberty for all who strive to be free…We say to the world, we will strive to do our best, as imperfect as it may be.⁴

In this statement, American investigation was evidence to prove its moral superiority over the evil terrorists “to the world.” The investigations proved that “those who believe in democracy and in human rights” (agents) uncover, expose, investigate, and bring the “evil in our midst” to justice (acts) in the scene of the War on Terrorism. It also proved that Americans had a functioning legal system (agency), a character to “strive to do our best” amidst imperfections and the “willingness of Americans to acknowledge their own failures before humanity” (purpose). In summary, Rumsfeld encoded the prisoner abuse events in light of the image of U.S. responses; the scandal was used to affirm, if not to prove, the moral superiority of individual Americans and exceptionalism of the nation.

At this stage, detailed empirical codification was not being conducted, as further investigations were pending. But the very act of investigation itself was a form of information used to support ideational propositions pertaining to “good” actors in the War on Terrorism script. When questioned by Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher (Democrat-California) in the May 7 hearing on whether early internal reports about prisoner abuses were taken seriously, Rumsfeld responded:

Of course they’re [the reports were] taken seriously. They’re taken seriously. There are 18,000 criminal investigations opened a year in the Department of Defense. You would not open them if you did not take them seriously. They are the responsibility of the commands.⁵

The secretary’s deductive reasoning goes: if the U.S. military (or the Bush administration) indeed do not reflect a democracy- or justice-loving country, then they could not be so interested in conducting so many investigations toward the goal of prosecution. The very ways U.S. responded to the events therefore proved the democratic, compassionate, and just agency that America possesses all along. The act of correcting mistakes evidenced that the U.S. was indeed helping to spread freedom, justice, and democracy in Iraq.

The use of the aggregated number as evidencing data is worthy of note. The fact that there were 18,000 criminal investigations open every year could also indicate an alarming degree of moral corruption in the U.S. military, bringing into question the good and exceptional nature of U.S. soldiers and military officials. But in this particular instance when favorable information was scarce, this information was used to construct a fitting image of the U.S. military. The same “fact” (information) thus affirmed one pattern rather than another.

In sum, Rumsfeld exercised certain methods. First, to minimize attention to and elicitation of current information, thus rendering the epistemic situation maximally ambiguous (e.g., the role of “investigations” to ascertain the empirical status of U.S. conduct, as represented by its military institution). Second, to introduce many forms of other information (e.g., positive examples of U.S. conduct) in order to create “streamlined” patterns in accord with the War on Terrorism script.

With contradictions minimized by the methods exemplified by Bush and Rumsfeld, U.S. congressional politicians created differing speculative explanations of the events. These speculations fell within a parameter, forming an orbit of potential explanations. Even though they did not resolve the questions at hand, they all served some protective functions to the War on Terrorism script by creating plausible, competitive theories.

Varied Codification by Republicans

Every Republican representative showing up on TV programs reinforced Bush and Rumsfeld’s depictions surrounding the Abu Ghraib events, while adding elaborate articulations and vivid descriptions on their own. Four central points were being reinforced:

(1) Most U.S. military soldiers sent to Iraq were fine and honorable individuals and were not associated with the act en masse;

(2) The purpose and motivation behind the acts—while remaining ambiguous—were unacceptable and were against American cultural upbringing;

(3) The agency or instruments that gave rise to the acts were ambiguous and were to be rigorously investigated;

(4) Investigation and legal procedures were mechanisms that symbolize democracy, justice, and freedom; they were mechanisms to deal with lasting ambiguities.

