Keywords

1 Introduction

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious programme to connect Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks along six corridors with the aim of improving regional integration, increasing trade, and stimulating economic growth. The BRI comprises a Silk Road Economic Belt—a trans-continental passage that links China with Central Asia, Russia, and Europe by land. The initiative defines five major priorities: policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and connection of people.

While China and Russia play a prominent role in Central Asia, the United States, the European Union, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Iran are intensifying their influence in the area thanks to political, historical, cultural, and linguistic ties. These roles are changing, however, as China becomes a highly significant economic and geopolitical player in the region. Since the BRI’s launch in 2013, China’s economic strategy has been characterised by infrastructure projects, and by hydrocarbon and mining resource extraction financed by state banks. However, the strategy is now more diversified, with an increasing focus on the agribusiness and industrial sectors and a growing proportion of private sector investment from China.

This chapter analyses the phenomenon of urbanisation in Central Asia and its political and social implications. It will be shown that major cities have emerged as important economic and political centres, but that they are also focal points for ethnic and social conflicts which threaten regime stability. The BRI, while supporting sustainable urban development, does little to attenuate the problematic political and social consequences of urbanisation.

2 Urban Development in Central Asia

Urbanisation is an ongoing global trend. In 1950, 29.6% of the world’s population lived in cities. In 1980, this figure was 39.3% and in 2000, 46.7%, while more recently, in 2020, it reached 56.2% (United Nations, 2018). This trend is also apparent in the post-Soviet space, chiefly in Central Asia where urban populations have increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the creation of new states in the region. In 1959, city-dwellers accounted for 38.5% of the population, whereas in 2021 this figure had risen to 48.4%, with the population increasing from 9.1 to 36.2 million (United Nations, 2018). According to UN forecasts, by 2050 Central Asia is to become home to 100 million people, with over 55% residing in cities (Dankov, 2015).

The rapid growth of cities and urban populations in Central Asia brings both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, cities are drivers of economic growth and development, concentrating opportunities for businesses and people. On the other hand, urban infrastructure often fails to keep pace with demand, leading to a deterioration of living conditions and such problems as environmental degradation, a shortage or poor quality of public services, and the rise of disease and health risks. Urbanisation is becoming a major challenge for Central Asia, a region which is experiencing rapid economic and demographic growth. Today, the region’s population exceeds 75 million, with 48.5% living in urban areas. Urbanisation processes in Central Asia are extremely unbalanced, with some areas having many urban dwellers and others still dominated by rural communities. The population is growing fastest in major cities, which attract a high number of Central Asians. According to official data, in 2021 the region’s seven largest cities had 9.8 million residents, or 13% of the total population (see Table 20.1). Over the past 25 years, these cities’ populations have increased 1.5–2 times, with Nur-Sultan (Astana) in Kazakhstan being the absolute leader as the number of its inhabitants has quadrupled. The two largest Central Asian cities are Tashkent in Uzbekistan and Almaty in Kazakhstan, ranking fourth and eighth respectively in the former USSR. Tashkent is more populated than Paris, and Almaty has more residents than Hamburg or Milan.

Table 20.1 Population of the largest cities in Central Asia (1989–2030), million
Full size table

Central Asia’s major cities such as Almaty, Nur-Sultan, Dushanbe, Tashkent, and Bishkek will continue to expand in the medium term. By 2030, major cities that today have populations of over ten million are expected to have populations officially totalling 12 million, i.e. over 15% of the regional population, and almost 25 million combined with settlements around these new large cities. In fact, in 10 years’ time, every third Central Asian resident will live in large agglomerations around the million-plus cities.

The urbanisation and formation of megalopolises is a new phenomenon for Central Asia. According to the 1989 USSR census, by 1991 the share of urban residents in Central Asia was expected to fluctuate from 33% in Tajikistan to 57% in Kazakhstan, well below the USSR average of 66% (Census, 1990, p. 5). The region had only two million-plus cities, Tashkent, the largest city in the region, and Almaty, where the population only passed the one million mark in 1981. Most people living in towns were largely of European origin by the late 1980s and resided in small and medium-sized towns.

3 The Economic and Political Significance of Big Cities

Managing a major city is a complicated and risky process, and the emergence of Central Asian megalopolises poses a tough challenge to regional stability, chiefly due to their excessive political and economic influence.

First, big cities are centres of economic activity; their share in national GDPs reaches 20–30%. This applies in particular to Bishkek, which generates more than 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP, with the figure expected to rise in the 2020–2021 period. Second, specific features characteristic of the Central Asian political environments (rigidly centralised decision-making systems, etc.) mean that capitals have an excessive importance for their countries. In the post-Soviet era, no Central Asian country has seen regime change through conflict in the periphery. The partly Islamist revolt in Andijan, Uzbekistan, in May 2005 was crushed swiftly and ruthlessly, although the uprising was definitely the most powerful in the former USSR and the rebels enjoyed massive support among the local population. The December 2011 riot in the Mangystau Region, Kazakhstan’s largest oil producing territory, and the January 2022 unrest in Almaty and other cities were quashed with similar alacrity. On the contrary, the imposition of control by different political groups over the capital has served as a major factor in the political victory and establishment of new regimes, whether during the civil war in Tajikistan or the Kyrgyz revolutions of 2005, 2010, and 2020.

