Abstract
In his paper, “Kuhn, Coherentism and Perception,” Howard Sankey shows that Kuhn’s epistemology does not fit squarely in the coherentist framework, though some aspects of his theory are akin to that position. Sankey examines and then criticizes a previous work by Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen that argues that Kuhn’s work fits in well with a coherentist approach and with a realistic position in which the correspondence theory of truth is still defensible. I will not examine Kuukkanen’s argument here. I will only comment on Sankey’s qualifications on Kuhn’s alleged coherentism. In the first section I shall add some more details to Kuhn’s relation to the concept of “the given” that reinforce Sankey’s doubts concerning the thesis that the author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions fits in with a coherentist account of scientific knowledge—though I also agree with Sankey (and Kuukannen) that a study of coherentist ingredients in Kuhn’s epistemology would bring insight. Even so, labeling Kuhn’s epistemological views as either foundationalist or coherentist goes beyond his original point of view. I shall devote the second section of this commentary to argue in favor of this thesis on the basis of an unpublished lecture by Kuhn in which he discusses his convictions in the theory of knowledge—which agree with his attack to convergent views of scientific progress —and their connection to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
See BonJour (1985, 24–25, 90–92); the quotation is from 24.
- 4.
BonJour (1985, 88 and 24, respectively). BonJour goes on saying that there are some evident questions this conception must answer: (a) how to choose between alternative coherent systems?; (b) how coherent systems are related to the mind-independent world?; and (c) how is coherence related to truth? Sankey devotes a central section of his paper to question (b), whereas Kuukkanen deals with question (c). For BonJour’s full version of coherentist epistemology, see BonJour (1985, Pt. 2) (he devotes ch. 8 to (c), pp. 143–146 to (a), and ch. 6 and the first pages of 7 to (b)). His “systematic” version of coherentism (1985, 90 ff.) is richer than I can expound in this short commentary, however.
- 5.
See Sankey (2018, 6), and section 6 for a discussion of the option itself.
- 6.
See Kuhn (1962, 126). As he says in the “Postscript—1969,” “What I have been opposing in this book is therefore the attempt, traditional since Descartes but not before, to analyze perception as an interpretive process, as an unconscious version of what we do after we have perceived.” (Kuhn 1962, 195).
- 7.
- 8.
Lewis also provided a theory of the a priori—the “pragmatic a priori”—that let categories vary in time according to pragmatic considerations. A good analysis of his version of that classic concept in epistemology (and a comparison with other recent perspectives on the a priori) is Chang (2008).
- 9.
Lewis (1926, 252–253).
- 10.
- 11.
For a comparison of their respective positions, see Mayoral (2017).
- 12.
- 13.
A good discussion and critique of those alternatives can be found Hamilton (2014, 98–102).
- 14.
This is also Hamilton’s point in that regard; see Hamilton (2014, 102–103).
- 15.
I am not saying, for sure, that Kuhn’s epistemological views are the same as Wittgenstein’s, but rather that his attitude to the epistemological tradition at large is critical and he does not look for a place in it, which is similar in both cases. There are explicit influences, for sure, but a complete overlap of both positions is not what I am here arguing for. I am not saying that Kuhn is an orthodox follower of Wittgenstein’s writings, either. To what extent Kuhn reads Wittgenstein “correctly,” so to speak, or even carefully, is a matter for a different kind of essay.
- 16.
- 17.
See Kuhn (1991, 99–100); as he admits there, in “The Road since Structure” (and other places), he takes inspiration from Hacking (1982).
- 18.
- 19.
See, e.g., BonJour (1985, 22). Kuhn is not committed to coherentism in the same sense that Michael Williams (2004) says Wittgenstein is not (or not completely), either. That is, even though they assume the existence of some beliefs that are, as it were, essential to the normal functioning of a whole system of beliefs, whenever finding evidence for the beliefs one holds starts out, those former beliefs that are more essential provide support to the latter but are left out of that epistemological scrutiny themselves. Kuhn finds inspiration in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, as noted below, but he adapts Wittgenstein’s insights to his own perspective and vocabulary. For this version of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, see Williams (2004, 250–257).
- 20.
- 21.
- 22.
Kuhn finds support in J. L. Austin to say that, when inquired about how a given individual may know something about a certain phenomenon, a way—perhaps the most decisive and, at the same time, the most fundamental way—to answer is to invoke membership in a community of experts (“credentials,” in a more Austinian expression). See Kuhn (1976, 15–16). Again, see Mayoral (2015).
- 23.
See the details in Kuhn (1984, lect. I, esp. 18 ff).
- 24.
- 25.
- 26.
See references in fn. 24, above.
- 27.
- 28.
See Kuhn (1984, lect. I, esp. 3 ff.).
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Mayoral, J.V. (2023). Sankey on Kuhn and Epistemological Coherentism: A Commentary. In: Giri, L., Melogno, P., Miguel, H. (eds) Perspectives on Kuhn. The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 84. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16371-5_2
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