In one of the TV interview opportunities,⁶ the Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee John Warner (Republican-Virginia) reiterated that the agency and purpose behind the perpetrators of the acts in Abu Ghraib prison were ambiguous—saying that there were “no solid facts.” Then, he resorted to evoking certain known knowledge—known information, or known premises to make sense of the scandal. First, the detainees were “held for reasons” related to opposing those forces who “bring freedom in Iraq.” Second, obtaining information by “means of cruelty” was “not a part of [U.S.] military history.” Third, the U.S. military was governed by discipline and professionalism, hence the revelation prompted “apology” and “total condemnation.” Fourth, the U.S. soldiers wanted to propel “the cause of freedom,” joining the military to fight the enemy for that motivation. Fifth, U.S. soldiers, representative of all children raised in the American nation, were all taught not to conduct such behaviors “at home” and in “schools.” Elsewhere in his interview, Warner described that “99.9 percent” of the soldiers were courageous and good. ⁷ By deduction, the president should be commended for being “the first to step in and apologize.”

From Warner’s aggregate figure of “99.9 percent,” one could deduce the “fact” the abusive behavior only constituted 0.1 percent (100 minus 99.9 percent) of all soldiers. Another Republican colleague reinforced his idea by citing two other aggregate numbers.

REPRESENTATIVE DUNCAN HUNTER (Republican-California): And I have seen that same Army lady now over and over and over again in those pictures. And the American people need to remember just two numbers, Joe. One is 135,000, because that’s the number of soldiers who are in that theater doing a great job. And the other is six, because it’s precisely six so far who have been charged under Article 32 of the UCMJ for criminal activity.⁸

Like Warner, Hunter evoked this highly certain piece of information that indicated a pattern—against the relatively uncertain, purportedly insufficient empirical information about the scandalous situation.

Tentative Idea One: Technical, Systemic Failure to Blame

Among Republicans, two tentative explanations were offered to explain the incident. The first group acknowledged that there was broad-scale “system failure” and problems. Senator Lindsey Graham (Republican-South Carolina) belonged to the latter type, acknowledging that there were failures in the “system.” Here are two of his quotes:

(1) I think that probably the core issue here is we just don’t want a bunch of privates and sergeants to be the scapegoats here. And I don’t want any political person to be the scapegoat. I think we are dealing with system failures. When you say this is a few bad apples, in terms of the values that we represent, these are a few bad apples. In terms of the million—thousands of people serving in Iraq, these are a few bad apples. But I think it’s clear to me that we had system failure.…⁹

(2) One thing I found from these photos, Bob, this is not hazing, these are felony-type offenses. The abuse is real, it’s serious, and the idea that a few rogue MPs directed all this, I think, is gonna be disproved by the photographs. ‘Cause when you look at these photographs, you see military intelligence analysts, maybe interrogators, present at the abuse situations, and it’s—present during the abuse sessions. So I’ve never believed this was just a few rogue MPs, but I’m not willing to indict everybody in the system until I have more evidence.¹⁰

Graham read into the clues of the photographs, seeing the presence of military intelligence personnel. From this information, he suggested a tentative, fitting idea—the presence of “system failure” in the U.S. military. This idea tacitly noted that the U.S. military system might serve as an agency for the Abu Ghraib events, a point of potential tension with the War on Terrorism script. However, he also subtly deflected such a tension. The deployment of the “system failure” metaphor was consistent with the meanings suggested that Abu Ghraib events probably took place because an otherwise good system failed; if the system had not failed, then Abu Ghraib events would not have happened. He further speculated the reason:

SENATOR GRAHAM: And what will we learn from this prison abuse scandal? Number one, we didn’t have enough people in place, they were poorly trained and it just failed. That prison failed. We need to get to the bottom of it to make sure we don’t let a military unit ever get out of that cont—ou—so out of control again, and we show the world that we’re different, that we lead by example, that we walk the walk, we’re the good guys.¹¹

In this quote, Graham specified some of the system failures as being a result of staff shortages (“didn’t have enough people in place”) and lack of training (people were “poorly trained”). The statement implied technical failure and not other types of problems (e.g., moral behavior of the leadership). And by modeling an interest to correct the system, he created a piece of information that fitted the idea that “we [Americans] are the good guys.”