The problem presented by these large cities is inherent in their important role in Central Asia’s socio-economic and political life. Its leaders allocate sizeable resources to maintaining urban stability because complications invariably threaten the steady political and economic development of the entire state. As a result, regions outside the urban centres receive less attention, with their problems going unsolved for decades. This prompts more people to move to the big cities, further aggravating the issues posed by rapid urbanisation and ultimately forming a vicious circle.

4 The Political Challenges of Big Cities

By the end of the Soviet period, all cities in Central Asia with a population of over 350,000 were multi-ethnic, none were dominated by a titular ethnic group. During the three decades of independence, their ethnic composition has drastically changed. On the one hand, de-Europeanisation resulted from the massive outflow of non-Asians, while on the other hand, the titular ethnic groups gained ground through migration from the countryside to the cities. For example, over the 1989–2021 period, the share of Uzbeks in Tashkent rose from 44 to 67%, while that of Russians dropped from 34 to 16% (Census, 1990). Over the same period, the proportion of Kazakhs in Almaty grew from 24 to 60%, and that of Russians contracted from 57 to 25% (Census, 2011, p. 15). Some large cities became almost mono-ethnic, with Tajiks accounting for 91% of Dushanbe’s population in 2021, a steep increase from only 39% of the total population in 1989. This process engenders several problems.

The Fate of Ethnic Minorities: For a long time, ethnic minorities, including non-Asians, Koreans, and others, played a key role in the Central Asian republics. Not only did they help shape the urban middle classes, but they also played key roles in industry, transport, municipal infrastructure, and the social sector. In the post-Soviet period, many have set up small and medium-size businesses and have thus come to form the backbone of the business community. Minorities boast high education levels and living standards, but an issue arises due to broader changes in ethnic balance within the population.

On the one hand, the continuing contraction of minority ethnic groups in large cities hampers their sustainable development, as these groups historically boasted skills that proved vital for the industrial, transportation, energy, and municipal sectors. Many were employed in the education system, replenishing the professional workforce, or owned their own businesses and created jobs.

On the other hand, these cities face a massive influx of rural migrants who mostly represent titular ethnicities. Many of them are poorly educated and lack the qualifications they would need to get a decent job and settle into city life. Hence, they tend to gather in suburban slums, are underpaid, and have a low quality of life, resulting in the accumulation of social and interethnic tension fraught with the risk of social unrest. Under this scenario, well-off minorities may fall victim to the wrath of those rebelling under slogans of national, ethnic, and social justice.

Relations between clans: All Central Asian countries, except for Kazakhstan with its three expanding big cities, suffer from a lack of alternative centres of growth. Hence, they are seeing only one city develop, the capital, which attracts migrants from other parts of the country. In Central Asia, where politics is highly dependent on ethnic, religious, and clan solidarity, the number of people from a certain nationality or region largely determines the configuration of the political system.

As a result, a clan-based issue is emerging as a consequence of urbanisation. Central Asian countries are each largely ruled by a single dominant regional political clan, e.g. Turkmenistan is dominated by the Akhal velayat, and Tajikistan by the Khatlon Region. However, the capital-cities give a home to people from various territories, including those whose clans are not happy about the distribution of power. These individuals may well be tempted to try to exploit regional identity and mobilise political supporters for rallies and marches, or even unrest and military clashes, as was the case in Tajikistan where demonstrations in the capital, Dushanbe, escalated into civil war in 1992.

5 Social Problems of Suburbs

The ‘favelisation’ of the suburbs—that is, the creation and expansion of irregular or informal settlements—has recently become the predominant threat to the sustainable development of major cities. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the region lacked balanced urban development policies. The various administrations plunged headlong into the illegitimate sale or distribution of huge plots of land for private house building. As a result, in the 1980s, Central Asia became home to the spontaneous construction of settlements and country-house complexes, as well as the uncontrolled development of farming lands adjacent to large cities. This unplanned construction spree failed to provide for social infrastructure, and buildings often even remained unconnected to basic utilities. People hailing from rural areas who, for whatever reason, could not stay in the cities, inhabited these new residential communities. For the past two decades, most major cities have been surrounded by massive newly built housing developments, which continue to expand. An example is the notorious Adobe Belt of residential communities around Bishkek, where almost one-third of the city’s population lives.

The Stigma of Life in the Favelas: These suburban settlements are known for having a very poor quality of life, high levels of poverty, a skyrocketing crime rate, the absence of elementary utilities (potable water, electricity, and gas), and highly limited access to social services such as education and health care. This is home for the rural migrants, the poorly educated, and the unskilled who flock to the major cities but cannot find a decent job. Many get stuck there for years with the dubious status of neither rural nor urban. They marry and transmit this intermediate culture to a younger generation that is growing up poor, uneducated, and often without values.