Tentative Idea Two: A Few Bad Soldiers to Blame

The second group of Republican politicians, seeing the same photos, insisted that only a few individuals committed the acts, as a result of their own character flaws. They strongly rejected the characterization that the U.S. military system might be an agency contributing to the abusive acts in Abu Ghraib. Consider the following two exchanges:

HOST::

But you’re a military man. Do you believe that national reservists would go to Baghdad with hoods or dog leashes and actually undertake that kind of activity without it being devised by someone higher up?

SECRETARY POWELL::

I wouldn’t have believed that any American soldiers would have done any such thing, either on their own volition or even if someone higher up had told them. I’m not aware of anybody higher up telling them. But that’s why Secretary Rumsfeld has commissioned all of these inquiries to get to the bottom of it. What these individuals did was wrong, was against rules and regulations. It was against anything they should have learned in their home, in their community, in their upbringing.¹²

Secretary Powell denied the theory that there were instructions from higher up which contributed to the events. Powell—being a retired four-star general and a current Secretary of State—lent his epistemic authority as an insider to vet for this idea: “I’m not aware of anybody higher up telling them.” Powell also added a set of information that comes from his ostensibly personal knowledge, testifying what he knew of the general characters of the American soldiers—they should have been, and usually were, strong enough and good enough to resist commands from higher up. He used the information that “Rumsfeld has commissioned … inquiries” to evidence the integrity of the system and of higher-up officials. In the context of these coded “facts,” a normal pattern was established, and the few “individuals” are seen as exceptional to the normal patterns of the American institution.

Similar efforts to defend the system—the U.S. military system and military policy in particular—were represented in public statements by Senator John Cornyn (Republican-Texas), who characterized the violators lacking in discipline and training that were mysteriously missing: “This was a handful of American troops run amok and not acting pursuant to any policy that we heard about.” ¹³ Cornyn did acknowledge some technical deficiencies in the military system as possible agency—but those deficiencies were strictly technical, and not intentional. Cornyn’s theory emphasized the perpetrators’ own decisions and misbehavior (“acting on their own” and “run amok”) as the primary agency for the Abu Ghraib events. The military system and military policy as a whole were an agency to prevent the abusive acts in Abu Ghraib; the Abu Ghraib events occurred because individual soldiers broke with established policy.

Varied Codification by Democrats

The Democrats, like their Republican counterparts, also represented the Abu Ghraib events and the U.S. response within the War on Terrorism script parameters. Based on the information available, Senator John Edwards (Democrat-North Carolina), who ran for presidential primary earlier in the year of 2004, characterized U.S. troops as consisting of “thousands and thousands of men and women who put their lives on the line in Iraq and who are good, able, brave people,” and that the incident “is also damaging to them.” As far as critiques go, he said: “It’s disturbing that our senior military leadership…is not stronger and more on top of this than at least it appears right now they are.”¹⁴

In many respects, Edwards’ codification was almost identical to many of the Republicans.’ The main discernable difference was Edwards’ explicit emphasis on the “senior military leadership” as a probable mechanism contributing to the abusive acts. However, these leaders were not intentional agents performing the acts. By technical neglect—by senior military leaders “not stronger and more on top of this”—the agency that allowed the Abu Ghraib events to occur was created. Edwards thus indirectly agreed with the assumption that a stronger and more proactive leadership would have prevented the acts. He faulted the senior military leadership for not implementing the War on Terrorism project more properly and effectively than it could.

Edwards also evoked a snippet of information—the “thousands and thousands” of highly honorable military members in Iraq, which was an aggregate depiction common to an ideational mode of codification. Along the same lines, several renowned Democratic Party members also affirmed this information, depicting the U.S. soldiers as unambiguously good and honorable. Once this fact was established, they went one step further, depicting such soldiers as the victims of the scandal:

(1) SENATOR CARL LEVIN (Democrat-Michigan): I agree, by the way, with everybody that 99.9 percent of our troops are doing the right thing. What these actions have done, this leadership failure has done, is to stain the honor and the reputation of honorable men and women in the military and that’s one of the real tragedies, it seems to me.…¹⁵

(2) SENATOR DIANE FEINSTEIN (Democrat -California): Well, my reaction was disgust. There’s no other way to put it. I think the actions by these people, military people, really disadvantaged all the valiant military we have all over the world who are doing fine jobs.¹⁶

(3) SENATOR JOSEPHE LIEBERMAN (Democrat -Connecticut): It’s hard to tell. This is a very serious allegation that Sy Hersh is making. It must, like everything else about the prison abuse scandal, be investigated, and the search of truth should take us wherever it leads. That’s the only way we’re going to restore the honor of the United States and the honor of the 99.9 percent of American military who live by the law.¹⁷

The aggregate number “99.9 percent” was repeatedly stated, as well as the descriptive words associated with “honor.” The U.S. soldiers were described as “doing the right thing” and “doing fine jobs.” They were portrayed as victims in the Abu Ghraib scandal (and/or by the military leadership failure)—not perpetrators. The perpetrators might be, per Liberman’s suggestion, the people who dishonored the soldiers given the information available thus far; Lieberman’s critique of Seymour Hersh indirectly conveyed what he saw as the appropriate parameter for the discourse.

Seymour Hersh, a renowned journalist who wrote a public commentary critical of the higher-up officials,¹⁸ argued that evidence provided by a preliminary, internal document known as The Taguba Report:¹⁹

amounts to an unsparing study of collective wrongdoing and the failure of Army leadership at the highest levels. The picture he [Major General Antonio Taguba] drew of Abu Ghraib was one in which Army regulations and the Geneva Conventions were routinely violated, and in which much of the day-to-day management of the prisoners was delegated to Army military-intelligence units and civilian contract employees. Interrogating prisoners and getting intelligence, including by intimidation and torture, was the priority.

Based on the information provided in the document, Hersh made a reasonable, justifiable interpretation, without significant leaps and added speculation. Lieberman’s critique of him was the interpretive choice Hersh made—in that particular moment, given the available information, he chose to make a “serious allegation” dishonoring the U.S. and its military (and in the process chose not to encode the information at hand in the context of the positive “information” associated with the American nation). Highlighting empirical ambiguity (that “the search of truth” is pending) underscores the subjectivity in one’s sense-making. Making this interpretive choice—one that linked the acts to the strategic intention by military and intelligence personnel—and articulating it publicly was beyond the parameter of acceptance as deemed by Lieberman. And it was beyond the parameter of acceptance because it violated the core premises of the War on Terrorism script too heavily.

To the extent that Democrats were willing to critique something, it would be from angles that did not challenge the “goodness” (as in character goodness) of the American institution, including the military or intelligence institutions. The Democrats instead sought to imply that the Republican Party was ineffective in delivering such goodness.

Tentative Idea One: Critiquing Anonymous Authorities and Administrative Incompetence

Democrats were generally more explicit in recognizing that the acts of prisoner abuse probably went beyond the scene of Abu Ghraib, that these disgusting behaviors were part of a systemic effort to obtain intelligence (purpose), and that some officers in military leadership positions probably gave the order to conduct such acts—or at least they were professionally responsible for the administrative climate in which the Abu Ghraib events occur.

Consider the following quotes:

(1) SENATOR LEVIN: According to the testimony in the Taguba report, and even the photographs that reinforce that to indicate some really strong evidence that this was an organized effort to extract information from the people who were being detained, to get information from them by using MPs to mistreat them in the way that they were mistreated, to soften them up. In the words of one of the MPs in the Taguba report, this is more than MPs misbehaving and conducting themselves in the despicable ways that they conducted themselves. This is, it seems to me, quite clear part of a pattern, an effort, to obtain and extract information for the intelligence folks. And they’re the ones, if in fact this is true, that have got to be held accountable.²⁰