Social Protest: ‘Favelisation’ begets a host of social and political problems, such as poverty and marginalisation, which in turn generate discontent and unrest. The example of the inhabitants of the Adobe Belt around Bishkek serves as proof, as they were especially active in the Kyrgyz revolutions and the accompanying looting.

The increase in urban population puts pressure on major cities to expand. This, in turn, requires proper city planning. However, the construction of new residential neighbourhoods, civic centres, and transportation infrastructure, i.e. roads, bridges, etc., is hampered by the existence of the suburbs, most of which are illegal, with land and property undocumented. With new construction projects comes the problem of moving the residents, as became evident in clashes with the police in the Almaty suburbs of Bakai and Shanyrak-1 in 2006, and Duman-2 in 2011.

Crime and Terrorism: The impoverished suburbs also serve as ideal recruiting sites for organised crime and terrorist groups. This is an environment where it is easy to find shelter, and where persecution is unlikely because the areas are highly criminalised. Criminal groups are merging with international terrorist cells that resort to extortion, robbery, and drug trafficking to obtain funds for their attacks. Numerous villages, settlements, and country-house complexes around large cities are in fact the marginalised and criminalised favelas of the twenty-first century, which often serve as a refuge for extremists and terrorists, and they seem to be set to grow into a potent tool for political struggle in Central Asian countries. Recently, the region has seen a considerable uptick in Islamic State activity, and special operations have taken place both in the city centre and the suburbs.

6 The Impact of BRI on Urbanisation in Central Asia

China’s BRI provides financial and technological assistance to Central Asian countries. Despite the fact that experts consider the Belt and Road Initiative to mainly be a transport, logistics, and industrial project, sustainable urban development is also an element of the initiative. China sees urban development as inclusive of modernising energy infrastructure, developing transport and logistics, and maintaining security. Major Chinese projects that contribute to sustainable urban development include the modernisation of thermal power plants in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; projects of construction of transport infrastructure in Nur-Sultan, Almaty, and Bishkek; and the construction of a high-speed road from Almaty through Taraz and Kyzyl-Orda to Aktobe.

What then are the main problems regarding the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative in local sustainable urban development programmes? First and foremost, the amount of Chinese financial aid for sustainable urban development is much smaller than the Chinese loans and investments that go into large-scale infrastructure projects and resource extraction. Thus, sustainable urban development does not seem to be a priority of Chinese investment. A second problem is the ineffectiveness of Chinese financial aid. Financial support is provided without risk assessment. For example, funding allocation does not take into account the quality of governance in the countries where investments are made. The local Central Asian authorities are corrupt and cannot guarantee the efficient use of funds. This is illustrated by the unsuccessful example of light-rail transit construction in Nur-Sultan. Third, there is a severe shortage of skilled professionals in the industry, transport, and utility sectors in region. This is why Central Asian economies annually attract tens of thousands of foreign blue- and white-collar workers from China and other countries for the implementation of new industrial and construction projects. This also means, however, that Chinese projects do not provide a solution to the problem of the unemployment of unskilled workers in Central Asian cities.

7 Conclusion

Big cities in Central Asia such as Tashkent, Almaty, and Bishkek are increasingly important as centres of economic activity, but also as focal points of political and social disruption and dispute. In the 10–15 years to come, Central Asia’s large cities are expected to keep growing, chiefly due to population expansion. Rural areas are overpopulated, with fertile land per capita at a virtual minimum and farmers forced to relocate. A third reason lies in the attractiveness of large cities due to the heightened economic activity and availability of jobs. As a result, hundreds of thousands of rural dwellers are moving to the major urban centres, particularly to the already crowded capitals. In the near future, infrastructure development will remain a burning issue. Two-thirds of the urban infrastructure in these urban centres, with perhaps the exception of Nur-Sultan, was built in the Soviet period. Managing social problems and political protests and riots, as took place in Kazakhstan in January 2022, in Central Asia’s large cities will be key items on the political agenda of the region for the next two decades.

As section four of this chapter has shown, urbanisation has led to a shifting ethnic balance in Central Asia, especially in the cities. A dwindling number of well-educated and economically successful city-dwellers belonging to ethnic minority groups are increasingly facing mostly poor, uneducated people from the titular ethnicity that migrate to the cities from the countryside. Movement into the cities has also led to shifting power balances between clans, who are confronted with each other in the cities. These ethnic divisions could lead to conflict and political instability. Section five highlighted how the expansion of irregular settlements around big cities generates a host of social problems, including poverty and a lack of access to basic utilities, that make these areas a breeding ground for social protest, but also for crime and terrorism. Socio-economic divisions in the cities could hence also become a source of violence and instability.

In the face of this scenario, section six offered some reflections on whether BRI investments could (potentially) have any impact on these trends, coming to the conclusion that so far, the influence of the BRI has not been able to mitigate the problematic political and social effects of urbanisation. Urban development in Central Asia should be stimulated gradually. To address the trends and challenges of urbanisation, the governments of Central Asia should gradually shift their priorities to urban infrastructure development and increase the absorption capacities of urban communities, especially by providing affordable housing and improving public utilities, as well as medical and educational services, for local communities. Last but not least, they should explore how Chinese BRI investments could better support these objectives.