(2) SENATOR FEINSTEIN: Well, I think this: This apparently, this degrading terrible humiliating treatment went on in more than one place. And I think that what’s clear to me is that there was not a strong chain of command. And the Geneva Convention was winked at. And that somebody gave the order that prisoners had to be softened up and someone came [up] this idea of doing it this way. Now, who that was, I have no way of knowing. But, you know, we have some problems in other places, as well. The important thing, and I think something we should know, we were just able to obtain the ICRC, the International Red Cross report, which I believe was finished in February and sent in to the military. And it would seem to me that very strong action should have been taken at that time based on that report. And that’s something that we have to look into, because the report documents some of the behavior. I spent the afternoon reading General Taguba’s full report, plus what are called the annexes of that report. And I think he’s really to be commended. He did a tremendous job of investigation. So all the dots are there. He connected them. And I think the next thing is for the powers that be, in the military, in the CIA, to take a good look at this and take the necessary action, clean it up, prevent it from ever happening again, provide the supervision, the command structure, that’s necessary to do that.…²¹

Carl Levin explicitly identified “intelligence folks” as part of the agents; the purpose of the acts was to “soften prisoners” and to extract information. In other words, Levin explicitly identified a select group of people higher up in the chain of command as possible agents behind the acts of abuse. Even though he saw “strong evidence” that supported his theory, he did not hold that the evidence was strong enough for a definite conclusion. Levin merely stated that “if in fact this is true” (i.e., if the intelligence agencies made an organized effort to abuse prisoners in order to obtain information), then they should be held accountable.²²

Similarly, Diane Feinstein interpreted from the information that some unknown, superior military authority “came up with the idea” and “gave the order” to soften up the prisoners in such a terrible manner. She further depicted that the policy environment—in which “there was not a strong chain of command” and “the Geneva Convention was winked at”—gave rise to the Abu Ghraib events. Moreover, she also cited the International Red Cross report as an informational source, which reported problems associated with the military administration and possibly with individual military administrators—affirming the idea of official negligence. However, Feinstein also indicated that she did not know the specifics regarding these problematic issues. According to her theory, the key to preventing future occurrence was through effective investigations, a proper “command structure,” and appropriate supervision. By stating that these actions should be put in place by “the powers that be” in the military and the CIA, Feinstein’s explanation assumed the fundamental problems to be fixed did not correspond to the characters of CIA and military leaders; the problems lay in their administrative competence—that they did not take “very strong action” upon receiving the International Red Cross report. She erected General Taguba as a model agent, since he conducted thorough investigations and connected the dots.

Tentative Idea Two: The Fault of Secretary Rumsfeld

Several prominent Democrats explicitly called for Secretary Rumsfeld’s removal, linking him to the cause of Abu Ghraib events. These figures include 2004 Presidential Candidate John Kerry, 2004 Vice-Presidential Candidate John Edwards, Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware), 2004 Presidential Primary Candidate and Retired General Wesley Clark, and Minority House Leader Nancy Pelosi. Two lines of argument were repeatedly raised. One line critiqued Rumsfeld’s leadership and bureaucratic incompetence—such as the dismissal of the Geneva Convention and the dismissal of investigative reports issued by IRCR and other entities—which led to the unnecessary loss of lives and honor of good American soldiers. Senator Tom Harkin (Democrat-Iowa) used the information of Rumsfeld having “pooh-poohed the Geneva Convention” as a cause of the event. ²³ Representative Charles Rangel (Democrat-New York) used the information that Rumsfeld “didn’t tell” the Congress and the president of the ICRC’s report as an evidential indicator of a deliberate “cover-up.”²⁴

Based on such information, Minority House Leader Nancy Pelosi actually called for the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld and the replacement of the president. In her opinion, both Bush and Rumsfeld should be removed because their faulty leadership had created “the lack of preparation, the lack of equipment, the lack of intelligence, the lack of knowledge” among U.S. armed forces, a condition which harmed the American soldiers who were risking their lives in Iraq. ²⁵ She stated in a TV interview that she made the resignation calls in order to protect the U.S. troops, whose lives were endangered and whose honorable reputation were “tainted” by the leadership of the Bush administration.

Senator Harkin also iterated the need to send a correct signal. He stated that Rumsfeld should resign “for the morale of our troops. I think if all we’re going to do is go after a few of the lower ranking people that were there, and not go after the ones up the chain of command, I think it’s going to send the wrong signal to our troops out there that the higher up you go, the easier it is to get off.” ²⁶ A voluntary resignation by Rumsfeld would help to maintain the “morale of the troops” as well as maintaining the “moral high ground” of America.²⁷ General Wesley Clark, another presidential candidate in the Democratic primary, stated Rumsfeld should resign because the action would remedy the U.S. image in the Arab world as well as promoting democracy in Iraq and promoting U.S. views “of the right way to govern around the world.”

When asked for why he would support Rumsfeld’s removal, Senator Joseph Biden (Democrat-Delaware) dramatically stated:

Look, Bob, this is a sad moment. I mean, you know, this is—I—I don’t care about Rumsfeld and Myers. This administration seems to have lost the clarity, its voice. I mean, what we need is the kind of moral clarity that occurred when the president stood on top of that rubble with the bullhorn and communicated to the American people he understood their feelings, he knew what they were about and he was determined to change it. Look, what—thi—this has jeopardized our troops. It’s jeopardized our mission. The rationale for us going in now has been we’re going to restore civil rights and human rights to the people who are in Iraq. What does this say about—what does this communicate to those millions of people in the Arab world and in Iraq who are looking for us to provide the moral clarity for their ascension into some kind of democratic position? I mean, it—it—I—this is so much bigger than Rumsfeld and Myers.²⁸

This quote shows Biden’s rationale: Rumsfeld should be removed because it was the way to maintain the moral clarity that Bush had established in the rubble of New York City after 9/11. The call for removal is not due to personal failure but rather institutional morale, image, and effectiveness. The resignation from a senior official would produce positive evidence about U.S. democratic character for the public in Iraq and the Arab world.

Policing the War on Terrorism Script Parameters

Figure 16.1 maps out the four tentative theories, which constitute a space of speculations that fall within a parameter of acceptable contradictions.

Fig. 16.1

An orbit with four potential explanations operating within parameters of acceptable contradictions (regarding the Abu Ghraib incident)

They were similar enough not to contradict the War on Terrorism script, yet different enough to suggest different solutions—with partisan, political implications. The first two theories proffered by Republicans did not implicate higher-up military officials and the high-ranking administrative officials, unlike the latter two theories proffered by the Democrats. Democrats, even when they suggested official resignations as solutions, tried to make their case aligned with the War on Terrorism script.

Republicans—with the participation of some Democrats—occasionally tried to suggest that certain voices might be exceeding the appropriate parameters. The critique of journalist Seymour Hersh by Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman was one example. There are two other examples of political statements that illustrated the contour of acceptable and unacceptable ideas. One example surrounds the speech-acts of Senator Edward Kennedy (Democrat-Massachusetts).

HOST::

Duncan, let me begin with you. Of course, you know Ted Kennedy [Edward Moore “Ted” Kennedy] came out yesterday and he compared the American troops that were operating this prison to those that ran Saddam Hussein’s torture chambers.²⁹ Do you believe today’s pictures, today’s events coming out of Iraq actually undercut his theory a great deal?

REPRESENTATIVE HUNTER (Republican-California)::

I think the American people are really upset about this bashing of America and America’s military which has taken place. And I think Teddy Kennedy has been right in the center of that… And those 135,000 people [i.e., U.S. troops in Iraq] who are doing such a great job need to have some focus on them. And so I say to my senator friends, let’s get off this thing. We have compartmentalized it. You have got six Army investigations on it. Those people are going to be the most questioned, most interrogated people in history and most prosecuted. Let’s go to the 135,000 who are in combat right now and help them.³⁰

Hunter was actively policing the War on Terrorism script parameters. The anchor paraphrased a Democrat’s comment that seemed to juxtapose the U.S. and Iraqi torture chambers—thus raising questions regarding the U.S. righteousness in the War on Iraq. That paraphrased statement itself suggested the idea based on ideational codification. In return, Hunter depicted the comment as “bashing of America and America’s military.” He further urged that senators should stop public critiques of the Bush administration officials on the issue of Abu Ghraib and start to help the “135,000 who are in combat right now.”

Aggregate depictions of information were used to build visualized images (coded things). For example, “those 135,000…in combat” were, without any other information, all doing a great job. And the mechanism of six investigations, without knowing how they are conducted, will be—without any empirical nuances whatsoever—“the most questioned, most interrogated people in history and most prosecuted.” So too was the depiction that the problem had already been “compartmentalized,” and senators should instead focus on the incident to begin to “go to the 135,000 who are in combat right now and help them,” implying such an act had not been done. None of these statements required exceptional empirical investigations, but they formed a coherent set of vivid ideas.

Another instance pertains to the Congresswoman and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (Democrat-California). Pelosi, who called for the removal of Rumsfeld as well as President Bush for their leadership failure, faced strong criticisms from Congressman and House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (Republican-Texas).

HOST::

Your counterpart in the House on the Republican side, Tom DeLay, said this: “Nancy Pelosi should apologize for her irresponsible, dangerous rhetoric. She apparently is so caught up in partisan hatred for President Bush that her words are putting American lives at risk.”

REPRESENTATIVE PELOSI::

Well, I totally disagree. I made the statement that I did, and I think with great courage, if I might say about myself because I am worried about the troops on the ground in Iraq and wherever our troops serve. I…

HOST::

Do you think that President Bush does anything well?

REPRESENTATIVE PELOSI::

Of course I do.

HOST::

What?

REPRESENTATIVE PELOSI::

And this is not about a partisan—this isn’t about politics. It’s not even about personalities. It’s about policy. It’s a situation where the clear and present danger facing our country is terrorism, and we’re in this abyss in…

HOST::

But where does he show judgment, experience and knowledge?

REPRESENTATIVE PELOSI::

I think he’s a nice person. I think he’s true to his religious convictions. It’s not about personality. I think we have to get away from that. Just because we think someone is a good person doesn’t mean that they are capable. And I have no dislike for President Bush.³¹

A parameter could be sensed in this exchange of words. Pelosi’s statement was characterized as being motivated by “partisan hatred” and, more damningly, “putting American lives at risk.” Empirically, it is hard to prove whether criticizing the Bush administration’s leadership and effectiveness would increase or reduce the risk to “American lives.” Ideationally, the idea could conceivably be valid, if indeed Pelosi’s motivation was one of “partisan hatred,” as DeLay tried to encode Pelosi’s intention. Pelosi defended herself within the parameter by also applying the War on Terrorism script; she immediately related her criticisms to her concern “about the troops on the ground in Iraq” and to the scene of U.S. conflict with terrorism. She elaborated her critique by recognizing President Bush as a “good” and “nice person” with “religious convictions,” just that she believed Bush was incapable—that is to say, incapable of serving U.S. troops well and incapable of winning the War on Terror. Like Bush, Pelosi encoded a set of information about Bush to illustrate that her ideas were also built upon the codes, assumptions, and propositions of the War on Terrorism script.

Overall, Democrats were distinguished by their unhesitating rejection of the “few bad apples” theory and in their acknowledgment of large-scale systemic failure and the probable involvement of some leaders in the top sector of the chain of command. Their arguments stretched the War on Terrorism parameters further than the Republicans—but without violating them. In the two rare instances when the border was breached, an interaction of policing and self-policing occurred. Ultimately, the U.S. politicians skillfully employed both ideational and empirical codification to repair the War on Terrorism script. Even as they attacked each other and called for each other’s removal from office, they did so by reinforcing the core assumptions about the U.S. political institution and creating various elaborative explanations that helped to reduce the contradictions brought forth by the scandal.